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Preface 
 
 
This thesis consists of a number of published papers and conference papers written between 2009 
and 2013 that constitute the chapters 2 - 9. Chapter 2 was published in 2012 and the chapters 3 and 
9 in 2013. Chapter 1 is the joint chapter where the key themes that connect the papers, which from 
the outset focus on different aspects of the Circassian revival, are outlined and discussed. This 
includes the key research questions. The conclusion is placed at the end of chapter 1.  
 
As the published chapters are kept in their published form, a number of overlaps and repetitions 
cannot be avoided, though a few of the most obvious have been removed.  
 
The thesis includes a comparatively high number of footnotes. This is partly due to the general lack 
of knowledge on Circassian context. It is also an acknowledgement of the importance of footnotes 
when researching into the Circassians as dispersed minorities that often have been forgotten or 
disappeared from many history books in, for instance, Russia and Turkey.   
 
Background information on the Circassian context can be found in Appendix B: ‘Facts and maps on 
Circassians and Circassia’.  
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Chapter 1 
 
The Circassian Revival: A Quest for Recognition 
 
Mediated transnational mobilisation and memorialisation 
among a geographically dispersed people from the Caucasus 
 
 
 
The Winter Olympic Games will be held in Sochi by the Black Sea coast of Russia in 2014. The 
downhill skiing competitions of the Olympic Games will take place in the mountains at Krasnaya 
Polyana where, prior to 1864, the village Kbaada was located. On May 21, 1864 the Russian army 
used this place to celebrate its final victory over the Circassians, the last of the Caucasian 
Mountaineer peoples, following many decades of colonial warfare. The Russian victory of 1864 
resulted in the expulsion of the Circassians from their historical homeland of Circassia - with 
hundreds of thousands fleeing to the Ottoman Empire under such harsh conditions that tens of 
thousands died during the flight. May 21 has become the annual day of commemoration among the 
Circassians. 
 
The 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics thus coincides with the 150th anniversary of the Circassian exile. 
As a result, the planning of the Winter Olympics, an international mega event, has generated an 
acceleration of an already ongoing transnational revival of the Circassians. A number of new 
Circassian organisations have appeared and a number of claims have been made focusing on a 
variety of issues ranging from new options for repatriation to the homeland to calls for recognition 
of the forced exile as an act of genocide.  
 
The Circassians today form a minority of 800,000 people in the North Caucasus region of Russia, 
while three to six million Circassians are scattered over many countries, especially in the states of 
the former Ottoman Empire, i.e. in Turkey and the Middle East. Several million Circassians reside 
in Turkey alone. Many Circassians have started to use the Internet to establish contacts across 
borders, and many new Circassian organisations have sprung up since the mid-2000s. As a part of 
this process, a new understanding of the 1864 forced exile as an act of genocide has grown 
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significantly among the Circassians. This issue was further elevated when, in May 2011, the 
Georgian parliament recognised the 1864 expulsion of the Circassians as genocide as the first UN 
recognised country. 
 
Many Circassians in the diaspora have limited knowledge about their historical homeland, since all 
villages were burned down in the nineteenth century and more than seven generations have been 
living in exile. Today, an ever increasing number of Circassians speak of the city of Sochi as the 
place of the last Circassian parliament, which existed from 1861-1864. Sochi is therefore now often 
referred to as the “historical capital of our lost homeland”. Another Circassian narrative that has 
gained increased circulation refers to Krasnaya Polyana as a place where the blood of Circassians 
was spilled in 1864, due to the fact that the name Krasnaya Polyana can be translated as “Red 
Meadow”.    
 
The role of the 2014 Sochi Olympics in the ongoing Circassian revival, which is increasingly 
becoming more transnational, is just one example of how an identity-building process can escalate 
due to an international mega event.  
 
 
 
The aim and relevance of the thesis 
 
The overall purpose in writing this thesis is to unveil, present and discuss the rising transnational 
revival of the Circassians - composed of different but related indigenous minorities in Russia as 
well as diaspora groups in several countries. The different Circassian minorities consist of ethno-
cultural- territorial groups in Russia while the many diaspora communities represent different 
categories of identification, illustrating the complexity of the Circassian context.1 This is often a 
confusing challenge for the Circassians, which is illustrated by frequent questions aimed at 
clarifying definitions and identity at Circassian events or on websites.  
 
                                                 
1
 Today, four Circassian peoples are found in the North Caucasus: Kabardians and the Shapsug represent old ’tribes’, 
while the Adyg and the Cherkess are Soviet constructions (somewhat confusing as the former is the Circassians’ own 
word for ‘Circassian’ and the latter is the term for ‘Circassian’ used in Russia, Turkey, Denmark, etc. The three 
constitute ‘titular nations’ in three republics: Adygea, Kabardino -Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia. (Hansen and Krag, 
1994). See Appendix B for further informat ion.  
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It is the ambition of this thesis to discuss the overall development of the transnational Circassian 
mobilisation within the so-called Circassian World - frequently also referred to as the “fifty places 
around the world where Circassians reside”.2 The contemporary Circassian revival is, in many 
ways, picking up from the immediate post-Soviet Circassian revival, which, by the mid-1990s, had 
experienced a set-back or was neutralised by the authorities. Since then, new conditions and 
initiatives have occurred that have contributed to today’s accelerated Circassian revival.  
 
The key overall themes that I have chosen to illustrate and discuss the process of the Circassian 
revival are the three M’s that have guided significant parts of my research process: Mediated 
Mobilisation and Memorialisation.  
 
Re. Mediation: the Circassian revival can be viewed as mediated, in particular, through civil society 
organisations and different forms of media. In the context of this thesis, however, I will concentrate 
on the latter and save the discussions on the role of civil society until the section on ‘mobilisation’. 
My focus on mediation is, on the one hand, inspired by the terms ‘print capitalism’ (Benedict 
Anderson 1983) and ‘electronic capitalism’ (Arjun Appadurai and others during the 1990s) as 
discussed in relation to processes of ethnic, indigenous or minority mobilisation - including a 
discussion of these terms in relation to the contemporary media technologies of late modern 
globalisation. In these discussions, I also draw upon discussions from media studies - including the 
role of remediation in relation to the multimodality of Web 2.0, which is particularly relevant to 
discussions on the role of memorialisation through the use of the Internet. 
 
Re. Mobilisation: new types of Circassian civil society organisations and cyber-activists are 
engaged in efforts to broaden their space for action, engaging in lobbying efforts, gathering 
information and becoming ‘enlightenment activists’, etc. I draw upon studies of civil society 
development and social movements in order to discuss this issue, including Rogers Brubaker (1996 
etc.), Saskia Sassen (2001 etc.) and others. 
 
Re. Memorialisation: most of the key concerns of the Circassian mobilisation refer to issues of 
Circassian memory and some of the most significant activities are the protests against the 2014 
Sochi Olympics; the struggle for recognition of genocide; and the annual events commemorating 
                                                 
2
 ‘The Circassian World’ has been chosen as the name of one of the most important Circassian websites in the English 
language: CircassianWorld.com.  
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the expulsion take place each year on May 21. The focus on memory is clearly visible in the 
radically increased Circassian Internet presence. Studies on memorialisation are manifold but, in my 
analysis, I have drawn inspiration from Pierre Nora (1997), Andreas Huyssen (2000) and others. 
 
The three themes of mediated Circassian mobilisation and memorialisation as sketched above are 
intertwined and I study these as integrated parts of the ongoing redefinition of Circassianness. The 
discussion of this process of redefinition and re-negotiation will be seen in the context of recent 
geopolitical reconfigurations in the wider Caucasus region. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
areas of the north-western Caucasus, where the Russian Circassians live, have once more become a 
border-region with geopolitical implications. New power games in and around the Caucasus 
influence the Circassian context as illustrated, for example, by Russia’s recognition of Abkhas ia as 
an independent state in 2008 and by the formal recognition of the Circassian genocide by the 
Georgian parliament in 2011. These events have also proved important for some of the Circassian 
civil society organisations who strive to become transnational actors in these geopolitical games - as 
illustrated by the successful lobbying efforts of some Circassian diaspora organisations in relation 
to the parliaments of Georgia and other post-Soviet states. This can be seen as a form of geopolitical 
reconfiguration that can be assessed, for instance, using the term ‘frontier zone (of globalisation)’ 
developed by Saskia Sassen. The processes of redefining and re- identifying Circassianness 
according to categories of indigenousness, ethnicity, minority-majority, and diaspora are discussed 
and understood in a contemporary - as well as from a historical - perspective. This will be assessed 
through discussions of the historical process of institutionalisation of Circassian ethno-cultural and 
territorial identity inspired by Rogers Brubaker (1996) and Anssi Paasi (1986, 1995).  
 
The north-western Caucasus, where the Circassians are mainly found in pockets in the three above-
mentioned republics, is today mainly known in Russia as the Kuban region or under the official 
name of Krasnodar Krai. In this region, the Kuban Cossacks have become a political force that also 
are presently undergoing a revival which, by many accounts, is countering the Circassian revival 
but is, to a larger degree, supported by both the regional and the federal authorities in Russia. This 
constitutes yet another trajectory of the contestedness that surrounds the Circassian revival. 
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
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In order to explore the above described themes in their geopolitical context, I have identified the 
following two main research questions: 
 
 Which role do civil society actors - including civil society organisations and Internet-based 
activism - play in the ongoing Circassian mobilisation? What is the role of resistance or 
counter-memorialisation in the process of memorialisation? Which new trends can be 
identified? How can the recent trend of more directly targeting the Russian authorities be 
understood? What implications do the geopolitical reconfigurations have for the Circassian 
revival and to what extent can Circassian actors be regarded as geopolitical actors?  
 
 In what way has mediation and remediation - especially through the Internet - come to play 
a key role in the Circassian revival? How do activists and civil society organisations try to 
reach the Circassians through the Internet and in what way has this affected the parallel 
processes of mobilisation and memorialisation? In what ways are the functionalities of Web 
2.0 qualitatively and quantitatively different from the Electronic Capitalism of the 1990s and 
the Print Capitalism of earlier periods? How does the new Internet media respond to the 
Circassian needs for generation of information and knowledge?  
 
 
RELEVANCE OF THE ANALYSIS 
 
Both in a Russian context and in the world at large, there is a lack of knowledge about Circassians - 
today well as historically. This is despite the explosion of information on the Internet and the 
significant exposure of Circassia and Circassians in the media of the nineteenth century. Provision 
of knowledge is a key part of the ongoing Circassian mobilisation. The need is great for scholars 
from outside the region to gain insight into an increasingly transnational context, where knowledge 
of minority identity and conditions of life is contested, and forms the background for possible future 
conflicts. Information and research thereof is only, to a limited degree, discussed in Russia - leaving 
space for various myths to circulate.  
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I find it relevant to assess how the Circassians, as a minority and as a dispersed number of diaspora 
groups around the world, can mobilise as civil society actors - especially by linking up to a mega 
sports event such as the 2014 Winter Olympics - to generate visibility and disseminate Circassian 
perceptions of history, establish their positions and promote their key issues such as the call for 
genocide recognition. This assessment can also provide an indication of the current status of the 
wider democratisation process in Russia, which seems to be further in focus as the Olympics 
approach. Similarly indications of civil society development in Turkey will also be included.  
 
An analysis of the Circassian revival can illustrate - qualitatively as well as quantitatively - how the 
features of Web 2.0 and the new forms of social media are a radically different way of performing 
vernacular transnational mobilising. The thesis will provide input into the debate on the functioning 
of this new technology. This also represents a different angle on contemporary democratisation 
processes - in this case with significant sub-national as well as transnational implications. 
Thematically, this has parallels in the recent Arab Spring and the so-called ‘colour revolutions’ of 
the post-Soviet space as in Ukraine and Georgia in the former decade - which the present regime in 
Russia is actively attempting to counter.   
 
The thesis will, hopefully, also contribute to the discussions on the role of transnational diaspora 
groups which, after more than a hundred years as largely invisible and silent groups, are able to 
mobilise in relation to their historical homeland and achieve a new positioning which is often rather 
critical or even hostile. An analysis of the historical process of institutionalisation of Circassia, 
Circassians and Circassianness can provide an insight into contemporary processes in the Caucasus 
and the wider post-Soviet space as a multi-ethnic area developing new forms of multicultural 
diversity under pressure from the authorities.  
 
The recent geopolitical reconfigurations constitute another relevant discussion. Neighbouring 
Georgia is thus increasingly becoming involved in the North Caucasus after the Russian-Georgian 
war of 2008, which ended up with Russia recognising Abkhazia, which borders the historical 
Circassian homeland. The Abkhaz are regarded by the Circassians as a sister people and both 
belong to the category of north-western Caucasian peoples and languages. These geopolitical 
reconfigurations in a border area are affecting the Circassian mobilisation and have actively 
involved some of the Circassian civil society actors. 
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The Themes of the Thesis  
 
In the Circassian context the themes of mediated memorialisation and mobilisation are closely 
connected and will therefore in the following be discussed both separately and together. The role of 
media and mediation is an obvious issue to discuss in relation to the ongoing Circassian revival, 
which is apparent in relation to issues of memorialisation and mobilisation, where the use of the 
Internet in particular has become a key part of both processes. Mediated representations of 
Circassian history and identity play a key role in the Circassian revival and will, as such, be 
included in the discussions. 
 
The arrival of new types of civil society organisations among the Circassians marks a new form of 
mobilisation with a stronger focus on modern civil rights, and it is based on political action and new 
types of lobbying efforts. Memorialisation, which includes research, documentation and 
information dissemination as key elements, is mainly carried out by civil society actors with two 
main target groups: other Circassians are targeted in order to increase their historical awareness of 
Circassian identity and history (while simultaneously enhancing potential mobilisation). Another 
primary target group are the Russian authorities - especially with the purpose of challenging official 
Russian history-writing, for instance, by providing documentation from historical archives. This 
represents a new level of knowledge production and knowledge generation, whereby Circassians 
themselves take part in the formulation and reformulation of Circassian culture and identity to a 
much larger extent than before. Geopolitical reconfigurations in the Caucasus region have resulted 
in new possibilities for alliance-building for transnational Circassian civil society actors but have 
also opened up the possibility of potential new reactions from the Russian authorities that threaten 
these newfound possibilities. As in the nineteenth century the power-knowledge axis again plays a 
key role in understanding the Circassian revival although this time the role of new media 
technologies and civil society mobilisation is significantly different - as is also the case with the 
transnational aspects.  
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Finally, I wish to discuss the process of the institutionalisation of ‘Circassianness’ over the last two 
hundred years as a way of understanding and framing some key elements of the Circassian revival. 
‘Resistance’ and ‘protest’ will be relevant to discuss in relation to all the above-mentioned themes - 
as this is part of an understanding of contemporary contexts of indigenous, minority and/or diaspora 
existence. 
 
 
Mediation, Internet and Digital Diaspora  
 
Mediation refers to the increasing role of the media in almost all spheres of society and, in relation 
to the Circassian context, the increasingly significant role of the Internet in the Circassian revival in 
particular - within memorialisation as well as mobilisation processes.3 A starting point for my 
understanding of this dimension is the role of mediation outlined by Benedict Anderson in his book 
‘Imagined Communities’ from 1983, which describes how ‘print capitalism’ became instrumental in 
the construction of nationalism in the production of modern nation-states from the nineteenth 
century on.4 In the aftermath of the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 
Anderson’s ideas gained prominence in many scholarly analyses. I still find this approach relevant 
in relation to discussing contemporary processes among ethnic minorities - and diaspora groups - as 
in the case of the Circassian revival. These processes of ‘imagining communities’ also take place on 
levels other than the new nation-states - as has been illustrated on several occasions in the post-
Communist world – for instance by ethnic minority groups that had or still have some form of 
secondary- level territorial-administrative autonomy, which often represents a continuation from the 
Soviet period (Brubaker 1996; Hansen 2003). In several areas, this led to increased tension with the 
- new and often nationalising - nation-state and sometimes evolved into violent conflicts as seen, for 
instance, in relation to Kosovo/Serbia, Abkhasia/Georgia and Chechnya/Russia - though they all 
followed different paths. The process of print capitalism and nation-building - on a secondary level 
- also affected many other nationalities in the Caucasus including the Circassians in the three 
republics of the region, where they constitute titular-nationalities as the Kabardians, Cherkess and 
                                                 
3
 In a different understanding, ‘civil society organisations’ could be included as having a mediat ing role in  the 
Circassian revival, but I have chosen to deal with civil society organisations under the theme of ‘mobilisation’. 
‘Touris m’ can also be seen having as a mediating role in relation to Circassian me morialisation and mobilisation. 
4
 The rapid expansion of the ‘media sector’ - especially through the Internet - has led to a number of academic 
discussions within media and communicat ion studies on how this phenomenon should be analysed. This includes a 
discussion of which termino logy should be preferred, for instance, whether to use the term ‘mediation’ or 
‘mediatisation’ (Liv ingstone 2009; Hjarvad 2013).  
15 
 
Adygs respectively. The fact that Anderson ascribes the introduction of the phenomenon of print-
capitalism - in a modern understanding - to the early phases of nationalism and national movements 
in the nineteenth century also renders it relevant to discuss in relation to Circassia and the 
Circassians of the nineteenth century. 
 
In 1996, Arjun Appadurai (drawing on inspiration from others) employed the term ‘e lectronic 
capitalism’ to encompass the changes in media technology - especially the role of television, radio 
and the initial version of the Internet (Appadurai 1996).5 Among the features of electronic 
capitalism highlighted by Appadurai, the ‘aural’ and ‘visual’ elements encompass a strong potential 
for the emotional engagement of target groups and, potentially, have a greater outreach towards 
audiences - though still largely non-digital. Furthermore, specific language skills - as in the case of 
the written media - are not required. Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, there was a 
significant rise in the number of publications on Circassian history and identity in the North 
Caucasus - including translations of books from the nineteenth century never before published in 
the Soviet Union or in the preceding Russian Empire, where censorship usually prohibited this.6 
Some of these publications included eyewitness reports that challenged the official history books 
that many Circassian actors wished to revise. Many of these publications are now remediated and 
digitalised for presentation on the Internet - often with a choice between purchasing a copy or 
finding free copies on the Internet.7 Shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, electronic 
media began to gain importance in several of the North Caucasian republics, with a limited number 
of weekly hours of programmes in the Circassian language on issues of Circassian history and 
traditions. These became very popular among the audiences as I observed during my field work in 
the 1990s. The 1990s were, for the Circassians in Russia, marked by an overlap of print and 
electronic capitalism due to the delay of almost 150 years of censorship and other restrictions on 
free publishing on issues relating to the Circassian minorities.  
 
                                                 
5
 In the 1960s, Marshall McLuhan had already published now famous books where he discussed “mankind leav ing a 
typographic age and entering an electronic one” and, in the book ‘Understanding Media’, he coined the term the ‘global 
village’ to describe the new age of electronic media (Turner 2006, 53). The terms ’informat ion economy’ (Castells) or 
‘knowledge economy’ (Bowker) have also regularly been used in rela t ion to this phenomenon. 
6
 This included a number of non-scientific publications describing and celebrating Circassian history and culture. Some 
of these could express harsh opposition to official Russian history-writing and/or managed to offend neighbouring 
peoples - whether ethnic Russians or those belonging to other Caucasian groups. 
7
 Books published by Circassians and other Caucasians in the diaspora countries were also now translated and published 
in the North Caucasus. 
16 
 
As an extension of the above-mentioned terms used by Anderson and Appadurai, I have chosen to 
argue for the use of the term ‘digital capitalism’ to designate the contemporary period dominated by 
the features of the so-called Web 2.0. This is an updated version of the two preceding periods of 
print and electronic capitalism, representing a third phase of media technological development. 
Jürgen Habermas has stressed how the printing press only “unfolds its cultural and political 
significance” with the arrival of modernism. “It brings with it an enlargement of the communicative 
action which, through electronic mass communication, as developed during the twentieth century, 
has been intensified once more” (Habermas 1996, 366 - my translation).8 As an extension of the 
theory of Benedict Anderson, I argue that the present period of digital capitalism could be labelled 
as yet another intensification. This (gradual) shift from electronic towards digital capitalism more 
than indicates the role of speed and acceleration in this process. I argue that we are witnessing a 
profound change or shift in the form and practice of mediation with the arrival of Web 2.0, which 
potentially has significant consequences for processes of memorialisation and mobilisation - as the 
case of the Circassian revival illustrates.  
 
Cyberspace today functions as a space for identity negotiation and, as illustrated in the case of the 
Circasian revival and the role of  historical documentation and accounts, digitalised archives etc., 
which illustrates how the Internet can function as “an essential repository for information” 
(Brinkerhoff 2009, 57). As argued by Jeff D. Hempele the increased ‘mediation’ has resulted in an 
“upsurge of new cultural identities and practises” among many minority groups and indigenous 
peoples (Himpele 2008, 11). Internet mediation has become what Himpele refer to as “techniques of 
empowerment” to many such groups and people. As Fred Turner has noted: “the now widespread 
association of computers and computer-mediated communication with the egalitarian social ideals 
of the counterculture, have become important features of an increasingly networked mode of living, 
working, and deploying social and cultural power” (Turner 2006, 9). 9 And as Turner further notes 
on what he refer to as the ‘electronic frontier’: “Digital technologies had inherited the 
transformational mantel of the counterculture” (Turner 2006, 164).  
 
                                                 
8
 The contemporary phase of digital cap italism is also characterised by a more transnational, global or cosmopolitan 
outlook compared to the electronic cap italism of the 1990s, which was more state-centric (Saunders 2009). 
9
 To develop a tool with a potential for democratic or popular e mpowerment was part of the motivation of some of the 
key developers the initial versions of the Internet back in the 1960s.  
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Access to the Internet is increasingly seen as a fundamental human right by users worldwide as 
illustrated by a BBC investigation from 2010. As Hamadour Touré has put “the right to 
communicate cannot be ignored” and “the Internet is potentially the most powerful source of 
enlightenment ever created”.10 Still, limitations and restrictions of the space for action of an 
indigenous people such as the Circassians are considerable in authoritarian states though generally 
the space for online digital mediation is wider than offline.     
 
As one way of addressing a digital diaspora context, the anthropologist Maximillian Forte has 
developed a model for the analysis of Internet-generated revival among indigenous people which I 
find relevant and useful to discuss in order to understand the Circassian diaspora context. This 
model is called the ‘V.E.R.A.city loop’ and comprises the four issues of Visualisation, 
Embodiment, Recognition and Authenticity, which are linked in a continuously ongoing loop-
process (Forte 2006, 145). This will be discussed further below under the section ‘mobilisation’, 
though the role ‘visualistion’ should be noted as a specifically important characteristic of the 
present phase of digital mediation. Documentation that earlier had to be found in archives or in 
book published in different countries in different languages, have now been digitalised and 
immediately accessed  on the Internet. And as Kyra Landzelius notes indigenous cyberactivism: 
“cyberspace often presents a staging ground for the defence of authenticity” (Landzelius 2006, 23).  
 
The term ‘digital diaspora’ is used to describe de-territorialised groups use the Internet that can be 
used to perform and produce virtual re-territorialisation. Sreberny has characterized the Internet as 
the “diasporic medium par excellence” (Sreberny 2001, 156). I have applied the term ‘iCircassia’ - 
Internet-Circassia - to the new phenomenon of transnational information sharing, establishment of 
digital archives (and documentation), and the new links and new forms of cooperation developed 
among Circassians across the world. I argue that iCircassia represents an additional level that 
supplements the already existing Circassian World that traditionally have been defined as consisting 
of Circassians in the homeland plus in the Circassians in thediaspora. This is a new transnational 
Circassian public space that includes new interlinked networks and new flows of information.  
Internet visibility and the visual identity of the Circassian revival clearly involves a number of 
specific key visual elements that are repeated again and again and have become icons of the 
Circassian Revival (CR2): the flag, the cherkeska, the dancers (in Circassian dresses), certain 
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 Touré is General Secretary of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Finerminds.com/personal-
growth/source-of-enlightenment. 
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prehistoric elements (dolmen’s, archeological findings), the nature – the mountains (especially 
Elbrus), waterfalls etc. In this respect, the production and reproduction of visual identity of a cyber-
nation show the same type of essentialist approach found in most nation-states.   
 
One example of the Circassian use of Web 2.0 is the use of ‘viral communications’ in campaigns by 
organisations such as the Circassian Cultural Institute (CCI) from New Jersey, USA, the Caucasus 
Forum from Turkey etc. The production and circulation of videos through websites such as 
Facebook and YouTube has become a cheap and efficient tool that youth activists and cyber-
activists in particular use - also known as ‘viral videos’. For instance, in relation to the annual May 
21 commemorative events, viral videos are used to inform and mobilise target groups to participate 
in demonstrations and other events - while simultaneously providing information to the public at 
large. Historical images from the nineteenth century are often d igitalised and/or remediated for use 
in these videos although the forms vary greatly as organisations are becoming increasingly aware of 
not using the same formula from year to year. These viral videos hereby constitute an example or a 
meeting point of all 3Ms: mediated memorialisation and mobilisation. The role of a so-called 
Facebook-revolution among Circassian youth activists will be discussed below in relation to 
‘mobilisation’ and the so-called YouTubian-memorialisation in relation ‘memorialisation’. 
 
The second generation Internet or Web 2.0 is often referred to as a transnational hypermedia space 
where mobility, interactivity and visibility are combined in new ways. This in relation to the 
Circassian revival includes a significant remediation of earlier media output that can easily be 
circulation through the tools of the second generation Internet. The role of digital diaspora and civil 
society empowerment will be discussed in the section below on ‘mobilisation’. Mediation relating 
to memorialisation and mobilisation, respectively, will be futher discussed below.  
 
 
 
Memorialisation 
 
The frequent use of terms such as the ‘memory turn’, the ‘memory boom’, the ‘memory syndrome’, 
the ‘age of commemoration’ or the ‘memory drive’ indicate why the study of memory and 
memorialisation has become increasingly widespread (Andreas Huyssen 2003, 16). The many 
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media representations of, in particular, issues such as the Holocaust and the Second World War, 
illustrate one element of the memory boom in recent decades, which Nora has also labelled an 
acceleration of memory (Nora 1996, 1).11 Different forms of memorialisation have been at the 
centre of most of the post-Soviet national and sub-national identity-building processes, as many 
cultural and ethnic groups felt either dominated or repressed during the Soviet period.12 The 
massive legacy of manipulated and potentially conflicting memories from the era of the Soviet 
Union had already been addressed during the period of Perestroika in the late 1980s - illustrated by, 
for instance, the well-known Russian organisation Memorial,13 a civil society organisation that has 
continuously lobbied for a proper reassessment of the Soviet past. A search of archives and the 
dissemination of information on the history of repression, including individual victims as well as 
formal acts of public commemoration and erection of monuments were from the outset part of the 
work of Memorial. Considering the often enormous extent of post-war and post-genocide 
memorialisation processes and the defining agendas these play in many societies and nations, this is 
hardly surprising. 
 
Andreas Huyssen has defined three types of ‘memory narratives’ that have gained significance in 
the period of late-modernism since the 1970s - and which, as such, supplement the specific role of 
the Holocaust (i.e. a fourth type): musealisation; the traumatic side of memory: memorials, 
apologies etc.; and the combination of memory, entertainment and trauma in cultural products such 
as books and films (Huyssen 2000, 24). These are all issues that are useful to the discussion of 
contemporary Circassian memorialisation processes, which are increasingly centred on a 
redefinition of the forced Circassian exile in the nineteenth century as an act of genocide. Huyssen 
notes that the Holocaust can function as “a prism through which we may look at other instances of 
genocide” (Huyssen 2003, 14).14 Huyssen further states that “memory discourses of a new kind first 
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 This also includes a rise in academic research and publication on various aspects of memory and memorialisation 
which, accord ing to Huyssen, can also be seen as a bulwark against oblivion and forgetting (Huyssen 2003, 23). 
According to Huyssen, this is also a way of counteracting the fear of fo rgetting, which can potentially become a real 
threat considering the sheer amount of material published (Huyssen 2000, 29). 
12
 This occasionally led to conflicts, some of which evolved into wars that were covered by the international media. A 
‘conflict-understanding’ is therefore often found in public representations of the Caucasus in the international media.  
13
 Memorial is one of the oldest rights -based post-Soviet organisations in Russia and is generally widely respected. Still, 
the authorities regularly put pressure on Memorial, for instance when the computers of Memorial’s branch in Saint 
Petersburg were confiscated in November 2008. This resulted in a react ion from office director Irina Flinge, who stated 
that Memorial was targeted for being on “the wrong side of a new ideological div ide” - ‘Putin ism’ as based on a 
“strident form of nationalism”. Which includes not least the idea “that Stalin and the Soviet regime were successful in 
creating a great country” (“Stalin’s new status in Russia”, 27-12-2008, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7798497.stm).  
14
 In the case of the Circassians, the Armenian genocide recognition process plays an equally important role, as mainly 
civil society and exile-driven over many decades and also as located in the Caucasus with strong links to the ‘imperial 
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emerged in the West after the 1960s in the wake of decolonisation and the new social movements 
and their search for alternative and revisionist histories” (Huyssen 2003, 12).15 Taras Kuzio has 
discussed these memory discourses in relation to the post-Soviet context and concluded: “Thus, it is 
incumbent upon scholars to place post-Soviet ‘imperial transitions’ within the worldwide process of 
decolonisation that has taken place since the conclusion of World War II (Kuzio 2001, 260)”. 16 In 
relation to the Circassian context, it is necessary to take the debate on the imperial transition into 
nation-states as also including the secondary level of federal republics in Russia, as the process of 
imperial break-up or ‘unmixing of peoples’ was different in the case of Russia/Soviet Union to the 
European imperial break-up processes. 
 
The French historian Pierre Nora has stated that the memories of minorities is the key to the 
memory turn that marked a protest against the many nation-state projects around the world, which 
often ignored minority identities and eventually cracked under what Nora re fers to as a double 
movement: “The internal collapse of the myth that bore the national project and the emancipation 
that liberated the minorities” (Nora 2002, 7). In a Circassian-Russian context - and partly also in a 
Turkish context - this outlines a battlefield (undergoing reconfiguration) rather than the internal 
collapse of national myths and the emancipation of liberated minorities that Nora appears to 
describe in a French context.17 Still, Nora’s conclusion illustrates why the actors of the Circassian 
movement are mobilising and why they experience this as a legitimate part of an international trend. 
He also stresses the close link between memorialisation and mobilisation.  
 
“Among the new nations, independence has swept into history societies newly awake ned from their 
ethnological slumbers by colonial violation. Similarly, a process of interior decolonisation has 
affected ethnic minorities, families, and groups that until now have possessed reserves of memory 
but little or no historical capital” (Nora 1989, 7).18 In the case of the Circassian revival, it is this 
kind of ‘reserves of memory’ or ‘historical capital’ that has been brought into play, but I will 
discuss how ‘interior decolonisation’ can be understood in a Circassian, Caucasian and Russian 
                                                                                                                                                                  
reconfigurations’ between the Russian Empire/the Soviet Union on the one side and Ottoman Empire/Turkey on the 
other, as well as with Circassian groups and individuals involved in the atrocities in 1915. 
15
 A. Dirk Moses and others have discussed how ‘genocide’ increasingly has become part of analyses of the history of 
impire and colonialis m. 
16
 Like much of the literature on the post-Soviet contexts, Kuzio also mainly performs his analysis on the level of the 
nation-state. 
17
 Also reflected in the terms ’competing memories’ and ’counter-memorialisation’. 
18
 More on social capital and cultural capital under ‘mobilisation’ below.   
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context.19 In extension of the discussion of mediation above, the Internet can in a number of 
different ways function as a site of memory. 
 
‘Sites of Memory’ - a term first developed by Pierre Nora - is one of the key terms used to address 
the processes of memorialisation in this thesis. Nora: “There are lieux de memoire, sites of memory, 
because there are no longer milieu de memoire, real environments of memory.” (Pierre Nora 1989, 
7). Such sites of memory can be material as well as immaterial places of symbolic relevance to a 
particular site of memory. According to Nora ‘sites of memory’ are linked to “a particular historical 
moment, a turning point where consciousness of a break with the past is bound up with the sense 
that memory has been torn...” (Nora 1989, 7). Nora also refer to the turning point of modernity as 
related to the emergence of discourses on ‘sites of memory’, and Nora further notes that “such a 
fundamental collapse of memory is but one familiar example of a movement towards 
democratisation and mass culture on a global scale” (Nora 1989, 7).  
 
The term ‘sites of memory’ is used to discuss the ongoing redefinition of the role of Sochi as a key 
location of Circassian history - as a site of long-distance (counter-)memorialisation. In this 
discussion, I will attempt to combine ‘sites of memory’ with discussions on ‘long-distance 
belonging’ - as examined by several authors in relation to diaspora groups - and/or ‘long-distance 
nationalism’ as elaborated by Benedict Anderson and others. 20 In this case, a special focus is placed 
on the Circassian diaspora’s use of the Internet in their mobilisation efforts built around the protests 
against the 2014 Winter Olympics - a process that is linked to promoting the agenda on genocide 
recognition, in which Sochi and the greater Sochi area gain a key role, for instance in the 
documentation material found, researched, remediated and circulated. Sochi is thus elevated to a 
new and significantly greater role in the Circassian memorialisation process - as a representation 
and as a symbol of the lost homeland that simultaneously constitutes a concrete physical space in 
the Caucasus. 
 
As an extension of the term ‘site of memory’, Hue-Tam Ho Tai discusses the term ‘memorial 
nation’: “It would seem that nations are most likely to be in need of lieux de memoire when they are 
in their most liminal states: when they are being born and are in need of instant antiquity or when 
they are besieged, either by internal or external forces. Nora observes what he calls an ‘acceleration 
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 Besides Anderson, see also Glick-Sch iller and Fouron (2001) etc.  
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of memory’ as a result of ever-multiplying technologies of remembering; these technologies also 
have the effect of undermining nation-states” (Tai 2001, 918).21 Considering at least parts of the 
ongoing processes of memorialisation, both Russia/Russians and the Circassians can be seen as 
being in a liminal state - or in a state of prolonged post-Soviet transition and identity-building 
processes on different levels - whereby understandings of being under various forms of threat play a 
key role. 
 
As already mentioned, another key term in relation to memorialisation and the role of c ivil society 
organisations in the contemporary Circassian revival is ‘decolonisation’. The role of empire, 
colonisation and decolonisation is not just part of the statements and claims made by many of the 
Circassian actors but part of a general discussion on the legacy of the Soviet Union (and the Russian 
Empire as her predecessor).22 This has been an ongoing debate for the last twenty years although it 
has often been argued that a colonial framing is irrelevant given the special character of the Russian 
Empire as an entity that expanded over land as opposed to the overseas colonies of the Western 
European empires. This is an explanation especially popular within Russia, albeit for different 
reasons, and with an increasing understanding of the need for discussion on various problematic 
elements.23 As noted by Kuzio (2002, 260) ”...the reclaiming of the past, the revival of national 
history and collective memory is central to ‘imperial transitions’ in overcoming their colonial 
legacies. The reclaiming of national history for post-colonial Soviet states - with the exception of 
Belarus - is taking place at the same time as their rejection of Tsarist and Soviet imperial historical 
frameworks that denied them a past, present or future.”24 This type of reclaiming of a national 
history also takes place on a sub-national level in the North Caucasian republics as well as within 
civil society mobilisation as seen in the case of the Circassians. According to Kuzio “...it is 
incumbent upon scholars to place post-Soviet imperial transitions within the worldwide process of 
decolonisation that has taken place since the conclusion of World War II” (2002, 260). 
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 Tai mentions, for instance, the Internet and electronic media, border transcendence and long -distance nationalism.  
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 According to ‘The Black Book of Colonialis m’, the Russian Federation of today is a surprisingly imperial successor 
state that does not accept or recognise its former status (Ferro 2005).  
23
 Russia and the Soviet Union have, over the years, often been left out of various analyses of empires a nd colonialism - 
for different reasons, or due to different definitions and categorisations - sometimes geography, sometimes the type of 
expansion, sometimes communism/socialism etc. including, for instance, Edward Said (Irwin 2006, 305). Th is has 
resulted in accusations of being revisionists, apologists etc. Robert Conquest notes that the Russian conquest of the 
Caucasus took place in the nineteenth century and was “thus comparable to other colonial empires” (Conquest 2000, 
243). 
24
 This is yet another example of a desire to analyse the ‘nation-state-level’ focussing on RSFSR and the new states, 
while overlooking different fo rms of sub-nationalism, sub-regionalis m, local indigenous processes on different levels 
etc. 
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A recent categorisation of five models for formal confrontations with the past - especially but not 
only in legal terms - establishes a hierarchy ranging from the total confrontation with the past (as in 
the Nuremberg Trials following the Second World War) to an international confrontation (as in the 
war-crime tribunals after the wars in ex-Yugoslavia), to an internal confrontation (as in post-
Apartheid South Africa), delayed confrontations (as in Cambodia) and, finally, rejection as the fifth 
and final form of confrontation with crimes of the past (with Russia as the major example).25 This is 
not fully justifiable in relation to Russia as some form of historical rehabilitation has taken place - 
organised for instance by the above-mentioned Memorial in relation to, for example, Siberian 
forced labour camps and crimes of the Stalin era - but it is still an indication of the existing 
problems and the overall situation. The problem is that these processes have often been partial, 
incomplete, unimplemented - or, as in the case of the Circassians from the North Caucasus, largely 
rejected or manipulated (Genocide, 450th anniversary). 
 
Post-Soviet debates and conflicts over memory and history writing are found not only in Russia but 
all over the former USSR. Such debates have also been at the heart of the post-Soviet - and 
increasingly transnational - Circassian re- identification processes as they began during Perestroika 
in the late 1980s. This is no surprise. The same happened all over the former Soviet Union and in 
post-Communist Eastern Europe. In the case of the Circassians, this includes a widespread 
understanding of being denied the right to write and present their history from a Circassian 
perspective. This is a position shared by a number of indigenous peoples and minorities around the 
world - whether they are living under colonial, post-colonial or ‘partly decolonised, partly 
recolonised’ conditions.26 The latter could be used to describe the situation for many of the post-
Soviet peoples in the North Caucasus that still refer to the violent wars in the nineteenth century as 
their tragedy.27 
 
This type of conflict is often referred to as ‘memory wars’ (or ‘web wars’28) in analyses of the 
developments in the post-Soviet space.29 For instance, in relation to, on the one hand, the schism 
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 From the Danish newspaper Polit iken (27-07-2012). 
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 These are circumstances also discussed by Derek Gregory, Edward Said, Linda T. Smith etc.  
27
 This is, fo r instance, widely the case in eastern North Caucasian areas of Dagestan and Chechnya. 
28
 And ‘cyberwars’: for instance on the cyber-attacks on Estonia and Georg ia (among others Evgeny Morozov, 
slate.com, 14-08-2008). 
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between the historical ‘falsification debate’ in Russia (which is largely driven by attempts to protest 
at the slandering of Stalinist victories by various post-Soviet actors - whether within Russia or in 
some of the other post-Soviet states)30, and, on the other, the processes among Russia’s 
neighbouring states of defining new ‘national tragedies’, as in case of the Ukrainian Holodomor 
(the enforced famine of the 1930s) and the Georgian redefinition of the years under Russian/Soviet 
rule as 400 years of Russian repression.31 
 
Disagreements over history writing and counter-memorialisation processes are widespread in the 
post-Soviet space and, as such, the official Russian history writing contested by Circassian actors in 
their acts of counter-memorialisation is no surprise. Two examples, both from 2007, illustrate the 
renewed Circassian memorialisation: firstly, that Circassian history in the region was fully ignored 
in the extensive material prepared and published in relation to Russia winning the right to host the 
Winter Olympics in Sochi in 2014. Secondly, the fact that during 2007 the a 450th anniversary of 
the ‘voluntary union’ between Russia and the Circassians was celebrated with an extensive and 
expensive programme, in spite of the fact that the same kind of celebration was cancelled ten years 
earlier with the argument that it ran contrary to historical fact.32 Both examples became the object 
of protests and renewed mobilisation within the Circassian diaspora.  
 
Many Circassian websites present counter-narratives or a kind of resistance towards the official 
Russian version of Circassian history. As such, these initiatives can be labelled both post-colonial 
and post-totalitarian actions of resistance and protest.  
 
The so-called ‘war of conferences’ on the Circassian Question peaked in 2010 w ith the conference 
in Tbilisi, Georgia entitled ‘Hidden History, Enduring Crimes’, which focused on the forced 
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 The research projects ‘Memory at War’ (memoryatwar.org) and ‘Web Wars’ (web -wars.org) both include a 
significant focus on post-Soviet memorialisation contexts. 
30
 As noted by the Russian historian, Nikolay Koposov, the use of the term ’falsification’ “is very telling indeed: 
Falsifiers of History was the title of a pamphlet published under Stalin’s supervision in 1948 to defend the USSR from 
similar accusations of initiating the wa r.” (Koposov 2011).  
31
 “In May 2009, President Dmitri Medvedev created a commission to review “falsifications of history to the detriment 
of Russia’s interests,” delegating the commission to govern historical debate and to prevent the expression or 
publication of historical judgments “unfavourable” to Russia” (Koposov 2011). This commission was particularly a 
reaction to the Ukrainian rewrit ing of the history of Stalin’s period and the rewrit ing of the same period in h istory books 
in the Baltic States. Pierre Nora, as chairman of as chaiman of ‘Liberte Pour l’Histoire’, that successfully protested and 
campained against suggested memory laws in France, jo ined the international protests against the suggested Russian 
memory laws in 2009-2010 (lph-asso.fr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=78&ltemid=174&lang=en).  
32
 A commission of historians of mixed ethnic backgrounds reached this verdict in the 1990s.  
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eviction of the Circassians from the Caucasus in the nineteenth century. As an outcome of this 
conference (which has its own article on Wikipedia), a formal appeal was forwarded to the 
Georgian parliament suggesting that the Circassian genocide should be recognised.33 The 
conference is therefore often referred to as the beginning of the process that, a year later, resulted in 
Georgian recognition of the Circassian genocide. Similar issues had previously been addressed at 
other conferences but, this time, Russia chose to react with ‘counter-conferences’.34 Two 
conferences were held in Moscow which included a number of Circassian organisations and 
individuals that were generally regarded as friendly towards Russia, or at least neutral. On one 
occasion this initiative backfired when a representative of the Circassian Association in California 
chose to criticise the lack of discussion and potential recognition of the Circassian genocide. A 
conference planned to take place in Jordan - that some regarded as a follow-up to the Tbilisi 
conference - was cancelled later in 2010 after Russian pressure was placed on the government in 
Jordan. 
 
Internet-mediated memorialisation has become a key aspect of the Circassian revival, with new 
ways of transferring and distributing digitalised knowledge. The hypermedia space of Web 2.0 - 
which characterises ‘digital capitalism’, as mentioned above - has generally resulted in a “flattening 
out of knowledge hierarchies”, which “can be a very powerful social force” (Bowker 2008, 256). 
Still, access to historical knowledge in imperial archives is still - partly - restricted for Circassian 
actors in Russia. In relation to the search for documentation material from the period of war  and 
colonisation that led to the expulsion of most Circassians from the Caucasus in the nineteenth 
century, new openings appeared in Georgia, where a part of the imperial archives on Caucasian 
issues are located. Many of these sources have since been researched, digitalised and transnationally 
shared through the Internet. Similar processes are taking place vis-à-vis imperial Ottoman archives, 
where archives, for instance, have been searched in transnational cooperation and the ensuing 
publication of results has included Russian language versions published in Russia.  
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 Wikipedia is an example of a new Internet media that has offered an increasing space for knowledge and information 
on a minority group such as the Circassians. Wikiepedia has increasingly been recognised as a source of information 
and knowledge, with ’margins of error’ now almost on par with Britannica. (‘Click -on-Knowledge Conference’, 
Copenhagen University, May 2011). 
34
 A shift away from the earlier strategy of main ly ignoring Circassian claims and standpoints, which appears to be 
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Cyberspace can be understood as a ‘total archive’, as noted by Huyssen and others, or as an 
‘essential repository’, as noted by Brinkerhoff. Perhaps the constantly increasing amount of 
digitalised historical and cultural information on the Circassians that can now be found on the 
Internet constitutes an ‘alternative national archive’ of a non-state-supported and dispersed people? 
According to Lev Manovich, the ‘database’ is the model for a new form of media that can remediate 
and encompass all preceding media forms in a multitude of new combinations. Jack Andersen has 
referred to this as a ‘new cultural form’ that radically changes former ways, which often consisted 
of narratives presented for audiences - now these audiences can themselves produce fully different 
narratives or combine the information available in a multitude of different ways (Andersen 2008). 
This is potentially also a way of bypassing possible ‘gatekeepers’ or ‘filters’ that exist elsewhere or 
in other media forms. The database character of the Internet is also an illustration of how these 
features have improved the options for activities focusing on the provision of documentation and 
knowledge, as is the case with a significant part of the Circassian movement.  
 
An example of Internet-mediated Circassian memory is found in the so-called YouTubian 
memorialisation according to which Circassian actors - using low-cost methods - present Circassian 
history and culture in a number of different ways. Some are quickly made with a simple   
presentation of images taken from the Internet and then remixed into a Circassian narrative while 
others may be history lessons of a professional quality. These viral videos often generate comments 
and debate, illustrating the potentially mobilising role of Internet-mediated memorialisation. 
 
In general the performance of memory, such as for instance the use of visual representations from 
the nineteenth century on the Internet, marks a field in which the processes of mediatised 
memorialisation have increased significantly - both in size and pace - compared to the first phase of 
the first Circassian revival (CR1) from the years just before and after the fall of the Soviet Union.35 
One example is the use of avatars - a graphic image representing a person who takes part in online 
discussions or, for instance, has a Facebook profile (could be a photo of the person but a different 
form of graphic image is often chosen). In case of the Circassians on the Internet, many of these 
avatars depict the flag or, traditional costume (the cherkeska) - i.e. nineteenth century 
representations have attained iconographic status within the renewed mediated Circassian 
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 Could also be labelled re-enactments of the past - hinting at a type of performance of offline memory that has gained 
increased popularity at the beginning of the 21
st
 century. 
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mobilisation. These avatars have become a very visible element of the Circassian revival and they 
also represent an expression of the importance of belonging to a Circassian group and identity.  
 
 
Mobilisation 
 
In assessing the mobilisation of the so-called ‘Circassian movement’, I discuss how a civil society 
space for action can be understood in relation to the two different contexts of Circassian civil 
society action in Russia and in Turkey respectively. 36 The latter is supplemented by observations 
from the Circassian diaspora in general, as the level of transnational cooperation increases. This 
also indicates the increasing role of Internet-generated mobilisation, which is also included in the 
assessment.37 
 
Pierre Nora has noted the following on how memory has become a part of mobilisation processes 
through his comments on the difference between ‘history’ and ‘memory’: “Unlike history, which 
has always been in the hands of the public authorities, of scholars and specialised peer groups, 
memory has acquired all the new privileges and prestige of a popular protest movement. It has 
come to resemble the revenge of the underdog or injured party, the outcast, the history of those 
denied the right to History.” (Nora 2002, 6). This is further underlined by Linda T. Smith: 
“Traditional indigenous knowledge is re-generating in spaces created by activism” (Smith 2012, 
10)38 although Smith also underlines the fact that “there is no easy or natural relationship between 
activism and research” (2012, 1).39 Smith has defined an ‘indigenous research agenda’ that is 
“...moving towards the ideal of a self-determining indigenous world” in which self-determination 
constitutes a strategic goal (Smith 1999, 115). Smith further notes that: “Self-determination in a 
research agenda becomes something more than a political goal. It becomes a goal of social justice 
which is expressed through and across a wide range of psychological, social, cultural and economic 
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 The fact that the term ‘the Circassian movement’ is increasingly used - as seen in many Internet art icles in recent 
years - illustrates the significant expansion of the Circassian revival (Zhemukhov 2012) and, potentially, also the 
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 And perhaps a short comparative conclusion on civil society development in Turkey and in Russia, as  the heirs to two 
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 Presented at the seminar ‘Indigeneity: Options and Strategies’ in Copenhagen, March 2012. Part of this paper appear 
in the revised version of ‘Deco lonising Methodologies’ published in 2012.  
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very few - part icularly in relation to local communit ies (Smith 1999, 11). According to Smith, indigenous peoples are in 
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terrains” (1999, 116). In this ‘strategic research agenda’, self-determination as one ‘tide’ is a goal of 
an indigenous movement that is reached through three other tides: survival, recovery and 
development which, in the model, is supplemented by four ‘directions’, identified as decolonisation, 
healing, transformation and mobilisation (1999, 116).40 The agenda outlined by Smith is based on 
the continued legitimisation of indigenous peoples’ rights and the accompanying activism that 
“suggests a possible space for indigenous peoples” (1999, 115). The two issues of mobilisation (on 
different geographical levels) and recovery, which constitute key elements of the model, are 
particularly interesting for the discussion of the Circassian mobilisation.  
 
The role of civil society and space for action is discussed in relation to Russia and Turkey, 
respectively, which constitute two different contexts that, on the one hand, share a number of 
similarities in their processes of democratisation while, on the other, also outline two considerably 
different conditions for Circassian civil society mobilisation. What it is that makes this difference 
and how the increased space for civil society action in Turkey - and the rest of the Circassian 
diaspora world - affects the civil society mobilisation of Circassian organisations and initiatives in 
Russia are key aspects of the discussion. These discussions are informed by debates on the different 
understandings of civil society as a battlefield of interests versus the more consensus-oriented 
understanding often found in the West as described by David Lewis (2001, 2). As Lewis, according 
to an Antonio Gramsci- inspired approach, suggests: “Civil society is the arena, separate from state 
and market, in which ideological hegemony is contested, implying that civil society contained a 
wide range of organisations which both challenged and upheld the existing order” (Lewis 2001, 2). 
This indicates how and where the Russian and the Western understandings of civil society differ, 
which is further discussed in this thesis.  
 
Habermas has stressed how new communication technologies “...render the creation of public 
spheres possible” (367 - my translation) in an extension of the above-mentioned discussion of 
‘communicative action’ (under ‘Mediation’). Also Kraidy and Mourad (2010, 13) stress that 
‘hypermedia space’ has become a site of soc ial agency. In the case of the present phase of digital 
media technologies these new spaces for action perhaps represent, not just another intensification, 
but a leap to another level - qualitatively as well as quantitatively. 
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Regarding the potential for social change and empowerment of civil society actors and marginalised 
groups through the use of the Internet, the terms ‘social capital’ and ‘cultural capital’ have 
increasingly become popular in academic writings and are, as such, briefly included in relation to 
the discussions of civil society mobilisation. It is apparent that an increased space for action, or 
increased bonding and/or bridging of social capital, can be the result of using the Internet - as 
illustrated, for instance, by the use of Facebook as a tool for transnational Circassian mobilisation. 
As, for instance, the young activists from New Jersey state, the use of Facebook has been a 
‘revolution’ in their activities, whereby they can now approach Circassians all over the world, 
discuss issues of the Circassian revival and often end up linking with each other as friends - through 
individual Facebook sites as well as the sites of the organisation. These young activists often meet 
in the offices of CCI two or three times a week and perform these actions jointly - so the social 
offline face-to- face aspect is still important and motivating for this type of activism.  
 
Another way of assessing Internet-generated mobilisation and empowerment is the so-called 
‘V.E.R.A.city loop’ model developed by Maximillian Forte that is applied in the discussion of 
Internet-generated mobilisation among diasporas, indigenous peoples and minorities. This model of 
Forte illustrates how an Internet-generated mobilisation can be repeated again and again - 
henceforth labelled as a loop-function - through phases or processes of visualisation, embodiment, 
recognition and authenticity. These four issues are discussed in relation to the Circassian 
mobilisation, as all are relevant to the Circassian context. As a result of interviews and participation 
in Circassian events, I have identified ‘recognition’ as perhaps the single key-word that best 
describes the Circassian revival - albeit in a number of different understandings. The V.E.R.A.city 
loop model also illustrates the interconnectedness of the three key themes of mediation, 
memorialisation and mobilisation. 
 
‘Grassroots globalisation’ or ‘globalisation from below’ is the basis for some of the key discussions 
in relation to globalisation and civil society action - and often includes a focus on the role of the 
subaltern and the marginalised: “...a series of social forms has emerged to contest, interrogate, and 
reverse these developments and to create forms of knowledge transfer and social mobilisation that 
proceed independently of the actions of corporate capital and the nation-state system (and its 
international affiliates and guarantors).” (Appadurai 2000, 3). This is especially relevant to discuss 
in relation to a dispersed people without the formal backing of a nation-state that is increasingly 
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engaged in transnational mobilisation. Arjun Appadurai further notes on “the vast array of 
grassroots movements” that has emerged around the world: “Many of these movements also 
consciously build on global possibilities; build on possibilities of linking up to other likeminded 
movements, and so on and so on. I see direct connections between democracy and globalisation, 
positively speaking, as people leveraging connections and networks” (Hawley 2008, 292).  
 
The sociologist Saskia Sassen has coined the term ‘frontier zones (of globalisation)’ to designate a 
type of transnational border-crossing or networking cooperation that shares similarities with the 
developments within the Circassian civil society sector worldwide in later years. Issues and debates 
raised by civil society actors outside Russia have increasingly been shown to be able to affect the 
agenda in Russia - especially after the Georgian parliament chose to support a key Circassian civil 
society agenda in 2011 by recognising the Circassian genocide in the nineteenth century. The 
decision to hold the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi has also generated renewed transnational 
Circassian activity and has played an important role in facilitating significantly increased support 
for an understanding of forced exile as an act of genocide. This is perhaps the single most visible 
result of the increasingly transnational mobilisation among the Circassians - through mediated 
memorialisation and civil society action.  
 
Digital activism according to Hilary Pilkington “is the way millions of people - especially young 
people - relate to politics in the twenty-first century” (Pilkington 2011).41 Pilkington further 
concludes, based on research results: “The CivicWeb project concluded that ‘young people who are 
active online are also active offline’ and thus that the Internet civic sphere is best viewed not as a 
replacement for but a complement to offline civil and po litical action...” (Pilkington 2011).42 These 
conclusions largely correspond with my findings among the diverse and geographically scattered 
‘Circassian movement’, in spite of the different contexts they operate within. 43 
 
                                                 
41
 Hilary Pilkington refers to the Demos report ‘Digital Populism’ (published 07-11-2011). Th is survey, conducted by 
the British think tank Demos, was carried out in 11 European countries. 
42
 Pilkington quotes from the following Civ ic Web report by Banaji, C., Buckingham, D., van Zoonen, L. and Hirzalla, 
F. (2009): ‘Civic Web Report: Synthesis of Results and Policy Outcomes’, available electronically at  
www.civicweb.eu/images/stories/reports/civicweb%20wp11%20final.pdf (page 63). Hilary Pilkington further stresses 
that online activists are “not just armchair act ivis ts”. 
43
 On the fear of ‘coloured revolutions’ in Russia, that today also includes fear of Facebook or Twitter revolutions, in 
Moldova 2009 and the role of Russia (russiablog.org 17-04-2009); and of civ il society demonstrations and use of 
Internet mobilisation in Russia in December 2011 (russiablog.org 04-01-2012). 
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The Circassian revival illustrates the increasingly transnational character of civil society 
mobilisation while at the same time exemplifying some of the shortcomings or barriers this process 
is faced with. One example, for instance, was when the successful lobbying of and subsequent 
cooperation with official Georgian actors, which also included cooperation with a US think-tank, 
resulted in the cancellation of a large international Circassian conference in 2010 after pressure 
from Russia. Limited financial power is an obvious shortcoming in the Circassian revival, which 
can be seen when the two state actors of Russia and Georgian compete over the Circassian legacy 
along the Black Sea coast. The 2014 Sochi Olympics, which initially completely ignored Circassian 
history in the area, but has more recently allocated space to the Circassians in a less visible side-
event as part of the folkloristic entertainment. This type of experience is known from many 
indigenous contexts whereby large-scale projects are used to further marginalise indigenous people, 
who were hoping for the opposite. Further south on the Black Sea coast - just south of the 
Abkhazian border - within just a year Georgia had erected the monument to the Circassian exile that 
Circassian civil society actors would have liked to see in the Sochi area. The Georgian government 
further established a Circassian Cultural Centre in Tbilisi with researchers and other staff members, 
who take part in further elevating Circassian issues on the transnational scene.  
 
Since his re- inauguration as President of Russia in May 2012, Vladimir Putin has launched several 
initiatives restricting civil society action. A new law requires organisations that receive funding 
from abroad to register their activities formally as funded by ‘foreign agents’. In September 2012 
USAID was forced to close down its operations in Russia - according to the Kremlin for “attempts 
to influence political processes, including elections of various types, and institutions of civil society 
through the distribution of grants”.44 Fines for taking part in public demonstrations and other forms 
of public disturbance have also been raised significantly. Sergei Markov, prominent member of the 
Presidential Council for Civil Society, stated that foreign support for civil society development was 
both unwanted and un-Russian. These types of restrictions on the space for action within the civil 
society sector in Russia could also be used against Circassian organisations in the future, although 
actual funding from abroad has been limited. Still, these initiatives could serve to reduce the 
otherwise increasing efforts in the direction of transnational cooperation. A reduction in the space 
for action of Circassian civil society initiatives following the return of President Putin has been 
predicted by a number of Circassians. A few have suggested that the protests and demonstrations in 
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 Ch icagotribune.com (19-09-2012). 
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Russia - especially in December 2011 and in relation to the Pussy Riot court case in 2012 - 
represent cracks in Russian society through which future changes in the role of civil society might 
develop. 
 
Russia is repeatedly seeking and winning the right to host international mega sports events - the 
Football World Cup in 2018 and Formula One racing events will both include Sochi in the future - 
and this will inevitably bring a renewed focus on human rights, freedom of the media and civil 
society. These events also offer Circassian activists engaged in the anti-Sochi campaign and other 
elements of the Circassian mobilisation an opportunity for continuing the protests and resistance in 
which they have gained experience in recent years. This is probably important, as experiences from 
other mega sports events show that, once the event has passed, the spotlight quickly dies out and 
actions of protest again have to return to more limited public spaces.  
 
The process of civil society mobilisation among Circassian minorities in the two Eurasian states of 
Russia and Turkey, which both constitute former empires with a contested past vis-à-vis territorial 
minority groups such as the Circassians, is unfolding as part of ongoing but different processes of 
democratic development or transition. Both states formally underline the fact that they follow 
standards and practices from various European institutions such as the Council of Europe, the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (only 
Turkey), but the Circassian minority context indicates the actual outcome of these processes. 
Discussing and assessing the Circassian minority contexts in the two countries offers an opportunity 
to compare and conclude upon these parallel processes.  
 
 
Institutionalisation, Knowledge-Production and Geopolitics 
 
The institutionalisation of Circassianness as it has unfolded over the last two hundred years - the 
modern era - is a way of framing, understanding and discussing the contemporary Circassian revival 
that I find relevant and constructive. Partly because this is an analytical framework that can 
encompass the many different references to the nineteenth century by contemporary Circassian 
actors - including the contested issues and the displacement of the majority of the Circassian 
population. And partly because the nineteenth century was a period marked by the arrival of new 
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discourses on nations and nationalism based on ethnicity as territorially-based (nation-states), which 
little-by-little became the main ordering of the international system of states as large (European) 
empires began to disintegrate. The legitimacy attached to ethnicity, nation and nation-state was 
finally endorsed in the twentieth century by the post-World War I peace conference in Paris, 
including the principle of national self-determination as outlined by the American President 
Woodrow Wilson, and the rise of the United Nations after World War II as a successor to the 
League of Nations.45 Later decolonisation and the fall of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia more or 
less completed this process - for a period at least. In the nineteenth century, especially in Europe, 
the principle of nation-building and nation-state gradually gathered speed - often in parallel with 
imperial competition for colonisation of non-European spaces. This was illustrated by the processes 
of ‘Russification’ during the nineteenth century, as well as by the British and others’ perception of 
Circassia as an independent state/nation.46 A few decades later, Britain ended up accepting the 
Russian conquest of Circassia in spite of protests from some British actors who contested the 
Russian interpretation of the 1829 Adrianople peace treaty, according to which Russia had won the 
rights to Circassia and not just the former Ottoman trading posts on the Circassian Black Sea coast, 
which they actually possessed. This also illustrates why geopolitics is relevant for inclusion in the 
discussion.  
 
The process of institutionalisation of Circassianness over the last two hundred years is a process 
with significant shifts between continuity and change - both of which are important to include in the 
discussion.47 It is not enough to focus on the major historical (or geopolitical) shifts, such as those 
which took place in 1864, in 1917/1922 (Russian revolution and civil war) and in 1991 (the fall of 
the Soviet Union) but also to discuss the institutionalised continuities. 48 One example is the fact that 
Circassian territorial units reoccurred after the establishment of the Soviet Union, which represented 
not just a geopolitical necessity for the Bolsheviks in order to ensure that these territories stayed 
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 As noted by Robert Conquest, nationalism in the twentieth century became a dominant historical force (Conquest 
2000, 242). 
46
 Shifting - and somet imes competing - processes of ‘Russification’ and ’nativ isation’, respectively, were already 
unfolding in the nineteenth century and continued in different ways during the Soviet period, though never without an 
element of control and dominance from the imperial/Union centre. 
47
 I have chosen to use the term ’Circassianness’ instead of the terms ’Circassia’ and ’Circassian’, as it contain key 
elements of both. This is also inspired by Brubaker and his use of the terms ’nationness’ and ’nationhood’: “Instead of 
focusing on nations as real groups, we should focus on nationhood and nationness, on “nation” as practical category, 
institutionalised form, and contingent event” (Brubaker 1996, 7).  
48
 As an extension of the continuity versus change binary, Brubaker discusses the need to include both continuity and 
events that can happen suddenly in the analysis of institutionalisation of nationhood or nationness - as something that 
develops and as something that happens (Brubaker 1996, 19). 
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within the Soviet Union but also signified a continuation of the legitimacy attached to the categories 
of native belonging.49 This could be seen in the many republics that were established in the Soviet 
Union based on these principles since the 1920s. In parallel with the violent Imperial Russian 
colonisation of the Caucasus and the ensuing period of imperial integration in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, the Circassians and other North Caucasian peoples became part of a reformed 
and European- inspired administration and apparatus of scientific knowledge production that 
included ethnographic and geographical investigations of the Circassians and other North Caucasian 
peoples. This also entailed a number of new publications and a new Caucasian museum in the 
regional centre of Tbilisi, and supplemented knowledge production on Circassia and the Circassians 
that had already begun earlier in the century, when a number of different actors visited the area, and 
subsequently published books and newspaper articles in several different languages. 50 This was 
partly due to the Caucasus becoming a destination for adventurous travellers and writers of 
travelogues but especially illustrates how geopolitical concerns can generate wider interests in a 
European periphery otherwise absent from the European public spheres of the era. The type of 
legitimacy attached to Circassianness - both in the North Caucasus and in exile in the nineteenth 
century - is still relevant and reproduced today, including the alterations of the ethnic engineering of 
the Soviet period. 
 
 
The Institutionalisation of Circassianness 
 
The institutionalisation of Circassianness - as the kind of modern ethno-territorial identity-building 
process and a process of categorisation and re-categorisation that is of interest to this thesis - has 
taken place since the beginning of the nineteenth century. In the discussion of institutionalisation of 
Circassianness, I draw upon the geographer Anssi Paasi and his models for the analysis of 
geographical-territorial identity building, supplemented by the sociologist Rogers Brubaker and his 
writings on the processes of institutionalisation of Soviet and post-Soviet ethnicity.  
 
Many scholars investigating the former Soviet Union and the post-Soviet states apply a state-
centred approach that often leads to misrepresentations of minority populations or simply ignoring 
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 Kabarda was part of the independent Mountain Republic from 1918-1920. 
50
 The Circassian part of the collect ion of the Tbilisi museum was shown at a special exh ibit ion in Anaklia on the Black 
Sea coast in May 2012 in relation to the unveiling of the new monument to the Circassian genocide.  
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the minorities (and minority rights that are celebrated in other contexts). One example of a 
generalisation is when Taras Kuzio notes that eleven out of the fifteen post-Soviet successor states 
“...inherited peoples who had not yet acquired the attributes of what would be defined by political 
scientist and anthropologists as consolidated identities” (Kuzio 2002, 248). Although Kuzio does 
not specify which peoples he is focusing on, this statement is also an example of a potential 
misrepresentation of institutionalised ethnicity as a purely Soviet legacy and therefore potentially 
‘false’ or in other ways ‘wrong’. Brubaker, Kuzio and others, in some of their analyses, are inclined 
to overlook and/or even act patronisingly in their analyses of the role of minorities.51 
 
The relevance of categories such as being ‘indigenous’ are - just like the terms ‘diaspora’ or 
‘minority’ - still new to many Circassians - and are regularly discussed at Circassian conferences 
and events. Linda T. Smith has noted in relation to the importance of belonging to the category 
‘indigenous people’ that the term ‘people’ is just as important as the term ‘indigenous’: “It is 
regarded as crucial by indigenous activists because it is peoples who are recognised in international 
law as having the right to self-determination” (Smith 1999, 114). An increased legitimacy has 
generally and gradually been attributed to ‘indigenousness’ since the 1960s. Indigenousness has 
become a part of the ongoing Circassian memorialisation whereby the Circassians are often referred 
to as the ‘natives’ or the ‘native population’ in the different documents from the nineteenth century. 
This is also an illustration of the authenticity ascribed to being native or indigenous, which hints at a 
form of recognition.  
 
The institutionalisation of Circassian as a category of ‘people’ or ‘ethnicity’ in Russia generally 
began through an initial categorisation via anthropology and geography - first as an army 
occupation, since as independent sciences. Then, in the Soviet period, these categories were 
generally upgraded and assigned to different levels in the hierarchy of territorial ethnic groups. 
Most of the different hierarchies were abolished in the contemporary Russian Federation, in which 
the three Circassian groups all constitute so-called ‘titular nations’ in federal republics. In a Russian 
context, the term ‘nation’ (natsia) can have a double meaning as both ‘nation’ and ‘ethnicity’. The 
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 ‘Affirmative Action Empire’ by Terry Martin (2001) is one example. Interestingly, another book about roughly the 
same period is ‘The Great Terror’ by Robert Conquest (1968), which illustrates the broad spectrum of options when 
analysing the USSR in the 1930s. In 1970, Conquest published ‘The Nation Killers’ on the whole peoples that were 
deported during the Second World War (and became “un-nations”, disappeared from statistics and encyclopaedias). 
(According to Conquest, the relation to minority peoples became tactical, as the charges of disloyalty generally were a 
thin disguise).  
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term nation was already being used confusingly in the nineteenth century as referring to either 
‘people’ or ‘(state-)territory’, but often without clarifying which definition was being used. This can 
still be the case today. 
 
The identity categories of Circassianness and Caucasianness are overlapping and both are often 
used in the same sources. Circassianness is a part of Caucasianness, which is illustrated by the many 
websites that cover both Circassian and Caucasian issues and in which many of the themes are 
overlapping. This is, for instance, apparent in the visual representations from the nineteenth century, 
which illustrate how many aspects of folklore and legend are shared by the Caucasian peoples. In 
the words of Stuart Hall, it can be said that they all take part in “imposing an imaginary coherence 
on the experience of dispersal and fragmentation, which is the history of all enforced diasporas” 
(Hall 1990, 224).  
 
 
Knowledge Production (and uneven geographies) 
 
As already indicated in relation to memorialisation and counter-memorialisation above, a discussion 
of the so-called ‘power-knowledge nexus’ - as considered by authors such as Edward Said, Michel 
Foucault, Derek Gregory and many others - is at the heart of the Circassian revival.52 Historical 
knowledge is rediscovered, retrieved, reproduced and used to challenge the contemporary power-
knowledge nexus that exists in Russia in a form of resistance that resembles Rehnuma Sazzad’s 
description of how Edward Said turned his exile into “an intellectual exile of resistance” - although 
not all Circassians are in exile (Sazzad 2008, 1). Many elements of these processes have already 
been discussed above, so the important role of knowledge production in relation to the Circassians, 
today as well as historically, will briefly be addressed here. 
 
In his book ‘The Colonial Present’, David Gregory stated: “We need other ways of mapping the 
turbulent times and spaces in which and through which we live” (Gregory 2004, 12). Gregory 
stresses the need for ‘contrapunctual geographies’ and argues for a new need for analysis of the 
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 Rehnuma Sazzad writes about Edward Said as a Palestinian in exile, ”who transforms the pain of physical separation 
from” the ”native land into a priv ilege of intellectual freedom” (2008, 1) - or as the subtitle of the paper puts it: 
”resistance through revealing the power-knowledge nexus” (Sazzad’s comments on physical exile becoming an 
intellectual exile of resistance have similarit ies to the many Circassians becoming involved in knowledge and 
informat ion generation as part of resistance).  
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‘colonial present’ in which ‘memory’ plays a key role (Gregory, 9).53 Gregory argues that his 
analysis of these processes can be understood according to a scheme of ‘colonial amnesia’ and 
‘colonial nostalgia’ cross-cut by ‘culture’ and ‘power’ (his figure 1.1: ‘Memory and the Colonial 
Present’), which can be used as a “rough and ready template” for tracing “the arts of memory that 
play an important part in the production of the colonial present” (Gregory, 9). Gregory further notes 
that “...the arts of memory have always turned on space and geography as much as on time and 
history” (Gregory, 11) - as Gregory further states in relation to the celebration of the “new 
transnational cybernetics” (Jameson in Gregory, 11), which according to Gregory, “imposes its own 
unequal and uneven geographies” (Gregory, 12). These forms of ‘unequal and uneven geographies’ 
are also relevant to discuss in relation to the Circassians and Russia - not just in taking into 
consideration the one-sided domination but also in looking at how this affects Circassians in their 
acts of resistance and protest as well as the general processes of identity-building. The approach of 
‘unequal and uneven geographies’ includes a discussion on similar issues by Edward Said, Linda T. 
Smith and others in relation to marginalised and often colonised groups and territories. This leads to 
a discussion on the theme of geopolitics in the following.  
 
In spite of the Orientalist tendencies of both Russian and Western actors producing knowledge 
about Circassia and the Circassians in the nineteenth century, several ambiguities and 
disagreements were included in this knowledge production, and these play an important role in the 
ongoing reconstruction of Circassian identity. This has, for instance, been reflected in the reactions 
towards the enforced 450th anniversary in 2007 of the voluntary Circassian-Russian unification - 
celebrations that was cancelled ten years earlier after being rejected as ‘false’ by a committee of 
historians. The element of ‘unequal and uneven geographies’ is further stained by the regular 
references to terrorism in the North Caucasus region in Russia as well as in the rest of the world - as 
described by Gregory above. This is also used in relation to Circassian activists and also towards, 
for instance, environmental activists criticising the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games, historians 
investigating the nineteenth century Russo-Caucasian Wars etc.  
 
The geopolitical competition in the nineteenth century resulted in a space for Circassian voices that 
reached the public spheres of Europe and other parts of the world, in a period where public opinion 
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 ‘The Colonial Present’ is inspired mainly by the Western reactions towards Islam or the Middle East, Afghanistan 
and Iraq in the aftermath of 9/11 2001.  
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and public spheres were attaining new roles in these societies. 54 This is the period of increased 
production of newspapers and journals that Anderson labelled print capitalism. In spite of being 
able to voice their concerns to the outside world, Circassia still ended up being colonised by force, 
with large numbers of Circassians killed or sent into exile. To the Russian Empire, this was not only 
a victory over the last of the fiercely resisting Caucasian mountain peoples but also a geopolitical 
victory. This was the victory that settled the so-called Eastern Question in favour of Russia55, which 
was part of the reason behind the large celebrations of the 1864 victory - both in 1864 and again in 
1914. Power, in the end, settled the score but, as we can see from today’s Circassian revival, the 
significant amount of knowledge generated in the nineteenth century - partly due to the geopolitical 
competition that made the Circassian Question into an issue of international concern - today plays a 
key role in the Circassian revival. Not only are the voices of the Circassians reproduced and 
recirculated - albeit mainly through reports from, for instance, British agents and other visitors to 
Circassia in the nineteenth century. Sources found in Imperial Russian archives are now particularly 
used to document Circassian history, including the many incidents of what would today be called 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing or attempted genocide. In other words, Circassian voices were not 
fully ‘silenced’ in the nineteenth century, although the final victory of Russia resulted in a near 
‘silencing’.56 I will argue that this case of being only ‘partly silenced’ has proven to be significant in 
relation to the Circassian revival today, together with the evidence from the Imperial Russian 
archives that now functions as important elements of the revival of a ‘Circassian voice’ today. The 
use of imperial archives in research and documentation has today become part of an empowerment 
of Circassian civil society actors in a continuously reproduced and renewed mobilisation - in a 
manner similar to Linda T. Smith’s analysis of the wider process of indigenous people’s revival.  
 
 
Geopolitical Reconfigurations 
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 This was also illustrated by the role of civ il society organisations that worked for the promotion of the Circassian 
Question - Circassian committees were established in France, Ottoman Turkey and Great Britain (including in 
Scotland). This was a parallel to the more well-known anti-slavery efforts by civil society organisations active in many 
countries during this period. (During the 1990s, in a similar manner, a number Chechen support committees were 
established around the world - especially after Russia began the war in December 1994).  
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 For instance according to Russian newspaper articles from the period.  
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 The Circassians may have avoided being fully silenced due to the geopolitical competition surrounding their 
Caucasian location along the border zone between Asia and Europe. Much of the cont emporary voicing of Circassian 
issues is based on complaints about being more or less silenced and ignored - or misrepresented - for almost 150 years.  
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The role of memorialisation in the Circassian revival is largely a protest against official Russian 
versions of Circassian history and identity. The generation and presentation of knowledge, 
documentation and information from the nineteenth century is at the centre of these activities. Much 
of the mentioned material can be found in Russian archives, though access is still limited. However, 
much of the contemporary Circassian civil society research illustrates an attempted ‘reversal’ or 
‘countering’ of a colonial process, where, for instance, colonial archives from different empires are 
today used by the colonised or the marginalised in a process of mobilisation. As illustrated by 
access to Imperial Russian archives in Georgia, this process also has geopolitical implications 
whereby the increased tension between Georgia and Russia following the war in 2008 has generated 
a renewed Georgian focus on the peoples and republics of the North Caucasus. This is, on the one 
hand, an illustration of how minorities and indigenous people are often dependent on other actors in 
geopolitical games or simply risk becoming victims of the actions of bigger players. On the other 
hand, it also illustrates how these post-2008 changes in the geopolitical configurations in the 
Caucasus have made it possible for Circassian organisations from third countries to successfully 
lobby for access to archives and for recognition of the Circassian genocide. The latter case is also an 
illustration of how a ‘frontier zone (of globalisation)’ as defined by Saskia Sassen can function and 
an example of how local or transnational actors can become actors in geopolitical games, as 
emphasised in the ‘critical geopolitics’ by Tuathail and others. 
 
For parts of the Circassian movement, future Circassian independence is seen as the long-term goal. 
This is often voiced at various demonstrations and other events - and on the Internet. Other 
Circassians are primarily working for increased Circassian rights or self-determination, for 
increased repatriation, or for the creation of a joint Circassian republic in the North Caucasus. In the 
diaspora, especially in Turkey, there are still many who would like to see the multi-ethnic North 
Caucasian Mountain Republic of 1918 reappear in one form or another. 57 The formal Georgian 
recognition of the Circassian genocide and the partnership between Georgian and Circassian 
organisations also marks a geopolitical reconfiguration whereby a new Caucasian position that 
includes elements from the Russian North Caucasus is challenging the traditional Russian 
dominance. The use of the Imperial Russian archives located in Tbilisi as part of this process 
illustrates the element of a power/knowledge reconfiguration. Still, the use of scenarios of a future 
independent Circassia is angering parts of the Russian establishment and has been used by 
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 This idea still has some support in the North Caucasus, although the lack of success of the Confederat ion of Mountain 
Peoples in the Caucasus in the first part of the 1990s has diminished this support.  
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politicians, the media and others to paint a picture of enemies hostile to the federation and its 
territorial integrity. 
 
Both Russia and Turkey are undergoing processes of repositioning as major powers and geopolitical 
players in the Eurasian sphere, which is also attracting interest due to the rising role of China, the 
conflicts in the Middle East and the transportation of oil and gas. 58 In these games of international 
politics, the region of the Caucasus and its peoples has often ended up getting squeezed or on the 
losing side due to the interests of other players. This was particularly evident during the final rush 
for full colonisation of the globe in the nineteenth century, which is a key period in the 
contemporary Circassian memorialisation and mobilisation process. For the machinery of the 
expanding Russian Empire - a machinery that in the nineteenth century no longer only consisted of 
simply the military but also included modern administration and science - Circassia constituted a 
blank spot on the map. Still, the geopolitical competition secured an international attention for 
several decades in the nineteenth century. Whether the Sochi Olympics will be able to do the same 
in the 21st century still remains to be seen. 
 
The Circassian Question in the nineteenth century referred mainly to the potential survival of 
Circassia as an independent country. As such, the Circassian Question became part of the Eastern 
Question, which largely consisted of British - and some others as well - fears of Russian expansion 
and potential further dominance in Asia. This was one of the biggest issues in international politics 
of the period and has since also been known by names such as the Great Game or the Victorian 
Cold War. In Russia, the final victory in the Caucasus in 1864 resulted in different forms of 
celebrations and these sentiments were illustrated by a Moscow newspaper that declared that the 
Eastern Question had now once and for all been settled in favour of Russia.  
 
 
Methods  
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 Russia is one of the so-called BRIC-countries representing mainly non-European states with rising geopolitical 
influence and members of the G-20 group of the most powerful and dominant states in the world. The rising economy 
and increased role of Turkey in relat ion to, for instance, the Middle East would make Turkey a potential member of 
both groups but Turkey is widely regarded as a future EU member and geopolitically often regarded as ‘European’ or 
‘Euro-Atlantic’ due to its membership of the Nato alliance.  
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The chapters constituting this thesis consist of individual papers that all, in differing ways, address 
the ongoing Circassian revival. It is the purpose of this introductory chapter to establish a joint 
methodological or theoretical skeleton joining the papers together. I have two different overall 
thematic approaches to this process - one has emerged during my research into different aspects of 
the Circassian revival and the other I have had in the back of my mind as a potential theoretical 
framework that all or most of the papers could link up to from the beginning - partly because I have 
used theories on institutionalisation of territorial or ethnic identity previously. The other approach 
has become my internal ‘guide- line’ for the three M’s that roughly cover my research: the 
transnational Mediated Memorialisation and Mobilisation of the Circassians.  
 
I have worked in and with the Caucasus for almost twenty years - in between other jobs, including 
several years of working with civil society networking across borders in post-war ex-Yugoslavia. I 
have experience from several longer periods of fieldwork in the North Caucasus region during the 
1990s and have a network in the region that I have drawn upon in relation to this project on the 
Circassian revival. I have spent several periods in the Circassian parts or the North Caucasus and 
observed parts of the first post-Soviet Circassian revival at the beginning of the 1990s before the 
authorities took control of the organisations. Ever since, I have been aware that a renewed 
Circassian revival, such as the one that is presently unfolding, would at some point take place. I 
collected materials, conducted interviews and talked to a number of people who were active 
participants in the first post-Soviet Circassian revival, and this has formed a part of my preparations 
for the research found in this thesis. Caucasian minorities have been at the centre of most of my 
prior experiences in the region, although the outbreak of several violent conflicts changed the focus 
to also include refugees and internally displaced persons - and the so-called ethnic conflicts. 
 
When I began to follow the Circassian revival more closely from 2008 on, it was still being mainly 
noted by only a few beyond those interested in Caucasian affairs and generally passed under the 
radar of different national public spheres - including Russia. Still, in various Caucasian public 
spheres - including on the Internet - the renewed level of activity among Circassian civil society 
was clearly visible. The 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics in particular has, since the decision in 2007, 
been used by Circassian actors to develop an increasingly visible platform for action and 
information dissemination - a process that picked up speed especially after the end of the 2010 
Vancouver Winter Olympics.  
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It increasingly became clear that many of the themes that could be discussed in relation to this 
revival actually touched upon a number of key contemporary tendencies. These themes were often 
referred to as ‘turns’ and illustrated the fact that the Circassian revival was a timely issue to 
investigate. The Circassian revival can be assessed or analytically approached as an intersection of 
different ‘thematic turns’, such as the ‘diaspora turn’, the ‘memory turn’, the ‘civil society turn’, the 
‘mediation/media/mediatic turn’, the ‘indigenous turn’, the ‘geopolitical turn’, the ‘identity turn’, 
the ‘nation branding turn’, the ‘spatial turn’ etc. In the end, it is perhaps the ‘global turn’ of the 
contemporary processes of late modern globalisation that can encompass a discussion of many of 
these contemporary turns.  
 
The key methodological elements of my research process have been: interviews with key actors 
(mainly within civil society organisations59); field visits; observations (including both formal and 
informal occasions); conference participation (arranged by both Circassian/Caucasian organisations 
and academic institutions in different countries); participation in organisational meetings (including 
planning of events); presence at events; collection of materials; website pages of organisations and 
other Circassian/Caucasian websites, including social media; various other media representations of 
the Circassian revival.  
 
My main working language in interviews has been English, supplemented with some German and 
Russian. The dispersed nature of the Circassian World has resulted in a language barrier whereby 
there are still many organisational representatives that have limited English skills; however, a young 
activist or relative was usually able to assist. I have collected material from organisations in several 
different languages, including Russian and Turkish in particular. During the period 2008 to 2012, 
many organisations began to offer materials through their websites, which are often relatively 
newly-established or have been significantly upgraded during my period of research. Similarly, the 
number of documents translated and made available in the English language has risen significantly 
and this also includes articles on Circassian issues generally available on most of the websites. This 
                                                 
59
 Since my in itial focus was on the Circassian diaspora, I have interviewed more representatives from d iaspora 
organisations than organisations in the Caucasus. Another reason is that I wished to pass ‘under the radar’ of the 
intelligence services that follow the activ ities of many of the Circassian organisation in Russia (and sometimes also 
abroad) - mostly due to future intensions of working in Russian Caucasus, for instance in relation to the 2014 Sochi 
Winter Olympics. 
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is to a large extent due to the arrival of a new generation of ‘digital natives’ who often also possess 
English language skills.  
 
My field visits to different Circassian contexts that were most relevant in generating an 
understanding of the renewed Circassian mobilisation were: Istanbul, Turkey (x4); Dücze, Turkey; 
New Jersey, USA (x2); Amman, Jordan; Damascus, Syria; Brussels, Belgium (x2); Berlin, 
Germany; Hamburg, Germany; Sochi, Russia (x3); Maikop, Russia (x3); Nalchik, Russia; Saint 
Petersburg and Moscow, Russia; Tbilisi and Anaklia, Georgia. Beyond these field trips, I have been 
in contact with representatives from other Circassian places such as, for instance, Israel and France, 
during conferences and other events. I have not been in contact with the relatively visible Circassian 
organisations in Australia and California but I include some of their material in my chapters. Nor 
have I not been in contact with the Circassian organisations in Egypt and Libya which - together 
with Syria - suddenly became visible during the Arab Spring of 2011. 
 
My main research focus has been on the recent trends and especially the post-2005 developments, 
with the establishment of new organisations and with a multitude of new Internet initiatives 
appearing. Some of the older organisations and their events have, however, been included in order 
to give a fuller picture of the Circassian diaspora development. This is also due to the fact that many 
of the new organisations refer to the lack of initiative on the part of the older organisations as part 
of their motivation for starting up new organisations and getting involved. Since my entry point has 
often been the new organisations, this has led to a certain level of hesitation, suspicion or reluctance 
from representatives of the older ones. Many of these, for instance in Turkey and the Middle East, 
often rejected labelling their efforts as ‘political’ and insisted that their organisation or association 
only focused on Circassian ‘culture’. This is in line with the general approach of civil society 
organisations of ethnic or religious minorities for many decades - for instance in Turkey. This has 
been particularly noteworthy among the local organisations, while representatives from nationwide 
organisations such as the federal Circassian association in Turkey, Kaffed, have become more 
outspoken and also stressed their role as politically-oriented organisations acting on behalf of the 
Circassians in Turkey. This also illustrates how the new possibilities for political action among 
ethnic minorities in Turkey are also facing internal conservatism and carefulness that is often 
grounded in experiences from earlier periods and which can potentially lead to a form of self-
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censorship. It is this pattern that some of the youth activists and organisations often declare 
themselves to be acting against in particular. 
 
The Internet has, first and foremost, functioned as a source of information which, to a large extent, 
is very similar to going to a library. Compared to my work in the Caucasus in the 1990s, the 
conditions for collecting information have changed radically. The material available on the Internet 
has not only supplemented the interviews and the material collected in the region but has also 
constituted valuable sources that used to be difficult to obtain through the type of pre-Internet media 
available. The use of social media sites has increased significantly during my period of research, 
and most of these sites are open and available, and therefore easy to inc lude in my assessments.  
 
Two kinds of conferences have played an important role in my research: conferences arranged by 
Circassian or Caucasian organisations (mainly among the diaspora) and academic conferences held 
in academic institutions at different locations. The academic conferences have functioned as a way 
of testing various arguments, hypotheses and potential thematic understandings or approaches to the 
study of the Circassian revival. Such conferences also function as professional networking 
opportunities and have, on some occasions, generated interest in the publication of papers including, 
some of the chapters of this thesis. It has also been important for me to experience different 
locations that are important to the Circassians and the challenges they face in the planning and 
implementation of activities, including conferences. Both in the Turkish and in the Georgian 
context, conference organisers complained of a lack of interest on the part of many Western 
scholars who are often uninterested or cancel their participation (after the programme has been 
printed). There has been a widespread understanding at several of these events that locations such as 
Turkey or Georgia are still not fully accepted in contemporary European academia - which often 
appear to prefer a Western or Anglo-American orientation in conferences. Another challenge for 
academic conference organisers in Turkey came from, for instance, members of the public and from 
a specific Circassian/Caucasian organisation that repeatedly phoned and wrote to conference 
organisers to complain that the word ‘genocide’ is not being used in their posters and other material 
advertising the conference. They claimed this was equal to not recognising the Circassian genocide, 
despite this issue actually forming part of the conference. 
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Many Circassian events either include a conference or have the organising of a conference as their 
main object. The holding of conferences is one of the key activities for several of the Circassian and 
Caucasian organisations - especially within the Circassian diaspora, where the knowledge on a 
number of Circassian issues is still considered to be inconsistent or lacking (although this situation 
has improved considerably since 2005). At conferences, the positions of a number of key 
organisations and persons were often presented - and sometimes discussed. Participation in such 
conferences has given me valuable input for my research and has often included additional 
interviews with the organisers or speakers. Attending conferences often led to an opportunity to 
visit organisations and observe their premises - although not all organisations have their own 
premises - but organisational visits always contribute to a more concrete picture of the organisation 
and enable you to meet activists, board members, librarians etc. On several occasions I was able to 
observe various activities, collect written or printed materials such as brochures, newspapers, 
newsletters etc. and was introduced to various organisational functions. 60 I have on several 
occasions been able to use the libraries and archives of some of the organisations - partly to obtain 
new or additional information and partly to gain an understanding of the general content. The three 
foundations in Istanbul and Ankara, in particular, have unique collections sometimes dating back to 
the period before the forced exile from the Caucasus as well as from the early years of the exile.  
 
Many of the Circassian organisations are run on limited financial budgets and often depend on 
volunteers to act as activists, teachers, librarians etc. and many meetings and interviews therefore 
had to be conducted in the evening or during the weekend. In some cases, I had to meet the 
representatives first and have my intentions and background questioned before a level of trust was 
established. Afterwards, I often experienced very friendly and helpful assistance. Sometimes it was 
helpful when my earlier writings were known to the organisational representatives - some of which 
had been uploaded and circulated on the Internet without my knowledge, sometimes also translated 
into other languages. I have on several occasions given a lecture at a local organisation or university 
in return for visiting and interviewing representatives of organisations. To me, this has been a fair 
deal and also gave me valuable input in terms of obtaining feedback to my assumptions and ideas as 
well as generally observing the kind of discussions that followed.  
                                                 
60
 This has included taking photographs as part of my internal min i-mapping of the different Circassian events and 
spaces around the world, which includes a focus on how Circassianness and Caucasianness are visually represented. 
‘Circassiana’ or ‘Caucasiana’ are  often sold at Circassian and Caucasian events, which is part of my overall 
investigations into the Circassian revival, where I have especially focussed on visual representations of the nineteenth 
century - and particularly how these are reproduced/digitalised and circulated on the Internet.  
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Shifting the national fields or contexts from paper to paper - chapter to chapter - has been a constant 
challenge when analysing, generalising, concluding etc. In the diaspora countries, the main focus is 
on Turkey, where by far the most Circasssians are today found and many initiatives are potentially 
pointing in new directions for the ‘Circassian movement’. The Turkish context is discussed in 
Chapter 3. The American and European contexts will be used shortly to illustrate different 
approaches to civil society mobilisation compared to countries such as Turkey and Russia, where 
the space for action within the civil society sector is still relatively new to many - especially ethnic 
minorities. The Russian context has become more important to include since the renewed Circassian 
mobilisation from 2005 on, in which claims of genocide and other calls for ‘recognition’ now 
address today’s Russia far more than was the case before. The Russian context of the Circassian 
republics is therefore especially dealt with in Chapter 2, but is also part of the discussions in 
Chapters 4 and 5. As mentioned earlier, I visited fewer civil society organisations in Russia than in 
the diaspora, for a number of reasons. Instead I visited Circassian villages along the Black Sea coast 
where I also carried out mini-mappings of Circassian spaces, partly to test the allegations of many 
in the diaspora that all traces of Circassianness had been erased there. On my second visit, I did 
similar mapping exercises to look for potential changes. This can be seen in the paper/chapter on 
the role of the Sochi Olympics in the Circassian revival. I also interviewed representatives of 
research institutions and magazines specialising in Circassian/Caucasian issues, and visited libraries 
and interviewed environmental organisations in the Sochi area.  
 
This thesis is primarily written from a minority perspective. This is not the same as taking ‘sides’ - 
in any case, different positions are often found within minority groups. I do not see my research as 
promoting minority issues and agendas, which is something that I have, from time to time, been 
accused of: “Would it not be better if you just left them alone?” and “then they would stop 
complaining and not create conflicts in the future.” I believe this kind of allegation, that my interest 
- together with that of others - could lead to increased Circassian activism or even radicalism, is 
mistaken and erroneous. The fact that minority issues have been either ignored or misrepresented 
for long periods is actually a driving force behind much of the civil society mobilisation. I have met 
somewhat similar reactions from individuals - for instance, within academia - who insinuates that 
people like me may be promoting nationalism, which is generally seen as negative without much 
further attention to the context in question. I find such suggestions non-historic as many of these 
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academics previously supported processes of decolonisation as well as the fall of Communism - 
though both processes were dominated by national claims and nationalism. Such comments and 
suggestions almost endorse the instalment of a kind of ‘silence’ towards minorities such as the 
Circassians, which is actually one of the key issues addressed in the Circassian revival. Protests 
against being silenced - today as well as historically - are at the centre of this revival and, for many 
Circassian actors, constitute the main motivating factor.  
 
A multitude of studies that have analysed ethnic groups and minorities from a state perspective can 
be found - also in the case of Russia and Turkey. Some of these, for instance, recommend the 
abolition of ethnically defined republics in Russia or suggest replacing ethnic and cultural identities 
such as those found among the indigenous peoples of the North Caucasus with a new form of 
Russian civic citizenship. However sympathetic or idealistic such suggestions appear to be, they 
also show a lack of understanding of the situation in most of the ethnic peripheries of Russia, which 
most of these writers have never visited. This is a dilemma often facing minority groups - especially 
in countries such as Russia (and Turkey). This type of debate is found both within Russia and 
among various specialists from outside Russia. This to some degree resembles the understanding 
found among many writers, researchers etc. in Russia, many of whom have never actually visited 
the Caucasus but still voice or repeat prejudices and stereotypes about the region. I have often been 
met with surprise when I have informed people from, for instance, the central parts of Russia about 
the details of the minority situation in the North Caucasus. There is therefore a strong need for a 
minority perspective that focuses on issues of equal rights, discrimination etc.  
  
 
The Structure of the Thesis  
 
There are many both thematic and geographical overlaps in the different chapters, as all 
investigations behind these papers were driven by a curiosity to understand the sprawling Circassian 
revival as it has developed in various local and national contexts as well as transnationally. I have 
tried to avoid overlaps and repetitions but since most papers were written independently before this 
thesis was planned this is not fully possible, as I have chosen to maintain the published papers in 
their published form. Some parts of the chapters constitute shorter papers such as, for instance, 
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conference papers or other forms of draft papers that has been updated, as I find tem relevant and 
useful for the themes of the chapter in question.   
 
The papers that make up the chapters, as well as the structure of this thesis in general, reflect the 
fact that some of the papers are written from a similar perspective but set in different geographical 
contexts, as seen in Chapter 2 on the Russian context of the North Caucasus (Hansen 2012) and 
Chapter 3 on the Turkish context (Hansen 2013a). In both cases, civil society development - and 
especially the development of new organisations with new kinds of activities, the use of the Internet 
and the new role of youth activism - is at the heart of the chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 on the Circassian context of the North Caucasian republics in Russia represents an 
attempt to discuss and assess the new civil society initiatives - especially offline - as representations 
of Circassian minority groups in the North Caucasus. This includes observations on the relationship 
between non-governmental and governmental institutions in the three republics in which the 
Circassians formally constitute titular nationalities. This also constitutes an assessment of potential 
minority-majority reconfigurations in Russia around twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union.  
 
Chapter 3 on Circassian civil society development in Turkey represents an exercise partly similar to 
Chapter 2 on the Russian context albeit without the same need to discuss relations with the 
authorities.61 The main focus of this chapter is on the development dynamics within the steadily 
enlarging and dynamically-changing Circassian - and Caucasian - civil society sector. This entails a 
focus on a new type of politicisation of civil society actions which challenges the traditional 
approaches of the older organisations or associations. Differing understandings of the role of culture 
and politics are at the heart of some of the discussions and negotiations. An additional focus is on 
the trend towards increased transnational cooperation. 
 
Chapters 4-6 (Part III) are about the (contested) process(es) of institutionalisation of Circassianness 
in general over the last two hundred years - the modern era. Contrary to some representations, 
particularly in Russia, I argue that Circassia and the Circassians were not just subject to but also 
took active part in the introduction of modern narratives and agendas many decades before the final 
Russian colonisation of 1864. It is the aim of these chapters to try and establish a framework by 
                                                 
61
 A short analytical paper that functioned as the starting point of this paper, can be found in the Appendix. 
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which to understand a process of institutionalisation of geographical-territorial identity under 
shifting and often contested conditions. The starting point for these chapters was the ongoing 
process of virtual re-territorialisation of Circassia and Circassian identity on the Internet that I have 
labelled as ‘iCircassia’ - Internet-Circassia (Chapter 6). Chapter 4 is an introduction to the historical 
context of the nineteenth century, which is needed in order to understand the many historical 
references to this period within the contemporary Circassian revival.  
 
In Chapters 7-9 (Part IV) on mediated memorialisation and mobilisation, the focus shifts towards 
three key cases that illustrate the actions and priorities of the Circassian organisations and the 
Circassian revival in general: ‘May 21 (1864)’, ‘Genocide Recognition’ and ‘Sochi Winter 
Olympics 2014’ (Hansen 2013b). Here, especially, Circassian culture and memory play a key role 
as reflected in my 3M catchphrase of ‘mediated memorialisation and mobilisation’. Different 
approaches to the use of the Internet in new processes of memorialisation and mobilisation - often 
both at the same time - are the main focus of several of the papers. This includes a focus on the use 
of new features of Web 2.0 such as Facebook and YouTube in the combined efforts of Circassian 
memorialisation and mobilisation. The focus on memorialisation includes a discussion on 
Circassian vernacular memorialisation and counter-memorialisation as key elements of the 
Circassian revival.62 
 
 
 
ABSTRACTS OF CHAPTERS 
 
 
Chapter 2. The North Caucasian Context in Russia: Renewed Ethnic Mobilisation among the 
Circassians in Russia 
 
The renewed ethnic mobilization among Circassians in the North Caucasus region in Russia that has 
unfolded since the latter half of the 2000s is illustrated by the establishment of new civil society 
organizations and a substantially increased number of Internet-based initiatives. All of this reflects a 
new and increased form of agency and unity among the Circassians in which youth activism has 
played key role. It also illustrates how Circassian civil society actors and cyber-activists have not 
                                                 
62
 Two papers on the 2010 campaigns for the creation of a jo int Circassian Republic in Russia and for establishing 
Circassian as a joint category of the 2010 all-Russian census, respectively, have not been included in this thesis. As is 
the case with two shorter papers on the role of geopolitics. The chapters of part III have been shortened to fit the format.  
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only been able to establish a counter-public sphere or develop a new space for action, but also 
increasingly have been able to move key issues from Circassian spheres into the wider public 
sphere of mainstream Russian media and politics. The upcoming 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, 
Russia, in particular, has functioned as a lever in this process, which has also resulted in increasing 
support among Circassians for calls for recognition of the nineteenth century forced expulsion of 
the majority of the Circassians from the Caucasus as an act of genocide. In this manner, a mega-
event such as the Sochi Olympics has contributed to generating a more radical or politicized 
understanding or framing of the Caucasian exodus that, since the fall of the Soviet Union, has 
generally been known as “our national tragedy”. The million-strong and geographically dispersed 
Circassian diaspora have undergone a similar civil society and Internet-based mobilization since the 
mid-2000s, which includes increased transnational communication, coordination, and cooperation. 
 
 
Chapter 3. The Turkish Context: Frontier Zones of Diaspora-Making: Circassian Diaspora 
Organisations in Turkey 
 
It is the overall aim of this article to discuss the ongoing revival among the Circassian diaspora 
through a discussion of the recent developments among Circassian diaspora organisations in 
Turkey. Turkey is a key country for the Circassian diaspora, with a figure of somewhere between 2 
and 5 million Circassians, i.e. more than 90% of the Circassian diaspora. The relatively new space 
for action within the civil society sector in Turkey has resulted in Circassian actors taking part in an 
increased politicisation of Circassian issues, in which a number of relatively newly-established 
organisations have emphasized their opposition in relation to the older and more established 
organisations. This politicisation also represents a polarisation in which a relatively new and greater 
diversity can be observed among the Circassian diaspora.  
 
The combination of youth activism and the Internet, in particular, has resulted in the creation of new 
public spheres that function as platforms for future actions - including elements of transnational 
coordination and cooperation. This is illustrated by the campaigns for genocide recognition and 
against the 2014 Sochi Olympics. The increased transnational cooperation among the Circassian 
organisations is discussed through the theories of Saskia Sassen on the development of 
(transnational) frontier zones (of globalisation). 
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Chapters 4, 5 and 6 (Part III): Circassia, Territoriality, Institutionalisation and Virtual 
Reterritorialisation 
 
The three chapters are inter-connected in different ways as illustrated, for instance, by the 
discussions of ‘territoriality’. The presentation in Chapter 4 of key themes of the nineteenth century 
prolonged process of Russian colonisation of Circassia serve not just as a presentation of the key 
themes of the initial institutionalisation of Circassia in a modern understanding under conditions of 
geopolitical competition. It also relevant in order to understand the role of nineteenth century 
representations in the Circassian memorialisation process as it unfolds on the Internet. The themes 
include the role of the Russian army, officers and Cossacks; the literary invention of the Caucasus; 
geopolitical competition; the development of Caucasiology in relation to science and colonial 
administration. 
 
In Chapter 5, I discuss how the model for territorial institutionalisation, developed by the Finnish 
geographer Anssi Paasi, according to which the development over time of key elements of the geo-
spatial identity of an area can be assessed. This includes the role of maps, administrative units, 
borders, names, territorial symbols including flags etc. It also includes an element of contestedness.  
 
In Chapter 6, I investigate ongoing virtual re-territorialisation of Circassia on the Internet which, I 
find, is easier to understand on the basis of discussions of the Chapters 4 and 5. I suggest to apply 
the term ‘digital capitalism’ as an update of the terms ‘print capitalism’ and ‘electronic capitalism’ 
used by Benedict Anderson and Arjun Appadurai, respectively, to assign earlier periods of mediated 
mobilisation among nationalities - with or without a nation-state. In the case of the Circassians this 
is not just exemplified by the many different Circassian websites but also by the Circassians’ use of 
social media such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter (Web 2.0) - transnational and (partly) 
interactive by definition. A concrete empowerment of Circassian actors through the Internet is 
taking place. This illustrated how the development of ‘digital capitalism’ has both quantitatively 
and qualitatively new implications for a dispersed people such as the Circassians compated to 
earlier periods.  
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Chapters 7, 8 and 9 (Part IV): Three cases of Mediated Memorialisation and Mobilisation in the 
ongoing Circassian Revival 
 
The three chapters reflects the three issues that, I argue, together make up a strong triangle of 
ongoing and accelerating Circassian revival: May 21 (1864) as the annual Circassian day of 
remembrance (Chapter 7), recognition of the Circassian genocide (Chapter 8) and the 2014 Sochi 
Winter Olympics (Chapter 9). It could be argued that these issues in combination have come to 
encompass the ‘when’, ‘where’ and ‘what’ of the Circassian revival.  
  
In Chapter 7, I argue that the year ‘May 21st 1864’ has acquired a central role in the ongoing 
Circassian revival with the recent consolidation of the ‘when’, ‘where’ and ‘what’ of this process. 
The May 21 commemoration events, with its focus on 1864, make up the ‘when’, the 2014 Sochi 
Winter Olympics constitutes a ‘where’ (as well as a ‘when’) - while ‘genocide recognition’ finalises 
this triangle of continuously ongoing and accelerating Circassian revival through the establishment 
of the ‘what’ (as this issue increasingly has become a headline in this revival process) – focus on 
one of the three issues almost automatically enhances the others. I further argue that, in a process 
that began before the fall of the Soviet Union, the year 1864 has gradually become institutionalised 
as a so-called ‘defining moment’ in the contemporary Circassian identity.  
 
Re. Chapter 8: Since 2005, when Circassian civil society organisations began to apply to the 
Russian authorities for recognition of the Circassian genocide, this issue has constituted a key topic 
of the renewed Circassian mobilisation. At first initiated by Circassian Congress from the North 
Caucasus but soon also supported by Circassian/Caucasian organisations outside Russia. Most of 
these were newly established and had genocide recognition as one of their key priorities. The issue 
gained speed in the recent years, when it became the subject of several conferences and increased 
Circassian lobbying. Among the Circassians, the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics has played a key role 
in reformulation of the ‘national tragedy’ of the forced exile into an act of genocide. In 2011, the 
Circassian genocide was formally recognised by the Georgian parliament. The increasingly 
successful campaign for ‘genocide recognition’ has resulted in turning this issue in perhaps the most 
central ‘headline’ of the Circassian mobilisation - in tandem with the facilitating role played by the 
‘2014 Sochi Olympics’. I argue that, since I generally conclude that ‘recognition’ in a broader 
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understanding is perhaps the single phrase that best of all encapsulates the Circassian revival, 
‘genocide recognition’ can be seen as a way of speeding up the quest for recognition.   
 
Re. Chapter 9: In the Circassian revival, as it has accelerated since 2005, the 2014 Winter Olympics 
in Sochi has increasing attained a role as an ‘enabling event’. Sochi was the location of the last 
Circassian parliament before the final exodus of most of the Circassians from the Caucasus in 1864. 
For many Circassians May 21st (Day of Remembrance) and the 2014 Sochi Olympics now link to 
the forced exile in both time and space. 2014 also marks the 150th anniversary and Krasnaya 
Polyana - fifty kilometres from Sochi - is the mountain area where the skiing events will be held. 
Krasnaya Polyana was the place where the Imperial Russian army held its victory parade in 1864, 
on May 21st. The Circassian choice of Day of Remembrance was from the outset chosen to pinpoint 
a specific space and time. In the course of these processes, the year 1864 has been established as a 
defining moment and I argue that Sochi has been established as a site of long-distance memory 
(Pierre Nora) among, primarily, the Circassian diaspora. In my paper, I further discuss how the 
issue of the 2014 Sochi Olympics has affected recent May 21st commemoration events and the role 
of memorialisation on the Circassian counter-Olympic websites. 
 
 
Overall Conclusions of the Thesis 
 
I have introduced Circassia and Circassian in various aspects: their geographical region and 
diaspora, their organisations as well as their cultural revival. I have introduced the term iCircassia in 
order to introduce a distinctly new Circassian arena. In my research, I have illustrated how 
processes of mediated Circassian memorialisation and mobilisation are closely interconnected. All 
of these three themes represent processes that, in the case of the Circassian revival, have shown to 
be not only overlapping but also mutually reinforcing of each other. 
 
I conclude that it is relevant to speak of a ‘digital capitalism’ that is both qualitatively and 
quantitatively different from the earlier phase of ‘electronic capitalism’ (as discussed by Arjun 
Appadurai and others in the 1990s). This is, to a considerable degree, due to the features of social 
sites such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, often referred to as Web 2.0, which have proven 
useful in empowering minority groups and individuals such as the Circassians in new ways that are 
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markedly different from earlier periods. As can be seen in the case of the Circassians, these issues 
of the three Ms can generate new forms of action and activism that potentially can mobilise and 
include participants on a much larger scale than before. In other words, this illustrates the ‘network 
nature’ of the Internet, including its strong potential for participation instead of the passive 
spectatorship that characterised the former phases. The increased vernacular or popular involvement 
represents an element of empowerment, illustrating the strong potential for combined mediated 
memorialisation and mobilisation. In the case of the Circassians, this is also true for a relatively 
marginalised minority dispersed across many countries as diaspora groups. In spite of the various 
forms of obstruction used by the authorities to counter the Circassian revival, these efforts appear to 
be increasingly difficult. This is due not least to the fact that an increasing part of the Circassian 
activities can unfold or be shared across borders.  
 
The print capitalism and electronic capitalism of earlier periods were also transnational but the new 
possibilities of remediating and recirculating content through the Internet have hugely changed the 
accessibility of knowledge, which in the case of the Circassians plays a significant role. Much of the 
reproduced, remediated and recycled material is actually a product of the former periods of print 
and electronic capitalism that has been digitalised. 
 
As seen in the case of the Facebook-revolution outlined by the young Circassian activists in New 
Jersey in Chapter 4, the Internet can be used to reach out to other Circassians not otherwise 
involved in Circassian activities. This is a way of establishing links that can be further developed 
and used strategically in future actions. It is also an easy way of spreading information to other 
Circassians while at the same time confirming the links and connectedness, which also represent 
new forms of community building. 
 
The YouTubian memorialisation that has become a significant part of the mediated Circassian 
mobilisation shows how information and dissemination of knowledge can be performed in a 
relatively professional - or at least semi-professional - manner on a low budget. This is exemplified 
by the illustrated history lessons uploaded in different languages via YouTube and which are 
subsequently recommended, recirculated or commented upon by viewers - often with an integrated 
use of, for instance, Facebook. Another example is the message from one the activists in New 
Jersey in a viral video circulated ahead of the annual Day of Remembrance of May 21st, where he 
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states his recommendation to fellow Circassians: ‘Read, Read, Read’. This is perhaps the most 
straightforward illustration of the close links between mediated Circassian memorialisation and 
mobilisation possible. Reading on today’s electronic Web 2.0 media involves much more than 
words in books and articles. The visual aspect has become predominant. This marks a shift in the 
processes of identity building or mediated memorialisation and mobilisation that is still too early to 
envisage fully.  
 
The reverse of the coin are the hostile and even hateful statements or reactions so widespread on 
many social Internet media platforms. There are many nationalistic manifestations - both from the 
side of the Circassians and opponents to the Circassian revival. ‘Stupid nationalism’ (in this case 
referring especially on websites in Russia), as one informant put it, is so widespread that, for him, it 
had turned into a demotivating factor that had contributed to reducing his involvement in Circassian 
civil society organisations in Turkey. This illustrates some of the difficulties of the revival process 
and how quickly it may convert.  
 
Regarding the ‘total archive’, the ‘essential repository’ or the ‘database character’ of the Internet, 
this as a feature that clearly distinguishes this phase from the two earlier phases of print and 
electronic capitalism (Andersen). As noted by Brinkerhoff, the Internet can function as an essential 
repository of information about the homeland, information that was previously not always easily 
accessible. Through hyperlinking it is easy to move further into the sources used or move on to 
related websites. This represents a ‘flattening of knowledge hierarchies’ that is part of the above-
mentioned element of empowerment. This is a new form of knowledge generation that will be 
further discussed in relation to the role of the digitalised archive on memorialisation below. 
 
Beyond the database character of the Internet, which makes it highly applicable to an information 
and knowledge-based revival such as the Circassian, the Internet in general - and the features of 
Web 2.0 in particular - also functions as a network in which connecting is a central element. Henry 
Jenkins refers to this aspect as a ‘networked culture’ characterised by ‘spreadability’, where he 
particularly stresses the potential role of ‘influencers’. This illustrates the way in which Circassian 
activists - individually as well as within organisations - use the Internet as part of a strategy of both 
spreading information and generating further mobilisation. All of which jointly and simultaneously 
marks a significantly increased and renewed negotiation of Circassian identity.  
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Concludingly, the shift towards digital capitalism, and the features of Web 2.0 in particular, also 
represents a more transnational, global or cosmopolitan outlook compared to the earlier phases, 
during which the mediation context was generally more state-centred. I will argue that we are 
witnessing a profound change or shift in the form and practice of mediation with the arrival of Web 
2.0, which has significant consequences for memorialisation and mobilisation, as the case of the 
Circassian revival illustrates.  
 
The renewed Circassian civil society activity has generally gathered pace significantly since 2005. It 
has, for instance, radically increased the space for action in Turkey and Russia, where civil society 
action had been restricted for minority groups such as the Circassians. (In spite of the anti-
government demonstrations and upheavals experienced in both countries during 2012 and 2013.)  It 
is nonetheless clear that, as a territorially defined minority group living along the borders of the 
state, the Circassians in Russia are under a different form of pressure and counter-reaction from the 
authorities (formally as well as informally) than the Circassians in Turkey. Such pressure has 
temporarily managed to reduce the level of activity of the Circassian civil society sector in Russia - 
offline - while it appears not to affect online activity, which has continued to unfold. The new laws 
that recently give the Russian authorities further possibilities of closing down parts of the Internet, 
such as for instance YouTube, may reduce the activity but, judging from experience so far, this 
would only lead to a momentary decline in activity because, more often than not, new options are 
sought and tested. On the other hand, this could force activists into becoming cyber-activists to a 
much greater degree than before. Offline activism in physical space in the North Caucasus does, 
however, still appear to be needed in order to push forward certain agendas. While it might be 
necessary to keep a low offline profile for a period, this is obviously not a feasible long-term 
strategy when the overall purpose of activities is to achieve changes in the conduct of the same 
authorities. And yet the latter years have shown that key individuals from the Circassian 
organisations have had to leave the area for shorter or longer periods due to threats and other forms 
of pressure. Accusations from, for instance, politicians and media representatives that Circassian 
activism is (potentially) promoting terrorism has become another regular element that Circassian 
minority activists have to live with.  
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The role of the New Jersey organisations and activists as frontrunners in the Circassian movement 
is partly due to the less-restricted opportunities for civil society action and partly because of the 
inspiration they draw from other diaspora mobilisation initiatives and processes such as the Jewish 
and the Armenian, both of which have illustrated the value of lobbying and alliance-building. 
Lobbying played a significant role in the process of gaining support for the recognition of the 
Circassian genocide by the Georgian parliament in 2011. 
 
The increased space for civil society action in Turkey has also played a key role in the transnational 
Circassian civil society mobilisation. It is here that the largest annual May 21st commemorative 
events, as well as demonstrations, take place and this has gained increased significance as the 
planning is coordinated with organisations in other countries and both videos and photos are 
immediately shared through the Internet. Organisations in Turkey have, together with 
representatives from American organisations, been the driving force behind the ‘No Sochi’ 
campaign and website. The fact that organisations in Turkey are often ‘Caucasian’ before 
‘Circassian’, while still prioritising Circassian issues, has frustrated some of the organisations in the 
other countries, where only ethnic Circassian issues form the focus. A couple of new organisations 
in Turkey with a purely Circassian focus have appeared recently but it is still too early to assess 
whether they will be successful.  
 
The youth organisation Caucasian Forum has been one of the frontrunners in the second Circassian 
revival since 2005. This was initiated among students in Istanbul with an international outlook and 
awareness of international trends regarding the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples. The 
youth focus made it relevant to use state-of-the-art ICT tools in their operations and their visibility - 
also through, for instance, the annual May 21st demonstrations - has contributed to gradually 
attracting more youth activists from other parts of Turkey.    
 
Memorialisation has been an integral part of the Circassian mobilisation since before the fall of the 
Soviet Union - it is difficult to describe one without mentioning the other – and, as such, these 
processes mutually reinforce each other. Circassian memory - and the rediscovery thereof - has 
been a part of the development of a counter-memorialisation as a form of resistance or protest 
against official Russian history writing, which many Circassians regard as discriminatory - and 
which they still find actively performed in relation to the 2014 Sochi Olympics. This encompasses 
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the establishment of a new narrative on the Circassian tragedy of forced displacement, especially 
since 2005, which includes a different kind of victimisation to before by directly targeting the 
Russian Federation as the heir to the Russian Empire: the focus on recognition of the Circassian 
genocide. This is indirectly supported by actors in other post-Soviet countries that have similar 
complaints against Russia and, especially, official Russian history writing. The Circassian counter-
narrative is increasingly supported by documentation from nineteenth-century archives and a 
growing number of these elements are gradually being acknowledged by researchers, writers, 
bloggers etc. in Russia as well as internationally. These processes have played a significant role in 
motivating activists to become involved and have generated increased support for the Circassian 
revival in general. 
 
This resistance and counter-memorialisation unfolds in a context of competing memorialisation that 
has been enhanced with the increasing role of the Internet, which generally is widening the gap 
between official historiography in Russia and local peoples of the North Caucasus. Some examples 
of this are, for instance, monuments and names of Russian generals such as Yermolov, Lazerev etc. 
These play a role in the increasing production of both Kuban spatiality and Circassian spatiality. 
Another example is the Kremlin- initiated 450-year celebrations of 2007 that resulted in new large 
monuments in the key Circassian cities of Nalchik and Maikop. These, however, are contested by 
other large monuments erected during the last ten years that communicate a Circassian counter-
narrative. 
 
The discussions on the process of the institutionalisation of ‘Circassianness’ over the last two 
centuries - as inspired by Anssi Paasi and Rogers Brubaker - has illustrated some of the links 
between the contemporary Circassian revival and the historical development of Circassianness 
through various phases. This can function as a framework for identifying and understanding at least 
key parts of the contemporary memorialisation efforts within the Circassian revival. As can be seen 
from Chapters 4-6, Circassianness is and has been institutionalised on a number of different levels, 
and has been reproduced, and thereby survived, through seven generations of exile - under 
conditions that have varied strongly from country to country. This will to maintain a Circassian 
identity during the many years of exile illustrates a significant dedication to Circassian culture and 
identity in general, which was relatively easy during the many years of compact living in villages 
where they could use the Circassian language and Circassian traditions across several generations. 
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In the Circassian homeland in Russia, the institutionalisation process has been affected first by the 
Imperial Russian and then the various phases of the Soviet period, whereby the establishment of the 
Circassian titular republics with Circassian names had a key role to play, not least because this also 
meant some form of privilege for Circassian language teaching in schools, and publications and 
research into specific Circassian issues in the Circassian language. As I have shown, all of this is 
part of the foundations without which the contemporary revival would not be able to take place.  
 
Allegations that Circassian identity (and ethno-cultural-national projects) is mainly the result of 
Soviet ethnic policies, including not least the titular republics in the indigenous homelands in the 
North Caucasus, have repeatedly been voiced. This reflects a tendency to expand the importance of 
certain elements of the Soviet period both inside Russian society at large and within Russian as well 
as international academia. This could be interpreted as patronising or discriminating towards 
minorities such as the Circassians. The discussions on the institutionalisation of Circassianness 
indicate some ways of illustrating this. It is still a minority challenge in Russia - and not least in the 
North Caucasus - for Circassians to be able to voice their own perspectives and understandings 
without being subjected to superficial and often irrelevant understandings of being ‘too feudal’ or 
‘too clannish’ or simply ‘too Caucasian’. Actors both inside and outside contemporary Russia have, 
on several occasions, suggested the abolition of the ethnically defined republics as a way of 
generating a future civic and democratic Russia. For minority groups, however, such suggestions 
can generally be regarded as an extension of patronising approaches - in spite of often being based 
on a desire to promote democratisation and avoid ethnic conflict. In general, the desire to label 
Circassians and other Caucasian minorities as feudal etc. - while a certain level of cultural 
conservatism can be observed - is yet another example of the largely unfinished Russian encounter 
with the imperial past in the region as well as the contemporary myths on Caucasians that 
repeatedly circulate in the Russian media and are often accompanied by xenophobic statements.  
 
New actors can achieve status as geopolitical actors as a result of reconfigurations related to late 
modern globalisation processes, including the potential empowerment of transnational groups and 
individuals through the use of the Internet. New forms of transnational alliances can be built 
between new kinds of actors, as illustrated in the process of the Georgian recognition of the 
Circassian genocide in 2011 and the subsequent continued efforts from the Georgian side to support 
the Circassian movement (though this is not equally welcomed by all Circassians).  
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The new Georgian role in relation to the Circassians illustrates how the Caucasus has once more 
become a zone of geopolitical competition - and, as in the nineteenth century, Russia also today 
plays the role of the dominant player. It is still questionable as to whether the alliances of some 
Circassian organisations with Georgia will prove successful in the long run, as the history of the 
Caucasus has often shown how indigenous minorities can suddenly become dispensable in the eyes 
of more powerful actors. Still, the rights of indigenous peoples all over the world are being 
increasingly recognised, which could also - in the long run - serve to not only legitimise but also to 
strengthen a continued Circassian revival.     
 
I argue that a triangle of Circassian revival through the gradually successful institutionalisation of 
May 21st (1864) as the annual Circassian Day of Remembrance since the fall of the Soviet Union 
(a) on top of which two other issues have more recently been added: Genocide Recognition (b), and 
the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics (c). This triangle of Circassian revival illustrate how the three 
issues have become connected and reinforce each other in a constantly ongoing process whereby 
inputs for one issue immediately affect and enhance the others. I further argue that this triangle 
continuously reproduces and reinvigorates the Circassian revival in a process with the overall aim 
of achieving wider recognition of Circassian identity and history. It is this search for ‘recognition’ 
as an historical indigenous people of the north-western Caucasus that I find sums up the combined 
Circassian efforts most accurately.  
 
In the first period of the post-2005 Circassian revival, there was a reluctance to seek recognition of 
the Circassian genocide but, over the last couple of years, the issue has become a key headline or 
catchphrase of the Circassian revival. This is probably partly due to the appeal of a simplistic 
understanding that is based on a way of interpreting other similar tragedies such as the Holocaust 
and the Armenian genocide. The Internet has played a role in this process, where for instance social 
media often function through short messages presented more or less in headlines. To others, it is 
more or less the opposite: that a lot of material can now be read on the Internet which documents 
the Circassian tragedy of the nineteenth century in great detail, in a way that is emotionally 
affective, and which can thus lead to renewed support for genocide recognition. It appears as if 
many of those Circassians who were initially against the genocide recognition agenda have, 
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somewhere along the road, accepted that this is a strong vehicle for mobilisation, and one that could 
ultimately lead to the form of wider recognition they are seeking.    
 
The issue of genocide recognition could potentially challenge the Circassian movement in ways that 
are not always discussed publicly. To become too entrenched in the issue of genocide recognition as 
the key issue of the Circassian revival could threaten to stall or delay the revival - because Russia 
may not recognise the genocide for many years to come. Many of the post-2005 activities are 
strongly set on this ambitious agenda but I will argue that all the other and diverse aspects of the 
Circassian revival are just as important for the continued success of the Circassian movement. In 
spite of the recent dominance of genocide recognition within the Circassian revival there are still 
many for whom ‘recognition’ remains the important part of ‘genocide recognition’. Still, the issue 
of genocide recognition has proved to be appealing and has led to increased involvement among 
Circassians. 
 
The importance of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics as a large international mega sports event in 
relation to the transnational Circassian mobilisation cannot be exaggerated. The Sochi Olympics 
have offered the Circassian activists a platform for action and information dissemination that 
otherwise would not have been possible to establish. The Olympics have also played a role in the 
decision of the Georgian parliament to recognise the Circassian genocide. The significant and 
successful promotion of both issues within the Circassian World, as well as in various national and 
transnational public spheres, has to no small degree been due the mutual interconnectedness of the 
two issues. 
 
A challenge facing the Circassian movement will be how to maintain the dynamics of the present 
mobilisation process after the 2014 Sochi Olympics. To a certain extent I believe that the Circassian 
movement has grown so extensively and become sufficiently diversified and transnational that the 
mobilisation can be expected to continue - in spite of potential post-2014 setbacks. The two new 
sports events planned to take place in Sochi - the 2018 Football World Cup and the Formula One 
annual racing events - also constitute international mega events. This will present the Circassian 
activists with future possibilities for linking in with the international attention generated by these 
large sports events. 
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Concerning the challenges of activism in relation to an authoritarian regime, it can be said that the 
response has often been repression - for instance in Russia, through the use of ‘invisible’ actors 
often with connection to the intelligence services, of which there are several in Russia, and which 
have departments in the republics of the Caucasus. Violent attacks and killings of Circassian 
activists and other key individuals within the wider Circassian movement are believed to be 
connected to the Russian intelligence services and mostly constitute unsolved crimes. Circassian 
youths (like youths in other parts of the North Caucasus) regularly complain of harassment from 
representatives of the police and other governmental institutions to the extent that they often feel 
they have to leave the area: for other parts of Russia, for places abroad or for the mountains (to join 
the insurgents). Circassian activists generally state that they will have to await a future 
democratisation of Russia in order to achieve significant goals such as increased repatriation from 
the diaspora or perhaps the establishment of a joint Circassian republic in the North Caucasus. 
 
The Circassian revival can be termed a form of resistance to the power-knowledge configurations 
which have existed, in different forms and adaptations, in the relationship between the dominant 
Russian/Soviet/Russian state and the Circassian minorities/diaspora. Knowledge production is at the 
centre of the Circassian revival and is reaching further audiences. In the coming period , an 
increasing number of examples of recognition of Circassian history or elements thereof over the last 
two centuries or more can be anticipated. For instance, from researchers both inside Russia and 
internationally, through new publications and other forms of media representations. There is a 
strong element of legitimacy attached to being an indigenous people with a Caucasian homeland. 
This kind of authenticity is increasingly recognised through the growth of tourism in the wider 
Sochi area, as illustrated by the success of the Circassian village of Bolshoi Kichmay, where 
thousands of tourists learn about Circassian history and historical relations to the area on a daily 
basis, while being entertained by professional dancers from the inland republic of Adygea to huge 
applause. If the aims of a future for the wider Sochi area as a tourist centre attracting tourists from 
all over the world then this means that a number of individuals, and not just in Russia, will be 
informed about Circassian issues from Circassian perspectives. This is a (potential) offline impact 
that could be just as important as many of the online efforts, but especially important as an addition 
to the Circassian revival, from the heart of the historical homeland. 
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Historical documentation is not just a key element of the process of working for the recognition of 
the forced Circassian exile as an act of genocide but also functions as a vehicle for continued 
Circassian memorialisation and mobilisation in general. For many Circassians, this form of 
generating documentation on Circassian history in the nineteenth century - which today can easily 
be presented, visualised and made accessible to audiences - is part of a general education into a 
history that had previously often primarily consisted of fragments, and an addition to a 
memorialisation that has sometimes been based more on myth than on actual historical knowledge. 
Both a ‘hidden history’ and a ‘mythology of victimisation’ can function as strong motivating factors 
in mobilisation processes, but not least also within the wider processes of redefining Circassian 
identity. 
 
Regarding the three issues of the recent Circiassian movement that have been named as joint goals 
(Zhemukhov 2012): repatriation, the creation of one joint republic and recognition of the Circassian 
genocide, I have already discussed the latter. Repatriation to the homeland in the Russian North 
Caucasus has proved not to be attractive to most Circassians in the diaspora, which highlights a 
paradox or a contradiction in the Circassian movement, as this is often mentioned as a priority at 
Circassian events. This has led to ‘repatriation’ inc reasingly being linked to the other issue of 
creating a ‘joint Circassian republic’. According to some, a joint Circassian republic would make it 
much more attractive to repatriate from the diaspora. At the moment, very few Circassians actually 
wish to live in the Russian Federation, where they would have to speak Russian instead of 
Circassian and which they regard as too corrupt and authoritarian a regime to live under. Some - 
and it would appear an increasing number of - Circassians take this argument one step further by 
stating that only a free and independent Circassia would attract proper repatriation from the 
diaspora - as well as being able to protect and develop the threatened Circassian culture and 
language. Nonetheless, the increased long-distance cultivation of the historical homeland appears to 
continue in the diaspora. And since many Circassians have lost the ir immediate family connections 
to the homeland, they could be anticipated to continue to use the Internet sources to develop this 
aspect of belonging to a digital diaspora with both a virtually accessible homeland and a physical 
space - the geographical homeland in the Caucasus - which might continue to be experienced as 
relatively inaccessible for a considerable time. In any case, the level of knowledge of Circassian 
history and memory - both among the Circassians themselves and beyond - is constantly increasing, 
including knowledge of the homeland. This is also a way of increasing homeland relations although 
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for some the options of a virtual return may be enough and thereby potentially discourage actual 
repatriation.     
 
The terms social capital (and/or cultural capital) have been applied to illustrate how the element of 
linking - connectedness - can be developed against a background of cultural identities that have 
been largely ‘dormant’ or ‘internally oriented’ for decades if not centuries. This has proved a basis 
for both bridging and bonding on a whole new level and significant social capital has been 
developed in the process. 
 
The Circassian side-stories to the Arab Spring since 2011 illustrate how sudden violent events can 
render minority groups such as the Circassians vulnerable, but also how these groups have been re-
established within the wider Circassian World in a different way to before. This is not least due to 
the visibility generated by the Internet, where this type of sub-story can find space. This marked the 
closer inclusion of part of the Circassians in Egypt and Libya who are the descendants of the 
Mamluks who, centuries ago, played a key role in Egypt and other parts of the Middle East but 
originally came from Circassia and other parts of the Caucasus. 
 
Much of the Circassian revival is still largely unfolding under the radar of the wider public - albeit 
much more visible than before. A much wider Circassian World and Circassian Movement has been 
established (in all its sprawling transnational diversity). A process that has established a Circassian 
frontier zone (of globalisation) - or perhaps rather a number of different frontier zones is unfolding - 
sometimes connected, sometimes not - through the diversity of the many Circassian activities that 
have increasingly become transnational. Hopefully my articles, conference papers and chapters 
have contributed to increase the understanding of contemporary developments among the 
geographically dispersed Circassians, as minority groups from/in the Caucasus.  
 
Finally, the increased circulation of the terms ‘the Circassian Question’, ‘the Circassian Problem’, 
‘the Circassian Issue’, ‘the Circassian World’, ‘the Circassian Movement’, the Circassian this-or-
that - together with the many Circassian sites on the Internet - all more than indicate that the 
Circassian revival has evolved onto another level altogether. This is in spite of the potential 
humiliation of being labelled a ‘question’ or ‘problem’ by someone else - as underlined by Linda T. 
Smith. For the Circassian revival, this is mainly a consideration of theoretical relevance.  
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Chapter  2 
 
 
Renewed Circassian Mobilization in the North Caucasus 
 
 
 
In recent years, a new and significant type of unity and coordinated action has appeared among 
Circassian organizations across the three republics in the North Caucasus where Circassians 
constitute titular-nationalities: Adygs in Adygea, Kabardians in Kabardino-Balkaria, and 
Cherkessians in Karachai-Cherkessia. New Circassian organizations and Internet media have been 
established and have managed to involve many Circassians in their activities - especially since the 
mid-2000s. The arrival and spread of social media in Web 2.0, such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube have contributed to the increased involvement and visibility of Circassians in the North 
Caucasus. The aim of this paper is to discuss the ongoing Circassian mobilization, as represented by 
the actions of Circassian organizations supplemented by Circassian Internet activities, i.e. recent 
tendencies within the civil society sector of the region that signal a request for or suggest increased 
democratization (from below). In this process the role of youth and the Internet appear to be 
significant. All these activities represent a new type of unity compared to earlier period, when the 
Circassian organizations mainly operated within their own republics and in relation to the local 
republican power structures. Both the republican and the federal authorities have often reacted with 
hostility to the organizations and many of their proposals have been rejected, ignored, or have 
resulted in different forms of harassment including severe beatings and threats against the family.63  
 
 In the analytical context of this paper, I will use the term “ethnic mobilization”, as this is a term 
that has achieved widespread usage, though the militaristic connotations sometimes affiliated with 
the term “mobilization” can make it challenging for use in a Caucasian context that has become 
internationally known for violent conflicts. The word “ethnic” has often been affiliated to these 
conflicts and, when combined with “mobilization”, this could appear self-explanatory - or be 
misused as such (Dragadze 1998). The Circassian mobilization is multidimensional; it is not just 
ethnic, but also, inter alia, cultural, indigenous, and minority rights-oriented. Some Circassian 
examples from Turkey will be included as they have been undergoing a significant process of civil 
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society reform starting more than ten years ago and several million Circassians live in Turkey - 
compared to 700,000 in the North Caucasus - and are in a process of becoming organized also 
beyond Turkey. 
 
This study of the Circassian civil society mobilization in the North Caucasus is an empirical study 
based on the recent developments in the region. However, the paper is part of a larger study of the 
ongoing transnational revival among the Circassians analyzed according to an overall conceptual 
framework on ethnic and territorial institutionalization over time. The two main overall conceptual 
notions behind this paper are, firstly, post-Soviet civil society development and, secondly, the role 
of a so-called “nationalizing state” in relation to national or ethnic minorities.  
 
The first theoretical or conceptual approach to the analysis of the Circassian revival consists of a 
discussion of civil society development as part of a post-communist process of democratization, 
where “space for action” will be discussed in relation to the recent Circassian civil society 
developments. The developments among the Circassian organizations and Internet-based initiatives 
largely unfold within the civil society sector. The analysis in this paper of the new initiatives is an 
attempt at understanding the character of this apparently new (or enlarged) space for action within 
civil society in Russia. The actions of the Circassian organizations in Russia at large have mostly 
been confined to the public spheres of the three Circassian republics but, for instance, the arrival of 
and increased access to the Internet in Russia has contributed to greater visibility and influence 
beyond the public spheres of these republics as well. 64 The public spheres in which civil society 
organizations in Russia operate have been going through phases of both expansion and contraction 
during the last 20 years of economic and democratic transition. Two different understandings of 
civil society development outline the discussion in this paper: on the one hand, the understanding of 
civil society as a battlefield and, on the other hand, a more consensus-oriented understanding of 
civil society representatives in interaction with the state and the market in the making of democratic 
societies. The first version seems to be most appropriate in the (semi-)authoritarian context of the 
Russian Federation, including the role of potential counter-publics. 
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The second theoretical approach in this paper consists of reflections by Rogers Brubaker on the 
“relationship nexus” between ethnic minorities, such as the Circassians, and a “nationalizing state”, 
such as the Russian Federation. Brubaker stresses the importance of the dynamic character of this 
relationship. The fact that Brubaker has developed the term “nationalizing state” as part of an 
analysis of the post-communist context renders this term particularly relevant. In this theory, 
Brubaker operates with a triadic relationship nexus consisting of the nationalizing state, the ethnic 
minority, and the external homeland. As the latter part is not relevant in the case of the Circassians, 
I will discuss whether the Circassian diaspora can be said to be in the process of taking on the role 
of the third element in the relationship nexus, as the transnational contacts are increasing and the 
agendas set by the Circassian diaspora organizations increasingly penetrate into the general public 
sphere in Russia. The suggestion of David Smith (2002, 9) to further enlarge Brubaker’s model into 
a quadratic relationship nexus in order to include the role of international treaties, institutions, and 
organizations is also relevant to include in relation to the context of the Circassians in the North 
Caucasus.65  
 
 
The Circassian Question  
 
The term the Circassian Question has lately managed to enter the wider public sphere of Russian 
mainstream media, following a number of years of circulation in the transnational sphere of the 
Internet.66 Particularly in connection with the Sochi Winter O lympics in 2014 that − especially 
since the end of the Vancouver games in 2010 − has drawn wider attention in the Russian media. In 
Russia, Sochi is often referred to as the “Summer Capital (in the South)”, as the president and the 
prime minister spend several months there every summer and often receive international guests. The 
area was colonized by the Russian Empire after a prolonged war over many decades in the 
nineteenth century, which resulted in the exiling of most of the Circassians. Sochi has become a 
place of significant symbolic value for many Circassians as this was the last place in the historical 
homeland the Circassians left in 1864 after losing the war (Jaimoukha, 2001: 67). This 
understanding of Sochi has become widespread in recent years, especially through the Internet. The 
last battle took place by the in a mountain valley in the vicinity of Kbaada village, which is 50 
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kilometres from today’s Sochi. This is where, on May 21, 1864, the Russian Army performed its 
victory parade. The location of Kbaada is today known as Krasnaya Polyana, where the alpine 
skiing events of the 2014 Winter Olympics will take place. The Olympic Games in Sochi will thus 
encapsulate vital elements of time and space in Circassian mythology or cultural memory - the final 
loss of the homeland in 1864.67 Due to the Sochi Olympics, the Circassian Question has been 
elevated to a higher level on the international sceneas a parallel to the situation in 1864 when 
international media followed the war in Circassia. 68 One of the key achievements of the 
transnational Circassian movement since the fall of the Soviet Union is the institutionalization of 
May 21-the date of the Russian victory parade in the Kbaada valley in 1864-as a joint annual day of 
commemoration. 
 
The Circassian Question was a term that also gained significant international use in the nineteenth 
century when the media, especially in Europe and North America, followed the lengthy Circassian 
war against the invading Russian Army (though back then the term mainly referred to the potential 
survival of Circassia as a homeland of the Circassians). In spite of the widespread use of the term, 
the Circassian Question is rarely defined. According to one recent definition, the Circassian 
Question of today consists of three main elements: recognition of the nineteenth century war and 
forced exile to the Ottoman Empire as an act of genocide, repatriation from the diaspora to the 
North Caucasus, and the establishment of a joint Circassian republic. 69 Some organizations and 
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activists go one step further and declare their ultimate goal as the re-establishment of Circassia as an 
independent state.70  
 
During 2010 the Circassian Question received increased international attention following new 
interest from neighbouring Georgia. This was widely regarded as a reaction to the war with Russia 
in 2008 and Russia’s subsequent recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhasia as independent states. 71 
This led to the so-called “war of conferences” in 2010 where two state-sponsored conferences in 
Tbilisi focussed on the Circassia genocide in particular, supplemented with other claims of genocide 
of the North Caucasian peoples.72 As a result of the first conference-called ‘Hidden Nations, 
Enduring Crimes’an appeal was forwarded to the Georgian Parliament with a request for a formal 
recognition of the Circassian genocide.73 The conference and the appeal generated strong reactions 
from Russian politicians and media.74 Georgia is staging a politicized revision of its history with 
and within the Russian Empire, which has parallels to related processes in, for instance, Ukraine in 
the second part of the 2000s.75 Another Georgian initiative in 2010 was to establish a visa-free 
regime for Russian citizens registered as residents of the North Caucasian republic, which was 
labelled as a provocation by the Russian side.76 
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The Circassian question was raised further on the international agenda in 2010, when Circassian 
diaspora organizations lobbied Estonia for recognition of the Circassian genocide. In October 2010 
the Estonian member of the European Parliament, Tunne Kelam, declared that he would raise the 
Circassian Question at the next hearing in the European Parliament on human rights in Russia. 
Mark Mickelson, Estonian Member of Parliament, further promised to keep the “Circassian 
problem” on the agenda in general and specifically in relation to the Council of Europe. 77 
 
The Russian parliament deputy, Sergei Markov, reacted by stating that the Circassian problem does 
not exist and represents “ideological sabotage” from the side of the Russophobe governments of 
Georgia, Estonia, and Poland, supported by certain strategic centres in Washington. 78 According to 
Markov, Russia is planning ‘a comprehensive programme to counter the plans for recognition of the 
genocide of the Circassians’.79 Markov refuses to accept the existence of a Circassian genocide 
without further argumentation and characterizes it as “anti-Russian politics” in line with the so-
called Ukrainian genocide“Holodomor”. A different view came from academic circles in Moscow 
in the form of a conference called ‘the Circassian issue: historical memory, historiographic 
discourse, political strategies’ in March 2011, at which the hosts stressed that the conference was 
academic and non-political.80  
 
On May 20, 2011 the Georgian Parliament formally recognized the Circassian genocide and 
condemned the crimes committed by the Russian Empire during the war from 1763 to 1864 by 
referring to a number of historical documents.81 Circassian representatives took part in the 
discussions in the Georgian Parliament, which led to strong reactions from Sergei Markov who 
called the participating Circassians traitors of their people. Weeks later Markov was forced to 
apologize for his remarks, but by then the Head of the Adyge Hasa organizatio n in the Republic of 
Adygea, Aramby Khapay, had already responded by comparing this reaction with the words of the 
Russian Emperor Alexander II, who during a visit in Maykop in 1861 allegedly stated: ‘We need 
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Circassia but we do not need Circassians themse lves at all’.82 The official Russian response was 
holding two official hearings on the Circassian issues in June, where the anti-Circassian rhetoric 
was significantly reduced.83 These events led a representative of a Circassian non-governmental 
organization from Kabardino-Balkaria to conclude that the Circassian question had been elevated to 
a completely higher level.84  
 
The Georgian recognition of the Circassian genocide was initially met with hesitation from many of 
the Circassian organizations, as many feared it was being used (or misused) by the Georgian 
government with the aim of hurting Russia in the aftermath of the 2008 war. Also, the strong 
Circassian solidarity with the Abkhasians-whom they regard as a brothersin the many years of 
conflict with Georgia resulted in some reluctance. Still, after some days of consideration, eight 
Circassian organizations used the occasion of their meeting on another matter-promotion of 
repatriation from the diaspora to the homelandto send a formal letter of thanks to the Georgian 
Parliament.85 Most of the Circassian reactions in Russian- language Internet forums were positive 
towards the Georgian recognition. Already a year lateron May 21, 2012a monument to the 
Circassian genocide was officially revealed in Anaklia by the Georgian Black Sea coast.86 
 
 
Civil society mobilization   
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Following a decade during which most of the Circassian organizations were relatively passive and 
largely controlled by the authorities, the mid-2000s was marked by the appearance of new 
Circassian organizations and by new attempts at cooperation and coordination between the 
organizations.87 This represents a new form of unity, in which youth and the Internet are key terms 
in the understanding of the recent developments within the civil society sec tor.88 Still, it is 
important to stress that other-and sometimes related-issues such as increased urbanization, increased 
levels of education, and various global trends also play a role in this process.  89 
 
In general, Circassian movements and organizations have been oriented mainly towards the local 
authorities in their home republics. Since 2009 the level of cooperation among the Circassian 
organizations within the republics, as well as across the republican borders, has increased. In 
December 2010, eighteen Circassian organizations from the Russian Federation established a joint 
Circassian Council in order to present a united Circassian approach to their key issues, such as the 
Sochi Winter Olympics, recognition of the nineteenth century genocide, etc. 90 The idea is to be able 
to present a united platform for stronger lobbying efforts in relation to the federal authorities. This 
step was the culmination of a long process that gained momentum in late 2009, with joint protest 
gatherings by Circassians in Karachai-Circassia and Kabardino-Balkaria, which increasingly 
involved more and more Circassian organizations, including those from outside the entity where the 
protests were held.91 Jointly, all of these initiatives represent a new level of unity and protest among 
the Circassian organizations. 
 
The new Circassian Council represents a challenge towards the International Circassian Association 
(ICA), as seen when the initiators stated that the new council should be seen as a continuation of the 
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congresses held in the early 1990s.92 Criticism of the ICA has long been widespread among the 
Circassian diaspora organizations and has recently been mounting support among Circassian 
organizations in Russia. The ICA is regularly accused of suppressing Circassian issues instead of 
supporting them, and of acting as an instrument of control on behalf of the Kremlin authorities. 93 
The ICA was established in 1991 as an international Circassian organization created to promote 
Circassian issues in general and especially cooperation between the diaspora and the homeland 
(Jaimoukha, 2001: 86). According to many Circassians, the Russian authorities during the 1990s 
managed to control the ICA and the organization was forced into a more defensive or passive role, 
which has led many to criticize the ICA for becoming a Soviet-type of organization just offering 
window dressing to the Circassian issues.94 Protesting against the role of the ICA has become one 
of the key mobilizing points among many of the newer organizations. The youth protests against the 
ICA congress and elections in October 2009, where they were not allowed to speak or even enter 
the conference hall, marked a turning point in the re-activation of Circassian activism.95 The 2010 
establishment of the International Circassian Council (ICC), initiated by Circassian activists from 
the Circassian Cultural Institute in the USA with the purpose of performing international lobby-
efforts on behalf of Circassian issues, especially promoting recognition of the Circassian genocide, 
represents another challenge to the ICA.96 Dissatisfaction with the actions of the ICA had become 
so strong that it functioned as a point of mobilization among many Circassian individuals and 
organizations.97                         
 
The Coordinating Council of Circassian Organizations in Kabardino-Balkaria, which is an umbrella 
organization of all the Circassian organizations in the republic, is another example of the new type 
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of unity, cooperation, and strategic thinking. Most of the member organizations are, for instance, 
supporting the idea of creating a joint Circassian republic (by joining the existing Circassian 
territories of the three existing republics).98 Furthermore, representatives of the Council have 
initiated the establishment of a so-called “Circassiada”-a pan-Circassian sports event planned to 
take place in the North Caucasus in 2012.99 This was another attempt at creating an event that 
potentially could unite the Circassians, but the proposal was met with harsh comments and rejection 
from substantial parts of the diaspora-arguing that this was a pro-Russian proposal and that it was 
meant to legitimize the Sochi Olympics in 2014.100 At the same time, the proposal was also met 
with harsh comments in Russia, claiming that the Circassiada was an attempt at smearing and 
discrediting the Russian arrangement of the Sochi Winter Olympics. 101 In the end, the project had to 
be shelved.102 This illustrates some of the dilemmas and the difficulties the local Circassian 
organizations and initiatives often face.  
 
The new Circassian initiatives are often met with rejection from the side of the local and federal 
authorities by referring to their opponents as “nationalists”, “foreign agents”, “agents of the 
opposition”, etc., often making use of a terminology known from the Cold War period (Pirani, 
2010: 123).103 Leading organization members and activists have been monitored by representatives 
from the intelligence services, and several Circassian activists and journalists have been forced to 
leave the North Caucasus following harassment, threats, beatings, etc. Two Circassian (youth) 
activists were violently attacked in two of the republics in 2010-one was killed and one was 
seriously injured. Furthermore, two important Circassian public figures were killed in Kabardino-
Balkaria late 2010, which shocked many in the Circassian organizations and civil society at large.104 
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As a result of these events, several Circassian civil society representatives decided to be less 
publically visible and some chose to leave the republic or the country. 105  
 
The mobilization unfolding through the actions of the Circassian organizations, activists, and 
Internet media operates mainly within the public sphere of civil society, which is an area of key 
interest in the democratization process unfolding in the Russian Federation since 1991.106 The 
understanding of civil society as a field of conflict and resistance is highly relevant in the Russian 
context (as well as the Turkish context).107 Civil society has become one of the key terms when 
discussing the democratization process in post-communist Eastern Europe and lately also in Turkey, 
where a democratization process is changing a former authoritarian state into a semi-authoritarian 
state under continued transformation. As a part of this process, a number of new Circassian 
organizations and websites have sprung up since the mid-2000s in Turkey. Compared to this, the 
Circassian organizations in Russia are still lagging behind, while the Circassian Internet activities in 
Russia appear to have reached the level found in Turkey. As part of the ongoing revival, the 
Circassian civil society sector in Turkey has undergone politicization and an accompanying 
polarization between the politically- and culturally-oriented organizations (Hansen 2013). However, 
in the total picture of the significantly increased Circassian/Caucasian civil society sector in Turkey, 
this also represents a new division of labour, where the newer organizations tend to specialize in 
more politically- or lobbying-oriented activities, while most of the older organizations tend to 
prioritize more culturally-oriented activities.  
 
“Space for action” is a term often used in relation to discussions on civil society, though it is not 
necessarily defined. According to Alison Van Rooy (1998), space for action const itutes one of the 
six viewpoints that categorize the concept of civil society. 108 This has led Hakkarainen et al. to the 
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 Informat ion obtained from several sources - mostly informally - for instance at conferences in Brussels (June, 2012), 
Anaklia, Georgia (May 2012), Istanbul (May 2012), New York (April 2011) and during visits to Maikop (October 
2011). 
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 Much criticism on the use of the term civil society can be found, includ ing for instance the tendency to idealize civil 
society as actors of democrat ic change (see for example Grugel and Uhlin, 2009). Lately the term has also been 
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 According to Vaclav Havel (1993) ‘a strong civil society is a crucial condition of a strong democracy. Empowering 
civil society is a central concern for the project of democracy’ (Flyvbjerg 1998, 210). According to the definition of 
David Lewis − inspired by Antonio Gramsci − ‘civ il society is the arena, separate from state and market, in which 
ideological hegemony is contested, imply ing that civil society contained a wide range of organisations which both 
challenged and upheld the existing order’ (Lewis 2001, 2).  
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 The other five are value, co llect ive noun, historical moment, anti-hegemony, and antidote to state (Hakkarainen, et 
al. 2002, 2). 
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following formulation: “Civil society has also been used as a metaphor for the space organisations 
occupy, usually described as the enabling environment in which they prosper (or fade) rather than 
the more battle-ridden terrain of Gramsci’s writings. Civil society is, together with the state and 
market one of the three ‘spheres’ that interface in making of democratic societies” (Hakkarainen et 
al., 2002, 3).  
 
According to the annual ratings from Freedom House on the development of democracy, Russia has 
experienced a drop from 4.88 in 2001 to 6.14 in 2010-with 7 as the lowest rating.109 The ratings 
consists of eight different indicators and the rating for civil society has, in the same period, dropped 
even more from 4.00 to 6.75, while the ratings for independent media has stagnated at 6.25 for the 
last four years. The low ratings on civil society are mostly due to a number of incidents of violence 
against activists (often unsolved and unpunished) and persecution from the police and other 
authorities due to a strict law from 2006 governing their activities. 110 On the positive side, it notes 
that bloggers have found new ways of mobilizing groups and that a drop in racially-motivated 
crimes has appeared in 2010 (Orttung 2010, 437).111  
 
The fact that the ratings on freedom of media has stagnated could hint at the new opportunities for 
civil society action on the Internet, but otherwise the apparent new space for action reflected by the 
present mobilization among the Circassian organizations appears to be paradoxical. The drastic fall 
in democracy ratings in Russia has been part of the process of the so-called “managed democracy” 
model of the period of Putinism during the last decade.112 This has also been labelled as “managed 
pluralism” by others (Richter 2008, 195). The increased potential of the Internet, the new approach 
of the youth, and international inspiration from the diaspora and from internationa l civil society 
trends all appear to be key elements of the new space for action. 113 The Circassian organizations 
and activists are inspired by prevailing international notions on civil society activism, rights-based 
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 On the Corruption Perception Index 2011 from Transparency International, Russia is placed as no. 143 of 183 
countries and Turkey as no. 61 (Available at : http://www.transparency.org/country). 
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 ‘Russia’, Freedom House. (Report 2011), available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
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 According to the 2012 Freedom House ‘Freedom on the Internet’ report, for Russia ‘Internet Freedom Status’ is 
labelled as ‘Part ly Free’ while ‘Press Freedom Status’ is generally noted as ‘Not Free’. Available at: 
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lobbyism, freedom of speech, cultural and religious diversity.114 Also the rights-based approach of 
organizations, such as the all-Russian Memorial that has existed for more than two decades, 
constitute inspiration for civil society pioneers in Russia-and potential partners.115 It seems as if the 
recent Circassian actions increasingly attempt to challenge the managed democracy and 
centralization of the Russian Federation of the last decade.  
 
The Circassian civil society sector has managed to enlarge their space for action in the battlefield of 
political life in the Russian Federation. This is a parallel to the politicization experienced by 
Circassian organizations in Turkey and elsewhere, which could indicate a new development in the 
Russian democratization process. The geographic location clearly indicates why the Circassian 
question in Russia is often framed as a geopolitical issue or as a security issue, rather than an issue 
of minority rights, which is a situation the Circassians share with many ethnic minorities around the 
globe. 
 
 
Youth mobilization 
 
Circassian youth have in many ways been spearheading a movement to openly challenge the 
authorities, as well as some of the older Circassian organizations in recent years. 116 Youth play a 
key role in the ongoing revival of new Circassian initiatives. Youth groups and activists have 
managed to put pressure on Circassian organizations and get agendas approved that had originally 
been rejected, and youth groups have successfully mobilized young people and staged their own 
protest gatherings and events, as seen on several occasions in Karachai-Cherkessia in November 
2008 and again in October 2009.117 The actions of youth and youth groups challenged the 
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 Civil society activis m of today is also based on earlier movements, such as the civil rights movements of the 1960s, 
the decolonisation movements , the movements for rights of indigenous peoples, etc. 
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 Memorial is perhaps the internationally most well-known Russian human rights organization. Memorial was started 
in the late 1980s, before the fall of the Soviet Union, when members began to document and inform about human 
rights violations during the Soviet period. Memorial played a lead ing role in defining how civil society 
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memo.ru). 
116
 The category “youth” is rarely defined but generally refer to persons between 16 and 29, most of whom are students 
and live mostly in larger towns.   
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 Fatima Tlisova, ‘Circassian Congress calls for unification of Circassian republics in North Caucasus’, North 
Caucasus Analysis 9, 45. jamestown.org (26-11-2008);  ‘In Georgia, the conference on "Circassian issue" demanded 
boycott the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi’ (in Russian), kavkaz-uzel.ru, November 23, 2010; ‘Window on 
Eurasia’, CircassianWorld.com (05-10-2009). 
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Circassian/Caucasian traditions for respect of the elders, which earlier had, from time to time, 
resulted in a marginalization of the young in organizational activities. 118 Still, many have afterwards 
accepted and respected the initiative shown by youth and their activist approach. Youth groups have 
become active and visible, and have managed to bring new ideas and inspiration from the outside, 
such as through discussions and observations from the Internet. In the last couple of years, 
Circassian youth in Russia have increasingly been involved in discussions of Circassian history, 
tradition, and identity in general.119 The renewed campaign for recognition of the Circassian 
genocide is but one example.120 This has played an important role in the newfound mobilization and 
can be expected to continue to do so in the nearest future.  
 
A significant portion of the young people are internationally oriented in their rights-based approach 
to civil society action and they have from the outset embraced modern technological tools, such as 
the Internet and mobile telecommunication, where they often are ahead of the older organizations in 
their working modalities. The cultural globalization appears to have an empowering effect on the 
Circassian youth that actively look for opportunities to counter some of the negative aspects of 
globalization, such as the threats of losing the Circassian language (Kirmse 2010, 5). Critics of 
globalization have often suggested that young persons are in a process of alienation from traditional 
culture due to globalization, but as the Circassian examples show this is not necessar ily the case 
(Kirmse 2010, 5). 
 
Youth is not just taking part, but often initiating processes of reproduction of Circassian ethnic 
identity. The Caucasus is a region often presented by various local, as well as international, 
observers in culturalistic terms as being “clannish” or “feudal”,  but the Circassian youth (and 
others) are countering these perceptions and updating the classical Caucasian understanding of 
youth with a modern, global, and democratically-oriented dimension.121 The importance and the 
responsibility of the present generation of Circassian youth to take action were affirmed in a 
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 A statement from some of the organizers of the ICA-conference in Maikop: ‘young people have no reason to be here 
and their opinions are irrelevant’. (‘W indow on Eurasia’, CircassianWorld.com, October 5, 2009).  
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 As note 30 (21-01-2011). Also confirmed in individual conversations in the North Caucasus in 2009 and 2011, as 
well as during conferences in 2012.  
120‘Employees of Kabardino-Balkaria deny the charges of illegal detention by lawyer Dorogova’, kavkaz-uzel.ru (18-11-
2010). 
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 A similar tendency can be observed in relat ion to gender issues. 
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statement from three organizations in March 2011, as part of their protests against killings and 
terror attacks in the region.122  
 
Youth representatives are insisting on their right to argue and lobby for the collective rights of the 
Circassians as an indigenous ethno-cultural group.123 This includes what could be called a campaign 
for a post-colonial assessment of the two to three hundred years of history within the Russian 
Empire and the Soviet Union.124 This type of discussions are taking place in contemporary Russia, 
though on a relatively marginalized level compared to many of the neighbouring post-Soviet states, 
where such discussions are much more central. As these discussions often point at imperial Russia 
as a colonizing empire, they are often met by rejection or anger by official Russian 
representatives.125 Still, new developments could push such discussions into a more central role in 
Russia, which is one of the key aims of the Circassian organizations. So-called hidden histories or 
suppressed memories possess a strong potential for mobilization-as can be witnessed by many of 
the Circassians in the diaspora and on the Internet (Cohen 1997, 235). 
 
In the post-communist democratization programmes of many of the other post-Soviet countries, 
western donors have often supported and encouraged the development of youth activism and 
organizations. In the Russian Federation such programmes are largely met with suspicion from the 
authorities, and are often labelled as foreign support for the opposition (Richter, 2008: 196). The 
fear of youth (and others) as civil society agents of change has led to new youth policies and the 
creation of new so-called patriotic youth movements and policies in Russia to counter these 
tendencies, for instance the “Nashi” movement and the “Young Guards” of the United Russia party 
(the party of power that also plays a role in relation to Nashi). 126 Nashi and other so-called patriotic 
youth organizations were established to prevent youth involvement in the type of new agendas and 
changes brought by the Rose-revolution in Georgia and the Orange-revolution in Ukraine and have 
received considerable funding for their activities (Blum 2007, 135). Members of Nashi were spotted 
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 What is Circassian nationalism?’, Natpress.net (17-03-2011). 
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 North Caucasus Analysis 10(15), Jamestown.org (17-04-2009). 
124
 ‘Russia is formally a federation, but it has kept a number of imperial features and is still a multiethnic empire with 
potential territorial instability looming round the next corner’ (Hedetoft and Blum 2008, 21).  
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 ‘Dumanov: There is not Circassian problem in Russia’. Statement by Hasan Dumanov, hist orian and acting head of 
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 Young Guards have been active in the Circassian republics for a longer period, while Nashi only in 2011 has taken 
steps to open branches in the North Caucasus. 
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at the football- related riots in Moscow in December 2010, where Caucasians were violently 
attacked and the slogan “Russia for the Russian” repeatedly voiced. 127 In relation to the North 
Caucasus, an organization such as Nashi with its loud othering of the non-Russians of the 
neighbouring countries often manages to strengthen the production of Caucasian identity as a 
counter-reaction. This appears to be counter-productive in relation to the aims of the organization, 
which are to support Russian sovereignty and prevent foreign influence in Russia.128 This is a 
reference to the youth-dominated movements (Otpor) that played a key role in ousting Milosevic in 
Serbia in 2000, the launching of the “colour revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine in the mid-2000s, 
and the so-called Arab Spring of 2011. The contemporary trend of Circassian youth activism is an 
attempt to manifest their role in the post-Soviet democratization process-as the first post-Soviet 
generation. 
 
Olivier Roy has emphasized how the Arab Spring of 2011 is (also) a generational phenomenon, 
where a new generation is protesting against the stagnating societies and expressing their wish to be 
part of the global economy and global exchange at large − much in line with the May 1968 events 
in Paris.129 The youth initiatives among the Circassians, with their demands for increased rights for 
minorities, have some parallels to the Arab Spring, though the national level of the mobilizations in 
these countries cannot be compared to the Circassian efforts. In Russia, the incidents of the 2011 
Arab Spring have led to speculations on a potential tightening of the use of the Internet and a new 
law to facilitate such action has been approved.130 However, that could risk generating further 
dissatisfaction among ethnic Russian youth beyond the control of the authorities and the above 
mentioned pro-Kremlin youth organizations. 
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 ‘Russia: Kremlin Struggling to Keep Lid on Pandora's Box of Nationalism’, eurasianet.org (December 20, 2012). 
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 The Arab Spring that began in 2011 led to speculations of a Russian Spring or a Russian Facebook Revolution , 
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Another youth-related issue is about young people leaving for the forests and mountains of the 
North Caucasus to join the insurgents.131 This issue links to contemporary discussions on security 
and terrorism that have gained significant media coverage in Russia, as well as in the rest of the 
world through the last decade, and are also widely circulated through the Internet. Of the three 
Circassian republics, the insurgents are mainly found in Kabardino-Balkaria, though in recent years 
the number of insurgents in Karachai-Cherkessia has also been increasing.132 The Islamist 
“movement” appear to be spreading slowly from east to west, which increasingly results in reports 
on people’s fear of potential terrorist acts directed towards Sochi due to the 2014 Olympics. 133 It is 
widely believed that youth are motivated to join the insurgents by unemployment, lack of other 
options, and, to a lesser degree, religious reasons. The well-known Circassian activist Ibrahim 
Yaganov stated, after the rejection of topics for the agenda of an ICA-meeting that had been 
proposed by youth representatives, that youth in Circassian republics are caught in a vacuum for 
which the dominant Circassian organizations and the ICA are also responsible.134 This could lead to 
increased support for Islamic extremism.135 
 
A different example of the new role of youth is the suggestion by a young parliament member from 
the Republic of Adygea who, at the all-Russian forum of young parliamentarians, managed to 
achieve support for an appeal to the Russian government and the Russian Olympic Committee for 
the inclusion of Circassian symbols in the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics programme. The appeal 
referred to the philosophy and traditions of the Olympics movement for promoting multi-cultural 
coexistence and tolerance and how the inclusion of one specific popular talethe so-called Nart 
epos-which connects the themes of multi-cultural coexistence and tolerance to the Caucasian 
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setting.136 This is another example of how new voices in Russia can be supportive towards 
Circassian issues (or at least elements thereof).137 
 
The type of civil society agency discussed in this paper is often dependent on the initiative and 
examples of key individuals. Douglas W. Blum suggests applying the term “cultural entrepreneurs” 
to such figures, according to a definition from Crawford Young: “a cultural entrepreneur will be 
understood here as someone who strategically fashions and activates identity; i.e., who “devotes 
himself to enlarging the symbolic, solidary resources of the community” by mobilizing dormant or 
unselfconscious cultural beliefs and practices into overt, ideologized symbols of belonging, thus 
creating a “catechism of identity”” (Blum 2007, 140). In his study of youth activism in Russia and 
other post-Soviet states, Blum has identified a new type of Russian youth activism that has 
blossomed in recent years, though mainly within the sphere of Russian nation-building and largely 
as the result of a state-managed and state- initiated policy (Blum 2007, 138). Blum distinguishes 
between three types of cultural entrepreneurs: state, sub-state, and non-state. In relation to the 
Circassian mobilization addressed in this paper, the Circassian entrepreneurs are almost entirely 
non-state actors, especially related to the role of youth. Circassian cultural entrepreneurs of the three 
Caucasian republics have tended to constitute cooperation between sub-state and non-state actors 
with the former in the dominating role, which has often resulted in relatively restrained or 
representational functions in relation to certain public events. This is the level of activity that 
Circassian organizations were forced into in the second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 
2000s, which Ruslan Keshev from the Circassian Congress has labelled as “dormant”. And this is 
what many of the newer and often youth-dominated organizations and initiatives protest against.  
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Contemporary Circassian youth activism shares some of the tendencies of the Russian youth 
movements described by Blum and are similar or parallel in terms of the use of indigenous and 
ethnic identity in their mobilization.138 The major difference is role of state and government 
policies. Recent Circassian youth activism is partly a re-action to official Russian youth policies 
that, on the one hand, praise tolerance and coexistence as part of an all-Russian federal civic 
nationalism and, on the other hand, constantly emphasize the role of ethnic “Russianness” and the 
Orthodox religion in the history of the Russian state (Vodichev and Lamin, 2008: 120). In this way, 
Circassian youth activism also represents a protest against marginalization as a minority ethnic 
group that is less privileged than the majority ethnic group. On a general level, Circassian activism 
benefits from the institutionalization of the Circassian ethno-national identity as it has taken place 
through many years as a titular-nationality in the republics, which include rights to local language 
teaching and publishing, local research institutions, local media, etc. Still, much of the 
contemporary protests by Circassian civil society actors are targeting different forms of 
discrimination and erosion of cultural rights in terms of language teaching, publications, conditions 
for repatriation from the diaspora, etc.139   
 
 
Internet mobilization  
 
The scale of Internet coverage in Russia was limited for a long period of time, and access was 
controlled and monitored by the authorities. However, since the mid-2000s, increased Internet 
access and the arrival of the new social media of Web 2.0 have resulted in significant Circassian 
Internet activity and many Circassian Internet sites can now be found. In relation to contacts with 
the Circassian diaspora, language has been a barrier as Russian is the preferred language in Russia, 
while Turkish is the preferred language in Turkey (or Europe), where the majority of the diaspora is 
located. Moreover, the Circassian language is sometimes used in Russia with the Cyrillic alphabet, 
which only a small number among the diaspora can use. English is thus increasingly becoming the 
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language of transnational contacts between Circassians in the diaspora and in the Caucasus. The 
digital divide appears to be in a process of being bridged, and youth activists play a key role in this 
process. In Turkey, there have also been delays in bridging the digital divide, though during the last 
decade ethnic minorities have increasingly been allowed to organize and present their issues in 
public due to the Turkish democratization process, partly motivated by the rapprochement to the 
EU. Protests against the Sochi Olympics in 2014, linked to the key Circassian narrative on the 
forced exile in both time and space, play a facilitating role in this renewed Circassian 
mobilization.140 The ongoing Internet revival among the Circassians, which for a period appeared to 
take place in two separate zones defined by the Russian and Turkish languages respectively, now 
increasingly includes links and the transfer of information.141 Many Circassians in the North 
Caucasus are becoming aware of the mobilization and discussions among the diaspora and the fact 
that a kind of virtual Circassia or transnational Circassian public sphere has developed from below 
by a multitude of actors. The Internet has built- in potential for multiplication through hyperlinking 
and cross-mediation, which increases the potential visibility and thereby also the potential for 
mobilization.142 The dialogue and feedback functions of the social media sites of Web 2.0 also 
increase involvement and potential mobilization.  
 
For a number of years there has been a significantly wider space for action online than off- line 
within the civil society sector and the media in Russia. 143 Within the online sphere there is  an 
awareness of international standards and discussions on issues such as human rights, minority 
rights, and freedom speech from the beginning, which was enhanced through transnational links and 
contacts. It is this functioning of the Internet as a kind of free-zone in Russian society that has also 
increasingly affected Circassian visibility and mobilization-especially online. There is no doubt that 
these activities are also monitored closely by the intelligence services in Russia, and several 
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activists have been contacted and asked why they carry out anti-Russian activities, if they care 
about the safety of their families, etc.144 The Nart television station, which was initiated by 
representatives from the diaspora in Jordan, has managed to establish an office in the Caucasus and 
has become another example of media that can unify the Circassians. 145 Their transmissions mainly 
focus on culture, traditions, and history, and can use the Circassian language without having to 
choose an alphabet, which is a challenge to many Internet actors.  
 
Internet coverage has risen significantly in Russia and in 2012 almost half of the population has 
access to the Internet.146 This number is generally lower in the North Caucasus, but key actors, such 
as civil society activists and a substantial proportion of young persons have extensive access. Aihwa 
Ong has stated that the Internet is an information technology that transnational groups wish to use 
‘to exercise a new form of power’, thereby hinting at the potential role of the Internet in lobby and 
policy oriented efforts (Ong 2003).  
 
In the Freedom House report for 2010 on democratic development in Russia, the index ranking for 
independent media is still very low; small and marginalized websites that are often referred to as 
belonging to the opposition are allowed to remain, while the more popular media outlets and 
websites are often censored or bought by the authorities or companies with close links to the 
authorities (Orttung 2010, 437). So far most of the Circassian websites appear to fall in the marginal 
category and are allowed to continue. New laws in 2012 have increased the options available for 
authorities to close websites, which has led to a fear of censorship and crackdown on independent 
Internet media and non-governmental organizations by some observers.147 
 
The anthropologist Maximilian Forte has developed an analytic model for electronic revival among 
marginalized minorities or indigenous groups, according to which such groups can achieve 
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free-speech fears’. Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (01-11-2012), available at: 
http://www.rferl.o rg/content/Russia-Internet-blacklist-free-speech/24758022.ht ml; ‘Internet restriction law comes 
online’, Moscow Times (01-11-2012), online edit ion, available at: 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/Internet-restriction-law-comes-on-line/470892.html).   
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visibility, embodiment, recognition, and authenticity through the use of the Internet in a manner 
similar to Hobsbawm’s notions on “invention of tradition” or Anderson’s “imagined communities” 
(Forte  2006, 145).148 This type of revival contributes to the creation of a collective consciousness 
of belonging to a joint Circassian community beyond the republican borders of everyday life-and 
increasingly also across international borders. The daily use of and participation in various 
Circassian forum discussions and social websites constantly enhances this process in a manner 
described by Forte as a continually ongoing loop-function. This results in a much wider circulation, 
outreach, and potential impact than was the case with the so-called electronic capitalism of the 
1990s that mainly built on television and radio.149 Many of books and articles on Circassian history, 
traditions, and identity published in the 1990s are now remediated and circulated on the Internet. It 
is clear that much larger target groups can be reached and, through the use of modern media with 
youth appeal, additional target groups become involved, which includes youth as active participants 
in discussion forums and in various ways of commenting on texts, photos, films, etc. Informing 
Circassians about their culture, history, and traditions has often been the first priority of Circassian 
organizations and Internet initiatives, as many Circassians had a limited knowledge about this. This 
approach to enlightenment has also shown a potential for mobilization. Increased use o f the Internet 
has contributed to enlarging the Circassian public sphere in Russia and has offered a space for 
Circassian actors that are not available off- line. 
 
Thus, a new type of Internet-based organization has emerged with the spread of the Internet and can 
function on a low budget, which makes it well-suited for grass-root oriented activism. This also 
contributes to explaining how virtual community building on a transnational level canto a certain 
extentbypass the authorities or other powerful actors. As stressed by many observers, the virtual 
world is part of the real world. 
 
 
Factors enhancing ethnic mobilization   
 
                                                 
148
 These tendencies are part of what have been labelled “dig ital d iaspora” where homeland relations can be virtually 
redefined and create or recreate links that had disappeared (Brinkerhoff 2009).  
149
 Electronic cap italism is a term pointed at by Arjun Appadurai (1996, 161) based on the term print capitalis m 
developed by Benedict Anderson (1991) to describe how (new) media had an impact on the production of 
nationalism and national identity in h is famous book Imagined Communities. The period after 1990 in the North 
Caucasus was marked by a revival o f both print and electronic capitalis m.  
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As already mentioned, the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi constitutes a key issue in the ongoing 
transnational Circassian mobilization, but a number of what could be called structural issues also 
contribute as mobilizing factors. These include anti-Caucasian xenophobia in Russia, the role of 
ethnic Russians as the dominant ethnic group in the Russian Federation (in an asymmetrical 
relationship), the double-titular composition of some of the republics in the North Caucasus, and the 
general process of ethnic homogenization.  
 
Anti-Caucasian xenophobia and discrimination is widespread in Russia. Between fifty and hundred 
persons are killed annually by racists in Russia and hundreds are severely injured in vio lent hate 
crimes (Orttung 2010, 443). A significant portion of the victims are Caucasians. These problems 
have become so widespread during the last ten years that the Circassian and Caucasian 
organizations in Moscow now spend more energy supporting Caucasians with legal assistance and 
other forms of support than originally planned. The high number of Circassians and other 
Caucasians living in Moscow as students, businessmen, or various types of labourers has 
contributed to make Caucasians more visible targets of racist groups. 150 
 
 The type of relationship that exists between the big Russian state that shares its name with a 
dominant ethnic group, the Russians or so-called “Staatsvolk” (Brubaker 1996, 172), and the 
Circassians, as ethnic minorities located in the southern periphery, can only be labelled an 
asymmetric power-relationship. This relationship is further challenged by the fact that for an 
extended period both groups have been troubled by questions of identity and identification as part 
of the transitional uncertainties that also occurred in many other areas of the post-Soviet space.151 In 
spite of being the “weaker” part in the power-relationor sometimes also because of itthis situation 
can generate new support and mobilization behind issues of ethnic character or relevance for 
peoples such as the Circassians.152 This is a type of structural problem in the so-called asymmetrical 
                                                 
150
 The violent riots in the centre of Moscow in December 2010 illustrated how anti-Caucasian sentiments and violence 
erupted after a young ethnic Russian football fan was killed by a young Circassian. Several Caucasians were 
randomly beaten and the slogan “Russia for Russians” was used repeatedly. Circassians in the North Caucasus, 
including from the authorities, and the diaspora protested, while much of the coverage of the Russian mainstream 
media focussed on the young ethnic Russian as a victim of vio lence (‘Moscow’s race riots: Are Caucasians white?’, 
The Examiner, 06-01-2011). 
151
 Also Khazanov (2006, 45) has written on contemporary Russia as a nationalizing state in quest of identity (identity 
politics). 
152
 The widespread anti-Caucasian xenophobia and the tendency of the Russian media to constantly link the North 
Caucasus to issues such as Islamists, terror, and vio lence to many Circassians end up stressing the point made by 
Andreas Wimmer on ethno-national dominance as performed by various elite actors in Russia, and how this can 
function as a mobilizing factor among ethno-cultural minorit ies. 
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ethno-federalism of Russia that dates back to the state- formation process that began in 1991-a 
federal model with a solid built- in conflict potential (Sakwa 2006, 618).  
 
Andreas Wimmer distinguishes between inclusivist and exclusivist types of dominant ethnicity, by 
which he states that the more exclusivist variant delineates a field of political tension and can 
represent a more contested and conflictive mode of ethno-national dominance (Wimmer 2004, 47). 
Wimmer use the term ethno-national dominance to cover both dominant ethnicity and dominant 
nationhood, which can be useful in relation to the Russian context where the two forms often are 
mixed and often not defined. Within contemporary Russia there seems to be a tendency to switch 
between being inclusivist and exclusivist in a manner that has similarities with the earlier periods of 
the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, when, for instance, periods of “Russification” could shift 
with periods of “nativization”. Elements of this can also be found in the Circassian areas today, 
where local languages and history are being taught in schools and published in books, but due to 
enormous developments in the electronic media, especially in television and on the Internet, the 
Russian language has a strengthened position vis-à-vis the local languages. Still, despite significant 
differences between the three republics, the Russian language continues to play an important role as 
a lingua franca in these ethnically-mixed entities. When the weekly hours of teaching in local 
languages from 2011 were reduced as a result of a federal decision, it indirectly strengthened the 
role of the Russian language.153 
 
The system of dominating ethnic groups is also found on the secondary level of the republics, which 
Wimmer has termed as “dominant minorities” (Wimmer 2004, 47). In Kabardino-Balkaria, Balkars 
regularly complain about the domination of the Kabardians, as do the Cherkess about the Karachai 
in Karachai-Cherkessia. In the republic of Adygea, Adygs and Russians are mutually complaining 
about each other. The closely related Turkish-speaking peoples of Balkars and Karachai are also 
undergoing a process of mobilization and increased cooperation as found among the Circassians. 154 
These two parallel mobilization processes partly enhance each other, which is a by-product of the 
double-titular republic structure. 
 
                                                 
153
 ‘Wikipedia has opened a Circassian language site (eastern dialect)’ (in Russian), Elot.ru, (25-03-2011), available at : 
http://www.elot.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2318&Itemid=1.  
154
 ‘In Kabardino-Balkaria, the public organization "Alan" conducted a public meeting Balkar’ (in Russian) and 
‘Leaders of Karachai organisations in Karachai-Cherkessia prepare congress of repressed people in the North 
Caucasus’ (in Russian), Caucasian Knot (25-01-2011). 
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Since the 1960s, a process of ethnic or demographic homogenization has taken place in the North 
Caucasus, though at a slower speed in the west than in the eastern parts. Ethnic Russians have been 
steadily leaving the region in a process that began when the Balkars and the Karachai returned from 
exile in Central Asia in the late 1950s. This is a process that has parallels to the so-called process of 
“un-mixing of peoples” that took place in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, which a lso 
took place on the level of the non-state units such as the republics in the North Caucasus (Brubaker 
1996, 150). This could also be seen as a counter reaction to the demographic Russification of the 
Soviet era-enhanced by the North Caucasian re-ethnification processes since 1991. These 
tendencies increase the legitimacy of the type of self-determination found among the titular-
nationalities of the North Caucasian peoples and, in some way, counteracts the Russification or 
ethnic Russian domination processes mentioned earlier. Internally in the republics, the ethnic 
homogenization processes are to some extent countered by the on-going process of urbanization, by 
which many villages have lost half of their population since the fall of the Soviet Union. 155 
 
  
Conclusion 
 
At first sight, the space for action within the civil society sector in Russia for an ethnic minority 
located in the periphery close to the Georgian border-an area widely perceived as being of strategic 
importance to Russiaappears reduced. This seems to be in line with the conclusions of reports by 
Freedom House and Transparency International in their annual assessments of the democratic 
developments in the Russian Federation. Still, by observing the activity level of the Circassian 
organizations, as well as their increasing numbers and the significantly rise in Circassian activity 
level on the Internet, it becomes clear that the space for action of the Circassians within the wider 
public sphere of the Russian Federation has actually been enlarged. The Circassian youth in 
particular has taken a lead role in this new process of enlarging the space for action of the 
Circassians, even though a significant part of this space is in cyberspace, which is also a part of 
reality and does not constitute a separate or artificial world. This role of Circassian cyberspace 
reflects similar tendencies in other parts of Russian society, where a larger space for action is 
generally found on the Internet than in the printed and electronic media.  
                                                 
155
 A new programme encouraging ethnic Russians to move to the North Caucasus was presented in 2010 but has not 
yet materialized. Th is could mark a return of the demographic po licies of the imperial and communist era.  
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The fact that a number of killings and acts of violence have affected Circassian activists and cultural 
personalities at the same timeand the perpetrators are rarely arrested and convictedindicates that 
this type of civil society mobilization can be dangerous. Still, many activists state that they have 
gone beyond the “point of no return” and will continue their activities within the democratic 
framework of Russian law. 
 
The strengthened ethnic mobilization and the tendency towards increased unity among the 
Circassian organizations in the North Caucasus represent a new platform for future action. The level 
of exchange and cooperation with the diaspora organizations is generally rising, as seen in relation 
to the campaign for recognition of the Circassian genocide. This new Circassian platform for civil 
society action could in the coming years be further strengthened through cooperation with other 
actors such as human rights organizations and academic institutions, from the centre of the 
federation as a type of strategic partner. When environmental organizations or anti-corruption 
bloggers have also protested against the Sochi Olympics, such parallel action has occurred. Another 
example was the statements from the Russian Academy of Science in 2010, when they 
acknowledged the Circassian claim of constituting one joint Circassian peopleand not the four 
different peoples presently outlined based on divisions from the Stalin era. The Circassian 
mobilization on the Internet continues to widen, which increasingly includes cooperation with non-
Circassian actors. 
 
The 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, as a high-profile international mega-event, has stimulated 
renewed mobilization among the Circassian diaspora, and little by little the same is happening 
among the Circassians in the North Caucasus. The timing of the event plays a double role in the 
mobilization as “Sochi” embodies both the time and space of their final eviction in 1864. In the 
renewed mobilization process since the mid-2000s, it has increasingly become popular to rephrase 
the “national tragedy” into an “act of genocide”. It appears evident that in the years remaining until 
the 150 years anniversary in 2014, the process of Circassian mobilization will continue to grow.  
 
The combined role of youth and the Internet has, in the case of the Circassians, shown potential for 
the promotion of a democratization process in line with international trends. As such, many of the 
Internet-based actions of young Circassians constitute attempts at countering some of the autocratic 
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tendencies in Russia during the latter decade. Both the Circassian youth and Web 2.0 efforts 
illustrate the shift towards a new generation, where representatives from this second post-Soviet 
generation of youth are inspired by international trends on rights-based activism, while Web 2.0 
represents the second generation Internet that is both qualitatively and quantitatively different than 
Web 1.0. So far, most youth representatives have- in spite of internal differences and calls for 
increased ethno-centrismmanaged to demonstrate that ethno-cultural revival can be performed 
while simultaneously being modern and globally-oriented.  
 
The increased functionalities of the Internet in Web 2.0 have clearly contributed to strengthening 
the Circassian mobilization and have resulted in steadily increasing involvement of Circassians. In 
terms of the form and tools applied in the Internet mediation process, the community-building 
element of Web 2.0, as used by Circassian actors, is quite different from the processes described by 
Benedict Anderson (1991) and Arjun Appadurai (2001) as print-capitalism and electronic-
capitalism, respectively. The “digital-capitalism” of today’s Web 2.0 is more sprawling, grass-roots, 
and dialogue-oriented and is a less post-Soviet phenomenon, where the level of popular 
involvement is significantly larger than the more elite-oriented processes of the above mentioned 
earlier periods.  
 
The Circassian mobilization is not just ethnic, but is also cultural, indigenous, and minority rights 
related. The framing of the Circassian mobilization as “ethnic” regularly results in allegations of 
nationalism from local and federal opponents, as well as from academic specialists in Russia. This 
often results in a dilemma where the rights of the Circassians as an indigenous minority are 
questioned and presented as a threat towards political stability. 156 This is obviously an awkward 
situation for an ethno-cultural minority group in a country like Russia, where the ongoing ethno-
cultural revival of the ethnic Russians, as the dominating group in a nationalizing state, is widely 
regarded as more legitimate than similar processes among ethnic minorities in the North Caucasus. 
One North Caucasian observer has referred to this type of ethnic Russian dominance as 
“ethnocratization” (Sampiev 2008). This type of imbalance in the long run seems to enhance and 
fuel the Circassian mobilization. The 2014 Sochi Olympics has contributed to generating an 
international platform from which Circassian activists and organizations have launched an 
                                                 
156
 Three Circassian organizations in the North Caucasus issued a statement in March 2011 protesting against what  they 
called propaganda against nationalism as equal to chauvinism or xenophobia, while insisting on their rights to 
lobby for the rights and interests of the Circassians (‘What is Circassian nationalism?’, Natpress.net, 17-03-2011). 
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encounter with biased Russian history writing and other elements of discrimination on a much 
larger scale than before. This is just one example of how the Circassian organizations and cyber-
activists increasingly challenge the authorities on local and federal level in Russia. 
 
 The transnational cooperation and linking between the Circassians minorities in Russia and the 
Circassian diaspora could be said to approach a level described by Rogers Brubaker as a triadic 
relationship-where Russia, in the role of the nationalizing state, is no longer just met with resistance 
from national minorities within the country, but is also faced with new transnational diaspora 
groups. 
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Chapter  3 
 
Frontier Zones of Diaspora-Making:  
Circassian Organizations in Turkey 
 
 
 
After 150 years in relative oblivion as a scattered and forgotten people, the Circassians are now 
reemerging as a visible and internationally recognized ethnic group insisting on their place in the 
history books as well as on their contemporary rights as minority and diaspora groups in different 
national contexts. The Circassians—along with their historical North Caucasian homeland Circassia 
that was once situated between the Black Sea coast and the northern slopes of the Caucasus 
mountain range—were well known in the nineteenth century. Their century-long resistance to 
Russian conquest and colonization was followed by the international media and supported by 
official as well as unofficial actors from Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Following their 
final defeat in the 1860s, the majority of Circassians went into exile in Ottoman Turkey and, today, 
the largest contingent of Circassians—several million—are still found in Turkey, though an 
increasing part of the diaspora can also be found in the Middle East, Western Europe, and North 
America. In the Russian North Caucasus the Circassians of today includes the Adyge, the Cherkess, 
and the Kabardians, where they constitute titular-nationalities in three federal republics.157 
 
Over the last couple of years, new Circassian organizations and Internet-based media have emerged 
and taken advantage of the new options within Turkish civil society, which include increased rights 
for minorities to establish their own organizations and increased freedom of speech. This ongoing 
process of reform and democratization in Turkey includes adaptation to standards of minority rights 
and so on, as required in the rapprochement with the European Union. The Circassian organizations 
are becoming key actors in the contemporary redefinition of Circassian identity from being 
regarded as a Turkish subgroup into an ethnic minority group in a modern Western understanding. 
The new organizations and the media are challenging the kind of status quo that has existed among 
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 The republics of Adygea, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Kabard ino-Balkaria. 
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the diaspora for decades, and this has resulted in the development of new lines of division within 
the Circassian communities. 
 
Based on interviews with representatives of Circassian organizations, online material, and a 
subsequent mapping of a number of key Circassian organizations and their activities in Turkey, it is 
the aim of this chapter to investigate how the arrival of new organizations with new priorities has 
affected the diaspora community in Turkey and created alternative lines of division and potential 
conf licts.158 This chapter explores the ongoing repositioning among the Circassian diaspora 
organizations and discusses the resulting politicization and polarization. In addressing this new 
space for action within civil society in Turkey, I have drawn inspiration from two different civil 
society discourses: (a) the role of civil society organizations in democratization processes, 
especially in the former eastern Europe, upon which much of the democratization process in Turkey 
has been modeled; and (b) the role of civil society organizations in developing and promoting a 
postcolonial agenda, which is rarely discussed in relation to Turkey but is highly relevant in relation 
to the priorities and actions of the Circassian organizations. This twinning of democratization and 
postcolonialism encapsulates the process of redefining the Circassians as an ethnic minority as well 
as a diaspora in Turkey. 
 
The recent developments among the Circassian organizations are not just affected and inspired by 
the democratic reform process in Turkey but also by the overall wider globalization process. 
Drawing inspiration from Saskia Sassen’s (2009) theory on frontier zones, I will discuss the role of 
modern globalized cities such as Istanbul and Ankara as arenas for the creation of this type of 
frontier zones. This will include a discussion on the role of the Circassian organizations in Turkey 
in the increasing transnationalization of the Circassian diaspora in general. Selected organizations in 
Turkey and especially in Istanbul will be included in order to illustrate recent trends.159 The 
establishment of such new Circassian frontier zones could signify not just the establishment of new 
alternative spaces of Circassian mobilization and reidentification, but could also constitute  
a significant new—national as well as transnational—alternative space of resistance toward the 
Circassian situation in the North Caucasus. The constitution and character of this type of alternative 
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 Interviews were conducted in Turkey in 2008 and 2010. Over the same period, I visited and conducted interviews 
with representatives of Circassian diaspora organizations in several other countries. 
159
 The term organizat ion refers to a broad range of civil society organizations including associations, umbrella 
organizations, foundations, nongovernmental organizations and so on. 
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space that appears to be different both in terms of form and content as compared to what it was 
earlier will be discussed. 
 
 
Historical Background 
 
In 1864, Circassia disappeared from the map after many decades of war with the Russian Empire, 
and most of the Circassians f led their homeland for the Ottoman Empire. For many centuries, 
Circassia had existed as a loosely connected premodern state or union of related tribes speaking the  
Circassian language, which belong to the North-Western Caucasian type (Hansen and Krag 2002, 
62). The Muslim religion was introduced by the Crimean Tatars during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries and was consolidated during the many years of war with Russia. 
 
In Russia the war is referred to as part of the Caucasian Wars, while the Circassians (especially 
among the diaspora) increasingly refer to it as the Russian-Circassian War that lasted for 101 
years—from 1763 to 1864 (Hatk 1992; Jaimoukha 2001). According to the official Russian p 
osition—then as well as now—the right to the territory of Circassia was ceded to Russia from the 
Ottoman Empire as part of the Adrianopolis-Treaty of 1829 (Jaimoukha 2001, 63). As the war went 
on for decades and new generations became involved, the animosities between the warring sides 
worsened. In the end, almost all Circassian villages were burnt down, and almost all Circassians 
driven out of their place of residence. Those who stayed in the Caucasus were also relocated. That 
the majority of Circassians chose to f lee came as a surprise to both Russian and Ottoman 
authorities and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands during the flight in overcrowded 
ships, on the way to relocation in different parts of the Ottoman Empire. The number of casualties 
during the many years of war and the exodus is difficult to assess but various estimates refer to as 
many as 800,000 (Jaimoukha 2001, 68). More conservative estimates put the figure at half a million 
dead, with approximately one million Circassians surviving. 
 
As far back as the 1830s, Great Britain had become a key player in the geopolitical competition 
with the Russian Empire for influence in the Caucasus, as the Ottoman Empire gradually weakened. 
Several British explorers, traders, and diplomats visited Circassia during the period and the 
geopolitical competition generated strong interest for what came to be known as “the Circassian 
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Question” in the international media of the time.160 Key British actors contributed to the design of a 
new flag as a joint symbol of the united tribes of Circassia and a declaration of independence was 
published in the international media in order to counter Russian claims on the territory. Formal 
British recognition of Circassian independence followed in 1838. All this resulted in a number of 
British publications on Circassian issues and many documents can be found in the British archives. 
Today, many of these documents are the object of research and many of them have been published 
over the last two decades. Such documents play a key role in the ongoing ethnic revival among 
Circassians, including the formal appeals for recognition of their displacement as an act of 
genocide, in which they are used as part of the general documentation process.  
 
During the many years of Soviet rule, the three above mentioned Circassian subgroups experienced 
a gradually increased institutionalization as ethno-territorial groups and administrative units within 
the North Caucasus. As a characteristic part of Soviet nationality policies, this was accompanied by 
divide-and-rule measures: the Kabardians and the Cherkess (a new subgroup that is one of several 
new inventions of so-called Soviet ethnic engineering) were not placed in the same republic, but 
today still constitute titular-nationalities in the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-
Cherkessia. The Circassians today once more find themselves located in a border zone close to 
Georgia and Abkhasia—a location that gained new significance after the 2008 war between Russia 
and Georgia, and the subsequent Russian recognition of neighboring Abkhasia as an independent 
country. 
 
Sochi, in the deep south of Russia on the Black Sea coast, has been chosen to host the Winter 
Olympics in 2014. The Circassian name for Sochi is Sache and it is a place of high symbolic 
importance for the Circassians as this was the last place in the Caucasus that Circassians left in 
1864, after losing the final battle of the war. The Olympic Games in 2014 in Sochi thus managed to 
encapsulate an absolutely key element in the time and space of Circassian mythology, which is 
already on the agenda of the ongoing Circassian revival. In this way the Circassian Question has 
again been elevated to a higher level on the international scene.  
 
 
Contemporary Circasian Diaspora Trends 
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 The terms the “Circassian Question” or the “Circassian Issue” have recently begun to enter the vocabulary of the 
Russian media. 
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The aim of this section is to introduce key themes and theories with which to discuss the situation 
of the Circassian organizations in Turkey.  This includes the parallel processes of reidentification as 
a diaspora and an ethnic minority respectively; processes that are unfolding within the framework of 
a civil society in which potentially increased space for action is appearing as part of the ongoing 
democratization process. These processes interact with ongoing globalization processes—including 
increased urbanization—and create overlapping spaces that can be characterized as being not just 
global, or just national, or just local. Saskia Sassen’s theories of frontier zones (of globalization) 
will be included to discuss these phenomena. All the above mentioned thematic overlaps reflect the 
complex contexts of the Circassian diaspora and their organizations in Turkey today. 
 
There is significant agreement with regard to the motivation of the Circassian organizations, in 
which all representatives stress the need to preserve culture and identity that are widely regarded as 
threatened by assimilation in all countries of their scattered communities. This has especially been 
accentuated by the prospect of losing their language in the course of just one generation. Among 
many Circassians active in the organizations, this implies a need to act immediately, as in 10 or 15 
years it may already be too late. This apparent unity among the Circassian organizations as to their 
motivation display a contradiction also often found among other modern diaspora groups, whereby 
new urban and globalized living conditions, on the one hand, result in the establishment of new 
organizations setting new agendas while, on the other, they are simultaneously losing the language 
that used to be regarded as one of the fundamental pillars of their identity. The threat of loss of 
language has come as a surprise to many Circassians and has potential repercussions regarding the 
issue of repatriation of Circassians to the homeland, where command of the Circassian language is 
regarded as crucial. 
 
The first Circassian association in Turkey was established in 1908 but was closed down by the 
authorities with the outbreak of the World War I. Only in 1950, when the election victory of the 
Democratic Party ended the long period of de facto one-party rule since 1923, were the Circassians 
again allowed to establish associations, though only focusing on cultural activities (Bas 2008, 13). 
As a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union, and especially the subsequent outbreak of violent 
conf licts in Chechnya (1994) and Abkhasia (1992), a process of redefinition of identity began 
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among the diaspora Caucasians.161 These violent conf licts resulted in a new and more visible role 
for the Circassian/Caucasian organizations in Turkey, whereby these organizations took part in the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, support for refugees and different forms of support to the 
parts of the homeland affected by conf lict and war (Hansen and Krag 2002, 102). The Turkish 
media started to cover the activities of the Caucasians in Turkey in relation to these wars, which 
increased their visibility in Turkish society. 
 
The history of Caucasian exile in first Ottoman and subsequently Kemalist Turkey has, on the one 
hand, resulted in a confusing use of the word “Circasssian” as equivalent to “Caucasian,” and 
especially “North Caucasian” or “Caucasian Mountain Peoples.” On the other hand, it hasalso led to 
widespread solidarity and interaction among the Caucasians in Turkey—especially among the so-
called mountain peoples, mostly from the North Caucasus. This has resulted in a contradiction 
whereby “Circassian” (“Cherkes” in Turkish language) is the term most used in Turkey in general, 
while most of the organizations—old as well as new—are named “Caucasian.” Although most of 
the activities may deal with Circassian issues, other issues of concern to the (North) Caucasian 
peoples are also included—especially in relation to Abkhasians and Chechens.  
 
The process of reidentification along ethnically defined lines began with the fall of the Soviet 
Union, although many still state their all-Caucasian solidarity—an example of the modern hybrid 
identities at stake in many Caucasian diaspora communities. The organizations in the other diaspora 
countries almost all use the term “Circassian,” albeit with different levels of inclusiveness toward 
other North Caucasian peoples.162 As a result of many years under Kemalist rule, “Circassian” is, in 
Turkey today, widely considered as a Turkish sub-ethnos—the term ethnic minority referring 
mainly to non-Muslim groups (Karaomanoglu 2010).  
 
 
Diaspora 
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 A rough estimate of the ethnic dispersion within the Circassian/Caucasian organizations: 75 -80% Circassians, 10-
20% Abkhasians, 5-10% Chechens. Personal communication Istanbul 2008, not verified.  
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 I have chosen to use the term “Circassian” organizations, and my writ ing here is part of a wider study on the 
Circassian diaspora and their organizations. 
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According to William Safran a diaspora group is generally characterized as a particular group that 
has been forced into exile from its area of origin to an area of resettlement—often for long periods, 
marked by anxiety or oppression (Safran 1991, 83). I shall use Safran’s six diaspora characteristics 
to outline the Circassian diaspora situation in Turkey.  
 
Safran suggests that the concept of diaspora be applied to expatriate minority communities whose 
members share several of the following characteristics: (1) they, or their ancestors, have been 
dispersed from a specific original “centre” to two or more “peripheral,” or foreign, regions; (2) they 
retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland—its physical location, 
history and achievements; (3) they believe that they are not—and perhaps cannot be—fully 
accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it; (4) they 
regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their 
descendants would (or should) eventually return—when conditions are a ppropriate; (5) they 
believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their 
original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and (6) they continue to relate, personally or 
vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethno-communal consciousness and 
solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship (Safran 1991, 83). 
 
After many generations and almost 150 years in exile great differences can be found within the 
Circassian diaspora as to their collective memory of their homeland. The current Circassian revival 
does, however, include many discussions and negotiations on the role of a common vision, 
memory, and myth about their homeland and has reactualized these issues. Regarding Safran’s third 
issue, the Circassians are generally considered to be a well- integrated group in Turkey for many 
generations and are widely accepted by the host community. The ongoing redefinition of the 
Circassians as an ethnic minority group appears to be broadly accepted among the Turkish public, 
although this process is still in its early phases. Some Circassians express hope that they or their 
descendants will be able to return to the homeland but few believe in actual repatriation in the short 
to medium term. Most fear that it could take many years before the conditions are right. Cautious 
optimism can be found in relation to the longer term perspectives. The issue of repatriation is 
considered important by most Circassian organizations, although this is generally regarded as an 
issue marked by failed expectations. 
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Regarding Safran’s fifth and sixth characteristics, some Circassians have been assimilated in 
Turkey, while many are still in the early phases of rediscovering their ethnic identity. These 
characteristics of homeland relationship can therefore be found although they are still often absent 
or undergoing redevelopment. The knowledge of the homeland among the diaspora Circassians 
vary. In most cases, family links to the homeland still have to be established, although the 
prevailing family- and clan-structure formally makes this possible. A surprisingly large number of 
Circassians have still not visited the homeland, which is often regarded as distant and inaccessible 
due Russian and post-Soviet culture and bureaucracy. 
 
These are differences that—together with the lack of skills in Russian language—largely function 
as demotivating factors in relation to potential repatriation. Visits to the homeland could increase in 
the near future due to the Russian decision in 2010 to remove the visa regulations for Turkish 
citizens. The activists (online as well as off line), board members, and so on, of the 
Circassian/Caucasian organizations—together with writers, academics and others—constitute the 
vanguard or frontrunners in the ongoing process of redefining the homeland relationship among the 
Circassian diaspora.163 
 
Robin Cohen (1997, 235) describes the strong potential for social mobilization contained in 
belonging to a so-called victim diaspora, where a narrative of forced exile plays a key role.164 This 
also plays a key role in the ongoing redefinition of Circassian history and identity among the 
diaspora. Cohen further describes the importance of (imaginative) rediscovery of “hidden histories” 
as central to this type of social movement and goes on to stress how many diaspora representations 
have the character of “imaginary reunification.” This can function as an attempt to recreate the 
coherence lost by dispersion and fragmentation (Hall 1990, 224). Almost all Circassian 
organizations, websites and activists of different kinds refer to “hidden histories” on different levels 
and of different types as part of their motivation and purpose. For many Circassians, the discovery 
of a history that moves beyond the abstract mythologies and taboos of their childhood days has been 
a revelation. According to Shami, these processes have resulted in changed homeland relations—a 
transformation from an abstract space into a more concrete territory (Shami 1998, 642). However, 
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 Today, a significant number of Circassians have experienced secondary and tertiary migrations through, for instance, 
urbanization processes within Turkey and through (mostly labor) migration to large cities in Western Europe, where 
they are generally known as “Turks.” 
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 A “victim diaspora” is a “classical diaspora forced into exile such as the Jewish, African, Armenian d iasporas” 
(Cohen 1997, 235). Cohen defines the other four diaspora types as labor, trade, imperial, and cultural diasporas. 
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Cohen’s considerations on the role of “imaginary reunification” seem highly relevant, as 
repatriation is a difficult issue. Many diaspora Circassians have abstract dreams of future 
repatriation but very few have actually returned and very few feel attracted by life in the Russian 
society of today’s North Caucasus. The many references to the historical homeland or motherland 
found among the diaspora therefore tend to support the notion of an “imaginary return,” which has 
been further enhanced through the use of the Internet, where many individual actors from outside 
the organizations are also taking part in producing representations of the homeland. The tendency 
toward virtual return could even replace or diminish wishes for an actual return. Kaya identifies this 
as a significant shift among contemporary diaspora as compared to conventional forms of diasporic 
formation, as they can now no longer be “characterized by the overwhelming wish to return” (Kaya 
2005, 1). 
 
The rising use of the term diaspora in a number of different contexts has led scholars such as 
Nicholas Van Hear, Nauja Kleist, and Simon Turner to call for a reassessment of the use of the term 
in order to perceive diaspora as a process instead of as a fixed category of identity (Turner 2008, 
746). Turner has suggested using the term “diasporize”: “ . . . to diasporize expresses an active 
process, resembling Kleist’s (2007) proposal to perceive diaspora as ‘becoming’ rather than 
‘being’” (Turner 2008, 746). Recent diaspora politics represent a potential empowerment of 
diasporas as groups with transnational connections (Ong 2003, 88) and it is a global trend that “ . . . 
migrant groups are seen as potential political actors” (Kleist 2008, 127). I will return to the making 
of the Circassian diaspora as an ongoing process later in this chapter.165 
 
 
Ethnic Minorities 
 
As part of the democratic transformation in Turkey, ethnic minorities such as the Circassians are 
currently undergoing a process of redefinition. This is a challenging process that encompasses an 
overall shift within Turkish society, from a strongly institutionalized monolithic national Turkish 
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 Other relevant discussions on the making and unmaking of diasporas could include Rogers Brubaker (1996, 2005) 
and Nicholas Van Hear (1998) 
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identity into a new form of multicultural diversity (Karaosmanoglu 2010, 208; Clark 2006, 245). 
This process of transformation into a more heterogeneous society is, however, only halfway through 
and the new status of ethnic minorities is still not fully secured within the constitution.166 
Large parts of Turkish society are still unfamiliar with the new type of dual identities represented by 
ethnic minorities (Karaosmanoglu 2010, 208). Nevertheless, a number of ethnic minority 
organizations have begun to utilize the increased space for action within the Turkish public sphere, 
thereby gradually strengthening their visibility and legitimacy. This also supports the general 
redefinition of Turkey as a heterogeneous society. According to some observers, the fundamental 
character of the ongoing changes could ultimately threaten the contemporary status of Turkey as a 
unified state (Köker 2010, 66). Yet the popular support for the proposed constitutional changes in 
the referendum in September 2010 indicates that an increasing proportion of the population of 
Turkey support the ongoing process of democratic reforms.167 The process of redefining the ethnic 
identity of the Circassians is not as controversial as is the case, for instance, of the Kurds, where 
issues of separatism and terrorism often complicate the process or may be used by various political 
actors to derail the process.168 Such undertakings could threaten to halt or delay the general process 
of redefining the status of ethnic minorities—though most observers seem to believe that the overall 
process of democratization in Turkey has moved beyond the point of no return (Köker 2010, 65). 
Several civil society organizations are actively promoting and supporting a call for a reassessment 
of the past in Turkey in relation to a number of crimes targeting different ethnic minorities (Todays 
Zaman , 03-07-2010). 
 
Such processes could increase the visibility of the Circassians in Turkey. The ongoing redefinition 
of ethnic identity among the diaspora Circassians includes an element of long-distance 
nationalism—to use a term from Benedict Anderson (1998)—that is considered controversial by 
some observers and authorities in Russia. Such processes of redefinition can also lead to the 
potential branding of ethnic minorities as “nationalist” by states that themselves practice “state-
nationalism” in a more or less similar manner. This is sometimes referred to as “state-nationalism” 
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 Caucasian Forum: statement 2010: “Yes, but not enough” (www.kafkasyaforumu.org).  
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 “Turkey says yes to democratic transformation,” Today’s Zaman (13-09-2010). 
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 Kurdish struggles for cultural, indigenous or minority rights are often met with un-proportional force by the 
authorities in Turkey, where many Kurd ish politicians, writers and activist are jailed o r otherwise politically persecuted. 
This is one of the major obstacles to achieving formal status as EU accession country. Corlu sta ted in 1993 that 
possibilit ies for Circassian civil society action widely depended on the future democratization of Turkey including 
rights of Kurds as minorit ies (Corlu 1993, 18).  
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versus “micro-nationalism” (Pollock 2001, 34-36). Renewed action among minority or diaspora 
groups such as the Circassians can constitute a response to state-nationalism. In spite of the official 
and highly institutionalized status of state-nationalism in both Turkey and Russia169, these nation-
states are still undergoing changes in the redefinition of their national identities and further 
Circassian responses can be anticipated.  
 
 
Civil Society and Space for Action 
 
“Civil society” is the public sphere or arena that the Circassian organizations operate within, and 
strengthening civil society has increasingly become a priority in the ongoing Turkish 
democratization process. This is in line with Vaclav Havel’s statement from 1993: “...a strong civil 
society is a crucial condition of a strong democracy. Empowering civil society is a central concern 
for the project of democracy...” (cited from Flyvbjerg 1998, 210. Emphasis added). The 
democratization process has become a political strategy in Turkey and is strongly supported by the 
European Union—inspired by the democratic transition programs from Eastern Europe—through 
the ongoing negotiations on rapprochement with the European Union and the provision of funding 
for institutional reforms and civil society development (Kuzmanovic 2008, 246).170 “Civil society” 
is a term marked by many different definitions—today as well as historically—which largely reflect 
the great diversity found among the different civil society actors. According to one short and often 
used definition, civil society is a third sector with relative autonomy in relation to the state and the 
market but often dominated by these latter two (www.lse.ac.uk). A related definition simply 
characterizes civil society as the sum of organizations outside the market and the state. David Lewis 
has presented an alternative definition inspired by Antonio Gramsci: “...civil society is the arena, 
separate from state and market, in which ideological hegemony is contested, implying that civil 
society contained a wide range of organizations which both challenged and upheld the existing 
order” (Lewis 2001, 2). The different definitions sometimes refer to the different contexts in which 
they are applied. Lewis, for instance, discusses civil society in relation to development support to 
non-Western countries and stresses the potential function of civil society as a field of conf lict and 
resistance, as opposed to the more consensus-oriented understanding represented by the former 
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 In spite of formally constituting a federal state. 
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 As part of the accession process EU launched a civil society dialogue program in 2004, but so far Circassian or 
Caucasian organizations have not yet participated (avrupa.info.tr)  
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definitions (2001, 4). The consensus-oriented version is mostly linked to a normative understanding 
of civil society as a category in Western donor programs that can be applied in very different 
contexts: from support to democratic transition in Eastern Europe (and Turkey) to development 
programs in sub-Saharan Africa. These two different directions of civil society understanding 
represent different levels of politicization, which I will return to later in this chapter.171 
 
“Space for action” is a term often mentioned in relation to discussions on civil society, although not 
necessarily defined. According to Alison Van Rooy (1998), space for action constitutes one of the 
six viewpoints that categorizes the concept of civil society.172 This has led Hakkarainen and others 
to the following formulation of civil society as a “space for action”: “Civil society has also been 
used as a metaphor for the space organisations occupy, usually described as the enabling 
environment in which they prosper (or fade) rather than the more battle-ridden terrain of Gramsci’s 
writings. Civil society is, together with the state and market one of the three ‘spheres’ that interface 
in the making of democratic societies” (Hakkarainen et al. 2002, 3). That an increasing space for 
action within the civil society sector in Turkey has developed over the last couple of years was 
confirmed in all interviews. This is also substantiated by Daniella Kuzmanovic, who states that 
“...civic forces have gradually gained more room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis an authoritarian state” 
(Kuzmanovic 2008, 246). 
 
The Circassian and Caucasian organizations in Turkey have not yet been affected by the notion of 
civil society as a funding category—which has been a trend among both national and international 
donor programs (for development support) for a number of years and identified as one of the 
questionable effects of the EU civil society funding schemes in Turkey (Kuzmanovic 2008, 242). 
Yet the Circassian and Caucasian organizations are obviously inspired by prevailing international 
notions of civil society activism, rights-based lobbying and so on. The orientation toward 
international notions of human rights, freedom of speech, cultural and religious diversity, and the 
right to act (politically) and voice concerns can be found especially among the new Circassian 
organizations, and particularly among the youth and youth organizations, as illustrated by the 
Caucasian Forum and, for instance, the all-Turkish multiethnic organization Young Civilians. Both 
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 Much criticism of the use of the term civ il society can be found including, for instance, the t endency to idealize civil 
society as actors of democrat ic change (Grugel and Uhlin 2009). Lately, the term has also been applied to discussions 
on, for instance, cultural diversity, and social cohesion (Murray 2002, 2).  
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 The other five are value, co llect ive noun, historical moment, anti-hegemony, and antidote to state (Hakkarainen et al. 
2002, 2). 
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organizations were started by students but have since moved on to become more widely recognized 
groups with a voice and potential influence in Turkish society. 
 
 
Frontier Zones 
 
In relation to contemporary globalization processes, the sociologist Saskia Sassen has stated the 
need to rethink spatial hierarchies, the following understanding of which has been taken for granted: 
local < national < global (i.e., the global are larger than the national, which are larger than the local) 
(Sassen 2001, 272). Global action mostly takes place within national and local settings on the part 
of actors localized within the national (and the local) level, which has led Sassen to develop the 
term “frontier zones”—or “frontier zones (of globalization)”—to describe this phenomenon (2001, 
275).173 The global is a partial condition, which indicates the way frontier zones are defined as a 
zone of overlap between two or more states, while simultaneously constituting an additionality, 
something unique. A space that is partly national and partly global—not exclusively one or the 
other (2001, 260). Sassen outlines two markers of frontier zones: first, they are “spaces of 
imbrications, of mixing, of interdependence. They are not lines where civilisations clash” and 
secondly “they are spaces where the work of teasing out the rules of engagement/encounters can 
happen” and where there is “...work to be done” (Sassen 2009, 1). 
 
“Power and domination can be expected from ‘the national level’,”but Sassen stress that 
simultaneously “...an incipient and part denationalisation of domains once understood and/or 
constructed as national” can take place (Sassen 2001, 261). In the same anthology, Arjun Appadurai 
states: “I am among those analysts who are inclined to see globalisation as a definite marker of a 
new crisis for the sovereignty of nation-states” (2001, 4). Safran further states that “...one becomes 
increasingly aware that the ‘nation state’ is an oddity” (1999, 255). As the discussion above reveals, 
there seems to be no doubt that a shift from the national to the global level has occurred—I will 
return to this shift in relation to the transnationalization of the issues dealt with by the Circassian 
organizations. 
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 The use of the term “frontier zone” has been criticized from different sides, for instance: “...frontierism smacks of 
opportunism” (Sassen 2009, 4). Some commentators have found the term frontier zone’s relat ion to colonizat ion 
processes and geopolitical domination controversial or provoking.  
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Sassen has adapted the term frontier zone to include a discussion of the function of global cities as 
frontier zones: “The space constituted by the global grid of global cities, a space with new 
economic and political potentialities, is perhaps one of the most strategic spaces for the formation of 
transnational identities and communities” (Sassen 2000, 3). According to Sassen, “Cities are a space 
for politics that is far more concrete than that of the national state” (2000, 3) and “...it is also a 
strategic frontier zone for those who lack power, those who are disadvantaged, outsiders, 
discriminated minorities” (2007, 1). There is no doubt that the urban environment in which the 
Circassian organizations of today are located has played an enabling role. Following many years 
with a predominantly rural location, increased urbanization has contributed to the rise in the level 
and the type of organizational activity, respectively.174 The role of youth, hitherto expected to 
participate primarily in cultural events, such as dance classes, has shifted into a more active and 
visible role—though still with the respect for elders required by Caucasian cultural tradition.  
Students have played a key role in developing new organizations and new activism and the 
universities of the big cities such as Istanbul and Ankara have functioned as localities for meeting 
and mobilizing. The long tradition of Circassian associations and foundations supporting students 
who arrive in these cities has played a facilitating role in this process. In return, students support 
some of the activities of the associations and foundations as volunteers but also increasing challenge 
these by additionally getting involved in other types of activities. 
 
Youth also play a key role through their use of the Internet to participate in transnational 
networking—whether this takes place within an organization or through individual use of, for 
instance, the new social networks such as Facebook, YouTube, and so on, where Circassians have 
become increasingly visible. As Sassen has noted: “...through the new network technologies local 
initiatives become part of a global network of activism without losing the focus on specific local 
struggles. It enables a new type of cross-border political activism ... Digital networks are 
contributing to the production of new kinds of interconnections underlying what appear as 
fragmented topographies, whether at the global or at the local level.” (2007, 2). According to 
Sassen, the global cities become strategic sites for these new types of operation, and this is a 
description that increasingly fits the Circassian situation. The global circuit of the Internet has 
                                                 
174
 Gerard Chaliand has observed that—in spite of the otherwise strongly institutionalized Kemalist nationalis m—there 
was a feeling in the countryside that nothing was forgotten (Chaliand 2010, 1). This type of resistance to Turkish state -
nationalism is probably of key importance fo r the ongoing reproduction of collective Circassian memory as it  unfolds in 
today’s urbanized context. 
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become widely used by individual Circassians in transnational discussions on identity and history 
and the organizations are increasingly using the Internet to facilitate national as well as 
transnational links. For some of the new organizations, this is an important way of becoming visible 
and necessary for continued mobilization of support. The ease with which digitized linking can be 
carried out and can include different types of Internet platforms results in a multiplication effect, 
which underlines the strategic potential of the digital network.  
 
According to Sassen, today’s global cities often constitute a postcolonial frontier space—that is, a 
network of global cities that can function as a space for action directed against the former colonial 
center by using contemporary language, methods, and institutions. This underlines Lewis’s notions 
of civil society as a battlefield: “...Gramscian ideas about civil society have long been relevant to 
understandings of organised resistance to colonialism” (Lewis 2001, 4). The arrival of the new 
Circassian organizations and their opposition to the older organizations illustrates the creation of 
this type of battlefield as a new space for civil society action in today’s Turkey. However, they are 
not challenging their “own” state in the same way as they challenge the state of their historical 
homeland. A significant number of these acts are addressing the contemporary Russian authorities, 
as successor to the Russian Empire that colonized the Caucasus in the nineteenth century, in a 
typical postcolonial manner, whereby demands for recognition and a rewriting of history are made. 
These endeavors have increasingly become an issue of transnational cooperation between 
Circassian organizations, especially within the diaspora, but have also included cooperation with 
one of the organizations in the North Caucasus, the Circassian Congress. The fact that key activists 
from the Circassian Congress had to go into exile because of this kind of action illustrates how this 
transnational space for action can contract as powerful actors respond when challenged within this 
“battlefield”. Actions and manifestations that may be free from consequences in most of the 
diaspora locations may seriously affect or damage partners in the homeland. 
 
 
Organizational Trends 
 
The ongoing polarization among the Circassian diaspora organizations in Turkey can best be 
illustrated by the line of division developed between the older and more culturally oriented and the 
newer and more politically oriented organizations. The cultural orientation includes focusing on 
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traditional music and dance activities, promoting cultural traditions and cooperating with the 
authorities in Russia on, for instance, student exchanges. The newer and more politically oriented 
organizations focus on modern activism and advocacy efforts, which includes voicing issues 
regarded as controversial by the Russian authorities. There is generally a high level of mutual 
distrust between the representatives of the two categories, which often includes accusations of, for 
instance, being controlled by Russia or being ethno-nationalistic. 
 
The positions of the older and more culturally oriented organizations are represented by Kafder and 
Kaffed, respectively. Kafder—the Caucasian Cultural Associations—has 58 branches in Turkey and 
began operating in 1950 when only culturally oriented associations were permitted to be established 
by the Turkish authorities. Kaffed—the Federation of Caucasian Associations—functions as an 
umbrella organization for the Kafders and is responsible for overall policy making, international 
contracts, including with the homeland, and overall planning of the annual Memorial Day on May 
21st.175 Kafder/Kaffed have played a significant role in maintaining Circassian cultural traditions 
and have become a strongly institutionalized structure within the Circassian diaspora community in 
Turkey. 
 
The new and more politically oriented organizations began operating in the middle of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century, when the overall democratization process in Turkey became 
more open toward the establishment of new forms of organizations. These positions are exemplified 
by the lobbying and think-tank-oriented Caucasian House of Social and Strategic Research Centre 
(CH) and the youth activist organization Caucasian Forum (CF). Both organizations were motivated 
by frustrations with the agenda set (or not set) by Kafder/Kaffed and inspired by operational 
modalities of civil society organizations in the modern democracies of Europe and elsewhere. A 
different type of role, which can be labeled as a kind of in-between type being both cultural and 
political, is played by the foundations that were allowed to establish from the 1970s on. For 
instance, the two foundations in Istanbul have played an important role by establishing Caucasian 
libraries and archives, providing scholarships for Caucasian/Circassian students, and so on. The 
foundations also represent a link in the development of Circassian/Caucasian organizational history 
in modern Turkey. 
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 Kafkasfederasyonu.org. 
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One example of the actions of the new and more politically oriented organizations is the 
NoSochi2014.com website that was launched in 2010 as an updated and renewed version of the 
earlier OlympicGenocide.org website.176 The new website was initiated by Caucasian Forum and 
organized as a transnational protest against the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics in Russia with the 
support of Circassian diaspora organizations in Turkey, the Middle East, Western Europe, and 
North America. Strategic use of the Internet is a priority for Caucasian Forum and this can be 
achieved relatively inexpensively while still maintaining a professional standard by using IT-skills 
already present among the youth activists—potentially supplemented by the skills of activists in 
diaspora organizations in other countries. 
 
Though still at a relatively low level, transnational cooperation with other diaspora organizations 
has increased, which is a tendency that can be expected to grow further in the near future. In 
connection with events of May 21, 2010, diaspora organizations from around the world cooperated 
by using the same design for visual communication on posters, flyers, websites, and so on. In May 
2010, CF for the first time arranged a large public demonstration in the center of Istanbul on the 
same day that Kaffed held its traditional commemoration event at the Kefken caves outside 
Istanbul, which marked a new step in the polarization and several organizations such as Caucasian 
House supported the arrangement.  
 
The fact that most Circassian organizations in Turkey are also Caucasian and generally obtain 
support from other Caucasians in relation to many of their activities is an example of modern hybrid 
identities functioning side by side and often overlapping. They are also used to operating in 
multiethnic and regionally defined fields, which also functions as a kind of antidote to the threat of 
exclusiveness, which is a dilemma facing many ethnically defined organizations.177 
 
 
Transnational Cooperation 
 
The same tendencies toward polarization and politicization can be identified in relation to most of 
the Circassian diaspora organizations in the rest of the world. For instance, in the United States, 
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 www.nosochi2014.com. 
177
 Other layers of the hybrid identities include, for instance, sub-Circassian ethnic groups, family- or clan affiliat ion, 
the Turkish national level and other relevant categories such as religion, p lace, region, and so on. 
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where the relatively new organization, the Circassian Cultural Institute, has become one of the most 
politically oriented of all the newer organizations, while the older Circassian Benevolent 
Association represents a cautious and more culturally oriented approach. In Western Europe, the 
many small and geographically scattered Circassian associations in five countries have established a 
Federation of European Circassians (Euroxase). They tend to place themselves more independently 
than the Federation (Kaffed) in Turkey and can therefore be placed in an in-between category as 
both culturally and politically oriented. In the Middle East, the Circassian organizations’ room for 
maneuvering as civil society actors in authoritarian or semiauthoritarian states can be relatively 
limited, though great differences can be observed from place to place and from time to time. Several 
have increasingly started to be in contact with diaspora organizations in other countries and 
developments in Turkey are being followed and could serve as future inspiration. 
 
The shift toward increased polarization is also illustrated by the fact that most of the newer 
organizations have dissociated themselves from the International Circassian Association (ICA), and 
regular discussions take place with regard to establishing of a new and different kind of 
international Circassian body.178 ICA was established as an international Circassian organization 
following the fall of the Soviet Union—in line with similar organizational initiatives among other 
post-Soviet ethnic groups—with the task of generally promoting cooperation between the diaspora 
and the homeland, including promoting repatriation from the diaspora to the homeland. ICA chose 
to locate its headquarters in Nalchik in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria and, after a couple of 
years, under increasing pressure from the Russian authorities it was taken over by a new leadership. 
Since then, ICA has been mainly involved in promoting cultural activities (Tlisova 2008, 16). The 
new and more politically oriented organizations in the diaspora have strongly criticized ICA for 
failing to place key Circassian issues on the agenda and for becoming a hindrance to transnational 
Circassian cooperation. 
 
Transnational cooperation was initially limited among the new organizations in Turkey but has 
recently gained momentum; cooperation with diaspora organizations in North America has 
especially increased—as can be seen in the case of the NoSochi2014 website. This has led to wider 
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 In late 2010, a new international organizat ion emerged from New Jersey, United States with connection to the CCI: 
the International Circassian Council (ICC). Representatives from the ICC went to Estonia to seek support for formal 
recognition of the Circassian genocide. (www.windowoneurasia.blogspot.com, 07-10-2010). 
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cooperation spanning three continents. In this case, the main language is English, which is the 
preferred language in key issues of transnational cooperation. In general, the issue of choice of 
language is challenging to most Circassian organizations. The use of Turkish on the Internet also 
includes organizations in Europe and North America. Other key Internet languages include Arabic 
and Russian. Language is an important factor when it comes to choice of websites by the 
Circassians. Choice of language can therefore facilitate a kind of informal transnational network— 
defined partly by language. Choice of language can lead to what Benedict Anderson has labeled 
“segregated networks,” which can have an exclusionist character.179 Yet, as mentioned above most 
Circassians also operate within other types of web-based platforms that can be defined as 
multiethnic or regional—for instance, all-Caucasian. Anyway, Turkish is already a lingua franca 
among many Circassians, and this is shared with other Caucasians in many countries.  
 
The first transnational issue that marked the new and more polarized approach was the application 
for the exile in the nineteenth century to be recognized as an act of genocide, and this application 
included a high number of historical documents. This was first initiated in 2005 by the new 
organization, the Circassian Congress, from the Republic of Adygea in the Caucasus, and was 
addressed to the Russian Parliament. When they rejected the application, it was forwarded in 2006 
to the European Parliament and to the Council of Europe—a move that was also supported by many 
diaspora organizations. The appeal was signed by 20 Circassian organizations, including several 
from Turkey, but not by the old associations (Kafder) or their federation (Kaffed). This was one of 
the first experiences of a new kind of transnational cooperation through the use of international 
institutions in professionally prepared lobbying efforts. It also resulted in increased pressure from 
the Russian authorities on key activists in the Circassian Congress, which was more or less forced 
into passiveness and some activists forced to f lee Russia. This illustrates the fact that new 
transnational and politicized spaces can be established but that the cost of cooperation may be high 
for organizations in the homeland, where the space for action is somewhat limited.  
 
Both the protests against the Sochi Olympics and the applications for formal recognition of the exile 
as an act of genocide also included serious question marks with regard to official Russian history 
writing. The campaigning in relation to the 2014 Olympics, in particular, has gained increasing 
attention in the Russian media—especially on the Internet. 
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 nettime.org, 1997, 6. 
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In 2010, the Moscow Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
decided to reclassify the Circassian exile as a “forced resettlement,” which represents a new 
opening toward discussing the Circassian exile in Russia.180 This could be the first in a number of 
potential civil society alliances whereby organizations or institutions based in Moscow could 
promote increased compliance with Circassian claims as part of their rights-based approach. There 
appears to be a significantly larger space for action on the part of Circassian civil society within 
Russian cyberspace than within the nonvirtual civil society sector in the North Caucasus. 
 
Maximilian Forte has developed an analytic model for electronic revival among marginalized 
minorities or indigenous groups, through which they can achieve visibility, embodiment, 
recognition, and authenticity in a manner similar to Eric Hobsbawn’s notions of “invention of 
tradition” through use of the Internet (Forte 2006, 145). These tendencies are part of what have been 
labeled “digital diaspora,” in which homeland relations can be virtually redefined and links that had 
disappeared be created or recreated (Brinkerhoff 2009). The Russian example also illustrates how 
the rejection of off- line cooperation between Circassian organizations in the homeland and in the 
diaspora can cause difficulties—but the general process of achieving visibility and recognition can 
still continue. Results achieved through the increasingly public sphere of the Internet are also a way 
of increasing the overall visibility of the Circassian Question. 
 
A conference on the so-called Circassian genocide was held in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi in 
April 2010 and resulted in an address to the Georgian Parliament, encouraging them to formally 
recognize the Circassian exile as an act of genocide.181 Only a few Circassian diaspora 
organizations participated in the conference and none of the Turkish organizations wished to 
formally participate,—a few participated on an individual level. This was an attempt by Georgian 
actors to include the Circassian diaspora in the geopolitical aftermath of the war with Russia in 
2008 and the subsequent Russian recognition of Abkhasia and South Ossetia. One response came a 
month later when a large-scale Circassian diaspora conference in Jordan was canceled due to 
pressure from Russia. This is another example of how the creation of an expanded space for action 
in one spot can quickly lead to reduced space in another.  
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 windowoneurasia.blogspot.com (23-06-2010). 
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 “Hidden Nations, Enduring Crimes” (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Circassian_Genocide_conference_in_Tbilisi).  
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Conclusion 
 
It is important to note that—in spite of the self-positioning as either cultural or political—the 
combined field of Circassian organizations in Turkey has undergone a significant politicization 
since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The successful institutionalization of May 21st as a 
nationwide (and worldwide) Memorial Day is probably the best example.  
 
This is in line with experiences from processes of diaspora-making in other parts of the world—
though the process of diaspora-making among the Circassians has unfolded gradually and relatively 
cautiously due to the specific limitations of civil society in Turkey. The polarization of recent years 
is a relatively new phenomenon for many among the Circassian diaspora. Like many other minority 
groups in Turkey, they are experiencing a democratization of civil society as well as of the wider 
public sphere, in which new types of positioning and political action can now take place. For many 
members of the Circassian diaspora this is a confusing situation, which potentially challenges their 
understanding of identity and brings new lines of division and conf licts—also among the 
Circassian organizations. Yet, this politicization and polarization generally represent the 
development of an increased Circassian space for action within the Turkish civil society sector and 
can also be considered as a new division of labor among the Circassian organizations—hence 
reflecting the development of a new kind of diversity in Turkish society. This space for action 
represents a new type of alternative space, where Circassian identity is discussed and negotiated in a 
new manner, where the Internet plays a key role. This has proven to be not just a space for the 
development of an increasing consciousness as Circassian but also an increased mobilization that 
has doubled the number of Circassian activists many times—which represents a new type of civil 
society agency. Moreover, the strongly increased transnational element represents an alternative 
compared to before—and has already managed to set a new transnational agenda vis-à-vis the 
Russian Federation. In this way this alternative space constitute a new type of space, which 
illustrate another type reconfiguration in relation to the options for minority groups, indigenous 
people etc. that the continued process of globalization can bring. 
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The formation of an alternative Circassian space takes place in a phase of ongoing democratic 
changes in Turkey. The democratic reforms have functioned as a platform for a new type of rights-
based mobilization among Circassians, with many organizations actively taking part in the process 
of redefining the understanding of Circassians as an ethnic minority. This includes a reassessment 
of the role of Circassians in the history of Turkey, which can also contribute to making the 
Circassians more visible. The impending loss of the Circassian language, in particular, and a more 
general fear of assimilation, has proved a strong mobilizing factor—particularly in the big urban 
areas such as Istanbul and Ankara, where most of the key organizations are located. Reproduction 
and reassessment of Circassian history and identity play a key role among the organization’s 
priorities, and this links to my second point on the role of the postcolonial aspect. The more recent 
shift among some of the new organizations from focussing primarily on internal information and 
enlightenment targeting the members of the Circassian diaspora to targeting external actors, 
including Circassians in other countries and the Russian authorities, illustrates this postcolonial 
aspect. This type of lobbying and policy-oriented activity has similarities with rights-based 
organizations promoting postcolonial change in other parts of the world and also illustrates the slow 
but increasingly transnational orientation of the Circassian diaspora organizations. This kind of 
politicization is also in line with general processes of diaspora-making as described earlier and this 
strengthened transnational cooperation represents a tendency toward increased strategic awareness 
and collaboration among the Circassian diaspora organizations. 
 
Large cities such as Istanbul and Ankara are examples of the role that late-modern global localities 
can assume as so-called frontier zones—in Saskia Sassen’s understanding of the term—where 
democratic transition and postcolonial resistance take place simultaneously. This type of frontier 
zone functions as a space for action, in which the urban location plays an important role—
supplemented and supported by participation in transnational networks in which the Internet often 
plays a facilitating role. The increased geographical dispersion of Circassians through secondary or 
tertiary migrations to large urban entities has in this way enabled the development of renewed civil 
society mobilization and organizational development. In other words, frontier zones, with their 
transnational links, can enable the unification of geographically dispersed peoples and localities—
and not just in a virtual understanding. They also constitute alternative spaces within which the 
Circassian can operate. 
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The fact that the so-called Circassian Question is increasingly surfacing on the agenda of the 
Russian public sphere—whether virtual or nonvirtual—is testament to the increasing role of the 
Internet. Circassian individuals and organizations from the diaspora have increasingly utilized this 
and have gradually achieved assistance—whether directly or indirectly—from civil society 
organizations in Russia promoting, for instance, environmental protection, human rights, freedom 
of speech, and so on. This appears to be a new type of virtual public sphere, where issues 
suppressed within a nonvirtual civil society can achieve prominence through use of the Internet. 
The space for action among individual Circassians appears to be much wider in the virtual public 
sphere in Russia than is the case for civil society organizations—virtually or nonvirtually. The case 
of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi is increasingly playing the role of a lever in these processes.  
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Chapter  4 
 
 Contested Circassian Territory:  
The Nineteenth Century Context 
 
 
Circassia and the Circassians were generally well-known in Europe and beyond before the 
nineteenth century, especially the reputation of Circassian men as warriors and Circassian women 
as favourites of the Ottoman harems. Circassian women became a popular theme for visiting 
painters from Western Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 182 In 1733 Voltaire wrote 
about the folk medicine of the Circassians, which long had been known in, for instance, 
Constantinople (Istanbul). For long periods during the Middle Ages, Circassian warriors formed the 
dominant group among the Mamluks, and trained warriors from the Circassian nobility regularly 
spent long periods in the Ottoman army before returning to the Caucasus. The Circassians also had 
different forms of contract towards the north and regularly interacted with free Cossack groupings 
before these were included as frontier troops in the Russian imperial expansion southward and 
eastward during the eighteenth century.183 To the northwest, the Circassians had regular contact 
with the Crimean Tatars, including occasional wars.184 When the German scientist Friedrich 
Blumenbach in 1795 chose to classify ‘Europeans’ or the ‘white race’ as ‘Caucasian’ or 
                                                 
182
 In the second half of the nineteenth century, Circassian women became popular at exh ibit ions in Europe and North 
America (chnm.gmuj.edu/lostmuseum/serchlm.php?function=find&exhibit=star&brows e=star). As a by-product, soaps, 
lotions and hair dyes were named ‘Circassian’ - a trend also refered to as ‘Circassophilia’ 
(geocurrents.info/tag/circassophilia). Naming ships ‘Circassia’ was another trend of the mid -n ineteenth century that 
lasted well into the 20
th
 century. This has become visible on the Internet with the digitalisation and publication of 
passengerlists. In 1900, Circassians were exh ibited at Tivoli, in Copenhagen (Andreassen and Henningsen 2011).  
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 There had been different forms of contact and interaction between Circassians and Cossacks during the centuries 
leading up to the late eighteenth century, when Cossacks became an organised part of the southern expansion of the 
Russian Empire. Cossack groups also drew cultural inspiration from Circassian costumes, weapons and dances. This 
has resulted in the term ‘Circassian Cossacks’ used with different meanings. 
184
 On the widespread fame of the Circassians in the nineteenth century, Charles King has noted the following: “It is no 
exaggeration to say that, for several decades in the middle of the nineteenth century, “Circassian” became a household 
word in many parts of Europe and North America. Correspondents from major newspapers found their way to Circassia 
or gleaned informat ion from foreign consuls and merchants in Trebizond and Constantinople” (King 2010, 93).  
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‘Caucasoid’, it was based on both the science of skull measurement and on the fabled beauty of 
Caucasians (in particular Georgians and Circassians).185 
 
From the end of the eighteenth century on, the Russian desire to push southwards for control and, 
finally, colonisation of the Caucasian isthmus became obvious. After achieving control over most of 
South Caucasus around the turn of the century, it took Russia more than fifty years to achieve 
military victory over the two North Caucasian territories of Circassia to the west and 
Chechnya/Avaristan/Lezgistan (the latter two today mostly located Dagestan) to the east. The fierce 
resistance of the mountaineers, the extreme violence and lengthiness of these wars in the North 
Caucasus are important issues when assessing the tragic outcome for the Circassians in 1864.  
 
The famous Russian general, Aleksey Yermolov, was in charge of the war in the Caucasus from the 
late 1810s and his stated goal was to subdue the mountain peoples through violence, fear, 
intimidation and, for some, forced relocation if they were not willing to surrender to the Russian 
Tsar (Khodarkovsky 2011, 69). This type of war, and subsequent subjugation, can be characterised 
as a form of ‘settler colonialism’, as most mountain villages and fields were burned to the ground - 
by both parties - although, since, large parts have been left to become forests.186 Simultaneously, the 
Caucasus and its mountain peoples entered into the Russian literature of writers such as Pushkin, 
Lermontov and Tolstoy - the Golden Age of Russian literature - where a more romantic 
representation of the mountaineers as noble warriors and oriental beauties (m/f) unfolded. This 
dichotomy between extermination and romanticisation marked the Russian relationship with the 
Circassians from the beginning - and was supplemented by another geopolitical dichotomy that 
partly reflected the former: the competition between Russia, on the one side, and Great Britain and 
its allies, such as Ottoman Turkey, on the other, for influence over the future of Circassia. All of 
this resulted in a slow and contested colonisation of Circassia and the Circassians into Russia, and 
this is reflected in the ongoing Circassian revival - not least as it has unfolded on the Internet since 
the mid-2000s.   
 
In Russia, the wars against the Circassians are seen as part of the Caucasian Wars 1817-1864, as 
was also the case in the Soviet period, while during the ongoing mobilisation the Circassians have 
agreed to refer to the Russian-Circassian War 1763-1864. For analytical purposes, I have chosen to 
split this into three periods of ‘Circassian Mobilisation’: 1763-1829 (CM1), 1829-1853 (CM2) and 
                                                 
185
 The Eurocentric categorisation of Blumenbachs became widely accepted and used also in English from the early 
nineteenth century. According to this classificat ion ’Caucasian’ were regarded as the most civilised race. In the 20th 
century ’Caucasian’ became a formal category in the United States. 
186
 Part ly (and with some delay) because only some of the land was taken over by Cossacks immediately and because in 
many cases it was not until the end of the century that significant settler colonialism took place, for instance, in the 
Sochi area. 
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1853-1864 (CM3). In the following the main themes and events necessary to understand the 
contested character of the pre-1864 institutionalisation of Circassianness, some of which will be 
further discussed in Chapter 5, will be presented: the role of the Imperial Russian Army in the 
Caucasus; the literary invention of the Caucasus; geopolitical competition; colonisation and 
Russification; the development of academic Caucasiology, and the creation of Russian space in the 
Caucasus and local counter-versions. This will, concludingly, be supplemented by a short section on 
the continued institutionalisation of Circasssianness after 1864 and during the Soviet period.  
 
 
The Imperial Russian Army in the North Caucasus 
 
Russian officers actively involved in the colonisation of Circassia during the nineteenth century 
have gained a key role in the ongoing Circassian revival whereby many of the deeds that made them 
heroes of the colonial conquest and imperial expansion are today used by the Circassians in a 
‘reversal’ of this narrative.187 This role of officers in the Russian army (who were not necessarily 
ethnic Russians) was partly due to the ongoing modernisation of the Russian Empire at the time, 
which included a strong need for systematised information, resulting in a high number of reports on 
the peoples and territories of the North Caucasus including mapping of both geography and 
ethnography. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, these tasks were mainly performed within 
the Russian army but, by mid-century, many of them had been transformed into civilian institutions 
that were often located in Tiflis (Tbilisi). Today, Circassian historians and other actors in Russia are 
still not allowed full access to all imperial archives, although much information has been retrieved 
from the archives over the years anyway, as can be seen from the many of pages documentational 
material attached to the Circassian appeal for formal recognition of the genocide sent to the Russian 
parliament in 2005 and in the archive material from the nineteenth century recently made available 
in Georgia.188 Another key source to the period are the memoirs of officers participating in the 
Caucasian Wars, often written and published long after the end of the war.  
 
In this section, the Russian General Aleksey Yermolov, and his role in the war against the 
Circassians will be presented as an example of the role played by key Russian officers in general, 
and more particularly because he established a system that prevailed for many years after.     
 
                                                 
187
 Apart from some of the sources mentioned in this section, an example can be found in the 
NoSochi2014.com/campaign, exemplify ing the use of Russian generals (and Tsars as their commanders) in relation to a 
contemporary Circassian campaign.  
188
 Much of this material has been collected over a period of many years, and has since been analysed and digitalised 
(circassiangenocide.info). The latest book is by Walter Richmond (2013). 
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Yermolov was already one of the most famous army generals in Russia through his involvement in 
the Napoleonic War, when he was placed in charge of the war in the Caucasus from 1816 and 
subsequently throughout most of the 1820s. On this task, he quickly stated that his most important 
role was “to create fear at the Caucasian frontier” (Jaimoukha 2001, 63). Later, his approach was 
referred to by Russian historians as “the Yermolov system” (Gammer 2003, 184; Baddeley 1908, 
132): “Yermolov was the first of the Russian generals to practise the razzia, or raid; he obtained the 
system from the Cossacks, who learned it themselves from their constant skirmishes with the tribes” 
(Blanch 1960/1978, 102). The Yermolov system was a new and systematic approach (by a modern 
empire and its well-armed and large army) and was aimed at entire ethnic groups in the North 
Caucasus (including the Circassians). This is part of the reason why Circassian organisations and 
activists today refer to this an as act of genocide. 
 
 As Yermolov stated at the time in a letter to Tsar Alexander I: “I desire that the terror of my name 
should guard our frontiers more potently than chains or fortresses, that my word should be for the 
natives a law more inevitable than death” (Gammer 2003, 185; Blanch 1978, 24). Gammer further 
notes that xenophobia was a central idea of Yermolov’s: “The whole of the Caucasus must, and 
should become an integral part of the Russian Empire; that the existence of independent or semi-
independent states or communities of any description, whether Christian, Musulman, or Pagan, in 
the mountains or in the plains, was incompatible with the dignity and honour of his master, the 
safety and welfare of this subjects” (Baddeley 1907, 35 quoted from Gammer 2003, 185). Gammer 
further notes that Yermolov “set himself the aim of destroying any non-Russian nationality in the 
country” (Esadze 1907, 35; quoted from Gammer). The longevity of the Yermolov myth in Russia 
over the last almost two hundred years was enhanced by the Russian author Alexander Pushkin in 
his famous poem ‘The Caucasian Prisoner’, which included the following line: “Humble thyself O 
Caucasus, for Yermolov is coming” (Blanch 1978, 24). 189 
 
Yermolov became famous for his contempt towards “the Asiatics” or what have since been referred 
to as the Oriental Other. He believed that “the “Asiatics” were guided by different moral standards 
in which notions of truth and honour need not apply. Still, assessing the methods of Yermolov as 
well as the fact that he took on three wives while in the Caucasus, Michael Khodarkovsky 
concludes: “It turns out that the famous Russian general, revered as “a hero of the Caucasus,” was 
also an Oriental satrap” (Khodarkovsky 2011, 69). General Yermolov became the embodiment of 
Russian imperial power in the Caucasus as his “gigantic stature, roaring voice was the 
personification of... mythical heroes of Russian legend”, which contributed to the establishment of a 
                                                 
189
 Alternatively translated as: “Submit and bow your snowy head, Oh Caucacus, Yermolov marches” (Leyton 1994, 
54). 
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popular myth in Russia that is today still alive and revered.190 “The Titan figure who dominated the 
Caucasus scene” from 1816 became for the local Caucasians “the Moscow Shaitan - the Moscovy 
Devil” (Blanch 1960/1978, 23). On the role of Yermolov in the Caucasus and the “enormous harm” 
of his methods, Blanch stresses that they “were directly responsible for the revival of Muridism and 
the fanatic antagonism of Daghestan and the Tchetchen provinces” and that it also contributed to 
pushing many of the remaining Kabardians into the Western parts of Circassia to join their 
resistance against the Russian army (Blanch 1978, 26).  
 
Regarding the reputation of Yermolovs after his time in the Caucasus ended in 1827, Moshe 
Gammer has noted: “His period as ‘Proconsul of the Caucasus’ had acquired the proportions of a 
‘golden age’ in the collective memory of Russia” (Gammer 2003, 182). A tradition of presenting 
Yermolov as a hero in much Russian history writing continued into the Soviet period and after, as 
illustrated in a book published in 2001.191 Gammer ascribes the mythology surrounding Yermolov 
to the fact that “history is written by the victors” and he stresses the need for historians to re-
examine the history written on Yermolov as there is a need to “clean” it of “historical PR” 
(Gammer 2003, 188).192 As such, the conclusions of Gammer and others are in line with the 
contemporary protests of a number of Caucasians actors, who call for a reassessment of the 
nineteenth century heritage of the documented actions of Russian generals in the Caucasus, which 
are still praised among Cossacks and others in the districts of Krasnodar and Stavropol. 193 All in all, 
according to Gammer, the heritage of Yermolov was punitive expeditions, destruction of native 
villages, hanging of hostages, killing of women and children, selling of captives as slaves, stealing 
of entire herds of cattle and horses etc. Gammer states that “even by the standards of those 
times...Yermolov’s brutality was excessive” (Gammer 2003, 186). 194  
 
                                                 
190
 Especially in the Cossack-dominated areas of Krasnodar and Stavropol bordering the North Caucasus, statues of 
Yermolov are found and are used in memorialisation events, which many Circassian activists and organisations have 
regularly p rotested against. 
191
 Gammer refers to a book by A. V. Shishkov about the generals of the Caucasian Wars published in Moscow in 2001 
(Gammer 2003, 183). 
192
 Gammer further notes that the necessary revision of Russian history writ ing on the heritage of Yermolov is also 
needed due to the fact that his actual results were limited, referring to the fact that it still took several decades to 
conquer these lands. 
193
 As seen in the names of towns and in monuments that are often used for annual gatherings. 
194
 Gammer notes that it is no wonder that Yermolov has to this very day remained a satanic figure to Chechens, and to 
Dagestanis as well (Gammer 2003, 186). In the Circassian parts, it was particu larly the easternmost provinces of 
Kabarda and the Kabardian villages that were increasingly exposed to the Yermolov system (Natho 2009, 277). As the 
Circassian author Kadir I. Natho states: “As R. U. Tuganov has justly noted this was one of the most disgraceful pages 
in the history of the colonial policy of Czarist Russia in the Caucasus.” According to Natho, the devastation “almost 
totally demoralised Kabarda”. The history of the many battles against the Kabardian s is among the many examples that 
question the enforced celebrations of 450 years of Circassian-Russian voluntary unity lavishly celebrated by Russia in 
2007. According to the Circassian author, Amjad Jaimoukha, the total number of Kabardians had decreased  from 
350,000 to just 50,000 by 1818, after four decades of war and punitive actions by the Russian army, supplemented by 
severe epidemics (Jaimoukha 2001, 63).  
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The strategy of the Russian army towards the conquest of the North Caucasus, as hinted at by 
Yermolov in the above-mentioned quote, consisted of the building of a line of fortifications 
including settlements for Cossacks. This strategy was initially begun in the late 18 th century but 
gathered speed with the arrival of Yermolov. A crucial part of this strategy was to divide the North 
Caucasus into two parts by another line of forts, from north to south along a middle axis, down the 
Military Highway from Vladikavkaz in the north to the city of Tiflis (Tbilisi) south of the Caucasus 
mountain range, which had been incorporated into the empire in 1801 (Khodarkovsky 2011, 21). 
From 1829 on, Circassia and the Circassians came under renewed Russian pressure as a result of the 
Adrianople Treaty, which transferred control over the Circassian Black Sea coast from the Ottoman 
Empire to Russia. Neither Circassia nor the Circassians were mentioned in the treaty and the 
Circassians protested at this as, in fact, only a few Ottoman trading posts were to be found along 
this coastline, apart from the late eighteenth century, beyond the fortress in Anapa that Russia had 
conquered during the war in 1828-29. As the Russian officer Fyodor Tornau later noted, “The 
Sultan’s concession was completely incomprehensible to the mountaineers” (Richmond, 2013, 34). 
The result was that Russia could now finalise its encirclement of Circassia as a blockade of the 
Circassian coast which, together with the establishment of new coastal fortresses, was aimed at 
preventing Circassian trade with traders from Ottoman Turkey (and beyond). This was especially 
done in order to weaken the Circassian resistance militarily, by preventing the supply of gunpowder 
and, physically, by preventing the sale of salt, which was crucial for health in Circassia.  
 
As stated by Charles King, the brutal methods employed by Yermolov in the Caucasus set an 
example to be followed “by tsarists, Bolsheviks, and Russian generals into the twenty-first century” 
(King 2010, 45). Among the many Russian generals succeeding Yermolov, many became well-
known due to the prolonged fighting in the Caucasus that was gradually more covered by the media 
in Russia and in Europe, where new public spheres and public opinion increasingly began to 
influence politics. The acts of many of the officers during the wars in the Caucasus are today 
questioned by Circassian civil society organisations, writers and others as part of their counter-
memorialisation efforts. General Zass, in particular, should be noted as the one who reshaped and 
perfected Yermolov’s methods as a “worthy pupil” (Natho 2009, 358) or simply a “typical disciple 
of Yermolov” (Khodarkovsky, 2011, 101). Zass had adorned the fence around his house with the 
skulls of dead Circassians and, furthermore, kept such skulls under his bed (which, according to 
visitors, smelled horrible), in order to send to scientist- friends in Berlin (Zhemoukhov 2011).195 
                                                 
195
 General Veliaminov, commander of the Caucasus 1831-38, also collected the heads of mountaineer peoples, “which 
he sent to the Department of Anthropology of the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg for study” (Richmond 2008, 
79). Richmond further notes: “Veliaminov certainly t reated the mountaineers as little more than animals”. Veliaminov 
had read parts of Khan-Girei’s manuscript on Circassia. 
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Circassian activists have launched a campaign for the return and formal burial of these skulls.196 
The generals Zass, in the 1830s, and Yevdokimov, in the 1860s, are seen within the contemporary 
Circassian revival as the ones who most vigorously pursued the Yermolov system to its extreme.197 
More on Yevdokimov below. Commander-in-chief and viceroy of the Caucasus, Mikhail Vorontsov 
(1844-1856), also played an important role, as will be discussed below. The changing Russian 
emperors, as the supreme commanders of the Russian army, should also be mentioned - for 
instance, Emperor Alexander II, who stated that Russia needed the fertile lands of the Circassians 
for agriculture and Cossack settlements. 
    
Other Russian officers that play a key role in today’s Circassian revival are, to name but a few: 
Lazarev, Tornau, Miliutin and Yevdokimov, all of whom in different ways ended up perpetuating 
the Yermolov system.198 Admiral Lazarev is a celebrated figure in Russia and seen in the name of 
the town Lazarevskoye, which today forms part of the Black Sea Riviera of Sochi.199 According to 
Yoav Karny, “Admiral Lazarev belonged to the gallery of empire builders - those whose military 
genius was matched by their ability to excite the imperial nation’s imagination and whet the 
appetite for further conquests. He was an ardent follower of Catherine the Great’s ultimate 
imperialist dictum, ‘The border is not finished’.” (Karny 2000, 7). In the contemporary Circassian 
revival, however, the name of Lazarev is repeatedly mentioned to symbolise repression and killings 
of the native population.200 In 1996, a bust of Lazarev was re-erected at the town’s train station (in 
honour of the 300th anniversary of the Russian Black Sea fleet). His nose was cut off by Circassian 
activists though (Karny 2000, 9).201  
                                                 
196
 www.causes.com/causes/481153-help-repatriate-circassian-reliccs-skulls-bones-from-museums-collected-by-
general-zass-an-others. A nineteenth century drawing showing the house of Zass set on top of a small hill with a fence 
with Circassian skulls on top of high poles has been widely circulated on the Internet and has become one of the visual 
icons of the Circassian revival.  
197
 See Chapter 5 on the ro le of Genocide Recognition in the Circassian revival.  
198
 Another Russian generals of importance was Alexei Veliaminov, commander o f the Caucasus 1831-8 (Richmond 
2008, 63). In May 1837, the Tsar instructed Khan-Girei to go on a mission to the Circassians, which, accord ing to 
Richmond, ”was essentially a demand for unconditional surrender”, though both the Tsar and Veliaminov knew that 
this would not be accepted (Richmond 2008, 64). Khan-Girei was sent as a messenger with a proposal that would place 
the Circassian in a catch 22 situation. The historian Yakov Gordin has noted: ”For [Veliaminov], a student of the 
Encyclopedists and to some degree Montesquieu, the mountaineers ’ way of life and their very worldview were in 
essence illegal and irrational. It was necessary either to exterminate them or force them to live correctly” (Richmond 
2008, 79).   
199
 Lazarev is famous in Russia as one of the first to exp lore Antarctica and he circumnavigated the world several times.  
200
 The Shapsug National District Area was established in 1925; in 1945, it was abolished and renamed Lazarevskoye. 
Walter Richmond has noted the following on renaming during the Soviet period: ”This was only the most visible 
example of the Soviet practice of rep lacing Circassian toponyms with appellat ions honoring Russian participants in the 
Caucasus Wars. For example, the settlement of Psezuapse was renamed Arkhipo-Osipovko in honor of a Russian 
soldier who blew h imself up along with a group of Circassians”...”The process of elimination of Circassian toponyms 
added to the feeling of cu ltural d isenfranchisement and resentment towards the Soviet government.” (Richmond 2008, 
128). More on the role of naming below. 
201
 Head of Shapsug Adyge Khase in Lazarevskoye, Majeed Chechukh, on Admiral Lazarev, the attacks and landings in 
the region, ”Under his watch, dozens of villages were wiped off the earth” - includ ing the village located where 
136 
 
 
Feodor Tornau is another example of a Russian officer who has today become visible within the 
ongoing Circassian revival, as well as in the western Caucasus in general. He travelled extensively 
in Circassia in the second half of the 1830s disguised as a Circassian but ended up in Circassian 
captivity for a long period. To find and liberate him became a top priority for the Tsar as well as the 
army in the Caucasus at the time.202 According to Khodarkovsky, the ‘Tornau affair’ “became one 
of the episodes in the geopolitical struggle among the Russian, Ottoman, and British Empires, better 
known as the Great Game” (Khodarkovsky 2011, 118). 203 Tornau was freed in November 1838. 
Decades later, Tornau wrote in his memoirs, published in 1864, about his experiences during the 
war in the Caucasus: “What is this all for? Is there not enough room on earth for all, regardless of 
their tongue and faith?” as a comment after a violently bloody attack on a Chechen mountain village 
in the eastern parts of North Caucasus in 1832 - the same tactics that were used against the 
Circassians in the western parts (Khodarkovsky 2011, 95). Tornau’s descriptions of Circassia and 
the Circassians were first published in the 1850s in Tiflis, in the journal Kavkaz (Caucasus).204 In 
the words of Khodarkovsky, Tornau’s memoirs represent a “wealth of geographic and ethnographic 
information” and are as such a part of the documentation efforts being carried out by various 
Circassian actors today.  
 
General Dmitrii Miliutin, who would later become Minister of War in St. Petersburg, in 1857 
reformulated the army’s approach to the Circassians. Instead of the resettlement of Circassians and 
subsequent settlement of farmers, “eliminating the Circassian was to be an end in itself - to cleanse 
the land of hostile elements” (King 2008, 94). According to this plan, the Circassians that chose to 
remain in Russia had to be moved out of the Caucasus.205  
 
General Yevdokimov was the last in a long line of Russian army generals during this period, aand 
was the commander of the Russian army that secured the final victory in the war in 1864. But, 
among Circassians and others, he came to symbolise what have been called ‘genocidal methods’, 
‘pogroms’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’, and as such in line with the system defined by General Yermolov 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Lazarevskoye lies today (Karny 2000, 11). ”He was the man who destroyed our nation, who committed genocide 
unprecedented in history” (Karny 2000, 9).  
202
 One of the most prominent Circassians of the period, Khan-Girei, was given this task but was not able to locate and 
free Tornau. Subsequently, the writ ings of both Khan-Girei and Tornau became part of the mid-nineteenth century 
literary canon on Circassia and the Circassians, and have been republished repeatedly since. 
203
 Several British actors visited Circassia in this period; more on this later. 
204
 Tiflis (Tb ilisi) was the regional centre of the Russian imperial admin istration in the Caucasus in the nineteenth 
century. In 2010, the Sochi department of the Russian Geographical Society republished a small book by the Abkhazian 
historian G. A. Dzidzariya from 1976 in celebration of the 175
th
 anniversary of Tornau’s stay in what is today the wider 
Sochi area (Dzidzariya 2010, 144).  
205
 “In his memoirs, Miliutin, who proposed deporting the Circassians from the mountains as early as 1857, recalls “the  
plan of action decided upon for 1860 was to cleanse [ochistit’] the mountain zone of its indigenous population”” 
(Richmond 2008, 79). 
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as well as the orders of different Tsars.206 ‘From Yermolov to Yevdokimov’ could be one way of 
framing the war in the region which, in Russia, is referred to as the Caucasian Wars of 1817 to 
1864.207 Today, Circassian actors have chosen to rename the war the Russian-Circassian War and to 
re-periodise it from 1763 to 1864 in order to include Kabarda and the Kabardians in the narrative. 
The inclusion of Kabarda - the eastern part of Circassia - is also a way of challenging the Russian 
narrative of the ‘voluntary’ inclusion of the Circassians into the Russian Empire, a widespread 
claim which is mainly upheld through reference to the Circassian princess that Tsar Ivan the 
Terrible married in 1557. Today, the above-mentioned army personalities, together with the 
responsible Tsars, constitute key elements of the Circassian narrative - which to a large extent also 
could be labelled a counter-narrative - on the wars and subsequent forced displacements of the 
nineteenth century, and which is at the heart of the contemporary Circassian revival. These are 
examples of the ‘competing memorialisation’ in the north-western Caucasian space in the present 
post-imperial phase.208   
 
Voices of opposition could also be found within the Russian Army as illustrated in the following 
statement made in 1841 by General Nikolai Raevskii, who fought against the Circassians at the 
Black Sea in the 1830s, taken from a letter to the Minister of War in St. Petersburg: ““Our activities 
in the Caucasus are reminiscent of the many tragedies of the early conquest of America by the 
Spaniards,” and he expressed the hope that the experience would not leave a similar “bloody 
legacy” for Russian history” (Jersild 2002, 73). These kinds of letter, together with for instance the 
memoirs of officers who served in the Caucasus, today form part of investigations into the period 
that are contributing to a rewriting of the history of the war(s).209  
 
The prominent Circassians of the period, Sultan Khan-Girei and Shora Nogmov, both also served as 
officers in the Circassian Corps in Saint Petersburg. Both wrote books on Circassian history and 
identity, which have been republished and analysed during the last twenty years. They are today 
regarded as the founders of modern Circassian literature. During the period of their military service, 
both argued for a softer Russian line towards the colonisation of the Circassian lands.  
 
                                                 
206
 Much of the documentation of events during the final years of the war comes from army reports in imperial arch ives, 
and from books and memoirs published by former members of the Russian army campaign, often many years after the 
wars. 
207
 The Circassian author Natho (2009, 359), notes: “The principal ‘ideologist’ of this genocide, Count Evdokimov, has 
clearly stated the aim and ‘strategy’ of the forcib le evict ion of the Circassians from their historical homeland”. 
208
 The thaw of the Gorbachev and Yeltsin periods has, in many ways, been reversed. This is illustrated by the increase 
in formal support to Cossack groups, which have significant influence in today’s Kuban region (formally Krasnodar 
Krai), where the mentioned Russian army officers of the nineteenth century are regularly celebrated.  
209
 Natho (2009, 359) on Russian officers as eyewitnesses: Veniukov and colonel Sharap (on  general Bab ich) and 
Vishnevetski (also on Babich).  
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Historians and other experts still discuss whether the forced expulsion of the Circassians from their 
historical homeland was the result of conscious decisions by key decision makers in Russia. The 
fact remains that a new demographic policy evolved as an extension of the Yermolov system and 
became an imperial population policy in an imperial border zone between Russia and the Ottoman 
Empire during a period of extreme geopolitical competition between empires. Empires that 
simultaneously increasingly were affected by nationalistic trends such as manifested in policies of 
Russification. Whether these population policies established a precedent for future expulsions of 
Armenians (1915), Chechens (1944) etc. is difficult to establish but there is no doubt that many of 
the peoples of the Caucasus have paid a high price for their location between empires. This is, in 
many ways, similar to what Timothy Snyder has called the Bloodlands in reference to the lands 
between the Soviet and the German empires in the 1930s and 1940s.210 
 
Furthermore, according to Austin Jersild, “many regime officials and other Russians in the 
Caucasus and throughout Russia quite simply believed that the Adygei and the mountaineers in 
general did not belong in the empire” (Jersild 2002, 25). Dana Sherry notes that the resettlement 
policies could be traced back to “European and Russian notions of governance” and further 
discusses whether the forced relocation of the Circassians was the result of an expulsion or 
emigration (Sherry 2009, 15). Sherry refers to Peter Holquist, who claims that the colonial Russian 
administrators were simply inspired by European ideas of ethnic homogeneity and refers to “the 
western Caucasus as one of the first places where officials attempted to create a homogenous 
population on a mass scale” (Sherry 2009, 15). “I argue that the existing scholarship on the 
Circassian emigration has mistaken the origins and goals of the movement and that the exodus 
should be understood as an unintended, if unsurprising, consequence of draconian Russian military 
practices in the region” (Sherry 2009, 16).211 Several of Sherry’s relativistic conclusions are 
countered in the 2013 book on the Circassian genocide by Walter Richmond.  
  
 
North Caucasus in Russian Literature - Pushkin Discovered the Caucasus 
 
After spending a period as an officer in the Russian army in the North Caucasus, the famous 
Russian writer Alexander Pushkin wrote and published the celebrated poem ‘The Prisoner of the 
Caucasus’ in 1822.212 This marked the beginning of a Caucasian trend among writers of the so-
                                                 
210
 More on this in the Chapter 8 on Circassian Genocide Recognition. 
211
 Sherry d iscusses the role of key figures such as Miliutin, Fadeev and Evdokimov in to the planning and executing 
the forced exile (Sherry 2009, 15). Fadeev fantasised about how the mountaineers’ surroundings could potentially result 
in the creation of a new kind of Russian, styled after the Caucasian Mountaineer: the Russian Mountaineer, well -trained 
and with a strong character. 
212
 Prisoners in the Caucasus became a often repeated theme in the later novels and other stories on the North Caucasus 
- both in ’high literature’, such as Tolstoy’s ’A Prisoner in the Caucasus’ (1870), and in  vernacular literature.  
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called Golden Age of Russian literature, with canonised writers such as also Mihail Lermontov and 
Lev Tolstoy also spending time as officers at the Caucasian military frontier. This had, in 1844, 
already made another significant Russian writer and critic - Vissarion Belinsky - state that ‘Pushkin 
discovered the Caucasus’ (Leyton 1994, 16). According to Susan Leyton, it is primarily thanks to 
Pushkin’s “romantic literature’s alpine Caucasus and Muslim mountaineers” that the region, and 
especially the North Caucasus, - of all the many ethnic groups and regions in the vast empire - 
generated the greatest interest (Blanch 1960/1978, 192). 213 This was primarily by representing the 
landscape and the population in a manner that made them ‘fit’ the Russian national as well as 
imperial needs. Belinsky noted that it was not simply the literary qualities of the poem that made it 
so popular but also its ethnographic and geographic content, presenting new and exotic peoples and 
landscapes thus far unknown to the public at large (Leyton 1994, 16). This is further emphasised by 
Leyton’s analysis of the poem and its use in the following two decades in Russia, where she 
concludes that Pushkin began the production of the Caucasus as ‘imaginary geography’, which later 
spread - eventually also beyond the borders of Russia. 
 
Circassia and the Circassians - together with other sub-regions and peoples of the region - became 
well-known, reproduced and included in a wider Imperial Russian discourse, in which the nature 
was celebrated as sublime and the peoples as noble savages (in need of a civilising mission).214 This 
resulted in the North Caucasian frontier zone acquiring “a stylized character to become the 
‘Caucasian Alps’” (Leyton 1994, 47). But the conclusion of Pushkin’s poem - as well as of most of 
the other writers and travellers subsequently visiting and writing about the region and its people - 
was that this unique territory had to yield to the inevitable sublime Russian civilisation and imperial 
power. According to Halbach, the image of the mountaineers of the North Caucasus of that period 
in Russia was that they were destined to eternal wildness (Halbach 1991, 59).  
 
Natural scientists and historians also visited and wrote more academic works about the people s and 
the nature of the region but, compared to the strong impact of the romantic representations, this 
largely went unnoticed. According to Leyton: “By rendering the Caucasus as the Alps of the 
homeland’s own periphery, Pushkin invented a soul-stirring realm of the sublime, full of perils for 
citified travellers but ready to inspire and rejuvenate them. The territory was thus appropriated as a 
space for the therapeutic uses of the lyrical Russian self unhampered by native peoples. Thrilling 
nuances of Asiatic tribal menace certainly enlarged the Caucasian poetics of space, already laden 
with natural dangers like precipices, violent storms and avalanches, but local populations were not 
permitted to hinder Russian communion with alpine wilderness” (Leyton 1994, 52).  
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 Lesley Blanch states that Lermontov, more than the others, established the Caucasian Landscape as the Russian 
imagination - which is a primarily an academic discussion. Blanch refers to Lermontov as “the personification of Russia 
in the Caucasus”. 
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 Pushkin was inspired by Byron. 
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Although the region and its nature are often described and celebrated as uninhabited and almost 
empty of local population over this period, it gradually became clear to the Russian readers that the 
region was also an “oriental combat zone” (Leyton 1994, 53). Still, Russian writers at large 
managed to erect “a screen to the inhumanity” of the military Russian imperial colonialism in the 
region. 
 
By mid-century, Tolstoy was attempting a more realistic approach to storytelling from the 
Caucasus, but the romantic versions of Pushkin and Marlinsky managed to gain dominance in the 
popular literature of the second half of the nineteenth century. Here, the romanticised mythologies 
and stereotype of the Circassian warrior and the Circassian beauty (or, sometimes, the more 
generalised: Mountaineer Peoples or Gortzy)215 enjoyed a revival as a Russian-Caucasian version of 
the Cowboy-and-Indians novels of the American Wild West.  
 
 
Geopolitical Competition: The Great Game and the British Discovery of Circassia 
 
The nineteenth century geopolitical competition between the two large empires of Russia and Great 
Britain is of key importance to understanding the final fate of Circassia and the Circassians. Britain 
feared that further Russian territorial consolidation in the Caucasus might pave the way for new 
Russian imperial ambitions whereby Russia could, on the one hand, conquer the steadily weakening 
Turkey and thus challenge the dominant role of the British Empire on the world scene. This might 
also constitute a threat to India, the Jewel in the Crown.216 The British interest in Circassia was 
increased after the Adrianople Treaty in 1829 passed control over the Circassian Black Sea coast 
from Ottoman Empire to Russia, which in many ways marked the beginning of the famous Great 
Game - as the geopolitical competition between the two empires for influence in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia was later labelled.217 The competition was sharpened and actualised by the steadily 
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 Tolstoy opted for an even older tradition in Russia by referring to the North Caucasian native peoples as Tatars.  
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 During several periods of the mid-n ineteenth century, this resulted in a number of key actors - especially politicians 
in Britain - placing Circassia in a potentially pivotal role in world polit ics. 
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 In the nineteenth century it was still treaties - main ly post-war peace treaties - that established and recognised the 
independence of states in Europe and the parts of Eurasia covered by large emp ires such as the Russian and the 
Ottoman. When most empires began to dissolve and subsequently an increasing number of nation -states evolved in the 
twentieth century this element of international recognition was taken over by the League of Nations and part icularly by 
the United Nations. 
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weakening Ottoman Empire - for centuries an (on-off) partner and ally of the Circassians.218 This 
competition resulted in a strong wave of anti-Russian attitudes and propaganda among British 
politicians and the rapidly growing newspaper media, which gave the public a new insight into and 
potentially a new role in politics. It is in this geopolitical context that the relatively strong interest of 
the British media in Circassia and the Circassians should be understood.  
 
It was primarily its geographic location in the North Caucasus, on the coast of the Black Sea that 
made Circassia interesting for the British. A number of official and semi-official representatives 
were sent to Circassia in the second half of the 1830s to assess the potential for the Circassians to 
halt or hinder the Russian advance in the region. These constituted a mix of civil servants, spies, 
former officers and merchants.219 They all had a significant and lasting impact on Circassia and the 
Circassians. The first to come, in 1834, was David Urquhart, who promoted the creation of a unified 
Circassian state with a modern united army.220 He became immortal for designing the first 
Circassian flag as a symbol of (new) national identity and unity.221 The next five British visitors all 
wrote books about Circassia after returning home.222 Several of these travellers also sent reports 
home to British newspapers, where the readers were able to learn about a foreign country from a 
group of rapporteurs sympathetic to the Circassian case. 223 Some of them also took part in the 
activities of Circassian support committees established not just in Britain but also, for instance, in 
Turkey and France. 
 
Most of the Russian writers never managed to visit the Circassian heartland but described the area 
and the peoples as seen from the frontier fortifications of the army or from the areas of 
neighbouring Kabarda already included in the empire.224 This is partly why Bell stated that his 
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 Especially after the Turkish military defeat by Russia, as expressed in the Peace Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. Th is 
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 According to Longworth, Urquharts visit was “itself an era in the destinies o f Circassia” (Vol. 1, vii).  
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 Ottoman Turkey also supported or promoted the unification of the Circassian tribes into a modern Circassian state on 
several occasions. Before the Russian ambit ions of conquering Circassia, the Ottoman Empire had for centuries  
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 The tradition of these Brit ish travellers and writers was continued by a number of European writers. Most famous of 
these is perhaps Alexandre Dumas. 
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 Kabarda was the easternmost Circassian territory and large parts of Kabarda were included into Russia in the late 
eighteenth century. 
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writings, as well as those of his British colleagues of the period, constituted key eyewitness reports 
on “that terra incognita - the Caucasian world” (Bell 1840, xv).225 Bell was a merchant by trade as 
well as a former army officer. In his own words, he was one of the first to fill the Caucasian space 
with content - his intention was to describe it as accurately as possible, with an emphasis on the 
scientific categorisation of the peoples according to linguistic and ethnic criteria etc. 226 
 
During the Crimean War (1853-1856) the Russian army left the fortifications they had managed to 
build since the 1830s on the Circassian coast and Circassians took control over them. British troops 
were in the Caucasus and Great Britain considered whether to support a rising and potential 
independence of Georgia, Circassia and Shamils Emirate. Once more there were popular support for 
the cause of the Circassians and the other Caucasians in Britain and in Western Europe in 
general.227 The British leadership, however, ended up taking a pracmatic or realpolitikal approach 
and left the Caucasus after Russia had been forced to leave the Balkans or the Western Black Sea. 
This was a potentially pivotal moment for the Circassians, who instead faced renewed attacks from 
the Russian army as form of revenge that resulted in a reorientation towards the eastern shores of 
the Black Sea after the defeat in the Crimean War (Geraci 2008, 347).228  
 
The international fame of the Circassians and the increasing interest in Europe and beyond has been 
named by Martin W. Lewis as a virtual ‘Circassiophilia’ that spread from Europe to North 
America.229 This illustrates the role of knowledge and knowledge circulation in a context of 
geopolitical competition where new public spheres (around the world) and new media technologies 
(and print capitalism) played a role in informing and mobilising the public in Britain, France, 
Ottoman Turkey and others. Much of this information was disregarded when Russia finally 
colonised the area but play a significant role in today’s Circassian revival. 230 
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 This is supported by the British journalist, Longworth, who stayed together with Bell in Circassian during one year.  
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part of claiming a reversing of the colonisation. 
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The Russian officer Fadeev, who served in the Caucasus in the 1860s, and became the main army 
publicist on the Caucasian Wars, has noted that the Circassian coast was of crucial importance to 
Russia. As stated by Fadeev, the Circassians had to be moved: “The re-education of a people is a 
centuries- long process, but in the pacification of the Caucasus  the time had come for us, perhaps 
only for a brief time, to complete one of the most vital tasks in Russian history” (Colarusso 2008, 
3). The connection to the solution of the Eastern Question through the final annexation of the 
Caucasus was part of the reason behind the 1864 celebrations, as also illustrated by the comments 
of a Moscow newspaper that the Eastern Question had now finally been settled in favour of 
Russia.231  
 
 
The creation of a Russian oriental space in the North Caucasus  
 
According to Leyton: “Russians considered the Caucasus’ native cultures strictly Asian. Ever since 
the mid-eighteenth century, Russian map-makers had taken the Caucasian range as an outer limit of 
Europe” (Leyton 1994, 71). In novels and travellers’ accounts of the period, the crossing of the river 
Terek or the river Kuban marked a farewell to Europe - with apprehension and excitement.232 
  
Circassia was often labelled as being located between east and west - between Europe and Asia - 
between the Orient and the Occident.233 After centuries of being located mainly in an Asian 
periphery, in the nineteenth century Circassia became the periphery of both Europe and Asia. And 
yet, by the mid-nineteenth century, Circassia was still a geographical area not clearly defined by 
internationally recognised borders in a modern understanding. Both Russia and Britain - in spite of 
the competition - took part in an Orientalist production of Circassia as an imaginative geography 
(Said 1978/1995, 54). As described by Edward Said, concrete imperial ambitions of colonisation 
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walk hand- in-hand with a new form of knowledge and identity production in such an Orientalist 
discourse. An Orientalist discourse is about the production of knowledge, difference/otherness and 
power (Said 1978/1995, 349). The Caucasus became imperial Russia’s own ‘Orient’ - inspired by 
the other European imperial ventures in Asia (Leyton 1994, 1). 234 This resulted in a specific 
Caucasian phenomenon or contradiction: while the Circassians and the other mountaineer peoples 
and their territories was treated part of Russia’s own Orient, in mos t maps (of Russia, Europe, Black 
Sea etc.) this area was after 1864 generally reclassified as part of European Russia.  
 
Colonised territories characterised by oral traditions - such as Circassia - were articulated in the 
imperial metropoles mainly through writing. Writing, publishing and the emergence of a new 
reading audience - in combination with the introduction of common education - by the nineteenth 
century had resulted in a decisive significance for the construction of colonised spaces such as 
Circassia (Gregory 1994, 173).  
 
Although the Orient is, according to Said, ‘silent’, voices of opposition and resistance could still be 
heard (Said 1978/1995, 94). The British/Western European narrative version of Circassia included a 
clear counter-narrative in relation to the Russian version. Within Russia, for instance, the writings 
of the Circassian Sultan Khan-Girei and Shora Nogmov on the language and history of the 
Circassians was, by mid-nineteenth century, representing a new Circassian elite partly educated in 
the imperial metropolis and serving in the imperial army, while still expressing a certain level of 
loyalty to the Circassians and local Caucasian belonging in their writings and in their deeds 
(Zhemukhov 2011).235  
  
 
Academic Orientalism and Caucasology in the Russian Empire 
 
In general, Russian academic Orientalism (Oriental Studies) - as performed at the universities and 
during scientific missions - was delayed in comparison with Western Europe. In the beginning, this 
was largely performed by foreign experts, which serves to emphasise the potential Eurocentric and 
Orientalist character of these academic ventures. A specific Russian academic Orientalism was 
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 Their writ ings were trongly censored at the time and only fu lly published after the fall of the So viet Union. Today 
their works are canonised as icons of Circassian history. 
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established as a Caucasian ethnology or Caucasology from the 1820s as a military undertaking 
(Halbach 1991, 57). From the 1840s on, some of the results of the Caucasian ethnology began to be 
published and some of the new Caucasian newspapers - especially from the regional Russian 
administrative centre in Tiflis (Tbilisi) - quickly became interested in disseminating this new 
knowledge. Still, by 1864 the Russian ethnographic knowledge of the Caucasian mountaineer 
peoples was marked by significant shortcomings (Halbach 1991, 59).  
 
Regarding the Russian mapping of the North Caucasus: “Modern cartographic studies of the region 
were begun by Russian scientists in Ciscaucasia about 1815, and some medium-scale maps were 
produced in 1862. Large-scale maps began to appear in 1866.”236 The first thorough study of the 
mountains was only published in 1881.237  
 
 
Excursus: The continued institutionalisation of the territorial affinity after 1864  
 
After the forced exile in 1864, most of the former Circassian territory was included in the Kuban 
region (Oblast), with sub-districts with Russian names as part of a strategy of Russification 
introduced into most of the North Caucasus. The categorisation of the Circassians now left in small 
pockets of land continued, however, and was further institutionalised within the Russian imperial 
administration through, for instance, army maps, now increasingly supplemented by maps and 
articles in encyclopaedias and other types of public as well as scientific publications.  
 
The Soviet period was marked by several changes but, in general, autonomous republics and 
territories were created using ethnic criteria to delimit the borders of the geographical-
administrative structures, with Circassian names used in the titles of the entities. 238 As analysed by 
Rogers Brubaker and others the creation of territorial units, during the Soviet period, among non-
Russian peoples such as the Circassians increased their legitimacy and to some degree strengthened 
local culture and language. The actual creation of these units were still marked by centralised 
control and supervision from Moscow: the Circassian peoples were placed on different levels in the 
territorial-administrative hierarchy on the secondary (as autonomous republic) and tertiary level (as 
autonomous area); two of the Circassian peoples were placed in double-titular republics with 
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Balkars and Karachai, respectively. Balkars and Karachai are related Turkish speaking peoples, 
which illustrates that it was a conscious decision to avoid placing the Circassians in one and the 
same republic. The creation of these republics, on the one hand, enforced a territorial affinity 
through continued institutionalisation, including support to develop and maintain the Circassian 
language(s), while on the other, the artificially created ethnic categories of ‘Adyg’ and ‘Cherkes’ 
also represented the creation of a further division among the Circassians. This also represents a 
Soviet heritage which is sometimes forgotten or overlooked in analyses of Soviet so-called 
‘nationality policies’.  
 
The territorial institutionalisation of the Circassians in three units continued after the creation of the 
Russian Federation in 1991, although now they were all elevated to the same level as ‘federal 
republics’. Although new discussions on the creation of new units without ethnically defined 
borders and names occurred from time to time - especially from politicians in Moscow or the 
neighbouring regions (krai) of Krasnodar and Stavropol - but these were always rejected from 
within the republics. 
 
 
Concludingly  
 
Two overall competing images - imaginary geographies - of Circassia was produced during the first 
part of the nineteenth century until 1864 as Circassia became subject to geopolitical competition 
between two modern colonial empires, where these images were formulated. This geopolitical 
competition resulted in a considerable larger space for the Circassian counter-version vis-a-vis the 
European colonising empire (Russia) than was the case in many simila r colonial contexts at the 
time. What Edward Said described as the ‘silent’ subjects in his theory on Orientalism or as stated 
by Paul Carter in relation to the Australian context: “White invation was a form of spatial writing 
that erased the earlier meaning” (Gregory 1994, 173). On the one hand, the Circassia neither had an 
urban centre with modern institutions, nor a written language standard expressed in publications, on 
the other, Circassian positions and protests against Russian colonisation was clearly voiced through 
British, Ottoman and other sympathetic actors, including politicians and newspapers.   
 
After 1864, the land on both sides of the Kuban River became Kuban, as illustrated by the renaming 
of the Cossacks of the area into the Kuban Cossacks, though divided into different territorial units, 
this marked the beginning of a prolonged period of colonial settlement in the area. Still, the 
symbolic and partly contradictory duality represented by the romantic writings contra the dangerous 
military adversary survived in a different form after the final conquest: On the one hand, the 
remaining pockets of Circassians became further categorised and institutionalised into the 
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modernising Russian Empire, in particular through the regional centre in Tiflis. On the other hand, 
the romantic myth initially created by Pushkin, Lermontov etc. continued to exist until today as 
their productions became canonised as the golden age of Russian literature and part of the curricular 
in both Soviet and Russian schools. In the second part of the nineteenth century, this myth was 
reformulated and circulated through popular illustrated publications (for instance the so-called 
lubok’s) as a parallel to booklets on the Wild West, Cowboys and Indians, well-known in the west. 
 
The power-knowledge system of a modern colonising empire of the nineteenth century and how this 
resulted in the creation of ‘imaginative geographies’ of the colonised areas as described by Edward 
Said was also taking place in the Circassian/Caucasian context. One of the ideas promoted by the 
imperial power-knowledge system was ethno-national classifications that were performed in the 
newly colonised areas, including their spatial locations on ethnographic maps. 239 These ideas or 
principles were also known to the Circassians and played a key role in their attempts at ‘ethno-
national’ unification as part of their resistance against colonisat ion.  
 
The classical dominance of colonial spatiality over the indigenous spatiality described by Derek 
Gregory (1994, 173) to a certain degree also unfolded in the case of the Circassians in Russia after 
1864, but, the significant production of (modern) C ircassian spatiality as part of the resistence 
against colonisation. Indigenous Circassian spatiality was redefined during the first half of the 
nineteenth century because of the pressure and threat from Russia. Within Circassia this culminated 
in the 1830s and again in the 1860s with the Circassian attempts to establish a nation-state, and 
seeking alliances abroad to stronger partners, and seeking international recognition. Jointly all of 
this set a precedent for the present Circassian revival. After 1864 the Circassian spatiality was 
formally replaced by a colonial spatiality though this included some indigenous elements (district 
boundaries, names, museums), while the rest now primarity belonged to the private sphere (which 
included taking case of historical items as can be seen in many of today’s museums). Also a form of 
‘third version’ was created by actors such Nogmov and Khan-Girei, both of whom were in the 
service of the Russian army and empire but still attempted to promote a ‘Circassia within Russia’ 
(and had their publications censored). Today the ‘third versions’ form an important part of the 
Circassian revival, where their books are published, republished and translated as key items in the 
reconstruction of Circassian history and identity. As such they have informally been canonised and 
have attained iconographical status. These works – together with the illustrated nineteenth century 
books by the British actors that stayed for longer period in Circassia at the time, together with the 
works of a few others, play a significant role or position in the ongoing Circsssian revival. The 
same can be said about the different ‘cracks’ in the colonial spatiality that, during various periods, 
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has given room for ‘Circassianess’ to be represented - whether in science, museums, administration, 
naming etc. The ‘colonial spatiality’ might be dominant but never without cracks of otherness, 
countering and resistance - in spite of the relative lenience of dominating a colonised and displaced 
culture largely without writing or urbanely based institutions.  
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Chapter  5 
 
 
 Territorial Institutionalisation of Circassianness 
 
 
A model developed by the geographer Anssi Paasi for the study of a modern territorial 
institutionalisation process with an historical perspective, could be used as part of a general 
analytical framework for the analysis of the Circassian revival. However, in this short chapter the 
ambition is more moderate: to discuss the institutionalisation of Circassian territoriality through 
inspiration from Paasi’s model. The analytical approach suggested by Paasi is a way of assessing 
the development of a geographic-territorial identity as part of processes of institutionalisation, 
which can focus on different kinds of units such as nation-states or regions, including transboundary 
regions that may include an element of contestedness (Paasi 1995). The main point of Paasi’s model 
is that institutionalisation can be applied as an analytic approach to address different processes of 
identity building and counter-building during shifting governmental systems. The model is a 
framework that offers an opportunity to include some of the key events from the nineteenth century, 
including prior to the final exile in 1864, and this plays a significant role in the ongoing formulation 
and reformulation of Circassian identity on the Internet today. The aim of this chapter is to illustrate 
the use of the above-mentioned analytical terms of territorial or geo-spatial institutionalisation and 
electronic/digital capitalism to understand the (new) virtual territoriality of Circassia in the light of 
the (historical) institutionalisation of Circassian territoriality.  
 
As an extension of the discussion and presentation in Chapter 4 of the different key aspects of the 
production and reproduction of Circassianness240 since the early nineteenth century, the aim is now 
to present and discuss the institutionalisation of Circassia (including the pockets of Circassians left 
after 1864) over time as a territorial or geo-spatial entity through the use of the analytical model 
developed by the Finnish geographer Anssi Paasi (1986, 1995).241 The ‘region’ is the geo-spatial 
unit that Paasi, as a geographer, has especially focused on. Among the objects of Paasi’s analysis 
can be mentioned Finnish border regions and territories - including when Finnish regions changed 
border demarcations with Russia/the Soviet Union - but Paasi stresses that the model can also be 
used on other forms of geographical-territorial delimitations, also including for instance nation-
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’networks’ increasingly becoming relevant in the discussion of territorial identities.  
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states. The model operates with four phases of institutionalisation: establishment of territorial form; 
territorial symbols; development of institutions; and consolidation. Through these, a geographical 
entity achieves a certain territorial identity that may include contested versions. 242 This is an 
approach to analytically discussing territorial identities through the modern era of the last two 
hundred years, challenged by periods of war and periods of shifting governmental systems, 
including the shift from Russia to the Soviet Union and, later, also the fall of the Soviet Union. This 
model on how geo-spatial identity is institutionalised - including contested identities - suggests a 
way of addressing ‘continuities’ or ‘historical strings’, some of which can be traced back to the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. This analytical framework represents a way of assessing and 
discussing the positions presented, for instance, on the Internet today. These often refer to historical 
sources or presents digitalised documentation from the nineteenth century, as found, for instance, in 
the archives of the former Russian Empire and other archives. Many of these representations of 
Circassianness, found on the Internet today, can be labelled as a kind of virtual challenge to the 
existing (formal) geo-spatial identities in the North Caucasus. This is in many ways similar to 
various cases of post- imperial/post-colonial countering found in different colonised or formerly 
colonised territories around the globe. The following sections represent an attempt to structure a 
discussion of territorial institutionalisation of Circassianness according to the terms suggested by 
Paasi. 
 
As mentioned, Rogers Brubaker has also applied the term ’institutionalisation’ in this analysis of 
Soviet and post-Soviet nation-building processes, including in competing forms by national 
minorities.243 This is an institutionalisation that often is highly territorial as reflected in the ethnic 
definition of most of the federal republics in Russia. Brubaker has stressed the dynamic character of 
national minority identities and shifting stances or positions: “...we can think of a national minority 
not as a fixed entity or a unitary group but rather in terms of the field of differentiated and 
competitive positions or stances adopted by different organizations, parties, movements, or 
individual political entrepreneurs, each seeking to “represent” the minority to its own putative 
members, to the host state, or to the outside world, each seeking to monopolize the legitimate 
representation of the group” (Brubaker 1996, 61). Such a multitude of positions or stances can also 
be found among Circassians though a movement in direction of convergence on a number of key 
issues can be observed, which in many ways is challenging the local Circassian political leadership 
in the three republics in Russia. 
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for establishing ‘Circassian’ as the joint and only category for Circassians in the 2010 census.  
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Brubaker argues that institutionalised definitions of nationhood from the Soviet period both 
contributed to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and has continued “to shape and structure the 
national question” in the post-Soviet successor states (Brubaker 1994, 47). Brubaker distinguishes 
between two forms of institutionalisation of nationhood and nationality in the Soviet Union: 
“territorial and political on the one hand, ethnocultural and personal on the other hand” (Brubaker 
1994, 47).244 “The Soviet institutions of territorial nationhood and personal nationality constituted a 
pervasive system of social classification, and organising “principle of vision and division” of the 
social world, a standardised scheme of social accounting, and interpretative grid for public 
discussion, a set of  boundary-markers, a legitimate form for public and private identities, and, 
when political space expanded under Gorbachev, a ready-made template for claims to sovereignty” 
(48). 
 
 
Phase 1.  The establishment of territorial form 
 
Paasi defines the establishment of territorial form as “the development of the social practices 
through which the region245 achieves its boundaries and will become identified as a distinct unit in 
the spatial structure of the society”, and he continues, “the emergence of territorial shape is a 
process in which the power relations in society, manifesting themselves in political, 
administrative/bureaucratic, economic and symbolic institutions, for instance, play a crucial role” 
(Paasi 1986, 124). 
 
Many maps showing cartographic representations of Circassia exist and many can be found on the 
Internet. The names ‘Circassia’ and ‘the Circassians’ can be found on maps - in atlases and on 
globes - from the sixteenth century onwards and up to the nineteenth century. These old maps often 
have no clearly defined demarcations of borders in the form of lines or a colour code.  
 
Two simple cartographic representations of Circassia before 1864 have achieved widespread 
reproduction and circulation, which has further accelerated with the increased role of the Internet as 
a multi-media outlet.246 Both are roughly outlined maps without great detail beyond the borders and 
easy to reproduce in books or on the Internet. The most prominent appear to be the nineteenth-
century version that shows Circassia from 1830 as located (roughly) between the Kuban River to 
                                                 
244
 In a paper that is not including in this thesis I discuss the 2010 Circassian campaigns for the establishment of on e 
joint Circassian republic in Russia and for being assigned as one people in the 2010 all-Russian population census, 
respectively. 
245
 In the work of Paasi mostly referred to here, he especially applies the geographical term ‘region’. The objects of his 
own investigations included Finnish border regions and territories but he stresses that the model can also be used on 
other forms of geographical delimitations, such as for instance nation-states. 
246
 For instance www.justicefornothcaucaus.com/maps.html and www.zum.de/whkmla/ region/russia/xcircassia.html.    
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the north/north-east, the Black Sea to the west and the main Caucasus mountain range to the south. 
Somehow, incorrectly, the map includes a narrow strip of land reaching into neighbouring Kabarda, 
which had already been included within Russia many years earlier. The other map shows Circassia 
from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that was double or triple in size, reaching up to the mouth 
of the river Don, covering both sides of the Kuban River and reaching well into both sides of the 
Terek River to the east. 
 
The discourse on the meaning of borders gradually changed during the nineteenth century, which 
only serves to increase the symbolic value of the cartographic representations of the Circassian 
borders at the time. In the North Caucasus, the establishment of territorial/regional form in a 
modern understanding initially took place during a long- lasting war. In the beginning, a relatively 
abstract frontier zone was established: the southern frontier of the Russian Empire between the 
Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. In the late 18th century, a line of army fortifications, including 
contingents of armed Cossacks, was established stretching from sea to sea. This could be regarded 
as a representation of a new northern boundary for in the North Caucasus region that bordered 
Circassia along large parts of the Kuban River up to the Black Sea.247 The meaning of this new 
demarcation became stronger as soon as the Trans-Caucasian territories were finally subdued and 
incorporated into Russia, thus making Circassia an entity encapsulated within the Imperial Russian 
territory (and between two seas). From 1829 on, control over the Circassian Black Sea coast was 
formally transferred to Russia from the Ottoman Empire according to the Treaty of Adrianop le, 
though this is contested not just by Circassian leaders but also by representatives of other states, 
including Great Britain.248 Formally this meant that Russia had managed to encircle Circassia on all 
three sides.249 This post-1829 and pre-1864 version of Circassia is also often found on different 
types of maps, as the cartographic sources of the Russian army increasingly became available to the 
public and as the Western media followed the progression of the war. It is also this version of 
Circassia that the Circassians suggested the Russian leadership to respect and recognise, as was 
illustrated when Circassian representatives in the 1830s formally suggested a mutual agreement 
with the Russian leadership on the Kuban River forming the border between Circassia and 
Russia.250 
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 The fortified line fo llowed the Kuban and Terek rivers. According to Jeremy Black, these two rivers defined 
Russia’s Caucasian frontier in the late eighteenth century (Black 1994, 21). These first cartographic representations of 
the North Caucasus as a region were created by representatives of the dominant outsiders, but the names that were used, 
along with other elements of new symbolic significance connected to visual representations of territory, became the 
subject of rival interpretations. 
248
 In the nineteenth century, post-war peace negotiations and subsequent treaties generally established the recognised 
borders between states and the imperial powers mostly dominated the negotiations. 
249
 This encirclement was a strategy of the Russian Army (and Navy), as not only could arms and gunpowder be 
blocked from arriv ing in Circassia but also the salt that was essential for the physical health of the Circassians 
(Longworth 1840 (vol. 2), 90).  
250
 Longworth 1840 (vol. 1).  
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The disappearance of Circassia and presentation of the lands as part of Russia on maps produced in 
Russia that was circulated beyond the borders of the Russian Empire, became one of the central 
points of protest from the Circassian leaders in their renewed campaign for international recognition 
in the 1830s (CM2).251 
 
 
Phase 2.  The establishment of territorial symbols / symbolic shape  
 
“Regions that are ‘ideas’ rather than fixed administrative entities are not usually promulgated by 
any central authority, but have emerged with time through interplay between the inhabitants and the 
institutions of society,” says Paasi (1986, 125). In the case of Circassia, the territory existed for 
centuries as a pre-modern territory that over the years increasingly was bordering on colonies of 
Cossacks, either free or in the service of the Russian army, as well as various nomadic groups and 
Crimean Tatars. The presence of the Cossacks in the Caucasus marked the beginning of a new 
period of interaction with Russia. The Cossacks, for instance, took on a number of Circassian 
traditions, including weapons and the local costume known as the Cherkeska. From the beginning 
of the nineteenth century the violent interplay between the two directly involved actors, the Russian 
army and the Circassian resistance, began. The ‘idea’ (or image) of Circassia as a territorial entity, 
that was roughly established before the beginning of the war, was radically strengthened and 
strongly canonised by the new role in Russian literature from the 1820s on. It was then further 
strengthened by the emerging geopolitical competition between Russia and Great Britain over 
influence in Circassia which created two competing - and mutually contested - images of Circassia: 
the noble freedom-loving natives (slowly becoming a modern nation) as opposed to an ever 
changing mix of noble savages (to be civilised) and untameable relentless warriors (to be 
exterminated). 
 
In the course of the decades from the 1830s to the 1860s, a strong public mythology grew up around 
the Circassians - together with the North-Eastern Caucasian mountaineers (mainly the Chechens 
and the Avars as led by Imam Shamil), which was known well beyond Russia, Ottoman Turkey and 
the Caucasus, and which lasted at least for the remaining part of the century. 252 Due to the 
emergence of print capitalism in Russia, and in particular the romantic narratives unfolding in the 
grandiose Caucasian settings, and in the more popular publications, this frontier became a parallel 
to the Wild West of USA. This was achieved through printing and publication in the West as well, 
                                                 
251
 See: ‘Declaration of Circassian Independence’, The Portfolio (Vol. 1, 1836), see appendix. 
252
 Many texts from this period are therefore found - dig italised and circulated - with in the contemporary Circassian 
revival.  
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including Denmark, often with Cossacks in the role of the rough cowboys, Circassians in the role of 
the wild Indians, and the Russian army as the cavalry. While in real life, many natives were 
slaughtered, their land was scorched and many Russian so ldiers were killed, an ‘idea’ of the region 
as a romantic but wild place was created, and filled with myths.  
 
Paasi remarks that “symbols are instrumental in the sense that they serve to evoke powerful 
emotions of identification with territorial groupings and can generate ac tion. Symbols are 
‘keywords’ in the dominating story of a territorially-based community” (Paasi 1995, 34). In a 
territory where the borders are pre-modern - at least as seen from the position of one of the parties - 
the growing and approaching Russian Empire, with its administrative system and a production of 
cultural representation, - was able to ‘create’ the ‘dominant story’ and the symbols attached to it 
achieved great importance. In a colonial setting like Circassia in the North Caucasus, the dominant 
story is established by the dominant ‘outsiders’ - the colonising empire. A competing story is, 
however, established by ‘the insiders’ - the Circassians. The area becomes a battlefield of symbols, 
which are often used deliberately by the dominant Russian side. These symbols have different 
meanings for the ‘insiders’ / the Circassians in their own ‘story’. The two narratives dialectically 
constitute the territorial identity, in which rivalry and conflict play a major symbolic role.  
 
Apart from the symbolic features connected to the landscape, the historically institutionalised image 
of the region in Russia also contains a prototypical image of Caucasians in general. This Russian 
image of otherness, formed by distance in time and space, has significant racist or xenophobic 
connotations. As an area perceived as being without fixed borders, an understanding of Circassia (as 
well as most of the remaining North Caucasus) has arisen as a territory inhabited by a core 
population of mountaineers, the Caucasians or the Circassians. When the word ‘Circassians’ (or just 
simply ‘Caucasians’, often implying the descendants of another mountain peoples such as, for 
instance, the Chechens) is mentioned in the Russian public sphere, most ord inary Russian citizens 
construct an image of an institutionalised Caucasian prototype. This kind of prototype has been - 
and still is - a huge part of an institutionalised image of the North Caucasian region as seen by the 
many outsiders. These elements are central to understanding today’s anti-Caucasian xenophobia in 
Russia, and the fact that such extremely violent wars as the ones in Chechnya can take place within 
its borders.  
 
The Elbrus Mountain - with 5642 meters the highest mountain in Europe253 - has become a central 
topographical symbol among the Circassians.254 Just as the Circassian flag Elbrus is used as a 
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 Elbrus share an element of ’h iddenness’ with the Circassians as it is still unknown to many that this is the highest 
mountain in Europe. This is partly due to ignorance and partly due to different understandings on how to define the 
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symbol by a many Circassian organisations, media outlets, companies and individuals (for instance 
as avatars on the Internet forums and social media). However, Elbrus is a Caucasian symbol that is 
also used by others, in particular, the Balkars and Karachais, who live in areas adjacent to Elbrus. 
Another mountain that has been brought to attention due to the Sochi Olympics is Mount Fisht, 
located north of Sochi, after which the Olympic stadium was named in 2012.255 This marks an 
attempt by the organisers to promote a specific version of one of the key Caucasian legends : the 
Prometeus legend. The name Fisht is of Circassian origin and the mountain has a significant role in 
Circassian history and legends. Fisht is located on the border between Adygea Republic and 
Krasnodar Krai, and an identity conflict was outplayed on this mountain in the 2000s when a large 
cross was placed on the mountain and subsequently was removed by Circassian activists.256  
 
Territorial symbols are often more or less abstract expressions of group solidarity (Paasi 1986, 125). 
Today, in the North Caucasus, on the level of the republics, groups each with their territorial 
symbols exist side by side. In the Adygea Republic, they chose to introduce the joint Circassian flag 
from the 1830s as the official flag of the republic, resulting in a strong institutional practice of using 
and reproducing the flag, also including the official website and a number of websites linking to it. 
 
Identity-building or nationalism at the level of ethnic groups and ethno-territorial entities in the 
North Caucasus is often seen as a relatively new phenomenon in the region. Jane Ormrod cites two 
Soviet scholars for stating that North Caucasian national consciousness still - in the 1920s and early 
1930s - consisted of a local, clan-consciousness, together with “a parallel consciousness of a huge 
ethnic society of North Caucasian gorskii” (mountaineers) (Ormrod 1993, 451). 257 This system of 
twin- identities existed until the Soviet nationality policies finally were victorious in the region after 
a period of ‘resocialisation’. According to Ronald G. Suny, the nationality policies of the Soviet 
                                                                                                                                                                  
border between Europe and Asia. This to some degree also illustrates that Eurocentric tendencies still prevail and an 
ambiguity towards this Euro-Asian borderland in general.  
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 See Appendix for examples of visual representations. 
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 See Chapter 9 for more on the role of Fisht. 
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 Natpress.net/index.php?newsid=3595, 22-08-2009. 
257
 The pan-(North)Caucasian or Gorsky identity level resulted in the creation of the Mountain Republic in 1918 that 
after the victory of the Bolsheviks in the post-revolution civil war in  Russia, which the peoples and states of the 
Caucasus became a part of in spite of their claims of  independence. In 1920 the Soviet Mountain republics was 
established but this entity was soon broken up into smaller and main ly ethnically defined units. The leaders of the 1918 
Mountain Republic went into exile in Turkey where the legacy and the idea of the Mountain Republic still have many 
supporters. In relation to Perestroika and the fall of the Soviet Union, a new organisation that built on similar ideas was 
established, the Confederation of Mountain Peoples in the Caucasus. (Pan-North Caucasian polit ical unity was also 
requested by the Western great powers in order to achieve support - both in relat ion to the Crimean War and in the 
aftermath of the First World War).  
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Union in the North Caucasus for the first time “provided clear political and territorial identity as 
alternatives to earlier religious and tribal solidarity” (Suny 1991, 68). As seen in the case of 
Circassia and the Circassians this is an oversimplification that is only partly true - in spite of being 
repeated again and again.   
 
The symbolic importance of being upgraded to a titular-nationality in the Soviet system was 
significant. The symbolic meaning of institutionalising the ties between ethnic group and territory 
has been illustrated in the conflicts of the 1990s, where the legitimacy for the underlying claims, are 
often drawn from this very bond. Out of the Circassians, the population of Adygea and Karachai-
Cherkessia achieved an elevated status as new republics of the Russian Federation - now on the 
same level as the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria.  
 
The name of a territorial entity is obviously an important symbol, and this “usually ‘gathers’ 
together its historical development, its important events, episodes and memories and joins the 
personal histories of its inhabitants to this collective heritage” (Paasi 1995, 35). From about the 
1240s onwards, the word ‘Cherkess’ (or ‘Circassians/Circassia) appears in a relatively high number 
of sources. The name Cherkess, which comes from the Turkic designation for the Adyghe, was 
adopted by other nations and became fixed in European and Eastern literature. 258 A number of 
events, episodes and memories are gathered in the name ‘Circassia’ and a strong mythology 
attached, as described above. As mentioned earlier, the connotations of the name, as a symbol of 
territorial identity, are different when it comes to ‘outsiders’. In many Russian sources from the 
nineteenth century the area is referred to as Kuban or Zakubanye - which means ‘the other side of 
the Kuban River’ - from a Russian perspective.259 
 
Along with Paasi, Peter Jackson considers naming an essential part of the making of spatial history 
and adds a dimension of imperialism: “The naming and renaming of places is a crucial aspect of 
geographical ‘discovery’, establishing proprietorial claims through linguistic association with the 
colonising power”, and “spatial history ‘begins and ends in language’; by the act of naming, space 
is symbolically transformed into place, a space with a history” (Jackson 1989/1992, 168). The 
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 Among the many places that references to historical Circassia can be found are the State Historical Museum of 
Russia in Moscow, where ‘Circassia’ happens to be mentioned on maps that are used to illustrate other aspects of the 
expansion of the Russian Empire. Mostly located along the fringes of these maps.  
259
 Today the region is formally called Krasnodar Krai but Kuban is to most popularly used name. 
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establishment of proprietorial claims by the Russian colonisers was distinct, not only because they 
established fortifications and towns with Russian names, but also because of the very meaning of 
those names in the neighbouring areas, such as Vladikavkaz (‘Ruler of the Caucasus’) and Grozny 
(‘Terrible’ or ‘Menacing’), referring to a former Russian Tsar. 
 
The element of naming has been important in the Russification of the North Caucasian territory and 
its communities.260 After the fall of the Soviet Union, ‘de-Russification’ and ‘re-naming’ has 
frequently been discussed, partly because of the heavy symbolism of Russian dominance embedded 
in these names. Ideas of renaming are often abandoned, however, as they often collide with strongly 
institutionalised everyday practice.261 
 
Today the Circassian revival, online as well as offline, is challenging the production of geo-spatial 
identity in the area of the former Circassia that now is known as Kuban and Krasnodar Krai. Here 
the Kuban Cossacks in recent years also have reinvigorated a revival process that is in line with a 
general Kremlin- led refocusing on Russian nationalism including a focus on orthodox religion 
combined with a local element of how Cossacks played a key role in the conquering, colonisation 
and subsequent cultivation of the land (most forgetting that the land had been cultivated through 
centuries by the Circassians and other Caucasian peoples). 262 Kuban Cossacks issues and 
organisations have played a key role in politics in Krasnodar Krai since the fall of the Soviet Union 
- this already significant symbolic role of the Cossacks in the Kuban region has now been further 
upgraded, for instance, through increased funding for events that often have strong elements of 
memorialisation.263 This is illustrated by, for instance, the creation of a public movement in 2012 by 
the head of Krasnodar Krai, Governor Alexander Tkachev, to promote the programme “For Faith, 
the Kuban and the Fatherland”.264 This development, together with the enforced celebrations of the 
‘voluntary’ Circassian-Russian interaction for 450 years as celebrated widely in 2007 and the 
attempts at downplaying Circassian history in the region within the project of the 2014 Sochi 
Olympics, outline some of the key positions in the renewed competition on the geo-spatial identity 
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 For instance, personal names have been Russified through the addition of Russian endings and patronyms, many 
names for geographical phenomena such as rivers or mountains have kept their names of, for instance, Persian orig in, 
but now in a Russian form, and most ‘modern’ words or expressions have entered the local languages in their Russian 
form. 
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 For instance, when the name of a town is the result of the forced relocation of four v illages into one - which of the 
four orig inal names should be used? There are countless examples of such dilemmas in the North Caucasus.   
262
 It is likely that the renewed Kuban Cossack revival of recent years is, partly at least, motivated by the advance and 
increased visibility of the post-2005 Circassian revival. That in turn was partly motivated by the suggestion to include 
Adygea into Krasnodar Krai - an idea that had widespread support from Kuban Cossack representatives. 
263
  
264
 This type of formulat ion mirror the old version, ”For Country, God and Tsar”, well -known among Cossacks and 
soldiers for centuries (Blanch 1960/1978, 102). The programme and movement was a reaction to the Pussy Punk event 
in Moscow in 2011 (vpered-kr.ru/raion/actual/2454-for-faith-kuban-and-fatherland.html). 
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of this particular geographic area. The role of the virtual reterritorialisation will be disucussed in 
Chapter 6 (iCircassia).   
 
 
Phase 3.  The development of institutions   
                                   
The establishment of social institutions and organisations is of decisive significance for the 
development of a territorial consciousness, as these are the bearers of the history and traditions of 
the society / community. They take part in the running reproduction of social consciousness, 
including territorial consciousness (Paasi 1986, 125). Because of this function of the institutions in 
the development of territorial consciousness, the discussion of this phase is largely taken together 
with a discussion of the structures of expectation, here exemplified through the role of language.  
 
With the introduction of Soviet power in the region, a much stronger emphasis was p laced on 
establishing formal institutions than had been the case under Imperial Russian rule, when the area 
was predominantly a military district. These institutions were not just the obvious governmental 
institutions, such as ministries at the sub-regional (autonomous republican) level with the capacity 
to implement direct power and control over the communities in the area. A wide range of spheres 
were exposed to Soviet institutionalisation and, in some cultural spheres, Soviet institutions brought 
more indirect Russian culturally-flavoured influences into the Circassian areas of the North 
Caucasus.  
 
The transformations in agriculture, industry and education during the Soviet period were also 
obvious discontinuities with the institutionalisation processes of the Circassian areas, since such 
institutions are carriers of locally-specific structures of expectations and symbolic content. Many 
examples of institutional changes can be discussed within this framework - I have chosen to refer to 
language as an example. As a by-product of this type of modernisation process, coinciding with the 
introduction of strictly Soviet institutional structures, the Russian language as one of these 
institutions gained a much stronger role than before. Language is a central institution as it inevitably 
plays a part in most other institutions. Since the North Caucasian sub-regions - the autonomous 
republics and districts were often composed of two or more peoples as titular nationalities speaking 
mutually unintelligible languages, the role of the Russian language had to be upgraded in public 
life. Having a dominant role as written language - in books, in newspapers and magazines, in radio, 
in television, in schools and universities etc., the Russian language is today steadily being 
reproduced. As mentioned earlier, however, reverse processes are also taking place at other levels 
of society. For instance, in publications in the local Circassian languages; even though only a 
limited number of people can actually read them, these are institutions of general symbolic 
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significance. Nonetheless, the local, national or ethnical media mainly use the Russian language in 
their publications, spiced with a few symbolic words from the local language.   
 
Language is a key issue for many Circassians - among the diaspora as well as in the homeland - on 
a number of different levels. Language issues are frequently discussed on Circassian websites, 
where they are often faced with language dilemmas in very practical terms.265 Should the Circassian 
language with the Cyrillic alphabet, as used in republics in Russia be promoted among the diaspora 
and used on their websites? Or should Latin or Arabic alphabets be introduced? Language is 
traditionally one of the key elements of ethnic or national identity but many Circassians in the 
diaspora have recently lost their language.266 How will the Circassian organisations and websites 
address this challenge? This is also an emotional issue which many still hesitate to engage in. 
Circassian websites generally have to use several languages and many wish to add new languages 
or are in the process of preparing for this (which often requires extra human and financial 
resources). In Russia, Russian is still the most important common language of the websites, as is the 
case of Turkish in Turkey - and in many of the countries in the West where Circassians have 
migrated to from Turkey.  
 
Still, it is important to stress - as with barriers presented by a lack of access to the Internet - that 
language also constitutes a barrier and excluding factor for many Circassians. There is still a digital 
divide to be bridged. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The analytical model suggested by Anssi Paasi on how geo-spatial identity is institutionalised - 
including contested or countered identities - suggests a way of addressing historical ‘continuities’ or 
‘strings’ back in time (longue duree). Key themes or items of investigation such as cartographic 
representations, the role of names and landscape representations as territorial symbols etc. can 
illustrate how territorial identities - including the competing and the contesting versions - have been 
institutionalised over time. In this case, in the era of modernity from the beginning of the nineteenth 
century until today. And as illustrated above, this production of an identity that from the outset was 
geo-spatial continued among Circassians in exile and has since moved on to the Internet. 
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 As mentioned elsewhere, this has functioned as a mobilising factor within the Circassian revival.  
160 
 
For centuries Circassia in one form or another was found largely on both sides of the Kuban River, 
as illustrated by a high number of old maps. From late 18th century Russian ambitions in the 
Caucasus became clear with the establishment of a number of fortifications joined together as a 
fortified line that could gradually be pushed further southward as the Russian colonisation 
progressed. The increased Russian pressure, that had increased with the formal transfer of control 
over the Circassian Black Sea coast to Russia according to the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople (though 
strongly contested), resulted in a suggestion from the Circassian leaders to Russia  to accept the 
Kuban River as the formal border between the two countries (Longworth 1840, vol. 1, 162).267 This 
meant that the Circassian leaders at this point accepted the loss of territories of Kabarda to the east. 
This illustrates a will to compromise with the new large and powerful actor from the side of the 
Circassian leaders that from time to time have been of being involved in a hopeless resistance which 
only had worsened their situation. But Russia felt too strong and superior to acknowledge the 
proposal - and somehow believed in the civilising mission and the legitimate right to territorial 
imperial expansion. Basically a classic encounter between the right to national self-determination 
and colonial expansion, which is one of the key geopolitical features of the nineteenth century. The 
principle of national self-determination that led to the establishment of an increasing number of 
nation-states but in large parts of the nineteenth century this was a Eurocentric understanding 
according to which continued colonisation of peoples that could be assigned as uncivilised could 
still be legitimate. Nineteenth century Circassia could be designated as uncivilised or pre-modern 
according to certain features of society but it appears as Circassia was too early in their claims for 
international recognition as a nation-state as the dominating European powers were largely not fully 
ready to appoint the principles of the right the national self-determination to this region in the Euro-
Asian borderlands. In spite of the support from significant actors in Britain, France and other states. 
By insisting on labelling the region as Asian and peoples as uncivilised it was easier for the Russian 
Empire to achieve final international acceptance of their annexation of the Caucasus, though this 
was further enhanced by the geopolitical strength of Russia in the area. 
 
The Circassia that asked for international recognition as a nation-state in the nineteenth century had 
a form of confederate character with largely independent provinces and without central government 
except in times of crisis or an external threat. In one of the Circassian appeals to the European 
powers they also expressed a willingness to become a ‘vassal’ of friendly empires of Britain or the 
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 This was the territory called Zakubanyie in Russia. In particu lar the Black Sea coastline was considered of strategic 
interest to Russia. 
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Ottomans. This illustrates transitional character of the nineteenth century context in the Caucasus as 
the Circassian leaders suggested both recognition as a nation-state and alternatively as a vassal state 
of a friendly empire. Vassal (state) status is generally understood as a premodern phenomenon of 
linking smaller territories to historical empires. For instance, the ne ighbouring Crimean Khanate 
had through centuries functioned as a vassal of the Ottoman Empire. 268 
 
Today historians generally agree that Circassia was tricked - even twice - in relation to the Treaty of 
Adrianople in 1829. First the Ottoman Empire as the losing part managed to give up control over 
the Circassian Black Sea coast without actually possessing one or two trading post. Probably in an 
attempt to reduce their loss they chose to scarify a small ally that Russia was interested in. When 
this resulted in strong reactions and discussions in Britain, Circassia was once more deceived as the 
British ambassador in St. Petersburg managed to persuade his government that the Ottomans 
actually possessed a key fortress on the coast which they therefore could pass on to Russia - in spite 
of the fact that the fortress had been abandoned in 1790 (Longworth 1840, vol. 1, 306). Which 
illustrates not just the difficulties of smaller actors in the geopolitical games of the nineteenth 
century but also how the lack of proper information - including cartographic - could make this 
manipulation possible. Still, the treaty and the way Circassia and the Circassians was manipulated 
in the process was part of the motivation for the involvement of Urquhart, Bell, Longworth and 
other British actors in the 1830s - all of whom play a significant part in the contemporary mediated 
Circassian memorialisation. 
 
Overall, the Russian conquest led to the renaming of Circassia into the Kuban. A large number of 
the names of Circassian origin survived the transition, however, in particular topographic names 
(river and mountains, in particular), while many of the villages were established by settlers from 
Russia and often, though not always, were given Russian names. This might be, partly at least, due 
to the extended period of warfare and conquest during which Circassian names were researched and 
entered the maps of the Russia army. For instance, based on the information achieved by agents of 
the Russian army seeking detailed topographical information behind enemy lines, such as illustrated 
by the Russian officer Fyodor Tornau mentioned above. In other words, the land was not just an 
empty canvas on which to write new content as seen in other colonial setting around the world at 
the time. 
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 The annexat ion of the Crimean Khanate by Russian Empire in the late eighteenth century also designated the 
Russian ambit ions towards the Caucasus.  
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During the Soviet period, Circassian names returned as titular-nationalities in republics in the North 
Caucasus. Though this is not a solely Soviet invention as is sometimes claimed. Before the Russian 
revolution territorial sub-divisions in the North Caucasus were often made according the ethnicity 
as seen, for instance, in relation to the Kabardians. After the fall of the Soviet Union this trend was 
further extended with the upgrading of the status of Adygea and Karachai-Cherkessia to federal 
republics. All in all, this represents not just a gradually increasing institutionalisation of Circassian 
geo-spatial identity but also illustrates the increasing legitimacy assigned to the link between 
ethnicity and territory. Which is not just a post-Soviet trend but can be found in many places around 
the world.                       
 
That many topographic names are of Circassian origin are frequently mentioned by the tourist 
guides who annually assist thousands of Russian tourists by the Sochi Black Sea Rivera. Beyond 
this information provided, for instance, during tourist excursions by bus, the Circassian names of 
villages and towns generally represent ‘local exotica’. The items sold to tourists includes, for 
instance, blankets, bags, caps etc. with prints, though generally only those who have been on a bus 
excursion actually know that this local Caucasian exotica is of Circassian origin. The emergence of 
a Russian Rivera from the late nineteenth century also signify the ambition of establishing a tourist 
resort for the increasing number of wealthy Russians in central parts of the empire after French 
Meditaranean example. This marked the second wave of tourism in the former Circassian areas 
after the spas were established in the first halft of the century in the eastern part ce ntrered on 
Piatigosk. The introduction of new Russian tourism oriented towards spectacular Caucasian natural 
landscapes was from the beginning of the nineteenth century part of the Russian colonisation of the 
former Circassian areas. This resulted in a continued institutionalisation into Russia through tourism 
which included, for instance, guidebooks, where the nature and varying degrees of the history of the 
area now was represented. As a parallel to the literary representations mentioned above.  
 
To a large extent the Circassian languages benefitted from the Soviet institutionalisation - in spite of 
the changing phases of Russification versus Korenisatsia (indigenisation), the enforced use of the 
Cyrillic alphabet, etc. Today these results appears to be gradually fading in many places of 
Circassian residence, as part of a general global trend that is further enhanced by the growth of the 
Russian-language dominated media sphere, not least in television and on the Internet. The 
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consequences of a potential loss of the language for the geo-spatial identity of the Circassians is 
difficult to assess as this also depend on the developments of other factors. Still, it would denote the 
loss of one of the absolute most significant Circassian identity markers. Some predict that 
Kabardian could be the only Circassian language that will survive in the long run.    
 
Informal institutions such as the family and civil society became key institutions for the survival of 
Circassian culture, language and traditions - in exile as well as in the homeland - after 1864. In 
particular due to village life as dominant among the Circassians that in cities of the diaspora was 
supplemented by cultural associations and foundations. All of which has formed an important basis 
for the presently ongoing Circassian revival.269 
 
The increased parallel revival among Kuban Cossacks during recent years has pinpointed the return 
of a situation of increased competing territorial memorialisation and identity building - though 
largely unfolding in separate spheres. Though generally Cossack identity are regarded as less 
consolidated than is the case among the North Caucasian Mountain Peoples such as the Circassians 
the significant support from federal, regional and district levels in Russia might not just ha ve given 
rejuvenated Kuban Cossack identity building process a renewed impetus but also, comparatively, 
have given them an advantage vis-a-vis the Circassian revival, that is mainly civil society driven, 
though also - to some degree - supported by the republican authorities in the North Caucasus. Thus, 
these increased and parallel revival processes also illustrates how the Northwestern Caucasus 
increasingly has become a playground for ‘external’ actors - whether from the Kremlin or the 
Circassian diaspora. 
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 A form of long-distance institutionalisation of Circassianness continued in exile, as manifested for instance in the 
Circassian cultural associations. Due to these efforts, generation after geneneration, a basis for the contemporary 
Circassian activism of the recent decades was created. Narratives of the homeland and the tragic expulsion played a key 
role. This institutionalisation was mostly driven by local communities, villages and civil society actors in general.  
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Chapter  6 
 
 
 iCircassia? 
Digital Capitalism and New Transnational Identities 
 
 
 
The (almost) wholesale exile of the Circassians from their homeland in 1864 after the final victory 
of the Russian army resulted in Circassia literally being taken off the map. Nonetheless, countless 
cartographic representations of Circassia from the preceding centuries exist and have today been 
digitalised, presented and circulated on the Internet. Circassia has, in this way, little by little begun 
to come back ‘on the map’ - at least virtually. And to be ‘on the map’ is a strong metaphor, which 
this chapter will be investigating. 
 
The total number of Circassians is today regarded as being somewhere between three and six 
million, spread across a number of countries. The largest contingent - perhaps more than two 
million - resides in Turkey. Other significant diaspora groups are found in Syria, Jordan, Israel, 
Germany, USA and Canada. In the Russian Federation there today reside between 700,000 and 
800,000 Circassians in the three North Caucasian republics of Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria and 
Karachai-Cherkessia, with a few small communities on the Black Sea coast of Krasnodar Krai. The 
three names of Adygea, Kabarda and Cherkessia are all the names of Circassian peoples, who 
constitute the titular nationalities of these republics 
  
Over the last few years, we have witnessed a strong rise in the number of Circassian websites, 
initiated by a number of individuals and organisations, with diverse aims - though all are united in 
the goals of presenting information on Circassian history, culture and identity. In the early part of 
the 2000s, many of the websites were simplistic projects initiated by various groups and individuals 
but, today, a large number of well-designed and well- functioning Circassian websites can be found. 
This includes a number of websites on broader Caucasian issues. In Turkey, the term Circassian 
(Cherkes in Turkish) has often been used as a collective term for all (North) Caucasian 
mountaineers (including, for instance, the Abkhasians). The many new (North) Caucasian websites 
- and the fact that they often link to each other or recycle each other’s texts - have resulted in a 
‘multiplier effect’ of their visibility on the Internet. In this way, the joint sum becomes more than its 
single parts. This also increases the potential outreach towards relevant target groups - also beyond 
the Circassians and the Caucasians. The websites on Circassian issues all contribute to the 
166 
 
production and reproduction of contemporary Circassian identity. ‘iCircassia’ - Internet-Circassia - 
is my term for the joint efforts of the many web-based creations and recreations of an imaginary 
homeland.  
 
The Internet has spawned a number of new challenges, opportunities and a new terminology for 
researchers of ethnic identity and nationalism, such as cyber-ethnography, electronic or Internet 
nations, virtual communities, digital diasporas etc. In this chapter, I argue that iCircassia is a virtual 
transnational ethnic space existing on the Internet, which both diaspora Circassians and homeland 
Circassians contribute to.270 The websites can roughly be classified into two main groups: A) classic 
websites providing information and, for instance, functioning as tools for organisations (often 
including interactive discussion forums), and B) social web media, such as Facebook, YouTube, 
Twitter etc. The increased level of hyperlinking has, however, increasingly blurred the boundary 
between these two forms, in which, for instance, social Internet media increasingly is used as 
different or additional tools of communication by civil society organisations.  
 
In many ways, ‘iCircassia’ is an ‘imagined community’ in the same sense as the nation-states 
analysed by Benedict Anderson in his 1983 book of the same name, where he employed the term 
‘print capitalism’ to designate the way nation-states increasingly became institutionalised through 
the production, distribution and general utilization of printed representations from the ninetee nth 
century. Similar processes of nation-building or ethnicity-building efforts have, however, unfolded 
among most of the ethnic groups found in the North Caucasus, through shifting phases and 
conditions over the last two hundred years, as will be illustrated in this chapter. This is, nonetheless, 
generally with a greater degree of civil society actor involvement as compared to the official 
nationalism of nation-states (Anderson 1983/1991, 163).271 In the 1990s, the term ‘print capitalism’ 
was updated and elaborated by Arjun Appadurai and others to become the term ‘electronic 
capitalism’, which I use as a platform for discussing the recent developments among the Circassian 
websites. To further update the term into ‘digital capitalism’, I suggest distinguishing it from the 
former phase, which largely focused on the role of television and radio.  
 
 
From Print to Electronic to Digital Capitalism 
 
The inspiration for this section is drawn mainly from two analytical terms applied to examine 
significant changes in communication technologies. Firstly, the shift from the two former phases of 
                                                 
270
 This reflects a new and/or additional way of community building that is not unfolding only in cyberspace. 
271
 In the Circassian republics in the North Caucasus, a secondary level of official nationalis m unfolded during the 
Soviet period, and especially after 1991, albeit  subject to a number of restrictions.  
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‘print capitalism’ and ‘electronic capitalism’, the two terms developed and/or discussed by Benedict 
Anderson (1983/1991) and Arjun Appadurai (1996), to the contemporary phase of ‘digital 
capitalism’. I have chosen to use the term digital capitalism due to the thematic relevance in 
continuing the two related above-mentioned terms, which are well-established in academic 
analyses. The contemporary ‘digital’ phase could also be labelled ‘digital mediation’ or ‘digital 
publishing’. I argue that this shift is reflected in the shift from the first post-Soviet Circassian 
revival (CR1) to the post-2005 contemporary Circassian revival (CR2). Secondly, the V.E.R.A.city 
loop model developed by Maximillian Forte for the analysis of processes of Internet-generated 
indigenous revival will be discussed in relation to CR2. According to Forte’s model, this process 
can be characterised as a continuous loop of four issues of visibility, embodiment, recognition and 
authenticity, which I find relevant in relation to the Circassian context.   
 
In his book ‘Imagined Communities’ from 1983, Benedict Andersons describes how ‘print 
capitalism’ became instrumental in the construction of nationalism in the production of modern 
nation-states from the nineteenth century on. This relates to the use of printed media as a modern 
dimension in the development of new public spheres with a new role in societies - initially mostly 
in European contexts. In the aftermath of the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, the ideas of Anderson gained prominent status in many scholarly analyses. 272 The processes 
of ‘imagining communities’ also takes place on levels other than the new nation-states - as has been 
illustrated on several occasions in the post-Communist world - for instance by ethnic minority 
groups that had or still have some form of secondary- level territorial-administrative autonomy often 
representing a hangover from the Soviet period (Hansen 2003). In several cases, this development 
has been part of an increased tension and conflicts between - new and often nationalising - nation-
state and ethnic minority groups. This sometimes evolved into violent conflicts as seen, for 
instance, in relation to Kosovo/Serbia, Abkhasia/Georgia and Chechnya/Russia - though they all 
followed different paths. The process of print capitalism and nation-building - on a secondary sub-
national level - also affected many other nationalities in the Caucasus, including the Circassians in 
the three republics of the region, where they constitute titular nationalities as Kabardians, Cherkess 
and Adygs respectively. The fact that Anderson ascribes the introduction of print capitalism - in a 
modern understanding - to the early phases of nationalism and national movements in the nineteenth 
century also renders it relevant to discuss in relation to Circassia and the Circassians in the 
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 As was the case with other studies of nationalism.  
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nineteenth century. This is illustrated by the geopolitical competition and many printed 
representations mentioned earlier in this chapter.  
 
In 1996 Arjun Appadurai (drawing inspiration from others) employed the term ‘e lectronic 
capitalism’ to encompass the changes in media technology - especially the role of television, radio 
and the initial version of the Internet (Appadurai 1996, 161).273 Among the features of electronic 
capitalism highlighted by Appadurai, the ‘aural’ and ‘visual’ elements encompass a strong potential 
for the emotional engagement of target groups and potentially having a greater outreach towards 
audiences - though still largely non-digital. Furthermore, specific language skills, as in the case of 
the written media, are not required. Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union there was a 
significant rise in the number of publications on Circassian history and identity in the North 
Caucasus - including translations of books from the nineteenth century which had never before been 
published in the Soviet Union or in the preceding Russian Empire, where censorship usually 
prohibited this.274 Some of these publications included eyewitness accounts that challenged the 
official history writing that many Circassian actors wished to revise. Many of these publications are 
now remediated and digitalised for presentation on the Internet - mostly free of charge.275 Within a 
few years of 1991, electronic media began to gain importance in several of the North Caucasian 
republics, with a limited number of weekly hours of programming in the Circassian language on 
issues of Circassian history and traditions, which became very popular among audiences, as I 
observed during my field work in the 1990s. The 1990s were, for the Circassians in Russia, marked 
by an overlap of print and electronic capitalism, partly due to the delay of almost 150 years due to 
censorship and other restrictions on the free publication on issues relating to the Circassian 
minorities. 
 
As an extension of the above-mentioned terms of Anderson and Appadurai, I have chosen to use the 
term ‘digital capitalism’ to designate the contemporary period dominated by the features of the so-
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 In the 1960s, Marshall McLuhan had already published now famous books, in which he, among others, discussed 
“mankind leaving a typographic age and entering an electronic one” and in the book ‘Understanding Media’ he coined 
the term ‘The Global Village’ to describe the new age of electronic media (Turner 2006, 53).  
274
 This included a number of non-scientific publications describing and celebrating Circassian history and culture. 
Some of these expressed harsh opposition to official Russian history writing and/or managed to offend neighbouring 
peoples - whether ethnic Russians or those belonging to other Caucasian groups. 
275
 Books published by Circassians and other Caucasians in the diaspora countries were also now translated and 
published in the North Caucasus. 
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called Web 2.0.276 This is an updated version of the two preceding periods of print and electronic 
capitalism, representing a third phase of media technological development. Jürgen Habermas has 
stressed how only with the arrival of modernism did the printing press “unfold its cultural and 
political significance”. “It brings with it an enlargement of the communicative action which, by 
means of electronic mass-communication, as developed during the 20th century, has been intensified 
once more” (Habermas 1996, 366 - my translation).277 Extending the theory of Benedict Anderson, 
the current period of digital capitalism could be characterised as yet another period of 
intensification. This (gradual) shift from electronic towards digital capitalism more than illustrates 
the role of speed and acceleration in this process. We are witnessing a profound shift in form and 
practice of mediation since the arrival of Web 2.0, which potentially has significant consequences 
for memorialisation and mobilisation - as the case of the Circassian revival illustrates.  
 
The shift to digital capitalism experienced since the mid-2000s has contributed significantly to the 
reproduction and acceleration of the contemporary Circassian cultural revival. Characterised not 
just by the newfound dominance of the Internet as a media but also the integrated multi-media 
character of the Internet, with by features such as hyperlinking, remediation, cross-mediality etc. 
Two main characteristics of the Internet can primarily be emphasised: firstly, the element of 
convergence of media forms and technologies that is illustrated by, for instance, the integrated use 
of ‘older’ media forms such as photos and films on social media sites and other parts of the Internet. 
This is sometimes referred to as ‘new media’ (Manovich 2001). Secondly, the Internet functions as 
an enormous digital storehouse, as a media form that is technologically based upon a database 
model (Manovich 2001, 55). These two twin characteristics of the contemporary Internet - or digital 
capitalism - to a large extent encapsulate the digital aspects of the ongoing Circassian revival.  
 
 
Re-Imagining Circassia 
 
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a re- imaging of the Circassian homeland as a key 
element of ethnic identity, both in the North Caucasus and among the Circassian diaspora - through 
a number of different processes and forms of expression, including a revival and reproduction of the 
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 The term ‘digital capitalis m’ is also used by Dan Schiller in h is book of the same name from 2000, where he mainly 
investigates the new economic landscape defined by the interface between neo -liberalism and the Internet. 
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 The contemporary phase of digital cap italism is also characterised by a more transnational, globa l or cosmopolitan 
outlook compared to the phase of electronic capitalism of the 1990s, which was more state -centric. 
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‘imaginary geography’ of the nineteenth century, as described earlier in this chapter. Seteney Shami 
has stated the following regarding the diaspora Circassians and the new role of the homeland: “The 
encounter with the homeland has brought this space back into time and has made it into a territory” 
(Shami 1998, 642). Since then the Internet has played a significant role in the process of what could 
be labelled a virtual ‘re-territorialisation’. This could be labelled ‘iCircassia’, which in many ways 
is also a way of contesting the situation on the ground in the contemporary Kub an region (formally 
Krasnodar Krai) and other parts of historical Circassia.  
 
Images of the contemporary homeland - the nature, the people, the traditions, the built environment 
etc. - are presented on many websites,278 both in the form of products presented by professional 
media outlets and as amateur photos and films by tourists and other travellers that have visited the 
region, including some from the Circassian diaspora. 279 After a slight delay, the Circassians in the 
homeland now also add to this joint pool of Circassian images, which is increasing on a daily 
basis.280 Together with the many examples of remediated nineteenth century representations, these 
many digital Circassian images constitute a visual virtual version of Circassia. 281 The historical 
homeland becomes more visible, not just for the members of the dispersed diaspora but also for the 
rest of the world. A contested European periphery becomes slightly more visible to the rest of 
Europe.  
 
One of the questions, raised by the emergence of ‘Internet-Circassia’ and the C ircassian digital 
diaspora, is whether this phenomenon will reduce the desire to repatriate among the diaspora. 
Repatriation is one of the most difficult issues facing the Circassian diaspora organisations, many of 
which have formally prioritised repatriation since the 1990s.282 As noted by Khachig Tololyan, the 
option of performing a virtual ‘return’ - a repeated turning towards the historical homeland through 
the Internet - could replace or reduce the will to actually repatriate (Gibb 2006, 175). Camilla Gibb 
has investigated the Harari diaspora, which originates from Ethiopia, including how they “construct, 
circulate and consume images of the homeland over the Internet”, and this could be relevant to 
consider in relation to the Circassian experience. “Because, as Appadurai (1995) notes, “The 
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 Imagology, sometimes referred to as ‘image studies’, is the analysis of the use of national and ethnic stereotypes in 
literature (and other cultural productions), which is a related way of d iscussing the production of national or counter-
national images - and imagined geographies (Beller and Leerssen 2007).  
279
 Tourists are increasingly contributing to the creation of a worldwide dig ital repository of visual images of places all 
over the world. W ithin this worldwide dig ital archive, Circassian trajectories can increasingly be found.    
280
 Including a central role for many of the territorial symbols mentioned earlier, such as the flag, the ninet eenth-century 
costumes, historical maps etc. 
281
 These virtual visualisations share similarities with the so-called ‘reversing of the imperial gaze’ described in a 
number of post-colonial studies, including Edward Said and Derek Gregory. Now this process of reversing has taken on 
a new form that could be labelled a ‘digital gaze’.  
282
 Many of the newer organisations criticise the older organisations for talking about repatriation, while rarely taking 
concrete steps to push forward an agenda on the issue. 
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homeland is partly invented, existing only in the imagination of the deterritorialized groups”, the 
Internet is one place where that imagination can speak in visual, textual and interactive terms” 
(Gibb 2006, 175). And Gibb further notes that “the loosening of the ties between people and place 
has fundamentally altered the basis of cultural reproduction” (Gibb 2006, 176). The arrival of the 
social media of Web 2.0, and the Internet in general, has contributed to enlarging and 
transnationalising the Circassian civil society sector significantly. Among the Circassian diaspora, 
this has led to the increased involvement of youths and others with an interest in using the Internet, 
to a much larger degree than before, in producing, circulating and discussing Circassian content. 
The Internet has turned out to be a highly appropriate tool for the twin task of mobilising 
Circassians for action (online as well as offline) and promoting what Gibb refers to as ‘cultural 
reproduction’. As mentioned, the threatening loss of Circassian language and culture in general is 
one of the key mobilising factors among the new generation of on- and offline activists. As also 
noted by Gibb in relation to the Harari, the role of transferring knowledge of history, culture and 
traditions, which used to be the role of the elders, has today partly been taken over by the 
Internet.283 Here, digital activists not only advocate contemporary Circassian issues such as 
genocide recognition but also promote Circassian identity by taking part in the production and 
reproduction of a digitalised version of Circassian cultural heritage. All in all, it is obvious that this 
development has contributed to invigorating the Circassian revival.284  
 
There are a number of different ways of practising ‘long-distance relationships’ with a distant, 
mythologised and mostly unseen homeland among the Circassian diaspora, whether on the part of 
associations, organisations or individuals. This diversity is also reflected in the five main strands of 
the contemporary Circassian movement identified by Sufian Zhemukhov as ranging from 
‘nationalists’ at one end, through ‘sovereigntists’, ‘centrists’ and ‘culturalists’, to 
‘accommodationists’ at the other end of the spectrum (Zhemukhov 2012). The nationalist stand is 
the one most widely discussed, as illustrated by, for instance, Benedict Anderson, who has used the 
terms ‘mobile nationalism’ or ‘long-distance nationalism’ to discuss the phenomenon of ‘Internet 
nationalism’ (Conversi 2012, 1361). Here, love of the homeland can grow strong - at a distance - 
while the homeland is often fetishised, and assimilation into the country of residence can become a 
form of treason. This is basically an intensification of the already well-known phenomenon of 
‘diaspora nationalism’ described by, among others, Anderson (1983/1991), and Schiller and Fouron 
(2001). Since nationalism only marks one end of the contemporary Circassian movement, albeit 
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 This has, to some extent, marginalised the elders, though many of these have also relocated to urban settings, where 
they are often active in various associations. As mentioned elsewhere, the threatening loss of language is an issue that is 
lamented by many Circassians. This could turn out to be the ‘collateral damage’ o f a successful Circassian revival.  
284
 Most of the elders that I have met at conferences, in cu ltural associations and elsewhere have welcomed this trend 
and often expressed pride in the renewed level of activity. I have not talked to elders in Circassian villages in the 
Caucasus or, for instance, in Turkey to see whether they have reservations regarding this development.  
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often the most visible and catchy one for news media in different contexts (used and misused for 
different purposes by different actors), it could be relevant to include assessments of the other four 
stands as well in order to achieve a fuller picture of the ‘creation of iCircassia’, although this is 
beyond the scope of this chapter.  
 
Thomas Hyland Eriksen has also elaborated on the relationship between nationalism and the 
Internet. He identifies “four varieties of Internet nationalism: State-supported (Chile), surrogate 
(Afrikaner), pre- independence (Kurdish) and multiculturalist (Moroccan-Dutch)”, which he then 
supplements with two more, which are not included in his analysis: ‘oppositional’ and diasporic 
identities with weak links to homeland. (Eriksen 2007, 14). 285 The case of the Circassian Internet 
revival does not fit easily into any one of the categories but the most visible part of the Circassian 
activism, focusing on genocide recognition and protesting against the Sochi Olympics, particularly 
shares similarities with ‘pre- independence’ and ‘opposition’. However, as mentioned above, 
nationalism is just one aspect of the Circassian revival. Eriksen notes that the Internet is creating 
”an invisible, but perceptible umbrella covering scattered diasporas in numerous countries” and 
stresses that, with the arrival of the Internet, a certain form of identity is more likely to persist than 
before, when ”encapsulation or assimilation were the most likely outcome” (Eriksen 2007, 15). This 
relates to identities such as, for instance, German Circassianness or American Circassianness. In 
other words, the Internet contributes to the creation of new forms of hybrid identity, and this is 
relevant to include in an assessment of the Circassian context.  
 
‘Internet-Circassia’ is multi- lingual, though the netizens of iCircassia generally belong to certain 
linguistically-defined spaces within the virtual part of the Circassian world. However, these spaces 
are increasingly overlapping. This is partly due to the growing knowledge and use of English and to 
the rising use - and usability - of Internet-generated functions such as Google Translate. Just a few 
years ago, iCircassia could be defined as consisting of almost separate linguistically-defined zones, 
especially Russian, Turkish and Arabic, with English functioning as an addition together with a few 
other languages. The role of the Circassian language on the Internet has also expanded as a zone 
that (potentially) cut across the other linguistic zones (as does English also) but a general lack of 
knowledge of the Cyrillic alphabet is impeding this development. Still, many new possibilities of 
learning and using the Circassian language through the Internet have evolved and, similarly, the 
possibilities of linking up to likeminded people have increased. These linguistically-defined zones 
not only constitute significant parts of iCircassia today but have grown with the arrival of new 
websites and, in particular, with the growth in social web media. This is a reflection of the diversity 
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 Anna Everett (2009, 34) has noted that ‘cyber-nationalis m’ can potentially challenge ‘o ld-nationalism’. Cyber-
nationalism can thus question fragile balances between groups and potentially lead to conflicts. Such concerns have 
occationally been voiced in relation to the Circassian revival.  
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of the geographically scattered Circassian population which, however, with the growing role of the 
Internet, is increasingly converging.  
 
As part of the accelerating process of globalisation, minority languages such as Circassian appear to 
become further marginalised, as ongoing processes over a number of years are further enhanced due 
to the geographically dispersed nature of the Circassian communities.286 The Internet is now being 
used to counter this situation by promoting different forms of language training, for instance 
through the use of YouTube, where a mixture of pedagogical methods and aural examples can be 
applied. Whether this will contribute to saving the Circassian language from extinction is 
questionable, and opinions among Circassian activists differ as to whether language survival should 
be a key element of the Circassian revival. Still, many Circassians refer to loss of language as a sign 
of assimilation and loss of culture, and thus as part of their motivation to become active participants 
in the Circassian revival.287 It should be noted that, for instance, the relatively few Circassian youth 
activists among the diaspora that speak the Circassian language evidently command respect from 
their peers.  
 
Initially, the rather low level of Internet action was not merely due to government control and a lack 
of access in the Russian North Caucasus and in Turkey but was also due to a lack of equipment and 
computer and language skills. A digital and linguistic divide still had to be overcome but, both in 
Turkey and in Russia, this situation is changing quickly, spearheaded by the young generation 
especially.288 The increased role of the Internet also increases some of the generally well-known 
negative side-effects, such as hate-speech, xenophobic or ultra-nationalistic remarks - both towards 
and by Circassians. A former Circassian diaspora activist referred to ‘stupid nationalism’, as occurs 
on the Internet, as a demotivating factor for him. This element has increased with the growing role 
of the Russian Internet sphere in the Circassian revival - xenophobic tendencies are widespread in 
Russia, and the Internet has proven to be a significant field of xenophobic clashes. The widespread 
xenophobic attitude towards Caucasians in Russia, which also unfolds on the Internet, similarly 
affects the Circassian Internet context. 
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 A large part of the Circassians lived on the Anatolian mainland for more than six generations but during recent 
decades, they have experienced a secondary displacement, albeit this time mainly voluntarily. A new generation of 
Circassians now dwells in Istanbul, Ankara or in large urban conurbation in Germany, Holland, Belgium etc. and, to 
many of those Circassians, regions in Central Anatolia have become a second lost homeland.  
287
 The fear o f assimilation can be seen, for instance, in Turkey, where a large number of young Circassians have lost 
the Circassian language that their forefathers had managed to keep alive for six or seven generations in exile. This is an 
illustration of one of the contradictions of late modern globalisation whereby Turkish as a daily language in the main 
urban centres, in the media and in education has achieved a more dominant position than before, while English is 
increasingly becoming the second language. 
288
 As noted by John Phillip Schaefer in h is discussion of ‘iGhana’: “Literacy is again required, and a computer lite racy 
is now prerequisite. There is thus a digital div ide that challenges the role of electronic capitalis m in the format ion of an 
imagined community of the nation-state” (Schaefer 2006, 211).  
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The following three examples illustrate the diversity of Internet-Circassia, while also demonstrating 
the (increasing) level of connectedness that is one of the key characteristics of the Internet. Firstly, 
the use of viral videos: short films or video clips that can instantly be shared through all web-based 
media platforms and which have often been inexpensively produced.289 These are now regularly 
produced and circulated by a number of organisations in relation to the annual May 21 events, both 
for online promotion of events and for use at the commemorative events, conferences etc. These 
videos are often short (for instance 2, 5 or 10 minutes long) and may be in local languages but often 
with a visual representation that can be understood without knowing the actual words uttered in the 
video. The content often includes historical images from the nineteenth century, digitalised and/or 
remediated for use in these videos, which can also be used to inform wider target groups about 
Circassian history and identity after these events. The form of the video often varies from year to 
year - one example of a different format is a viral video made by the youth activists at the 
Circassian Cultural Institute in New Jersey in May 2011, in which they filmed each other while 
telephoning the Russian embassy in Washington, all asking the same question: “Where is 
Circassia?” The form varies greatly, however, as organisations are becoming increasingly aware 
that they should not use the same formula from year to year. Viral videos are typically uploaded 
onto YouTube and further circulated through sites such as Facebook and Twitter, not just by 
organisations but also by individuals. These sites have become important supplements to the 
websites of the Circassian and Caucasian organisations and other initiatives and, in some cases, the 
main activities have moved to the social sites. Viral videos have become a new tool for civil society 
actions and campaigns, one that is cheap and easy to use, as illustrated by the Circassian activists, 
many of whom form part of an organisation. Their role is crucial as facilitators (initiating and 
maintaining) of the processes of sharing and connecting - partly related to what Malcolm Gladwell - 
in a slightly different context - has called ‘influencers’ (Jenkins 2009).290 Obviously, a number of 
different forms of cyber-activism can be anticipated to emerge in the (near) future.291 
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 On the use of viral videos as part of (viral) campaigning (Oba ma for President), see Kevin Wallsten (2010).  
290
 Gladwell has analysed the functioning of social networks or media including how and when certain cultural 
phenomena go viral. He use the terms ‘connectors’ and ‘mavens’ to assign key persons or actors, where the latter 
represents persons with knowledge and informat ion, and the former those with large networks that enable them to 
circulate informat ion and knowledge (Gladwell 2002).  
291
 As stated by Wallsten (2010, 163) in relation to the “Yes We Can” campaign of the American elect ions in 2008, 
these actors “seem to occupy a unique and influential position in determining whether an online polit ical video goes 
viral”. 
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In 2009, new transnational cooperation began among a number of leading Circassian and Caucasian 
organisations of the post-2005 generation. This was centred on cooperation, coordinated action and 
exchange of promotional material (slogans, poster design), videos etc., as illustrated by the 
May21.org site. Since 2010, May21.org opened a YouTube channel (as ‘may211864’), where some 
of the viral videos from the campaign can still be seen (3 videos as of 20-06-2012). Many videos 
documenting the May 21 actions in various places around the world can also be seen (18 videos as 
of 20-06-2013), along with a large number of digital photos (that can also be found on a number of 
other sites).292 These organisations, along with a few more, are also part of the parallel initiative, 
NoSochi2014.org. NoSochi is a topic that has increasingly achieved a central position in May 21 
events and initiatives. A NoSochi2014 YouTube channel was opened in 2010 and, by July 2013, it 
was showing ten videos that had been played more than 23,000 times. On YouTube in general, 
there are more than a hundred films on Circassians and ‘May 21’ (10-07-2013), most of which 
cover events such as demonstrations, commemorational ceremonies, conferences (of different 
lengths and detail), while a smaller number of films use ‘May 21’ in the title or subtitle of films on 
Circassian history and identity. These can be seen on the YouTube channel of May21.org, where 
activists and others are encouraged to do the same in their national contexts. This film was 
presented in negative, which adds visual drama to the story. In 2010, they presented a film that also 
featured activists (15 persons) being asked “What is your message to other Circassians?” These are 
both examples of the use of a contemporary format that avoids nineteenth-century images, and 
which could perhaps considered more appealing to contemporary cosmopolitan youth activists. A 
related example is the film from May 2013 made by representatives of the Caucasian Forum from 
Turkey and also circulated via the May21.org YouTube channel as well as their website, Facebook 
site etc. (in Turkish with English subtitles).  
 
The number ‘21’ has become an icon - also a visual icon - of the Circassian revival (CR2), NART-
TV produced a 61-minute- long documentary entitled ‘21’ (with the subtitle “The Circassian tale of 
suffering and pain”) based on a dialogue with a Circassian researcher, interviewed in Circassian and 
Arabic (with subtitles in English).293 
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 By Ju ly 2013, the ‘May211864’ YouTube channel had been viewed more than 28,000 times. 
293
 Nart TV is a Circassian satellite TV station that began as a voluntary project in Jordan in 2007 but now also has 
branches in two Circassian republics in Russia. Its aim is to promote the use and preservation of the Circassian language 
and many of its broadcasts are in the Circassian language. 
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A significant number of short (and longer) videos on Circassian history and identity have been 
produced and circulated on YouTube by organisations as well as by individuals. These ge nerally 
rather simple vernacular film productions mostly reproduce visual representations of the Circassian 
exodus from the Caucasus in the nineteenth century - a large part of which are the same images that 
have achieved iconographic status in the Circassian revival. Many of these images had already been 
reproduced in books and other publications but with the arrival of the Internet - and not least the 
contemporary second-generation - these images have been digitalised, remediated and circulated to 
a much larger degree.294 YouTube video clips are also used to promote other cultural products such 
as the films ‘Cherkess’ (2010) and ‘Homeland’ (2013). The making of these films, could in both 
cases, be followed during the years of production, which generated an increased interest among the 
Circassian or Caucasian audience. This illustrates the potential interconnectedness of Web 2.0 and 
its usability as a tool in campaigning, which can have wider or different aims than just promoting a 
product such as a film. 
 
One of the strengths of the video as a media type is, according to Bonnie Nardi, its potential to 
generate affinity or “feelings of connection between peoples” and this can establish a form of social 
bonding (Lange 2009, 73).295  
 
According to Snickars, YouTube has become the world’s largest archive and we are still in the early 
phases of investigating how this will affect cultural memory in general (Snickars 2009, 293). The 
significant Circassian use of YouTube indicates, however, that this has become a significant 
platform for media productions and one that is regarded as important in order to reach the relevant 
audiences. Snickars refers to the archive as “a kind of guiding metaphor for the contemporary 
digital landscape”, which includes not just YouTube but also Flickr, Instagram and others (Snickars 
2009, 303). As stated by Lawrence Lessig, YouTube can be understood as a kind of “community 
space” - “a virtual place where people interact, share information or interests” (Snickars 2009, 309). 
Still, for instance, the NoSochi2014 YouTube videos and channels generate a number of hostile and 
xenophobic comments, some of which have been marked as ‘spam’.  
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 See appendix for examples of websites. 
295
 A classical example of YouTube-generated vernacular memorialisation are the videos commemorating deceased 
individuals, as also noted by Wahlberg (2009, 218).  
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Many of the above-mentioned YouTube videos represent what could be labelled YouTubian 
memorialisation, which is a relatively new genre that includes individual as well as collective 
remembrance produced on a vernacular basis on a low budget (see Chapter 5.1 of this thesis on May 
21, 1864). In the case of the Circassian vernacular YouTubian videos, they often consist mainly of 
nineteenth-century images such as still photos, paintings, maps, illustrations from books, museum 
items etc. that are filmed in different ways (e.g. zooming in on details) and then cut into a short 
film. When these videos are shown at commemorative events such as May 21st or at conferences - 
often accompanied by sad Circassian folk songs, often laments related to the exodus - it often leads 
to emotional responses from the audience. Whether this form of affective response also is taking 
place when audiences are alone in front of the computer screen is difficult to assess. Anyway, 
YouTubian memorialisation has become a significant cultural genre within the contemporary 
Circassian revival (CR2) and the number of ‘memory-entrepreneurs’, to use a term from James E. 
Young, has increased many times. 
 
A second example comes from the Circassian activists from New Jersey who use the term 
‘Facebook revolution’ in reference to the new modus operandi they have adopted since the arrival 
of Facebook.296 Here, new linking opportunities (‘likes’ or ‘friends’) - sometimes transnational, 
sometimes national or even local - are used by the activists to develop further relationships and 
exchange information and knowledge.297 This can function as a negotiation on how to define 
Circassian culture and identity that can be performed both openly and publicly, making it possible 
for others to participate, or can be performed just between two individuals. This is an example of a 
method that can be used to strengthen an understanding of the Circassian exile as genocide, and 
perhaps engage new cyber-activists who can continue these promotional efforts through the 
continued process of sharing within their networks. This process has been labelled a ‘thickening’ of 
networks (linking, developing dense networks, thickening networking) and can now become a 
strategy of Internet-based activism.298 
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 The young activists meet in the offices of the Circassian Cultural Institute (CCI) two or three times a week and 
perform these actions jointly - so the social offline face-to-face aspect still seems important and can be motivating fo r 
this type of activism. They have presented themselves on YouTube via the video “Behind the scenes at the Circassian 
Cultural Institute”. 
297
 CCI also has its own YouTube channel with 13 v ideos as of July 2013, most of which consist of hour-long filmed 
presentations by lecturers. 
298
 Valtysson has analysed whether Facebook “represents a colonizing mediatisation of the lifeworld” or whether it 
represents an ‘emancipation’ o r ‘empowerment’ as ‘d igital cultures’ or ‘networked publics’ can use Facebook to reach 
audiences and set agendas (Valtysson 2012).  
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Thirdly, the promotion of genocide recognition, which is a topic addressed in both of the two 
former examples of viral videos and the ‘Facebook revolution’. Archives have been researched, 
results digitalised and made available on websites such as circassian-genocide.info where, for 
instance, documents from Russian and Georgian archives are presented. 299 This is a process still in 
its early phases and much more archive material can be expected to be made available in the very 
near future, some of which is already available in books. Digitalised testimonies from various 
nineteenth-century sources are also published on the Circassian-genocide.info site including 
newspaper reports, Russian army reports, letters from Circassians etc.; these or similar testimonies 
are regularly circulated on the Internet in relation to May 21 events.  
 
Perhaps the most important aspect of these examples is how they show an increasing tendency 
towards linking (hyperlinking). Connectivity and spreadability, to use a term from Henry Jenkins 
(2009), play a significant part in all these examples.300 
 
 
Discussion: Digital Mediation 
 
The digital shift marked by the second generation Internet, signified especially by the interactive 
elements of social media such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, has resulted in a radically new 
use of the media - both in terms of form, content and utilization. According to Kraidy and Mourad, 
the emerging global media environment can best be understood as a transnational “hypermedia 
space”, which includes terms such as media convergence, remediation, cross-mediality, 
intermediality, hyperlinking, interactivity etc., whereby older forms of media can be combined with 
new ones in a number of different combinations (Kraidy and Mourad 2010, 1; Livingston 2009, 3; 
cross-mediacom.dk). This includes, for instance, “the move from photography to its digital 
recycling” (Huyssen 2000, 9). Kraidy and Mourad analysed the role of social media and mobile 
telephones in civil society actions and demonstrations in Lebanon in 2005 and in Iran in 2009 
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 For instance, the book ’The Circassian Genocide’ by the American historian Walter Richmond is already - partly at 
least - one of the results of the recently researched and digitalised archival documents. As stressed by Cohen and 
Rosenzweig, the ‘new digital history’ will provide space for both contemporary and historical voices - fo r instance 
minority voices - that otherwise would not have surfaced (Cohen and Rosenzweig 2006, 248). They outline seven 
qualities of dig ital media and network that could potentially improve the work of h istorians (Cohen and Rosenzweig 
2006, 3). 
300
 Jenkins has applied the notion of ‘gift economy’ to exp lain spreadability - especially in relation to Twitter 
(retweeting etc.). 
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which, in many ways, formed a prelude to the Arab Spring from early 2011.301 They concluded that: 
“Hypermedia space’s importance resides in the ways in which it combines mobility, interactivity 
and visibility. We can now glimpse the contours of a theory of hypermedia in which mobile 
activists interactively activate inter-media configurations that connect media old and new, gaining 
visibility for their cause through a hypermedia space that is less controllable than social space and 
therefore potentially subversive of the prevalent mode of governance.” (Kraidy and Mourad 2010, 
11). Kraidy and Mourad here point at some of the key reasons why further elaborations of 
‘hypermedia space’ are relevant to discuss in relation to digital capitalism. For instance, key issues 
of hypermedia space such as remediation and circulation in combination illustrate how digital 
media is particular relevant and useful for a process of mobilisation, where mediated 
memorialisation plays a key role (Himpele 2008, 15; van Dijck 2007, 49). 
 
Some argue that the new hypermedia space has ultimately not managed to affect the end results of 
actions but, on the other hand, some of the successful actions and events during the Arab Spring 
demonstrate that some results have been achieved (Kraidy and Mourad 2010, 15). Whatever the 
outcome - an empowerment and mobilisation of civil society actors has taken place. This is a type 
of empowerment that can be applied in different ways in years to come. The civil society actions of 
a peripherally located Caucasian minority group cannot, however, expect support from potential 
civil society partners in the central parts of Russia. Various human rights groups might support the 
rights of the Circassians but are generally fully employed in documenting various forms of human 
rights violations while simultaneously under pressure from the authorities. The Circassian scenario 
is therefore quite different from that of the countries of the Arab Spring, and the new potential for 
linking Circassians in the homeland and the diaspora may turn out to be a difficult balancing act, in 
which local Circassians could be accused by Russia of being disloyal citizens. 
 
Diaspora groups often constitute a specific interface within the contemporary discussions on 
mediation, and this is reflected in the term ‘digital diaspora’, which often entails new forms of 
community building. As a field of study, this has become a meeting point between migration and 
media studies, and has inspired parts of this thesis. (See below on the V.E.R.A.city loop model). 
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 Post-Soviet examples of similar processes of civil society mobilisation include, for instance, Moldova, April 2009 
and Russia, December 2011 (www.russiablog.org 17-04-2009). 
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Cyberspace can function as a space for identity negotiation which can be both qualitatively and 
quantitatively different from earlier forms of mediation. In relation to such negotiations, identity 
can be put into practise differently from in offline communities of, for instance, Circassian 
associations, where people tend to come for cultural activities such as dance lessons, to play a game 
of chess, to speak Circassian etc. (Brinkerhoff 2009, 57). This can lead to the establishment of 
cyber-communities: “The interactive components of the Internet enable the creation of cyber-
communities that connect dispersed populations and provide solidarity among members” 
(Brinkerhoff 2009, 14). This corresponds to the experiences of the sprawling Circassian Internet 
community, though it should be noted that this community is highly heterogeneous and consists of a 
number of sub-communities.302 Brinkerhoff further concludes on the potential functionalities that: 
“The Internet may be an essential repository of information about the homeland, providing 
opportunities to continuously educate subsequent diaspora generations, as well as more general 
publics” (Brinkerhoff 2009, 57).303 This is an illustration of why the Internet can potentially 
function as a powerful tool in relation to the processes of both memorialisation and mobilisation, 
which I investigate in relation to the ongoing Circassian reviva l process. It also illustrates one of the 
key differences between the phases of ‘electronic capitalism’ and ‘digital capitalism’.  
 
According to Jeff D. Hempele: “...Martin-Barbero argues that the ‘mediation’ of transnational 
media in circulation has meant an upsurge of new cultural identities and practises, the anthropology 
of media has elaborated on mediation as a fundamental constituent of social and cultural 
reproduction” (Himpele 2008, 11). The kind of ‘upsurge in new cultural identities and practices’ 
described by Jesus Martin-Barbero corresponds with the Circassian context - especially as mediated 
and unfolding on the Internet. Himpele has further concluded that the important role of media in 
relation to indigenous revival (Himpele, 199) 304 - is what he refers to as ‘techniques of 
empowerment’ (Himpele, 212). According to Himpele, the indigenous media producers in this 
process asserted control over the circulation of Indianness.305 This, in many ways, corresponds with 
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 For instance, the discussions in relation to a Facebook group or a YouTube video can be quite different from the 
more internal discussions on the forums of the websites of Circassian organisations.  
303
 More on the role of the ‘total archive’, the ‘repository of information’ and the ‘database character’ of the Internet in 
relation to the discussion of memorialisation later.  
304
 Also on how in Bolivia - through media, touris m etc. - the term ‘indigenous’ came to be connoted with the national 
past (Himpele 2008, 199).  
305
 Much of the Circassian revival is about recognition of Circassian history and identity as part of a larger 
Caucasianness. This can also be seen as a way of challenging the Caucasianness that Russia is build ing in relat ion to the 
Sochi Olympics where historical authenticity is promoted through the connections to historical Greece (through 
archaeological excavations, legend of Prometheus and Fisht Mountains (name of the Olympic stadium, where 
181 
 
Circassian experiences, although the degree of empowerment obviously differs in different 
Circassian contexts. Russia constitutes a complex federal context in which issues of domination, but 
also of competition and resistance, unfold. Still, the process of reproduction and circulation of 
Circassian indigenousness takes place on a number of different levels - especially on the Internet. In 
a Russian context, it is relevant to discuss the potential differences between state-supported 
mediation and sub-state level processes taking place in the North Caucasians republics, where 
actors such as the Circassian organisations and their representatives are facing different kinds of 
possibilities and barriers. 
 
One of the paradoxes of Internet use by diaspora and other forms of migrant groups is that, on the 
one hand, the world has witnessed an interlinked de-territorialisation through the Internet and 
electronic mass media that can float freely across state borders while, on the other, this de-
territorialised digital media can be used to perform acts of virtual re-territorialisation. 
 
Fred Turner states the following conclusion on the development of the Internet: “I conclude by 
arguing that Brand’s entrepreneurial tactics, and the now widespread association of computers and 
computer-mediated communication with the egalitarian social ideals of the counterculture, have 
become important features of an increasingly networked mode of living, working, and deploying 
social and cultural power” (Turner 2006, 9). Turner also quotes the Mondo 2000 magazine with the 
following statement: “Digital technologies had inherited the transformational mantle of the 
counterculture” (Turner 2006, 164).306  
 
According to an investigation by the BBC, by 2010 four out of five people worldwide regarded it as 
a fundamental human right to be able to access the Internet.307 People in from from Mexico, Brazil 
and Turkey particularly supported this statement.308 According to the General Secretary of the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), Hamadoun Toure: “The right to communicate 
cannot be ignored.” And he further underlines the fact that: “The Internet is potentially the most 
                                                                                                                                                                  
opening/closing ceremonies will take p lace)), and not through the local indigenous populations as in Vancouver and 
Sydney. 
306
 Turner also refers to cyberspace as an ‘electronic frontier’. 
307
 Politiken.dk (09-03-2010). 
308
 27,000 adults in 26 countries were questioned.  
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powerful source to enlightenment ever created”.309 Toure further states that governments around the 
world should view the Internet as a fundamental part of infrastructure similar to roads and water.310  
 
The tendencies outlined above underline the relevance of discussing the four main elements of 
Maximillian Forte’s analytical model on Internet-mediated indigenous revival, the so-called 
V.E.R.A.city loop, which I find relevant to include in the discussion of the Circassian case. 
‘V.E.R.A.’ stands for visibility, embodiment, recognition and authenticity - these four themes are 
linked in a continuous loop-function as new material is constantly produced and presented on the 
Internet. A loop of processes whereby “online visibility [is] helping to virtually embody groups who 
might not otherwise be noticed or distinguished and who - given this virtualized visibility and 
embodiment - subsequently gain recognition from prospective allies and brokers. Depending upon 
the reputation of one’s ally, the fact of being recognised itself adds authenticity to a particular, 
previously under-recognised group’s claims” to ’real indigeneity’ (Forte 2006, 146).              
 
The role of visibility must be said to be obvious, as also illustrated by the many references in this 
and other chapters (see appendix). Visualisation does not just include images and films but also all 
sorts of written documents from historical archives and other written texts. This visualisation also 
represents a virtual embodiment of Circassianness (Circassian history and identity): “The Internet 
also helps to embody groups facing difficulties in gaining offline acceptance as ‘indigenous’” (Forte 
2006, 146). Thirdly, recognition, as also stressed by Linda T. Smith, who states that ‘recovery’ (of 
territories; indigenous rights; and histories) is also subject “to recognition that indigenous cultures 
have changed inexorably” (Smith 1999, 116). It is this kind of recognition that the Circassian 
activists are advocating for and that the increasing amount of historical and cultural documentation 
on the Internet helps to generate. Upon visiting a number of Circassian places around the world, 
interviewing and reading (including on the Internet), it is my conclusion that ‘recognition’ is the one 
word or term that most clearly encompasses the aims of the diverse Circassian revival(s). Fourthly, 
this recognition contributes to providing “further authority and authenticity to any given group in its 
respective offline context(s)” (Forte 2006, 146).311 Forte argues that it is through this process that 
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 Politiken.dk (09-03-2010). 
310
 The survey also included criticism of various kinds, including the possibilities for presenting violent content, for 
becoming a new field of criminal activity, for government censorship etc.    
311
 Authenticity as fundamental to creating and sustaining a brand: for instance, regional or national belonging. Or, on a 
different level: cheese production in Circassian parts of the North Caucasus as demonstrated to  tourists and then sold. 
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the V.E.R.A.city of “indigeneity is sought and attained by electronic means of promotion” (Forte 
2006, 146). 
 
As indicated on several occasions, the Circassian revival is not just virtual or only unfolding in 
cyberspace. Offline civil society initiatives have, to a very large extent, been initiating and driving 
the Circassian revival process forward. However, the arrival of the Internet, which has been a 
gradual and slow process in many areas of Circassian residence, has offered a new dimension to the 
revival, as it has extended and accelerated this process.312 
 
The high number of Circassian websites marks a significant change in a process of mediated 
Circassian revival that, in a Russian context, began in the 1990s in the North Caucasian republics 
through other media forms. Many Internet sites now represent a counter-narrative or resistance to 
the official Russian version of history, and share similarities with post-colonial actions and protests 
in other post- imperial settings. As noted in the Black Book of Colonialism, the Russian Federation 
of today constitutes a surprising imperial successor state, one that does not accept or recognise its 
former status (Ferro 2005). The Internet has become a space in which such inconsistencies can be 
pointed at, discussed and posibly used in a campaign for alternative versions based on 
documentation, as seen in the case of the Circassian revival. This type of mediated resistance has 
regularly been analysed within literature, media and cultural studies, although often with a focus on 
‘high culture’ as also illustrated by, for instance, Edward Said. The ongoing mediated and 
remediated Circassian revival illustrates the use of a variety of media tools to conduct what could, 
perhaps, be labelled a vernacular (post-)colonial encounter. In conducting these kinds of call for a 
reassessment of the history of the Russian Empire, the Circassians are part of a trend found among 
several of the peoples of the Caucasus as well as several of the countries of the former Soviet 
Union. 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In conclusion, then, there is a need to update the term ‘electronic capitalism’ to ‘digital capitalism’ - 
or ‘digital mediation’ - in order to encompass the increasingly widespread, fast and accessible 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Authenticity is in the combination between marketing and regional b randing thought to be the decisive element. 
Regional b randing can include an element of counter-branding vis-à-vis the dominant nation branding. 
312
 Until the mid-2000s Circassian civil society was largely dominated by cultural associations and primarily focussed 
on cultural or folklo ristic issues. The wars in Abkhazia and Chechnya in the 1990s marked an in itial mobilisation 
among Circassians in Turkey. Another significant precursor to the present revival was the establishment of Caucasian 
foundations which, due to an option in Turkish legislation for establishing philanthropic foundations, had been involved 
since the 1950s in preserving and collecting Circassian archival material, thereby establishing important and unique 
book collections.  
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Internet, with its increased interactive functions and social media such as Facebook, YouTube and 
Twitter. In addition, the increased role of mobile communication units and the database nature of 
the Internet signifies a fundamental difference vis-à-vis other forms of media. The products of both 
electronic and digital capitalism are often highly visual. Websites are visual and visualisation plays 
a key role.313 As noted by Schaefer, there is an “extensive representational power of the online 
universe” (Schaefer 2006, 213). This element of visualisation that is so prominent on Circassian 
websites also illustrates the importance attributed to authenticity and recognition through the 
presentation of different forms of historical documentation, especially from the nineteenth 
century.314 It should be noted that this includes not only the sources sympathetic to the Circassians 
in the nineteenth century but also other voices, including those who believed in the brutal 
implementation of an enforced civilising mission (‘they may have died in the process but we have 
built new roads...’). This includes, for instance, the memoirs of Russian army officers, some of 
whom express their pride in winning the war through extreme methods. These today function to 
enhance the understanding of a highly unjust colonisation that could be labelled as an attempt at 
genocide. 
 
The most important features of digital capitalism or mediation compared to earlier forms of 
publishing can be summed up as: the arrival of the social media of Web 2.0, the database nature, the 
hypermedia character, the hyperlinking options, the interactive features of social media, the low-
cost production options, the arrival of new and cheaper mobile user and producer units. Jointly, all 
of this signifies the increased diversity of media, mediation and remediation that constitutes the 
strongly mediated Circassian post-2005 revival (CR2). 
 
It could be argued that iCircassia has become a significant part of the Circassian World, often 
referred to among Circassians as consisting of fifty places (or spaces) of residence around the 
world. However, iCircassia cannot merely be labelled the fifty-first Circassian place. It could be 
argued that the Circassian World no longer consists of simply the sum of the homeland and the 
diaspora Circassians but today also includes iCircassia - in spite of the fact that all the netizens of 
iCircassia belong to the two former categories as well. What makes iCircassia a new and 
independent addition to the Circassian World is that this is not just a medium of communication but 
simultaneously a network of links between different Circassian offline places that might otherwise 
not have been connected. It is also a large repository of knowledge which, through digitalisation, 
has become available to Circassians around the world as well as to everybody else. All of this 
digitalised knowledge is not only available but also shared, used, discussed and reproduced through 
the aforementioned features of linking and communicating. All in all, iCircassia is more than just a 
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 See Appendix for examples: Maps, Drawings/Paintings, Documents 
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global network - it is also a social network with large databases of knowledge attached, much of 
which is not otherwise available to offline Circassians (and others) and which is regularly being 
brought to use in the ongoing Circassian revival. This illustrates how the Internet can function as an 
integrating medium for both mobilisation and memorialisation.  
 
The Internet has become a space for the reproduction of cultural traditions and history - 
representations of Circassian culture - that is also a tool that can reach out to large audiences, 
including beyond the Caucasus, to other Caucasians or to the Circassians that reside as 
geographically dispersed groups in many different states around the world.  
 
Circassia and the Circassians were recorded in many of the initial printed representations of the 
Russian nation and empire in the mid-nineteenth century as a wild frontier region in need of 
civilisation by an expanding modern European empire. The competition with Great Britain, 
however, generated competing printed representations of Circassia in the West - albeit still in an 
Orientalist manner. These representations described a nation with a number of prerequisites for 
becoming a modern nation-state. These competing versions of Circassian history are now presented 
as documentation, recycled and reproduced on the Internet in a number of different forms. 
 
The Internet is an arena for the return of geography (Hooson 1994, 134), for the return of history 
(Henze and Enders Wimbush), for contested spaces (Smith 1999, 50) and for contested histories 
(Smith 1999, 33) - all post-1991 statements that are of relevance to the situation in homeland 
Circassia in the North Caucasus as well as the diaspora. And relevant too for virtual Circassia, as 
found on the Internet today. Scattered and dissimilar, but with a number of key elements jointly 
constituting a virtual territorial identity.  
 
‘iCircassia’ is represented by a strongly increased p resentation of extremely visible elements of a 
thus far often more uncertain or distant homeland. Suddenly there is an archive, a museum, a library 
- always available, always open, always accessible – and, perhaps most importantly, constantly 
made relevant by the news items regularly posted on the front page. How all of these efforts will 
affect the future production and reproduction of Circassian identity remains to be seen, although the 
distance between the homeland and diaspora Circassians appears to be slowly diminishing. 
 
The Internet has increased Circassian visibility through a combination of different forms of media 
(electronic, digital, texts, images, films etc.), including interactive options for (transnational) 
communication. Jointly, all these new forms of media, with easier access for both users and 
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producers compared to previously, could be labelled as a new - and additional - language of 
nationhood for the Circassians.315  
  
“Virtual nations are patterned on existing national, yet with different modes of interaction and 
representation” (Schaefer 2006). ‘iCircassia’ is an imagined community that contain a number of 
the same features that most modern nations and ethnic groups - in spite of diverging power 
implications - and ‘iCircassia’ still is a relatively new accomplishment of transnational endeavours 
among the geographically scattered Circassians. Precisely how ‘iCircassia’ should be represented is 
a constantly ongoing discussion and a dynamic process including an ever increasing number of 
people. 
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Chapter  7    
 
The role of ‘1864’ and ‘May 21’  
in the Contemporary Circassian Revival  
 
The year 1864 plays a key role in the ongoing Circassian revival as a symbolic representation of the 
forced exile from the Caucasus that a number of Circassian actors, since 2005, have attempted to 
get recognised as an act of genocide.316 The year 1864 also plays a key role in relation to another 
issue that has generated increased Circassian mobilisation, namely the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics 
that will take place in the historical homeland of the Circassians in the year when they mark the 
150th anniversary of the forced exile. Both of these recent examples of the use of 1864 as a symbol 
of the Circassian forced exile or genocide can be seen as an extension of the increasingly 
‘institutionalised’ use of the year 1864 as a central part of the annual May 21 commemoration 
events that have steadily gained support since the fall of the Soviet Union. 317 This day is now 
commemorated in many Circassian spaces around the world with an increasing number of 
participants, and this is further enhanced through the use of the Internet. This has played a role in 
engaging an increasing number of young people in the Circassian revival. I argue that, in this 
process, ‘May 21, 1864’ has increasingly been seen as the defining moment in Circassian history 
and identity.318 
 
In 1864, May 21 was the day when the Russian Empire celebrated its victory over Circassians with 
army parades at the location of the final victory in the Kbaada valley, where toda y’s Krasnaya 
Polyana is located; this was marked by the issuing of medals of honour. The victory parades and 
medals were a marking of the final Russian conquest of the Caucasus, which had involved hundreds 
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 The init ial version of this chapter was a conference paper on the role of ’1864’ in the history of the Caucasus 
(Istanbul, December 2010). 
317
 See Appendix for visual representations. 
318
 A strong tradition of war memorialisation was institutionalised during the Soviet  period, when the historical truth 
was dictated by the leadership only. This has resulted in a variety of - often conflicting - d iscourses on the history of the 
20
th
 century in the post-Soviet states. In Russia, history has become part of the routine of the ru ling political party, 
United Russia, as they place a high number of memorial p lates on houses where heroes of the Second World War lived. 
Simultaneously, most of Europe has also experienced a memory boom since the First World War – a war that resulted 
in more than 60,000 monuments in Britain and France alone.  
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of thousands of officers and soldiers, many losing their lives in the Caucasus.319 The war had taken 
much longer and had required far greater losses than anticipated, and this had angered both the Tsar 
and the generals, though the losses among the Circassians and the other indigenous peoples were 
comparatively much greater. This kind of celebration was repeated in 1914 on the 50th anniversary 
but, since then, the commemoration of this date has apparently switched towards the victims, such 
as the Circassians, Abkhazians etc.320 In the words of Circassian author Amjad Jaimoukha in stark 
contrast to the 1914 celebrations “the luckless Circassians had to wait 76 more years to observe the 
bleak day” (Jaimoukha 2001, 70).  
  
The role of Sochi as a symbol - or a site of memory - of the lost Circassian homeland is based on 
the location here of the last Circassian parliament of rest-Circassia, which was established in 1861 
with the main purpose of reorganising the armed Circassian resistance. This last version of 
Circassia in the nineteenth century consisted of the last three Circassian tribes along the Black Sea 
coast and lasted until 1864 (Jaimoukha 2001, 67).321 This is an example of knowledge that had long 
been lost to many Circassians, perhaps especially among the diaspora, but which now functions as 
eye-opening understanding with a strong potential for mobilisation that can easily be circulated to 
others through the Internet.322 This is partly why the 2014 Sochi Olympics have managed to 
generate so much new activity among the Circassians - as exemplified particularly by the Circassian 
organisations and Internet-based initiatives. 
 
Various forms of commemoration that included a key role for the year 1864 and the date May 21 
had already begun among the Circassians in the North Caucasus during the late Perestroika years of 
the final period of the Soviet Union (Derluguian 2005). This materialised, for instance, in the form 
of the publication of new books on the forced exile of the Circassians, including the translation of 
books that had never been hitherto published or distributed. New organisations were established and 
also began to publicly promote an understanding of the forced exile of the Circassians that had not 
been possible before - including the use of a new term: the Circassian Genocide. Perhaps more than 
                                                 
319
 Such as, for instance, the monument to Tsarina Katharina in Krasnodar and in other towns, which are used by 
Cossacks for annual commemorations. This includes monuments to General Yermolov and oth ers in the regions of 
Krasnodar or Stavropol. 
320
 As an alternative to ’May 21, 1864’ Russia has officially chosen to focus on 1557 as the year of voluntary unification 
between the Circassians and Russia, which was celebrated widely in Russia in 2007.   
321
 This included sending a delegation to Britain to seek support, which did not materialise in spite of ”public 
enthusiasm” (Jaimoukha 2001, 67).  
322
 As stated by a youth activist from New Jersey in a promotional (viral) video in relation to May 21 event: “Read,  
read, read”. 
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anything else, this process of beginning to assign May 21 as the joint Circassian day of mourning 
has promoted an understanding of 1864 as the key year in modern Circassian identity - as the 
defining moment (Huttenbach 1995, 673).323 This was the beginning of a process of gradually 
institutionalising May 21 as the most significant annual event among Circassians worldwide and a 
priority issue among many Circassian and Caucasian organisations - in the Caucasus as well as in 
many diaspora countries.324 In a post-Soviet understanding, the tradition began in Nalchik in 
Kabardino-Balkaria as a response to the launch of a joint Balkar Day of Mourning in March 
1990.325 A year later, on May 21, a large international Circassian congress was held in Nalchik at 
which what later became the International Circassian Association was established. One of the key 
individuals in the Circassian movement, Professor Yuri Shanibov (Musa Shanib326) from Nalchik, 
refers to this meeting in 1991 as the most significant of all May 21’s: “This was a glorious and 
joyful event, when Circassians who were born and grew up in different countries of the world 
embraced one another as brothers with tears in their eyes”. 327 
 
Some of the inspiration came from similar processes among Armenians, where 1915 (and genocide) 
became the defining moment in a process partly driven by diaspora elites. Shared conditions: both 
tragedies took place in the imperial borderland between Russia and the Ottoman Empire; both have 
large and dispersed exiled groups (though the European location of more Armenians appear to have 
increased their politicisation); shared experiences of totalitarian or authoritarian regimes during the 
20th century (where both states authorized ideologically motivated (though sometimes shifting) 
history writing that significantly restricted the rights of ethnic minorities). When Armenia became 
an independent nation-state in 1991 this defining moment was formally recognised and 
commemorated in different ways as a state-endorsed issue.328 
 
Among the diaspora in Turkey and other diaspora countries, May 21 has also increasingly become 
an annual day of mourning, marked in different ways with ceremonies and gatherings, sometimes 
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 The potential power of a ’genocide recognition agenda’ is apparent  from the statements of Tony Kushner (and 
others) that the Holocaust constitutes the defining moment of the 20th century (Kushner 2004, 254).  
324
 Yuri Shanibov refers to ’Clarion - May 21 1961’ as the beginning of the tradition (CircassianWorld.com May 2009).  
325
 This took place as part of the generally accelerated processes of ethno-national resistance to Soviet power during the 
late Perestroika period. This type of pattern of action-reaction became typical of the period - as seen, for instance, in 
relation to the mobilisation of Balkars and Kabard ians in the Republic of Kabardino -Balkaria. 
326
 The Circassian version of his name. Shanibov is the Russianised version. 
327
 CircassianWorld.com (May 2009). Shanibov has been the subject of an interesting - and somewhat patronising - 
book entitled “Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus” by Georg i M. Derluguian.  
328
 The role o f the Circassians in the Armenian genocide is a different matter.  The Circassians were geostrategically 
located by the Ottoman authorities as a form of buffer v is -a-vis the Armenian areas in central Anatolia.  
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including conferences and other forms of information and knowledge dissemination. For a number 
of years, the most significant Circassian commemorative event in Turkey was held at the Kefken 
caves on the Black Sea coast, not far from Istanbul, which was one of the first places Circassians 
found refuge when they arrived in 1864. These annual events, organised on a national level by 
Kaffed, the Federation of Caucasian Associations in Turkey, managed to attract an increasing 
number of people for an emotional ceremony consisting of a long row of hundreds of people 
holding torches as the sun set (Bullough 2010, 31). The popularity of this event was also due to the 
spectacular location and the beauty of the flaming torches, which contributed to making the event 
an emotional experience. When this annual event was cancelled from 2011 on, it was officially due 
to the security risks as the event had become so popular that it was diff icult to find space for all 
participants along the rocky and steep coastline. Others have stated that this change was due to the 
fact that Istanbul had become the key scene of May 21 events in more recent years.329 The youth 
activists centred around the Caucasian Forum in Istanbul previously used to go to the caves in 
Kefken a day before the official Kaffed event and spend the night in the caves. Representatives 
from the Caucasian Forum began to challenge the way May 21 events were usually conducted 
through solemn commemoration ceremonies held at specific places of importance to Circassian 
history. They organised demonstrations in the centre of a key city (Istanbul), addressing the Russian 
authorities with statements read publicly in front of the Russian consulate. These demonstrations 
have since become very popular and have been supported by an increasing number of organisations 
in recent years.330 
 
In the renewed Circassian revival that has unfolded since 2005 with the arrival of a number of new 
organisations, ‘the tragedy of 1864’ is being used as part of a campaign for recognition of the forced 
exile as an act of genocide - as illustrated by, for instance, the Caucasus Forum (see Chapter 3). 
This has marked a new type of politicisation of the Circassian movement whereby ‘1864’ is now 
                                                 
329
 Istanbul has, in several ways, become a space of competing Circassian memorialisation, though especially among  the 
post-2005 generation, such as when Cherkessia (Cherkessia.net) organised its own event in 2012. Otherwise, it could be 
argued that the two large events - the demonstration and the ceremonial event - largely supplement each other. In 2013, 
the Kaffed-organised annual all-Turkish event took place at Samsun by the Black Sea.  
330
 Based on my part icipation in various May 21 events in Istanbul in 2009 and 2011, supplemented with interviews and 
conversations with organisers. Beyond the Kefken caves, the Besiktas district of Istanbul is significant as the first place 
where Circassians landed in Istanbul in the nineteenth century. This is where the Kaffed -organised events in Istanbul 
have taken place for a number o f years - often organised, for instance, one day after the ceremonies at the caves in 
Kefken. The ceremonies at the Besiktas harbourside also include traditional songs and music, reciting of poems, the 
showing of visual representations from the nineteenth century on a large screen and, finally, just as th e sun sets, one big 
wreath marking the year 1864 is thrown into the water by representatives dressed in classical Circassian dress from the 
nineteenth century followed by hundreds of red flowers – one for each person. 
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used to highlight and seek recognition of the Circassian genocide from the Russian parliament and 
others. The new organisations have challenged the older ones, whom they accuse of being too 
culturally oriented and of not being willing to confront the Russian authorities. This has also 
challenged the way in which May 21 events have traditionally targeted the Circassians internally 
during commemorative ceremonies with the use of slogans such as ‘we did not forget’ or ‘we will 
not forget’, as represented by, for instance, Kaffed in Turkey. 331  
 
Since 2011, a large number of the May 21 events - mainly public demonstrations and other forms of 
protest have been coordinated transnationally through the may21.org website, where activists from 
the Caucasian Forum have played a key role. This clearly illustrates the increased 
internationalisation of the Circassian movement and also exemplifies how youth activism and use of 
the Internet have become central elements in the renewed Circassian movement. The slogans used 
include, for instance, “Circassian Genocide - Memorial Day”, “No Sochi Olympics on the Land of 
Genocide” and “Forever Remember the Circassian Genocide”. 332Activists from New Jersey (mostly 
part of the Circassian Cultural Institute) have played a key role in developing a design that could be 
downloaded, printed out and used in several different places on different continents. This could be 
seen at demonstrations in an increasing number of cities around the world, as support for these 
events has gradually grown.333 In 2012, several thousand joined the perhaps largest 
Circassian/Caucasian demonstrations in Turkey on the main pedestrian shopping street in Istanbul, 
Istiklar, ending in front of the Russian consulate. 334 Youth groups from Circassian associations that 
normally used to take part in the Kaffed-organised events, in 2012 chose also to take part in this 
demonstration, which marked a bridging of the two major Istanbul-based events that take place at 
different times, making this possible. This is an example of the increased unity of the Circassian 
movement - especially on the issues of genocide recognition and protests against the Sochi 
Olympics but also on the wider priority of promoting Circassian visibility and recognition in 
general.335 
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 Kafkasfederasyonu.org; 21mayis.org. The latter is an example of a new init iative from Kaffed since 2011.  
332
 Other slogans used at various Circassian demonstrations in recent years include: “Sochi 2014 - The Hidden 
Genocide”, “Slaughter of Circassian Heritage and Identity”, ”Putin - Don’t build your credib ility on Circassian 
Genocide”. Most of these were distributed from the May21.org and NoSochi2014 - some used ready-made designs 
while others made their own posters and banners. 
333
 One example on how reports from events are shared on various Internet sites is Nosochi2014.com/news/circassians -
on-worldstreets.php. 
334
 Nosochi2014.com/news/circassians-march-for-recognition-of-genocide.php. 
335
 A spill-over effect had already taken place when, for instance, chants of ’Free Caucasus’, ’Free Circassia’ and  
‘Recognise the Circassian Genocide’ began to spread a few years earlier to the Kaffed -youth during May 21 events, as 
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‘1864’ has been used extensively in slogans and posters in connection with the May 21 events 
around the world in the last five years - as can be witnessed from a number of Circassian and 
Caucasian websites. The digits ‘1864’ are found twice on the formal emblem of the May 21 day of 
mourning, an emblem based on a Circassian national costume - the Cherkeska - on which the 
Circassian Flag can also be found (Jaimoukha 2001, 69). 336 ‘1864’ was the main headline on the 
posters placed all over Istanbul advertising the public May 21 event arranged by Cherkessia.net in 
Istanbul in 2012.337 Many examples of the Circassian representation of 1864 as part of 
rememorialisation and re- identification processes can be found on YouTube.338 The production of 
viral videos has become part of the Circassian revival - both as produced by organisations as part of 
their ongoing promotion of Circassian issues, for example in relation to the commemorative 
ceremonial routines of the annual May 21 event, and as produced by a number of individual 
Circassians.339 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 6 (‘iCircassia’) the Circassian presence and visibility on the Internet has 
virtually exploded - a situation that has further increased with the arrival and spread of the social 
media of Web 2.0. The new media situation has certain parallels with the situation in the nineteenth 
century, when mass media in the form of newspapers and illustrated journals published in different 
languages in different countries managed for the first time to reach out to new potentially large 
public audiences340 - to which information about the Circassians and the war between Russia and 
the Circassians was delivered.341 This is the period that Benedict Anderson, in his influential book 
                                                                                                                                                                  
this was not part of the official Kaffed and Kafder slogans. This is an illustration of how youth groups and individuals 
managed to push for an increased level of politicisation among the overall Circassian movement. 
336
 See appendix for illustrations. For instance, Circassian/Caucasian football club in Istanbul is called ‘FK 1864’.  
337
 This was a third - s maller and competing - May 21 event in Istanbul in 2012 by an organisation focussing on a more 
‘ethnic’ and ‘patriotic’ understanding of Circassian identity. The two other events generally include other Caucasian 
peoples in Turkey as has been the tradition in the country, although Kaffed /Kafder have been accused of increasingly 
focussing on ‘ethnicity’. 
338
 Many Circassian videos include ‘1864’ or ‘May 21’ in the title , many of which documents various annual 
commemoration events from recent years. A documentary produced by Nart TV in 2011 is simp ly called ‘21’ 
(youtube.com). 
339
 When presented on, for instance, YouTube they are often also presented and accessible via Facebook or other 
websites. This type of viral v ideo frequently generates comments and debates that can become emotional, angry etc. a nd 
which, from time to time, leads to the removal of comments as spam by the editors. 
340
 The (mid-)n ineteenth century was marked by the spread of newspapers and journals - especially in many European 
countries which, for the first time, reached a public audience undergoing a transition to increasingly become an 
important part of the sphere of politics, which also gradually underwent different degrees of democratic t ransition…  
341
 Another significant feature of the nineteenth century was the establishment of civ il society organisations that wished 
to address political issues - the anti-slavery efforts are a well-known example (italso included Circassian aspects due to 
the Circassian women who were still being sold in markets in Constantinople and popular in the harems of the Ottoman 
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‘Imagined Communities’ from 1983, has labelled the era of ‘print capitalism’. The break-up of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in the publication of a number of new books, journals, newspaper 
articles etc. on Circassian issues - often presented or written by Circassians - especially within the 
three Circassian republics in the North Caucasus and among some of the diaspora countries. This 
could be seen as a return to the period of ‘print capitalism’ experienced in the nineteenth century - 
with obvious changes in both form and content. As discussed in the chapter on iCircassia, during 
the 1990s this was mainly in the form of newspapers, books and local television - sometimes 
published by new Circassian organisations. The increased role of the electronic media during the 
1990s led Arjun Appadurai (among others) to coin the phrase ‘electronic capitalism’ as an update of 
Anderson’s term. With the arrival of the second-generation websites, including the so-called Web 
2.0 within the last ten years, the number of media producers, the number of media products and the 
number of media consumers has increased significantly.342 This is both qualitatively and 
quantitatively a new development that can be labelled ‘digital capitalism’, characterised in 
particular by the increased access to produce content (and comments/dialogue on/with others), 
instant possibilities of remediation, and significant new possibilities for interaction with mobile 
communication units such as mobile phones, tablets etc.  
 
Representations of Circassian culture and history embody a significant part of the new Circassian 
websites - often in the form of reproductions of texts and illustrations (including historical maps) 
from the nineteenth century.343 These representations clearly have a key position in the ongoing 
Circassian revival as it has unfolded on the Internet over the last couple of years. A certain number 
of these representations have achieved iconographic status - and they are used and recycled again 
and again on different websites.344 Both ‘1864’ and ‘May 21’ also constitute visual representations 
of Circassian culture and identity and have, as such, achieved iconographic status in the Circassian 
revival. Since this process of constant remediation is still relatively new and Circassians in some 
countries have arrived rather late to the Internet, new representations - including those from various 
archives - can be expected to continue to surface from time to time and further strengthen the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Empire and beyond). Circassian support committees were established at the time in, for instance, Great Britain, France 
and Ottoman Turkey, and public meet ings in support of the Circassian cause managed to attract spectators in many 
cities, covered by the media.  
342
 ’Hidden histories’ has a strong potential for mobilisation among digital d iasporas, as mentioned elsewhere.  
343
 See Appendix for a Russian map of the final conquest in 1864, including names of generals and red arrows showing 
their encirclement of the remain ing Circassian fighters. This map is widely circulated on the Internet by Circassians, for 
instance in viral videos and as an avatar. 
344
 See Appendix. 
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process of revival. This might include further texts and communicative action in additional 
languages. The publication of historical documents and images is not only enhancing the visibility 
of the Circassians but also functions as a way of documenting a Circassian past - and thereby also 
functioning as a way of establishing the legitimacy of a Circassian ‘today’ and a Circas sian 
‘tomorrow’. Some of the nineteenth-century representations are used to state not just that ‘we were 
there’ and ‘we were unjustly treated’ but also to illustrate a Circassian nation-building project that 
included actions and the formulation of intentions to establish a independent Circassian (nation-
)state. 
 
One characteristic of a digital diaspora is the new possibilities for creating and presenting counter-
narratives in relation to the dominant versions they experience, as imposed upon them by the 
present rulers of their historical homeland. Russian history writing, in particular, as represented by 
the official authorities in relation to, for instance, the Sochi Olympics and the celebration of a 
highly questionable voluntary union between Russia and the Circassians in 2007, is used in the 
internal Circassian mobilisation process. And it is countered at demonstrations, in Internet protests 
etc. as well as through involvement in archive-based documentation and publication.  
 
One example of contemporary Circassian counter-narrative is the use of nineteenth-century medals 
given to participants in the Imperial Russian army for service during the war - often with the year 
1864 engraved on them. On a poster from the NoSochi campaign, one of these medals from 1864 is 
used with reference to Olympic medals under the headline: “THIS IS AN OLYMPIC MEDAL”. In 
smaller letters, it explains: “They are medals given by the Russian government to the soldiers who 
committed the genocide against the Circassians after the conquest of Sochi”.345 These images are 
used on posters at demonstrations, on the NoSochi and other Circassian and Caucasian websites, 
and, for instance, in the magazine Isthmus, which is also used as part of a touring exhibition.346 This 
recycling by countless websites shows how easily a Web 2.0 remediation process can unfold and 
spread the message or opinion in question.347 
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 Nosochi2014.com/press-release/blog.php.
 
346
 Isthmus magazine is produced and published by the Circassian Cultural Institute, New Jersey. For examples of the 
magazine see: jantybasha.org/cat=81.  
347
 The 1864 medals can today be found in different museums in the reg ion as well as in the national history museum in 
Moscow. Digitalised images of the medals are used by many Circassian websites as part of their representation of the 
forced exile, some of which use them as part of the reframing of a Circassian narrative on the forced exile as an act of 
genocide. 
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Another example from the Circassian revival is the use of Krasnaya Polyana, the place where the 
downhill skiing competitions will take place during the Sochi Winter Olympics - in Russian 
Krasnaya Polyana can be translated as ‘red’ or ‘beautiful’ meadow.348 The use of the colour red is 
often referred among Circassians as originating from the amount of blood spilled at this place in the 
final phase of the war. The appointed winner of the anti-mascot competition organised by the 
NoSochi2014 campaign showed a skier skiing down a blood-red mountain.349 In most of the 
Russian tourist guide-book of the area, the name is translated as ‘Beautiful Meadow’, which 
perhaps is not so discomfiting for the tourists, who are mostly ethnic Russians. 
 
Another poster/page from Isthmus, ‘May 21, 1864’ graphically illustrates the potential 
contemporary population of Circassia, had the war in the nineteenth century not ended in the victory 
of the Russian Empire - May 21 1864 marks the demographic breaking point: presented as 20 
million instead of the 2 to 6 million scattered around the globe today.350 
 
According to a model for analysing indigenous peoples revival through the use of the Internet, 
developed by the anthropologist Maximillian Forte (already presented elsewhere), the key issues 
that need to be focused on are visibility, embodiment, recognition and authenticity. These four 
issues all constitute key elements of the ongoing Circassian mobilisation. After visiting and 
interviewing a number of representatives of Circassian organisations - especially among the 
diaspora - I find that ‘recognition’ can particularly be used to characterise the Circassian revival. 
Recognition of not just the Circassian genocide but a wider recognition on a number of different 
levels as a contemporary people of the Caucasus, as well as an historical people of the Caucasus, in 
the history books of the world. Not least in Russia, where the Circassian homeland is today located.  
 
The use of ‘May 21, 1864’ in the Circassian revival on the Internet is generally part of a story of 
war and genocide, both of which can be found in highly discernible genres of cultural production 
such as novels, films, documentaries, cartoons, games (board and computer versions) etc. With the 
explosive development of Web 2.0, an additional production of, for instance, videos have widened 
the circle of producers to include a strong vernacular element. A certain number of illus trations of 
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 As in the case of Red Square in Moscow. Richmond (2013, 2) also refers to blood as the origin of the name.  
349
 Nosochi2014.com/press-release/blog.php. 
350
 For example Isthmus magazine see: jantybasha.org/cat=81.  
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the nineteenth-century war are repeatedly used by the Circassian websites and in their viral 
videos.351 The fascination of war in general is, in the Circassian case, a combination of pride in the 
military skills and achievement of their forefathers, and sadness and anger at the tragedy of forced 
exile (and the lack of Russian recognition thereof). 
 
In general, an assessment of the use of cultural memory in the transnational revival of the 
Circassians must also be seen within a wider context of developing new national or ethnic 
narratives after the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union from 1989 to 
1991. Just as Western Europe and large parts of the rest of the world went through similar phases in 
the second part of the 20th century, when decolonisation processes led to the establishment of a 
number of new nation-states - and new minority groups were created. This also hints at the potential 
relevance of the field of post-colonial studies or the overlapping cultural studies when analysing the 
mediated output of the Circassian websites.  
 
The Circassians’ renaming of the war as ‘the Russian-Circassian War 1763-1864’ can be seen as an 
attempt at challenging official Russia’s rather lacklustre relationship with its imperial past. Since 
‘claiming by naming’ is a regular feature of colonisation, it is no surprise that ‘reclaiming by 
renaming’ is a part of the efforts of decolonisation (Day 2008, 49). Ashplant, Dawson and Roper 
have also stressed the importance of the politics of naming in relation to war remembrance: naming 
wars, which is usually a nation-state undertaking, is also a way of framing memories (Ashplant, 
Dawson and Roper 2009, 53). Renaming (and reperiodising) appears to be one of those key issues 
around which the mobilisation of the ongoing Circassian revival has produced a new consensus, 
alongside the issues of genocide recognition and protesting against the Sochi 2014 Olympic Games.  
 
The issue of the naming of the war has caused discussions on Wikipedia (including in the 
Wikipedia-subgroup on ‘Military History’) and it has been suggested to name the war(s) the Russo-
Circassian Wars (as Russian-Circassian Wars would be poor English). This would be more correct 
as 101 years of continuous war was never the case. But then a new problem arises: the official 
period of ‘The Caucasian War’ was also not 47 year of continuous warfare. 352 Anyway, the 
Wikipedia discussions illustrate how new digital spaces have developed.  
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 See Appendix. 
352
 The article in German is much longer that the English language version.  
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Conclusion 
 
The date of ‘May 21, 1864’ was quickly established as a key element - the defining moment - of 
post-Soviet Circassian identity immediately after 1991. This understanding has, in the years since, 
been steadily enforced and further institutionalised within Circassian communities around the world 
in a multitude of ways. This process of institutionalisation has increased significantly during the 
ongoing second Circassian revival, in which the social media of Web 2.0 play a substantial role. It 
has become the foundation on which the Circassian revival has since gathered pace within the more 
recent issues of ‘genocide recognition’ and the ‘2014 Sochi Olympics’. The ‘when’, the ‘where’ and 
the ‘what’ of the Circassian Revival, whereby ‘May 21, 1864’ constitutes the ‘when’; the Sochi 
2014 Olympics has become both a ‘where’ and a ‘when’ - while ‘genocide recognition’ has become 
the ‘what’, - form a new and dominant heading for the Circassian revival. These three issues can be 
seen as linked in a (triangular) wheel, a loop or a spiral, in which inputs for one issue almost 
automatically and constantly contribute to reproducing and reinforcing the other two. These three 
issues have come to define a Circassian master-narrative as it is produced and reproduced in the 
ongoing Circassian revival.  
 
1864 is not just a defining moment among the Circassians; neighbouring Abkhazians and other 
peoples of the Caucasus also share this date. It is also part of a wider North Caucasian 
memorialisation in which the wars with the Imperial Russian army in the nineteenth century play a 
decisive role - as seen in the celebrations of the resistance led by Imam Shamil among Chechens 
and Dagestanis in the eastern Caucasus. It is also part of a related movement to redefine the role of 
the Russian Empire in Georgia south of the main Caucasian mountain range, whereby the role of 
Russia during the latter years and, especially after 2008, has been reframed as 400 years of 
authoritarian rule. This attempt at redefinition runs parallel to academic efforts in Georgia (and 
elsewhere in the Caucasus) to increase an understanding of the existence of a Caucasian civilisation. 
Georgian actors play a key role in this process. Together, all these efforts represent a significant 
challenge to the official Russian understanding of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus in the 
nineteenth century, in what has many parallels with post-colonial encounters, resistance or protests 
against a former imperial centre. This illustrates how the contemporary reproduction of 
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Circassianness during the Circassian revival - in spite of various divisions and potential conflicts - 
is part of a wider trend of Caucasian memorialisation and reidentification.353 
 
May 21 as a Russian Day of Remembrance (especially for the army) disappeared with the Russian 
Empire but has, in the post-Soviet context, reappeared in competing versions in the North 
Caucasian space. On the one hand, the Russian army and especially the recreated Cossack 
movement, sometimes supported by local and regional representatives from the authorities in 
Krasnodar Krai and Stavropol Krai, celebrate the victory at certain events and on certain dates. This 
often includes ceremonies at the statues of famous generals or other forms of memorialisation.354 
On the other, the Circassian institutionalisation of May 21 as a Day of Remembrance has become 
widely visible within the Circassian republics in the North Caucasus as well as among the diaspora 
countries - and has also become more visible with its increased reporting on the Internet. This is a 
local example of competing post-Soviet memorialisation in a region within the Russian Federation 
that re-actualises the war, the expulsions and conflicts of the nineteenth century. 355   
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 ‘1864’ is a year of war memorialisation with strong symbolic importance among the Circassians and the Danes (or 
rather, Denmark). In both cases the year ‘1864’ has achieved a status as the ‘defining moment’ though the two contexts 
are very different. The official budgets for war commemoration are clearly much larger when performed by a (nation -
)state but judging by the level of activity on Facebook, the year ’1864’ generates less dynamic o r vernacular interests in 
Denmark than in the Circassian World.  
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 For instance the monument to Tsarina Katharina in Krasnodar. 
355
 This change in the use of this day towards a form of competing memorialisation can be said to mark a challenge to 
the understanding of the colonial character of the Russian Emp ire on the part of the Circassians, while the Cossacks use 
this date as part of their general post-Soviet rehabilitation. 
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Chapter  8   
 
Genocide Recognition as a key issue in the Circassian Revival356 
 
Recognition of the ‘Circassian genocide’ has become a catch phrase of the ongoing Circassian 
revival.357 It has proven to be an issue that can encompass many of the aims of the Circassian 
revival. In combination with the ‘2014 Sochi Winter Olympics’, the issue of genocide recognition 
has gained significant support in the Circassian world and has increasingly managed to generate 
interest beyond Circassian and Caucasian public spheres. It could be argued that genocide 
recognition has become the ‘What’ of the Circassian revival - as a supplement to the ‘Where’ of 
Sochi - as generated by the Olympic project. Both can be said to build on one of the main results of 
the post-Soviet Circassian revival: the creation of 1864 as the ‘When’, especially marked by the 
successful establishment of May 21st as the transnational Circassian ‘day of commemoration’ for 
the last twenty years. The role of ‘1864’ has been further enhanced by the fact that 2014, when the 
Sochi Olympic Games will take place, marks the 150th anniversary of the final Circassian exodus 
from the Caucasus. The Olympic project has thereby further strengthened the link to the ‘when’ of 
the Circassian revival. Genocide recognition has become the new ‘banner’ of the Circassian revival 
over the last couple of years in particular, to a much greater degree than before. I suggest that these 
three issues - the what, when and where – can together be seen as linked in a triangle whereby the 
three issues constantly and mutually reinforce each other in the mediated Circassian mobilisation 
and memorialisation process. The potential repercussions of the new dominance of an agenda on 
genocide recognition for the Circassian revival are also discussed in this paper. 
 
Since shortly before the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the year ‘1864’ has gradually become 
institutionalised as a so-called ‘defining moment’ of the contemporary Circassian identity, as can be 
seen in the activities of many Circassian organisations and Internet initiatives.358 The annual May 
21st commemorations, which have increased in number and size around the world, have played a 
key role in this process - supplemented by a number of publications, conferences etc. This process 
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 Init ial version presented at the conference ‘Circassian Day’ at the European Parliament, Brussels, June 18, 2012.  
357
 Where I have chosen to use the term ‘Circassian genocide’ without labelling it as ‘alleged’ o r ‘so -called’, it is partly 
for practical reasons and partly due to the fact that the term is now widely used throughout the Circassian World. This is 
also reflected in the books of, for instance, Richmond (2013) and Bullough (2010). The issue is further discussed below.  
358
 ‘Defin ing moment’ is a term applied by Henry R. Huttenbach (1995, 672).  
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has, in recent years, been significantly expanded through the use of the Internet in a number of 
different ways. I argue that, through the international mega sports event of the Olympics, ‘Sochi’ 
has become a concrete geographical representation of the mythological Circassian homeland. This 
is particularly the case among the Circassian diaspora - most of whom have never visited the 
Caucasus. 
 
When the renewed Circassian revival gathered pace from 2005 onwards, the issue of genocide 
recognition was at the centre from the beginning. A number of new Circassian organisations were 
established at this point, in what could be labelled a second generation of post-Soviet civil society 
mobilisation. They were generally characterised by a will to act politically - partly in opposition to 
the older associations that, for many years, had mainly focused on cultural issues.359 An appeal for 
recognition of the Circassian genocide was initiated by the Circassian Congress in the North 
Caucasus and was forwarded to the Russian parliament, the Duma, in 2005. A year later, the appeal 
was rejected by the Duma with the reason that the issue was not relevant since the events in 
question had not taken place during the Soviet period. This was a kind of non-answer that not only 
illustrated the difficulties of coming to terms with historical injustices in the Russian Federation in 
general but also offered the new Circassian organisations a motivation for renewed mobilisation. 
The contradiction in this non-answer from the Russian Duma is evident in a North Caucasian 
context, where the Circassian ‘co-titular’ nationalities of the two double-titular republics of 
Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia - the Balkars and the Karachais – were formally 
rehabilitated and had their forced deportations during the Second World War officially recognised 
in 1991. 
 
 
Genocide in a Caucasian and post-Soviet context 
 
Before turning to the recent role of genocide recognition in the Circassian revival, a few words on 
the historical background to issues of genocide in a post-Soviet context will be appropriate. The 
presumed Circassian genocide took place in the mid-nineteenth century and has recently 
increasingly been labelled as a precursor to the Armenian genocide of 1915 and the role of genocide 
in general in the 20th century. Both the Armenian and the Circassian genocides occurred in the 
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 This type of politicisation of civ il society was traditionally looked upon negatively in the contexts of the two most 
important countries of Circassian residence - Russia and Turkey.  
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wider Caucasus area in times of uncertainty and competition between the advancing Russian 
Empire and the waning Ottoman Empire.360 As Muslims increasingly faced difficulties in parts of 
the northern Caucasus, with the Russian advance, it similarly became difficult to belong to a 
Christian minority in the Ottoman periphery in the southern parts of the Caucasus. 361 The conditions 
in the South and the North were, nonetheless, different as the Russian army was the main agent in 
the Circassian genocide for a long period, while the picture was more blurred in the case of 
Armenians in the process of Ottoman disintegration - although, in today’s Turkey, the fear of 
Armenians siding with the advancing Russian Empire is widely referred to.362 The modern era of 
parallel imperial disintegration and competition - in which the colonial drive had reached its final 
phase and the last blank spots on the maps of the world, according to this logic, had to be conquered 
relatively quickly - appears to have created a contradictory policy of pogroms and forced eviction of 
populations in the imperial borderlands, at least on the surface. 363 On the other hand, the extreme 
violence applied was supposed to mark the arrival of civilisation, enlightenment and Christianity. 
Power and possession of territory were, however, more important drivers, especially for peoples 
who could be characterised as uncivilised and savage, as illustrated by these population policies that 
had become more radical and absolute in their character. 364 According to Peter Holquist, the war 
and expulsion of the Circassians marked a significant change in population policies of the Russian 
Empire that earlier had perfomed other act of ‘demographic warfare’ but as a population policy this 
was in the case of the Circassians taken to a new and more systematic level (Geraci 2008, 349). 
This kind of population policy culminated in the Holocaust which took place during the Nazi reign 
in Germany and in the occupied territories.365 These events led in 1948 to the adoption of the UN 
                                                 
360
 Many of the Circassians expelled from Russia were placed in central Anatolia, where they not only had to farm a 
difficult landscape for agriculture but could also potentially form a buffer zone in relation to the Armenians and Kurds 
liv ing on the eastern side of the new Circassian settlements. 
361
 The Caucasian ‘Bloodlands’ - by extension? The extreme vio lence that accompanied the Imperial p rocesses of 
advance qualifies the Caucasus to be described in the same terms as used for the clashes of empires in Eastern Europe in 
the 1930s and 1940s, which was entitled ‘Bloodlands’ by Timothy Snyder (2010). The Caucasus in the nineteenth 
century has by Robert Geraci been referred to as a “Eurasian zone of vio lence” (Geraci 2008, 346). The Kurds are also 
located close to the Caucasus and Anatolia, and today also refer to a Kurd ish genocide, namely in Iraq in 1988. As with 
the Circassian, the genocidal persecutions did not take place only in that year. 
362
 Reports on both cases of genocidal actions reached Western or European media while they were ongoing, but the 
actual results and the full extent of the cruelty of the actions only emerged gradually.  
363
 Like the ro le of anti-Jewish pogroms in the borderlands between the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian Empires as a 
precursor to the 20
th
-century Holocaust and Stalinist purges, as illustrated by Snyder (2010).  
364
 These new forms of population or demographic policies became some of  the first examples of Muslim and Christian 
population exchanges between Russia and Ottoman Turkey, which later also included the exchange of population 
between Greece and Turkey. 
365
 The successful mediated memorialisation and mobilisation, seen in relation  to the Holocaust in particular but also the 
Armenian genocide, has served as an inspiration for many of the actors of the Circassian revival. Th is includes the role 
of diaspora promotion and lobbying. 
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Convention on Genocide, in which genocide is defined as “actions that are carried out with the 
intent, fully or partly, to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group”.366  
 
This kind of radical method had already been applied on many occasions by European colonial 
empires towards indigenous populations, for instance, in South and North America from the 
sixteenth to the nineteenth century - methods that today would be labelled genocidal (Totten, 
Parsons and Hitchcock 2002). An encounter with this type of population policy of the past plays a 
significant role in the ongoing struggle for increased recognition and equal rights among many 
indigenous peoples around the world (Smith 1999, 34).367 The increased international focus on the 
rights of indigenous peoples and the success of the international lobbying efforts of indigenous 
peoples’ movements are also part of the inspiration behind the Circassian revival. 368 This 
combination of an ‘indigenous genocide’ and what is often referred to as a ‘classical (East) 
European borderland genocide’, such as the Armenian and the Jewish, is an intersection that in 
many ways is characteristic of the Caucasian context.  
 
As with other terms, such as for instance, geopolitics, the term genocide has gained renewed usage 
since the fall of Communism, and has been accompanied by another and related new term: ‘ethnic 
cleansing’.369 Claims of genocide during the Soviet period have been raised in several of the post-
Soviet successor states, for instance, in the Baltic States and in the Ukraine, where the so-called 
Holodomor is a relatively new term for genocidal actions - especially referring to the enforced 
famine during Stalin’s regime in the 1930s. This became subject to competing memorialisation as 
many in Russia protested against it by arguing that Stalinist purges and Gulag camps also affected 
Russians and other peoples of the former Soviet Union - and that this type of ‘enforced famine’ also 
affected large areas of Soviet Russia, for instance in the North Caucasus.  
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 genocidescholars.org/resources/about-genocide, www.folkedrab.dk/sw50052.asp - Art icle 2. The renewed civil 
society mobilisation of the Circassian diaspora is also a process of redefining the diaspora inspired by the role of 
’genocide recognition’ in the Armenian and Jewish diaspora mobilisation processes.  
367
 ”…to bring back into existence a world fragmented and dying” (Smith 1999, 28).  
368
 In the book ‘Annihilating Difference’ by Alexander Laban Hinton (ed., 2002), the introductory chapter is called ‘The 
Dark Side of Modernity’, and the following chapter on genocide and indigenous peoples is entitled ‘Modernity’s 
Edges’.  
369
 In relation to the wider European public sphere, especially in relation to the wars in the former Yugoslavia, where 
the killing of thousands of Bosnian Muslims (Bosniacs) in Srebren ica was labelled as a genocidal action by the media - 
and later acknowledged by the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague. Fears of another attempted at genocide led to a Nato 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999. 
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In the Russian North Caucasus, the formerly deported peoples, who were allowed to return from 
forced exile in Central Asia after 1957 now required recognition and rehabilitation. This was 
formally granted and a law on the rehabilitation of deported peoples was adopted by the Russian 
parliament in 1991. Complaints regarding the shortcomings of the implementation of this law are 
regularly voiced however (Richmond 2008, 134; Krag and Funch 1994, 30). This was accompanied 
by civil society initiatives to commemorate Stalinist attempts at genocide, including the 
establishment of new monuments and museums, and new annual commemorative events. The 
Balkars and the Karachai, who both constitute titular nationalities together with Circassian co-
nationalities, also began to initiate similar processes, which resulted in counter-reactions from the 
Circassians.370 In Nalchik, the capital of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, this has led to a 
situation whereby a new museum to commemorate the Balkars’ genocide has been built while the 
Circassian genocide is only briefly mentioned in the republican museum.371 On the other hand, a 
centrally-placed monument to the Circassian genocide has been erected in a park in Nalchik. The 
wars in Chechnya in the 1990s that resulted in the death of more than 100,000 Chechens are also 
regularly referred to as the Chechen genocide.372 In August 2008, Russia officially used the term 
‘genocide’ as the reason for Russian intervention against the Georgian army in South Ossetia - 
though only from the second day of the conflict (Staun 2008, 5). This might be a coincidence but it 
might also indicate a shift towards a conscious use of the term genocide as part of the political spin 
- possibly also in order to contribute to the ‘watering down’ of a term that many politicians, 
academics and others in Russia are often opposed to. In any case, this illustrates how the term has 
gained mainstream political usage.373 
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 It was a Balkarian init iative during the late Perestroika period that resulted in a related Circassian initiative, which 
illustrates the element of mutual action-reaction in neighbouring ethno-nationalist movements, which, for instance, can 
take the form of competing memorialisation. Similarly, one of the incidents that triggered the contemporary Circassian 
revival was the threat of the dissolution of the Republic of Adygea in 2004. A s illustrated by a statement by Ruslan 
Keshev from the Circassian Congress from KBR at a conference in Anaklia, Georg ia, in May 2012: ”The Balkars were 
deported in 13 years, we were deported in 148 years”.   
371
 A rebuild ing of the Republican Museum is planned and could include revised representations of the ‘genocides’. 
Instead, issues relating to the Circassian defeat in the war with the Russian Empire, the forced exile, the Circassian 
genocide etc. have regularly been dealt with in a large room of the museum reserved for changing exhib itions. 
372
 Recognition of the deportation from 1944 to 1957 played a key ro le in the Chechen independence movement of the 
1990s. During their period in power a monument to the Chechen genocide was created in the centre of Grozn y. The key 
statue of this monument, which also included a large number of old g ravestones that were disposed of or used as 
building material during the Stalinist period, was later moved to the outskirts close to the Russian army headquarters, by 
the pro-Russian leadership in 2008 (Kuwait Times via genocidewatch.org 05-06-2008). 
373
 This use of the term ‘genocide prevention’ was also a way of echoing the Western argument for the air strikes 
against Serbia in 1999. 
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Locally in the North Caucasus, two of the Circassian republics recognised the Circassian genocide 
in the 1990s. The Parliament in Kabardino-Balkaria formally recognised the genocide in 1992, 
while the parliament in the Republic of Adygea did the same in 1997. 374 Due to this, some 
representatives from the Russian authorities, including some highly-placed Circassians, responded 
to the 2005 claims for recognition of the Circassian genocide by stating that this was not needed as 
it had already been recognised.375 When the International Circassian Association (ICA) became a 
member of the UNPO in 1994, recognition of the Circassian genocide by the Russian Federation 
was noted as one of the key aims of the organisation. 376 Since 2005, UNPO has regularly published 
articles on the Circassian campaign for genocide recognition on its website, unpo.org.  
 
Many of the above-mentioned examples illustrate a kind of institutionalised competing 
memorialisation, as it may unfold within a framework of sub-federal administrative governance 
with roots in the early Soviet era. It also illustrates how this form of Soviet heritage often leaves the 
local North Caucasian authorities with challenges that can affect the political environment in these 
entities negatively.377   
 
 
The Post-2005 Process 
 
An application for recognition of the Circassian genocide, which included hundreds of historical 
documents from the nineteenth century to underline the argument, was sent to the Russian 
parliament, the Duma, on July 1, 2005.378 The application was submitted by the organisation 
Circassian Congress from the Republic of Adygea and was later re-sent now signed by six 
Circassian organisations, including some from outside Russia.  
 
                                                 
374
 The book ‘Genocid Adygov’ [Circassian Genocide], by the historians Kasumov and Kasumov, was published in 
Nalch ik in 1992, with references to much of the documentation from archives which, since 2005, had become part of 
the renewed attempts at genocide recognition. In many ways, this marked one of fi rst significant steps on the post-
Soviet road towards the Circassian promotion of genocide recognition. The book was subsequently translated and 
published in Turkey. 
375
 For instance, Asker Sokht from Krasnodar Krai in June 2012 during the Circassian Day in Brussels. 
376
 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO, Unpo.org/article/7869).  
377
 For instance calls for ‘European forms of self-determination’ are rejected by the federal authorities offhand - in spite 
of great efforts and will from the side of the Russian leadership to join international organisations such as the Council of 
Europe and the OSCE, which promote this kind of ‘self -determination’. 
378
 A petition was published on May 8, 2005 addressing the UN, the US Congress, the Council of Europe and the 
international community in general calling for the recognition of the Circassian genocide (unpo.org/article/2452).  
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The application to the Russian parliament was rejected in a letter to the Circassian Congress in 
January 2006. The reason given was that the Circassians were not on the list of ethnic groups 
repressed during the Soviet era, a list that had been prepared by the Institute of History at the 
Russian Academy of Science. In reaction to this ‘non-answer’, the chairman of Circassian Congress 
noted that a negative answer was also a result: “Now the organisations - the participants of the 
campaign - have a right (including a moral one) to address the international bodies”.379     
 
An appeal for recognition of the Circassian genocide was sent to the President of the European 
Parliament on October 11, 2006.380 The appeal was now signed by 20 organisations from the 
homeland as well as the diaspora countries. The number of historical documents attached had 
increased and was presented with an index that has since also been used in the translated versions 
that can be found on the circassian-genocide.com website. The Circassian appeal subsequently 
became part of the regular consultations on minority rights and discrimination between Russia and 
the European Union, and with other European institutions, such as the Council of Europe and 
OSCE, of which Russia is a member.  
 
Provision of documentation has been a priority from the beginning for the renewed campaign for 
genocide recognition, although a search of Imperial Russian archives had been taking place over a 
number of years on an individual basis.381 This material had to be compiled from different sources 
and scientific books and articles with references to specified archive documents. Eyewitness reports 
etc. also had to be collected and assessed.382 All of this material was attached to the above-
mentioned appeals as documentation.  
 
This file of documents has since been expanded with additional documents and the more than 480 
documents from the Russian archives have since 2012, been published on the website circassian-
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 unpo.org/article/3634. 
380
 unpo.org/article/5634; circassian-genocide.com/page.php?id=26. 
381
 As stated by, for instance, Ayse Pul (2011, 395), an examinat ion of the archives of the Russian Empire and the 
Ottoman Empire is still in its early stagees and much still needs to be done. 
382
 For instance, the above mentioned book by Kasumov and Kasumov (1992) was one of the first academic 
examinations to include a variety of historical sources as documentation. Other publications include the exile 
publications by Ramazan Traho (1991) and several others (Jaimoukha 2009). Further supplemented by publications 
such as the nineteenth-century books by A. P. Berge and Rostislav Fadeev (Kavkazskaia voina. Moscow 2005 (first 
published as ‘Pis ma s Kavkaza’ in 1864-1865)). Fadeev was a general and subsequently became an imperial army 
historian specialising in the Caucasian Wars of the nineteenth century. The Russian historian Berge has been called the 
official Russian historian of the Caucasian Wars. 
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genocide.com with translations into Arabic, English, Russian and Turkish. 383 Research and 
provision of documentation has been given a high priority by many of the Circassian organisations - 
even before 2005 - but now different organisations have coordinated and cooperated to establish 
and present this material on the Internet.384 According to the Committee of Volunteers that 
presented the material in May 2012, the purpose of the website presentation is for the material “...to 
be read and comprehended by the maximum possible Circassians and non-Circassians alike, so as to 
be able to provide the truth of the ‘Circassian Question’ to Academicians, Legislatures, Study and 
Research Institutions, Universities, Human Rights Organisations, Media and International Public 
Opinion”.385 A research study published by the American historian Walter Richmond in his 2013 
book, “The Circassian Genocide” is the most recent example of how this material - together with 
documents from other archives - has been made available to researchers thus bypassing the Russian 
archive authorities (and reducing the costs of travel). Other archives more recently made available 
and translated are the Imperial Russian archives in Georgia and archives from the Ottoman Empire. 
Both consist of handwritten sources, and in the case of the latter most often in the Turkish language 
but in Arabic script, which requires the assistance of specialists for the translation. Some of this 
material has been published in different languages - efforts that can be expected to continue in the 
very near future. 
 
The majority of the 487 documents are from the nineteenth century and consist especially of 
military reports and letters to and from commanding officers, including some of the key actors in 
the many years of warfare in the region.386 These are supplemented with extracts from 
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 circiassian-genocide.com. A CD-version in the four languages is circulated at conferences and other 
Circassian/Caucasian events. 
384
 Presented on behalf of the ‘Committee of Volunteers’ by Radio Adiga (rad ioadiga.com) and Justice for the North 
Caucasus (justicefornorthcaucasus.info). Some of the translations have been secured in a transnational cooperation 
between Circassian organisations. The Committee of Volunteers encourages Circassians in different states to further 
translate and circulate the documents (circassian-genocide.com/Documents/English.pdf).  
385
 From the introduction (circassian-genocide.com/Documents/English.pdf, page 4). Here the authors further elaborate 
on the purpose of their effort: “With honour and pride, volunteers who worked fo r years to present and bring up this 
important project into existence are intending to publish and disseminate this documented information for all whom it 
may concern, so that the narrative of the details of what had happened as per the correspondence taken place o n the 
level of leaders and military commanders of the Tsarist Russian Empire would verify the truth and tell the whole story 
of the Circassian Tragedy.” And the final sentence states: “The confiscated rights should be reinstated and restored in 
accordance with the United Nat ions Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Law and the 
right of Indigenous peoples to self-determination”. 
386
 Cossack groups were often placed at the forefront of the attacks on Circassian villages in the ninet eenth century. 
Today, Kuban Cossacks often live in areas neighbouring the Circassians, and have in recent years undergone a revival, 
with similarities to the Circassian revival but with stronger support from the local, regional and federal authorities. This 
has re-actualised the competing and conflicting memorialisation between the two groups. Cossack organisations have 
also raised claims of genocide, in reference to Stalin ist purges against the Cossacks in the 1830s.   
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autobiographies and memoirs written about the period and published mostly in the nineteenth 
century after the end of the war in 1864. There are more than 50 documents from the 1830s and 
more than 250 from the 1860s, which constitute the two central periods.387   
The material from the documents has been used for information and visibility purposes in 
publications and exhibitions targeting Circassians internally as well as the wider public at large.  
 
The process, which has been labelled a ‘war on conferences’, culminated in the ‘Hidden Nations, 
Enduring Crimes’ conference in Tbilisi in March 2010. This conference received support from the 
Georgian government and was arranged in cooperation with the American think tank, Jamestown 
Foundation.388 The conference ended with a recommendation to the Georgian parliament to 
recognise the Circassian genocide.389 It should be noted that some Circassian organisations - 
especially CCI from New Jersey - had lobbied the Georgian parliament as well as the parliaments of 
some of the Baltic States as part of this process. The Russian authorities reacted in different ways, 
after a long period of mostly ignoring the Circassian revival.390 Two roundtable seminars were held 
in Moscow with the participation of Circassian representatives from organisations that had not 
signed the genocide recognition applications nor taken part in the Tbilisi conference. One of these 
initiatives backfired when the representative from the Circassian Association of California in 
statements during and after a Moscow roundtable in 2010 openly criticised the Russian authorities. 
Since then, the representatives from Circassian organisations in California have more actively 
supported the genocide recognition agenda. A large international Circassian conference in Jordan in 
late 2010, which many representatives from the Circassian diaspora saw as a follow-up to the 
Tbilisi conference, was cancelled due to Russian pressure on the royal Jordanian authorities. As an 
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 One example is, fo r instance, Document 36, a report from General Zass to Baron Rosen (February 25, 1834). Zass 
has become ‘famous’ as part of the combined Circassian memorialisation and mobilisation, with the picture showing 
Circassian heads placed on the fence around the house of General Zass in particular being widely circu lated and 
remediated, as mentioned in Chapter 4. More on the role of General Zass in the contemporary Circassian 
memorialisation process below. 
388
 Shortly after, the conference achieved a separate entry at Wikipedia.  
389
 The statement from the conference also suggested that May 21
st
 should be recognised as an official ‘day of 
remembrance’ and that Sochi should be recognised as a site and symbol of the Circassian genocide and ethnic cleansing 
as a reaction to the 2014 Sochi Olympics (natpress.net/stat_e.php?id=5199).  
390
 According to Sergey Markedonov, this conference would have been forgotten in the “myriad of seminars and round 
tables that take place in the Georgian capital were it not for its unusually influential organizers - the Jamestown 
Foundation, an American think tank, and Mikheil Saakashvili’s personal education project, the Ilya Chavchavadze 
University” (russiaprofile.org via cakhasa.com/news/Crossing_the_Mountains.html). Shortly after the conference in 
Tbilisi, Markedonov recommended an active Russian strategy as a reaction to the conference by “reaching agreement 
with ‘moderate’ Circassian activist groups before the Sochi Olympics”(natpress.net/stat_e.php?id=5245).  
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extension of the Tbilisi conference, a Circassian Cultural Institute was opened on February 16, 2012 
in Tbilisi, financed by the Georgian government. 391 
 
On May 20, 2011 the Georgian parliament became the first UN-member state to officially recognise 
the Circassian genocide of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries - one day before the annual 
transnational Circassian day of commemoration. 392 This decision was based on a scientific 
presentation and conclusions, both of which are available together with the resolution on the 
website of the Georgian parliament.393 Somewhat surprisingly, many Circassians in the Caucasus 
responded positively to the Georgian recognition.394 To many Circassians and Caucasians in Turkey 
in general, this was a controversial issue that led to many discussions and considerations due to the 
fact that, during the post-Soviet period Circassian organisations had been critical of Georgia, in 
solidarity with the Abkhasians.395 
 
Circassian representatives from American organisations gave presentations on the Circassian 
genocide at two international genocide conferences in July 2011. Cicek Duman Chek and John 
Haghor from the Circassian Association in California spoke at the Third Global Conference on 
Genocide arranged by the International Network of Genocide Scholars (INGS) in San Francisco on 
July 1, 2011. The presentation was built around arguments relating to ‘intent’ - as a key issue of the 
UN Convention on Genocide - and based on archive material from the nineteenth century. 396 Eyad 
Cougar from CCI /ICC in New Jersey suggested the “possibility of a resolution on this continuing, 
hidden and forgotten Circassian genocide” at the Ninth Biennial Conference of the International 
Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) in Buenos Aires on July 22nd.397 
 
The Georgian involvement was further marked by the revelation of a new monument to the 
Circassian genocide in the Georgian Black Sea coastal town of Anaklia and additional 
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 eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/20127 (17-02-2012). 
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 www.parliament.ge/files/1544_32742_536746_genocidi_en.pdf   
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 www.parliament.ge/files/1544_32742_536746_genocidi_en.pdf. Staff members of the Circassian Cultural Institute 
in Tbilisi were involved in preparing this material.  
394
 Jamestownfoundation.org  (07-04-2010) 
395
 When the news of the recognition was announced at a conference in Kayseri in Turkey, it  was met with “deep 
silence” (Markedonov 2011).  
396
 A number of nineteenth century sources, that include many eyewitness reports, have been collected by Circassians 
through a number of years. Chek and Haghor use the first nine pages to present some of these sources of documentation 
(adigasite.com/arch ives/1715). 
397
 The proposal addressed the Executive Board of IAGS. www.justicefornorthcaucasus.info/?p=1251656538  
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commemorative events in relation to May 21, 2012.398 The ceremonies at the seashore and at the 
new monument were emotional moments for the participating Circassian representatives that had 
arrived from several countries, including Russia. This was enhanced by the location on the Black 
Sea coast, in the vicinity of the ruins of a former Russian fort used in the Imperial Russian 
colonisation of the Caucasus and to ship Circassians and other Caucasians to the Ottoman Empire 
during the nineteenth century. The event marked another expansion in the geographical outreach of 
the annual May 21 events and, according to the organisers, they would also like Anaklia to become 
a fixed point of the Circassian commemoration in the future. The event in Anaklia included a large 
exhibition of Circassian items from the museum in Tbilisi, an exhibition of books on Circassians, 
various forms of cultural entertainment and a one-day conference under the headline: ‘The expected 
results of the recognition of Circassians genocide’. 399 To participate in the Anaklia event was a 
contested issue among many Circassians, especially in Turkey, where the close interaction and 
solidarity with Abkhazians has resulted in a critical attitude towards Georgia. Still, a significant 
number of Circassians from Turkey chose to participate. 
 
In 2013, the American historian, Walter Richmond, published the book ‘The Circassian Genocide’ 
based on studies of archives from the nineteenth century, including those from Tbilisi. 400 Since this 
is the first monograph addressing this issue by an international academic specialist who does not 
come from the Caucasus, Russia or the former Soviet Union, some of his conclusions, as presented 
during two conferences in 2012, are included here. Richmond presents two major conclusions: 
firstly, that archive material and eyewitness reports confirm that genocide as defined in the UN 
resolution of 1948 has taken place, and secondly, that according to the documents it would be more 
correct to talk about a “century-long genocidal process”.401 In the first case, he focused on 
documents from the period from October 1863 to May 1864, which is the period when the highest 
number of Circassians were killed, died of other reasons or left the Caucasus. As Richmond states: 
“Based on documentary evidence, my conservative estimate is that between 320,000 and 400,000 
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 The winner was the most naturalistic nineteenth-century representation of a grieving Circcassian family of three 
where the father is absent but the pre-teen son is ready to take over according to old tradition (see Appendix). Visually, 
the statue is very much in line with the ongoing remediation and circulation of nineteenth -century representations that 
has been very popular among Circassians - and other Caucasians - for a long time. 
399
 Other events included a horse race, a (horse) polo game, music, an exhib ition of hundreds of Circassian items from 
the Historical Museum in Tbilisi and an exh ibit ion of books  on Circassian issues in a number of languages etc. 
400
 The results of the research were presented by Walter Richmond at conferences in May 2012 (Anaklia) and June 2012 
(Brussels). 
401
 Walter Richmond, Circassian Day conference in European Parliament, Brussels , June 2012. For the organisers, the 
European Circassian organisation Eurohaxe, this event marked a step in the direction of an increased political 
orientation as compared with the preceding six years, which were focussed more on culture, language etc.  
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people died in the period”.402 More Circassians died en route to the Ottoman Empire, resulting in a 
total number of 625,000 out of an estimated 1860 population of 1.5 million.403 
 
Regarding the second conclusion of the new study, Richmond states that the ‘genocidal campaign’ 
was already “blockading food and salt shipments and burning villages during a devastating plague” 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century in the central part of the North Caucasus, where the 
largest Circassian province Kabarda was located. The population here dropped “ninety percent from 
300,000 in 1790 to 30,000 in 1830”.404 Richmond thus indirectly supports the re-periodisation of 
the war that is today held by most Circassians and seeks to include the Kabardians in the 
understanding of the war. This was also indirectly supported by the Russian Academy of Science 
when they concluded that the Circassians constituted one people, at the request of Circassian 
organisations in Russia.  
 
 
An Example from the Archives 
 
The commander of the Russian army in the Caucasus, Count Yevdokimov, stated in a letter in 1864: 
“I wrote to Count Sumarokov as to why he keeps reminding me in every report concerning the 
frozen bodies which cover the roads? Don’t the Grand Duke and I know this? But does it depend on 
anybody to avert this misery?” (Shenfield 2008).405 During the protracted wars, the Othering of the 
Circassians (or the natives or the mountaineers or the savages406 or nations or ‘opponent nations’407) 
reached a new level when they were further demonised as an armed enemy with great knowledge of 
the local landscape. This is one of the reasons why the Russian army preferred to attack and burn 
villages at the crack of dawn.408 The use of enemy images of a terminal nature is part of any war but 
nonetheless the level of dehumanisation of the Circassians is surprisingly clear in the many reports 
where reports on killing unarmed civilians are just as frequent as reports of the killings of armed 
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 Walter Richmond, conference, Brussesls, June 2012.  
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 Walter Richmond, conference, Brussesls, June 2012. An estimated number of casualties of the eviction of the 
Circassians is 400,000 out of a population of 1,200,000 (Henze 1992, 104).  
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 Walter Richmond, conference, Brussels, June 2012. 
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 Ramazan Traho: Cherkessy [Circassians] (München 1956, 113), quoted from Shenfield (1999).  
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 www.circassian-genocide.com/Documents/English.pdf: document 36, page 39. 
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 www.circassian-genocide.com/Documents/English.pdf: document 38, page 39. 
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 www.circassian-genocide.com/Documents/English.pdf: document 37, page 39. 
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mountaineers in battle. Such atrocities would today be labelled war crimes while, here, they are 
noted as simple facts in the administrative reporting system of the army and the empire.  
 
General Zass of the Imperial Russian Army played a key role in the war in the 1830s and has gained 
a significant role in the Circassian memorialisation. This is particularly due to the story of how Zass 
collected the skulls of dead Circassians and placed some of them on the fence around his house; 
others were kept under his bed or boiled in order to send them to his doctor- friend in Berlin. This 
narrative has been enhanced through an historical (nineteenth-century) visual representation of the 
house and the fence that has circulated on many Circassian websites and has been included in many 
YouTube videos. The story of the Circassian skulls in Berlin has resulted in an Internet-based 
campaign to bring the skulls back for reburial.409 The campaign site had 922 members (as of 
October 11, 2012) and many have linked to the site via Facebook. General Zass became one of the 
key individuals in the Kuban Cossack history in the Caucasus and a statue of him can be seen in the 
city of Armavir on the Kuban River.410 
 
Other quotes from General Zass include the following: “The elimination of the mountainous nations 
... I considered it essential that our army reached heights it had never been to before, up to Ahmed 
Mountains, and the acquisition of the famous Tam neighbourhood in the mountains, which is 
known for its fortified location and richness, in order to terrorize and intimidate the mountaineers 
more”.411 Zass further notes that the Circassians were “terrified from the genocide that occurred in 
the Tam neighbourhood” and that “this brave storming of the mountains - that have not been 
touched or reached before by Russians...caused horror among the mountaineers”. 412  
 
 
Another Example from Nineteenth-century Sources 
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 causes.com/causes/482253-help -repatriate-circassian-relics-skulls-nones-from-museums-collected-by-general-zass-
and-others.    
410
 A tribute to General Zass as one of the heroes of the Caucasian War - especially among the Kuban Cossacks - can be 
found on this website: armavirskiy.narod.ru/hist_ktitor_addons_zass.htm. Here a photo can also be found of the statue 
of General Zass in the city of Armavir, where Zass is considered the founder after he granted this place by the Kuban 
River to a community of Armenians (referred to as ‘Cherkesogi Armenians’) in 1839 - the village was first called 
‘Armyansky Aul’ and was renamed in 1848 to honour the ancient capital of Armenia 
(armavirskiy.narod.ru/foto_new_zass_pam.htm). Th is statue has regularly attracted protests from Circassians.  
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 General Zass, 1834 (document 37, page 39). 
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 General Zass report, document 40, page 41. Tam is destroyed and many residents died in the fire. The inhabitants are 
noted in the report as being “neither obedient nor loyal to us” but Tam was symbolically useful for spreading fear 
among the native population (document 37, page 39).   
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The writings of the nineteenth-century Russian military historian, Rostislav Fadeev, have become 
one of the important sources in contemporary Circassian memorialisation: “This country, which for 
a thousand years has been an unassailable fortress, a vast hideaway for brigands, [and] which not 
one conqueror could approach with impunity, turned instantly, as if through waving with a magic 
wand, into an uninhabited land, [that was] rightfully belonging to every hardworking Russian 
person.” (Kreiten 2011, 384).413 According to Irma Kreiten “this triumphalist stance went hand-in-
hand with an equally optimistic view of the new colony’s future. In their first cataloguing of the 
region, Russian colonial authorities praised its manifold natural treasures, which, in Russia’s view, 
still lay untouched.” (ibid).414 Kreiten further notes on the Russian Enlightenment- inspired officials: 
“They treated Circassian lands as a tabula rasa, a landscape form which all traces of prior human 
existence could be wiped out in order to build up a ‘new country’.” (Kreiten 2011, 390).  
 
Fadeev further noted on the new options for Russia in the land south of the Kuban River that used 
to be Circassia: “Everywhere man will have free rein; in a warm and healthy climate ploughed 
fields, pastures, woods and water everywhere, all will be at his hand. [...]. And this sumptuous, one 
can say, newly discovered land lies not in the Pacific Ocean, but on the shore of the Black Sea. [...]. 
The Kuban province will grow a breed of people we have not been heard of even in fairy tales. We 
see Russian mountaineers. A round-faced, fair-haired Russian boy conveys the visiting [female!] 
tourist on his horses on steep mountain paths [in order] to watch from the neighbouring valley how 
the sun rises from out of the snows and [how] the shadow of the mountains suddenly reaches out 
over the whole region.” (Kreiten 2011, 386).415 Here, Fadeev gets carried away and simply 
appropriates some of the romanticised understandings of the mountaineers as established in the first 
part of the century through writers such as Pushkin and Lermontov, while in the 1850s Tolstoy 
actually attempted to add realism to these romanticised versions. Actually, no Russians wished to 
live in the former Circassian mountains, where all Circassian mountain-fields and mountain-
orchards or plantations subsequently simply turned into forests. Cossacks only wanted to colonise 
the lowlands. 
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 Rostislav Fadeev: Kavkazskaia voina. Moscow 2005 (first published as ‘Pisma s Kavkaza’ in 1864-1865): (199). 
Fadeev mostly refer to the Circassians as ’Caucasian Mountaineers’. 
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 Pasynkin, Inzh.-Polk (1865) 
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 Rostislav Fadeev: Kavkazskaia voina. Moscow 2005 (first published as Pisma s Kavkaza in 1864-1865, p. 210-211) 
217 
 
Kreiten refers to a number of sources on how the Russian colonial government tries to justify the 
colonisation and an image of the Circassians as “lazy natives”, and that it is necessary “to get rid of 
the irredeemably restless and obstinate populations”, according to quotes from the period 
immediately after the final victory in mid-1864. As Kreiten notes, these actors of the Russian 
colonial government used “exactly the same reasoning found with European colonists: they also 
saw the necessity of getting rid of the so-called ‘lazy natives’ (Kreiten 2011, 388).416 In contrast: the 
opposite is claimed, for instance, by Longworth (1840) and others who stayed in Circassia for 
longer periods in the 1830s who describe the Circassians as anything but lazy, that they represent a 
Caucasian civilisation with many centuries and perhaps millennia in the area and that they have 
ordered societies that farm the mountain landscape etc. (Kreiten 2011, 392).  
 
On the fundamental geopolitical reward of the victory in the Caucasian Wars, Fadeev has noted: 
“The establishment of Russian rule in the Caucasus should exert a decisive influence of the whole 
of Asian affairs [...]. Due to its central position the Caucasian isthmus commands Muslim Asia [...]” 
(Kreiten 2011, 392). This statement is in line with another Russian post-1864 victory statement of 
the period: that by this victory, the Eastern Question was once and for all settled in Russia’s 
favour.417 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Was it genocide? What has been documented? According to the many reports from the ninetee nth 
century about the intended killing and forced displacement of the Circassians under extremely 
severe conditions, the following can be summarised: a) countless reports of burning of villages with 
inhabitants still sleeping in the houses - livestock had often been stolen first or were stolen in the 
process and crops destroyed; b) many reports of Cossacks - often supported by other soldiers - 
killing unarmed Circassians; c) many reports of the Russian army forcing all Circassians out of their 
villages to take shelter in the high mountains where death by illness and hunger was often the result; 
d) many reports of dead bodies everywhere along the Black Sea coast, and a lack of food and 
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 Kreiten refers to Syed Hussein Alatas: The Myth of the Lazy Native. London 1977. Kreiten further notes how the 
understandings were in line with other ideas of the period, for instance, the so-called ’dying races’ - referring to Kreiten 
refers to Patrick Brantlinger (1995). Kreiten further notes: ”The theory allowed to rationalize co lonial genocide by 
pointing to the unalterable laws of history.” (Kre iten 2011, 389).  
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medicine in the makeshift camps, in the last phases of the war; e) the number of deaths in Turkish 
Black Sea ports due to illness and hunger. Today, many of these reports appear to be cynical 
reporting on the killing and destruction of Circassians - but this was part of the work and everyday 
life of Russian officers, soldiers and Cossacks in Circassia at the time. Many of the Circassians 
were attacked without warning while taking care of their animals and fields, and daily life in 
general. 
 
An increasing number of studies support the genocide claim, e.g. the most recent by Walter 
Richmond, mentioned earlier.418 The use of the term genocide is also justified by Alexander Ohtov 
(2011). According to Hasan Dumanov, Doctor of History and Acting Head of Division of Social 
and Political Studies at the Kabardino-Balkarian Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences: “We cannot say that there was no genocide of the Circassian peoples; however, here 
again, the point is who is now benefitting from manipulation of this issue”.419 
 
Assessing the number of victims is part of the documentation process. A number often referred to is 
that approximately half a million Circassians out of a population of between one and one and a half 
million died as a consequence of these actions (Natho 2009, 393; Richmond  2013, etc.). “Genocide 
staggers the imagination. It staggers us with numbers” (O’Neill and Hinton 1). 420 
 
Georgi M. Derluguian has elaborated on the role of the Armenian genocide in ethnic mobilisation - 
and other Caucasian cases of genocide: “The trauma of genocide produced among the victims’ 
families, and among their descendants, an exceedingly strong yearning for moral catharsis. Some of 
the most powerful ethnic mobilisations in the Caucasus occurred precisely in such groups: not only 
the Armenians but also, to a lesser extent, the Azeris, and then the Chechens, Karachai, and Balkars 
who had been deported by Stalin, as well as the Abkhazes who felt perennially embattled in the face 
of the much bigger Georgian nation” (Derluguian 2005, 187). 421 This underline of how the trauma 
of genocide can create a strong yearning for moral catharsis in the creation of ‘ethnic memories’ but 
the level of mobilisation, according to Derluguian, depends on two other factors. Firstly, different 
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 According to Henze, genocide was “clearly attempted” (Henze 2007/2011, 373).  
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 Caucasian Knot (18-10-2010 - southosetia.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/art icles/15233). 
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 A website presents a graphic representation of the loss in numbers - comparing the population of Circassia and Egypt 
in the nineteenth century and today. 
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 Circassians played a role in the 1915 Armenian genocide in different ways, partly because a large part of the 
Circassians had been settled in Central Anatolia as a kind of buffer population vis -à-vis Armenians. It is remarkab le that 
Derluguian does not mention the Circassian genocide in his book; today that would be unthinkable.  
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forms of catharsis other than simply retribution have been performed in a number of ways all over 
the former Soviet Union since 1991 - the case of the May 21 rituals and new monuments among the 
Circassian is an example of this (Derluguian 2005, 188). “Second, historical memory is a form of 
discourse that can have no material consequence unless it is linked to a chain of organisational 
resources and social mechanisms” (Derluguian 2005, 188). Individual trauma needs to be 
‘channelled’ through organisations or other forms of initiatives that can formulate political goals.  
 
In a context of mediated memorialisation and mobilisation, ‘genocide recognition’ can serve as an 
attractive catchphrase or slogan compared to the more general ‘recognition of our national tragedy’ 
- many peoples or nations can refer to a ‘tragedy’, while ‘genocide’ is more exceptional. It is a term 
that is easily understood and communicated and, as such, also well-suited to being promoted via the 
social media such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, where simple messages generally have  a 
better chance. A narrative on victimisation appears to function much more strongly when linked to 
an agenda of genocide recognition - especially from a mobilisation perspective.422 In spite of the 
dominance of the genocide agenda in recent years, the Circassian revival is generally about a 
broader type of recognition of the forced exile and its consequences for the Circassians - and about 
achieving wider recognition of Circassian culture and identity as contemporary issues of crucial 
importance to many Circassians.423  
 
In a discussion on the ‘continued genocide’ against the Circassians, Alexander Ohtov refers to the 
continued division of the Circassians as different peoples living in different entities as an attempt at 
‘ethnocide’ - a way of destroying a nation through forced assimilation (Ohtov 2011, 3).424 
According to Ohtov, the administrative structures in the Circassian parts of the North Caucasus are 
generating the “destruction of the historical memory of the people” and the loss of ”...language and 
culture, thus becoming nobody” (ibid).425 According to Totten, Parsons and Hitchcock, “cultural 
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case, it has also entailed a stronger focus on the exile as an act of genocide.  
424
 Ohtov refer to six areas in Russia where Circassians live.  
425
 Larissa Dorogova also uses the term “continued genocide” about the contemporary situation (Conference 
presentation, Istanbul May 2012). The American historian Walter Richmond refers to the Sochi Olympics as a 
‘continued genocide’ (Richmond 143).  Chek and Haghor, from the Circassian Association in Califo rnia, note in 
relation to the lack of archaeological excavations of the Olympic building projects that “the Olympics are 
unambiguously facilitating the destruction of physical evidence of genocide”(Chek and Haghor 2011, 15).  
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genocide and ethnocide are basically synonymous and refer to the destruction of a group’s culture” 
(Totten, Parsons and Hitchcock 2002, 60).426 The fear of a final loss of Circassian culture, 
especially due the widespread loss of the Circassian language, serves as a motivating factor for 
many of the Circassian activists.  
 
As mentioned above, the provision and dissemination of documentation has played a key role in the 
process of working for genocide recognition since 2005. The documentation material has, since 
then, been further expanded, and has been indexed, digitalised and translated into other languages. 
This illustrates how memorialisation plays a key role in the renewed Circassian mobilisation, 
although this was also the case before 2005.427 Today, the volume is significantly larger and a wider 
circle of individuals is actively producing content; there is now also a stronger focus on 
documentation.428 Perhaps the most significant element of the ongoing Circassian revival is the fact 
that the contemporary Russian Federation - as the formal successor state to not just the Soviet 
Union but also the Russian Empire - has become a target of the aims of genocide recognition.  
 
The role of documentation in the Circassian revival is similar to the processes of many other 
indigenous peoples around the globe that have suffered from forced displacement and other 
atrocities - often in relation to processes of colonisation. For instance, Linda Smith has stressed the 
importance of research in the revival of indigenous peoples. Smith further states that the Western 
discourse on post-colonialism reflects the dominance of a Western view, as there are still many 
places around the world where indigenous people are faced with a struggle for decolonisation. In 
many ways this corresponds to the challenges facing the renewed Circassian movement.  
 
One illustration of the importance of documentation in relation to the campaign for genocide 
recognition has been the access granted to researchers from Circassian civil society organisations to 
former imperial archives in Tbilisi in Georgia - when access to similar and larger archives in 
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 According to Chek and Haghor, a  reinforced Russification of the North Caucasus has taken place in recent years, 
including increased official support for a Cossack revival in the region, which they see as a sign of an accelerating 
ethnocide of the indigenous peoples of the North Caucasus (Chek and Haghor 2011, 12).  
427
 The role o f genocide recognition in the Circassian revival - and not least the mediated part, especially on the Internet 
- can also be seen as an extension of the “new genre of memorialisation” created by the late twentieth -century films on 
the Holocaust (’Shoah’ (1985) and ’Sch indler’s List’ (1993), both of which were accompanied by renewed efforts to 
collect eyewitness reports, enlarging archives of documentation and enlightenment campaigns)(Alexander 2004b, 259).  
428
 Alexander (2004b, 11) has stressed the role of carrier groups as “collective agents of the trauma process” in relation 
to “the cultural construction of trauma”.  
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different parts of Russia was prohibited.429 Since most of these sources are handwritten in the 
Russian language, they are not equally accessible to all and many of the documents are in a process 
of being translated into English and other languages. Corresponding research is taking place in 
Ottoman archives, where documents are mostly handwritten in the Turkish language using the 
Arabicc alphabet. Subsequently, these are also gradually being translated into other languages. As it 
concerns a minority group, these processes mostly take place within the civil society sector - outside 
governmental institutions and without access to public funding - although some limited cooperation 
with republican research institutions in the North Caucasus does take place. It is also a priority of 
many of the Circassian organisations to publish and present the material from the a rchives to the 
wider public in the form of exhibitions, books, websites etc. - and to promote further use of this 
material by potential independent researchers.  
 
The focus on documentation as part of the campaign for recognition of the Circassian genocide is 
included in the wider search for recognition and identity building among the Circassians. Just as 
with the Sochi Olympics, genocide recognition has become - internally as well as externally - a 
lever for increased Circassian mobilisation and memorialisation. This could indicate that the 
concerns sometimes voiced, that the genocide recognition agenda is too narrowly defined and could 
potentially lock the Circassian movement into a blind alley, are superfluous. The focus on genocide 
recognition seems to have generated further documentation and has thereby also served the needs of 
those interested in wider recognition of Circassian history and identity.  
 
“Governments and other agencies usually state that the deaths of indigenous peoples were an 
‘unintended consequence’ of certain actions, such as colonising remote areas, and that there were no 
planned efforts to destroy peoples on the basis of who they were” (Totten, Parsons and Hitchcock 
2002, 70).430 The lack of intention is often referred to in contemporary Russia, although an 
increasing amount of documentation is proving this argument highly doubtful. Addressing and 
countering some of the circulating myths has become a priority for many Circassian actors (Chek 
and Haghor 2011, 11). Two other examples of this type of myth should be mentioned. Firstly, that 
Circassians were killed by Turks on board Turkish ships - recent archive studies show that the ships 
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 Parts of the Imperial Russian archives are in Tbilisi, as the present-day Georg ian capital functioned in the nineteenth 
century as a regional administrative centre for the empire.  
430
 Maybury-Lewis stresses that a distinction between ‘genocide’ and ‘genocidal massacre’ - more singular cases of 
slaughtering of indigenous people - is sometimes relevant (Maybury-Lewis 2002, 45). 
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came from different countries, but mostly from Russia. 431 And secondly, that Circassia and 
especially the Black Sea coastal area became part of the Russian Empire according to the 
Adrianople-peace treaty of 1829, when this land was transferred from the Ottoman Empire - in spite 
of the fact that the Ottoman Empire at that point possessed only a few trading posts along the 
Circassian coast. These myths are regularly transferred through the media in Russia and through, for 
instance, tourism on the Sochi Riviera, although a new generation of tourist guides is increasingly 
interested in providing more accurate versions of Circassian history in the area, and some of the 
training courses for tourist guides are trying to do this.432 
 
Chek and Haghor complain about the misrepresentation of Circassian history in official Russian 
history writing, which they refer to as “in essence, a set of myths ... created to remove any 
culpability from Tsarist Russia for its crimes against the Circassian. These myths have become 
institutionalised to such a degree that even some Circassians themselves still believe them, despite 
conclusive evidence in the historical record that categorically disproves them.” (Chek and Haghor 
2011, 10).433 According to Chek and Haghor, “These myths are the primary instruments of genocide 
denial” (Chek and Haghor 2011, 11).434 
 
Maybury-Lewis has stressed the importance of power relations and introduced the term ‘relative 
powerlessness’ in relation to many attempted genocides against indigenous peoples. 435 The case of 
the Circassians in the nineteenth century in many ways corresponds to this description, though not 
on all accounts - either historically or today. Historically, the Circassians were far from powerless 
as they fought a war that lasted 47 years, according to official Russian sources, and 101 years 
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 Lists of ships, including numbers of Circassians on board, have been found in the Imperia l Russian archives in 
Tbilisi, Georg ia: Circassian-genocide.com/TbilisiIndex.php; presented by Ali Bersek, from the Circassian Cultural 
Institute, New Jersey, at a conference in Anaklia, Georg ia, May 2012, where copies of many of these documents were 
displayed in an exhibit ion. 
432
 For instance, trained by the Sochi branch of the Russian Geographical Society (RGS), which has regularly protested 
against the environmental destruction resulting from many of the Olympic building projects. RGS in Sochi has also 
published a book on Circassian history in the region. 
433
 Chek and Haghor themselves repeat a myth that is circulat ing among the Circassian diaspora: that the entire 
Circassian coast has “virtually no trace of Circassians”, referring to Oliver Bullough’s book: ‘Let our fame be great’ 
from 2010 (Chek and Haghor, 14).  
434
 According to Chek and Haghor, one of these myths is the ‘voluntary union’ between the Circassians and Russia that 
was celebrated in 2007. 
435
 “An overwhelming superiority in manpower, weapons and other technological means of support and a 
disproportionate use of power often characterise genocides towards indigenous peoples...” (Maybury -Lewis 2002, 43). 
Walter Richmond further adds that surrendering was often not accepted (Circassian Day, European Parliament, 
Brussels, 18-06-2012). 
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according to a Circassian understanding that is quickly gaining support now.436 Great Britain’s 
interest in the nineteenth-century Circassian resistance in terms of building potential alliances with 
the Circassians - though often coming from non-state or ‘non-official diplomatic actors’, also 
illustrates this kind of ‘relative powerlessness’. On the one hand, Circassia and the Circassians were 
a potential ally of Great Britain, but in spite of many statements of interest from various public 
figures supporting Circassia during the course of several decades, in the end some form of friendly 
relationship with the large and powerful Russia rather than small Circassia was regarded as more 
important to British interests (Jaimoukha 2001, 70). This kind of ‘relative powerlessness’ therefore 
also illustrates the role of the Caucasus as a location in the geopolitics of the nineteenth century, 
when the region became a scene of renewed imperial competition. In this game of geopolitics, 
Imperial Russia was successful in achieving control over the Black Sea coast, which was regarded 
as a key objective for the long-term interests of the Empire. At any rate, this can be seen in the way 
this objective - in the end - sealed the fate of the Circassians.  
 
It could also be argued that the contemporary Circassian mobilisation – which is increasingly taking 
the form of transnational cooperation - is showing signs of addressing this kind of ‘relative 
powerlessness’. The lobbying efforts of some Circassian organisations towards, for instance, the 
parliaments of Georgia and Estonia, where some form of post-Soviet and post-Imperial solidarity 
with Circassian issues can be found, is an example thereof.437 A number of Circassian civil society 
organisations played an important role in the process leading up to the recognition of the Circassian 
genocide by the Georgian parliament in 2011. The continued cooperation through, for instance, the 
Circassian Cultural Institute in Tbilisi and in relation to the 2012 revelation of the new monument 
to the nineteenth-century forced eviction of the Circassians from the Caucasus in Anaklia on the 
Georgian Black Sea coast are other examples of attempts at breaking-away from the situation of 
‘relative powerlessness’ through new forms of lobbying and alliance-building. In other words, 
Circassian actors have increasingly become transnational players with increased possibilities of 
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 It could be argued that it is precisely the strong Circassian resistance to the advancing Russian colonisation that 
ensured that a significant amount of knowledge about Circassia and the Circassians was circulated internat ionally - and 
arguably ensured an initial form of nation-state project which, in spite of never fu lly successfully materialising, still 
established a number of nation-state features that today play a significant ro le in the Circassian revival.  
437
 Georgian President Mihail Sakashvili has also, on several occasions, criticised the Sochi Olympics and encouraged 
an international boycott. 
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alliance-building in the geopolitical games surrounding the Caucasus which, since the fall of the 
Soviet Union, has again become a region of competing geopolitical interests. 438 
 
The fact that setting an agenda on ‘genocide recognition’ can be a potentially powerful ‘tool’ to 
break away from the position of ‘relative powerlessness’ has been illustrated by the successful 
lobbying efforts of, for instance, Jewish and Armenian diaspora organisations. This type of framing 
of historical atrocities as genocide has, in these and other cases proven to be efficient in relation to 
both the intra-group redefinition of identity and towards the external mobilisation, including a 
targeting of the relevant contemporary authorities - such as Russia in the case of the Circassians.  
 
Within the recent Circassian civil society mobilisation, the use of the Internet has played a key role. 
Circassian civil society actors have managed to enlarge and develop a new space for action - both 
among the diaspora and in Russia. It is important to stress that this is not just a virtual space. It 
includes the use of the Internet as both a means of publication of and campaigning for counter-
versions of the Circassian identity and history - as seen in the case of promoting an understanding 
of the exile as genocide - and as a means of communication, coordination and cooperation between 
the Circassian organisations. The arrival and increased outreach of the social media of Web 2.0 has 
resulted in new forms of youth activism and has further resulted in a large number of discussions on 
the definition and understanding of Circassian history and identity on sites such as Facebook, 
YouTube etc. According to my assessment, the Circassian Internet mobilisation has led to what can 
be labelled a virtual re-territorialisation of Circassia (which I refer to as ‘iCircassia’).  
 
According to a model developed by Maximillian Forte on the Internet-generated revival of 
indigenous people, the four key issues of this process are Visibility, Embodiment, Recognition and 
Authenticity. In the case of the ongoing Circassian mobilisation, these issues also constitute key 
elements of this process. After visiting and interviewing representatives from a number of 
Circassian organisations - especially among the diaspora - I can conclude that the word 
‘recognition’ perhaps characterises the Circassian revival best of all. Recognition of not simply 
genocide but recognition on a number of different levels as a contemporary people of the Caucasus 
as well as an historical people of the Caucasus in the history books of the world - and especially 
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 This type of phenomenon of new transnational forms of polit ical influence has been termed ’frontier zones (of 
globalisation)’ by Saskia Sassen. 
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those in Russia. In other words, this entails focusing on the second part of the ‘genocide 
recognition’ theme, which is generally discussed less than the more hyped-up term ‘genocide’.  
 
The reports on the forced expulsion of the Circassians in the nineteenth century, which are today 
remediated and presented on the Internet, include testimonies and eyewitness reports of such 
graphic detail that the suffering becomes emotional and affective - in spite of being 150 years 
removed. Even without the use of photographs and video interviews with survivors, which have 
played a key role in the remediation of the Holocaust over the past few decades - as described by 
Geoffrey Hartman as part of a “quest to recover or reconstruct a recipient, an ‘affective community’ 
... and [thus] the renewal of compassionate feelings” (Hartmann 1996, 153 - quoted from Alexander 
2004, 260).  
 
Moving from being a so-called ‘hidden people’ with a ‘forgotten history’, Circassians have now 
become frontrunners in a hyper-modern globalised transnational cosmopolitan way of life, in which 
new forms of media and communication are used for mobilisation and identity building. 439 And the 
Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014, as connected to the defining moment in Circassian history and 
identity through the 150th anniversary, will ensure that the Circassian experiences of today as well 
of their past will become much more known in the so-called World Community.440 A renewed so-
called Circassian ‘master narrative’ has been developed on the basis of this understanding of 
Circassian history and identity. It is this renewed C ircassian narrative that, in recent years, has 
increasingly been framed or referred to under the heading of ‘the Circassian Genocide’.  
 
In conclusion, the new Circassian organisations of the post-2005 generation have successfully 
initiated and continuously managed to set an agenda focusing on genocide recognition - assisted by 
the issue of the 2014 Sochi Olympics.  
 
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
439
 This is also a period when several of the classical cultural markers such as the Circassian language and the traditions 
of dances and music no longer have the same position that they used to. While this could be considered - at least partly - 
an effect of globalisation, the actions of the Circassian organisations and activists could be seen as a way of using other 
elements of the era of globalisation to compensate for these effects - in a redirected and modernised manner.  
440
 On thre ro le of defin ing moment, see Huttenbach (1995, 673). On the potential power of ‘genocide recognition’, 
Tony Kusher has stated that the Holocaust constitutes the defining moment of the 20th century (Kushner 2004, 254).  
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In combination with the Sochi 2014 Olympics, the issue of Circassian genocide recognition has 
contributed to elevating the so-called Circassian Question into a transnational issue that has also 
penetrated the agenda of the mainstream media in Russia - and elsewhere. This has been illustrated 
by reactions from politicians and various expert observers from the federal Russian centre. ‘Sochi’ 
has become a long-distance site of memory among Circassians worldwide, especially among the 
diaspora, where Sochi as a contemporary and concrete Caucasian space has become a symbol of the 
lost homeland, including the tragedy of war and forced expulsion that is now widely referred to as 
the Circassian genocide. The many references to the historical as well as the contemporary 
homeland in the Caucasus on the Internet, in the form of blogs, discussion forums, social media 
etc., can be termed a virtual re-territorialisation. They thus share a number of similarities with 
various decolonisation processes from different parts of the world - and with post-colonial efforts 
known in relation to other post- imperial contexts.441 
 
I find, in my analysis, that the decision to host the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi has played a key 
role, perhaps the key role, in creating a new unity among Circassians on the use of the term 
‘genocide’ as the joint heading or title of what was previously often referred to as the nineteenth-
century tragedy of the Circassians. The arrival of the Sochi Olympics has completed the triangle of 
constantly increasing Circassian mobilisation, in which the two other fixed points are ‘May 21 
(1864)’ and ‘genocide recognition’. These three issues have shown an ability to mutually reinforce 
each other and create a constantly increases memorialisation and mobilisation that continuously 
enhance the Circassian revival.442 The 2014 Sochi Olympics, as an international mega event, has in 
this way, significantly contributed to accelerating the Circassian level of memorialisation and 
mobilisation - within Russia and other national contexts as well as transnationally. In conclusion, 
‘genocide recognition’ has become the new framing of the Circassian revival, and this is largely the 
result of Circassian civil society action and mobilisation. The 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics play a 
key role as a ‘facilitating event’ that has contributed to mak ing the Circassian revival more visible - 
among Circassians internally as well as the world at large. It appears as though the Sochi Olympics 
have exponentially increased not just the visibility of Circassian issues but also the level of 
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 As Linda T. Smith notes, the term post-colonial indicates that the world has become decolonised, while in reality 
indigenous peoples are often still fighting a colonial heritage that they often experience as marginalising or 
discriminating (Smith 1999, 98).  
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 What we see in the Circassian memorialisation and counter-memorialisation process is simply the establishment of 
Sochi as a symbol of a lost homeland that is often mythologized.  
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involvement of ‘ordinary’ Circassians on a day-to-day level. The significantly increased role of the 
Internet - including social media such as Facebook and YouTube - has played a key role in this 
process. 
 
Although the term ‘genocide’ has a fairly precise meaning in international law, it has been highly 
disputed by governments. The term has, nevertheless, been used more broadly by a number of 
organisations, Circassian ones included, and played a significant role in mobilising against 
authoritarian or suppressive regimes.  
 
The Circassian genocide marks a particular Caucasian context in which different types of genocide 
intersect: ‘genocide of indigenous people’ and the ‘classical (East) European borderland genocides’, 
labelled as Bloodlands by Timothy Snyder (2010). The Caucasus also belonged to a zone in which 
modern imperial competition and collapse unfolded while new forms of population policies were 
introduced. All in all, in terms of genocidal policies and methods, the Caucasus region - by 
extension - can be categorised as part of the Bloodlands.  
 
Genocide recognition has largely functioned as a tool for mobilisation among the Circassians, 
simultaneously including historical documentation and memorialisation in general. As such, 
genocide recognition can be seen as a tool for achieving what I regard as a key overall purpose of 
the Circassian revival - to attain wider recognition as an historical as well as a contemporary people, 
with a belonging centred on an historical homeland in the in the north-western Caucasus.  
 
There is no doubt that genocide recognition is a powerful way of framing an historical trauma and 
functions as a powerful tool for generating internal mobilisation among co-Circassians (and 
sometimes including a wider circle of Caucasians). This illustrates the power of ‘identity politics’ in 
collective mobilisation - something that has been so significant in the post-Soviet sphere. 
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Chapter  9 
 
Sochi as a Site of Circassian Long-distance Memorialisation 
 
 
The following examples of slogans have been used by the revitalised Circassian movement since 
the end of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics.443 
“No Sochi Olympics on the graves of our ancestors” 
“Sochi - the land of genocide” and  
“You’ll be skiing on mass graves in Sochi.”  
This rhetorical linking of Sochi—and the 2014 Winter Olympics—with “Circassian mass graves” 
has proven to be a powerful combination in the increasingly transnational Circassian mobilisation 
of recent years. Another more elaborate example is from an editorial in the Circassian journal 
Isthmus:  
The Sochi Olympics 2014 will mark the 150th anniversary of the Circassian genocide. On May 
21, 1864, Russia declared the end of the Russo-Circassian war and the complete occupation 
of Circassia. The event that marked the end of the war was the fall of Sochi, the final frontier 
and the last capital of Circassia, all survivors of the massacre faced a mass exodus executed 
by the Russian government under such harsh conditions that most of them didn’t survive. 
Sochi was also the place that Circassians were exiled from, the largest diaspora 
proportionally in the world still lives outside of their homeland, and the Sochi Olympics is the 
final step of the Circassian genocide. Fully erasing the bloody history of Sochi and the 
Circassians. 444  
The new role of Sochi in the ongoing Circassian civil society mobilisation is no longer voiced only 
in relation to the annual Circassian commemorative events and demonstrations (held on May 21), 
that year by year have gained more and more support among Circassians around the world; it is also 
strengthened by the significantly increased level of Circassian action on the Internet. 
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 May21.org, noSochi2014.com, circassianculturalinstitute.org, caucasusforum.org. Other examples of protests against 
the Sochi Olympics are BoycottSochi.eu, AntiSochi.org and facebook.com/BoycottOlympics2014.  
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 “The Genocide Continues”. Isthmus No. 3, 2010. (Published by Circassian Cultural Institute, New Jersey.)  
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Circassians are an indigenous people of the North Caucasus who speak a unique Northwest-
Caucasian language. During the first decades of the nineteenth century, the southward expansion of 
the Russian Empire resulted in a renewed war between the Russian army and the Circassians. 445 At 
the time, Imperial Russia’s possession of the Caucasus was widely regarded both as a potential 
threat to the interests of Great Britain (and its allies) in the Middle East—as well as a threat to the 
geopolitical dominance of Great Britain in general. This led to discussions of potential British 
support for the Circassian resistance, which were often referred to in British and European media as 
the Circassian Question. Several British actors, officially and unofficially, visited Circassia in the 
mid-nineteenth century and took part in establishing a joint Circassian nation-building project as 
part of supporting the resistance against Russia (Jaimoukha 2001, 70). 446 Prior to this, a pre-modern 
Circassia had existed as a type of loose confederation of provinces without a central government. 447 
During many decades of war, lowland villages and crops were systematically burned in order to 
force Circassians into the mountains, where their resistance could be weakened by illness and a lack 
of food. The blockade of the Circassian Black Sea coast, maintained by Russia for decades until the 
final victory in 1864, resulted in widespread hunger and disease. The Circassian provinc e, where 
Sochi is located, was called Ubykhia, and it was the last district of historical Circassia to be 
defeated by the Imperial Russian army in 1864.448 As a result Ubykhia and the Ubykhians have a 
specific status in the renewed narrative on Circassian history (and victimisation)—often including 
the story on the death of the last Ubykh-speaking person in 1992 in Turkey. The Circassians 
presently found in Sochi are mainly urbanised Shapsugs from the Shapsugia province, north of 
Ubykhia. 
 
Circassians were presented with the choice either of resettling in the lowlands north of the Kuban 
River or of going into exile in Ottoman Turkey. Most of the surviving Circassians felt forced to go 
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 After the fall o f the Soviet Union, Circassian actors began to rename and re-periodise the war between Russia and 
Circassia from just constituting a (often hidden or misrepresented) part of the “Caucasian Wars” from 1817 to 1864, 
which is the term mostly used in Russia, into the “Russian-Circassian War” from 1763 to 1864. 
446
 A number of British actors spent what were often long periods in Circassia in the 1830s and took an active part in 
promoting political unity among the Circassian tribes in their war against Russia. This included promoting international 
recognition of Circassia as a nation-state and the design of the joint Circassian flag that has a key position in the 
contemporary Circassian revival. Several of these British actors wrote books about their periods in Circassia , which  
today constitute key historical and ethnographical knowledge that is often remediated and re -circulated on the Internet. 
447
 Most of the Circassian provinces could be labelled as feudal while some had a more egalitarian structure.  
448
 During the nineteenth century wars, Ubykhia increasingly became a part of the united Circassian resistance and 
eventually came to be regarded as a Circassian province, although earlier Ubykhia had often been regarded as an 
independent unit. Linguistically Ubykh constitutes a separate category parallel to Western Circassian and Eastern 
Circassian (Kabardian). Together with Abkhazian, they constitute the group of Northwestern Caucasian languages.  
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into exile. However, which neither Russia nor the Ottoman Empire was prepared for this; hundreds 
of thousands of Circassians perished under extremely harsh conditions during the exodus at both 
shores of the Black Sea. Many Circassian actors who protest against the Sochi Winter Olympics in 
2014 now seek recognition of this process as an act of genocide. 449 Notably, 2014 will mark the 
150th anniversary of the forced displacement, further enhancing the ongoing Circassian revival.  
 
Since the mid-2000s, a renewed transnational Circassian revival has gradually accelerated. 
Consequently an expression widely known and used in the nineteenth century has returned: the 
Circassian Question.450 The current Circassian civil society mobilisation began when, in the mid-
2000s, a number of new organisations began to appear—both inside Russia and in many of the 
countries where the diaspora are settled. Several of these organisations co-signed an appeal to the 
Russian Parliament for recognition of the forced Circassian exile from the Caucasus in the 
nineteenth century as an act of genocide. This marked the beginning of a new phase of Circassian 
mobilisation, which was further enhanced when, in 2007, Russia was chosen to host of the 2014 
Winter Olympics, to take place in Sochi.451 One of the first responses from the Circassian 
organisations was to establish the website OlympicGenocide.net, which later became 
NoSochi2014.com; the website was developed and maintained in cross-border cooperation among 
an increasing number of Circassian civil society organisations.  
 
Civil society mobilisation through youth activism and the use of the Internet constitutes a key 
element of the Circassian revival (Hansen 2012, 122). Circassian civil society actors have managed 
to develop a new space for action—both in Turkey, and to a lesser extent, in Russia as the two main 
states to consider in the Circassian context. This includes a use of the Internet both as a means of 
publication and campaigning for counter-versions of Circassian identity and history (as seen in the 
                                                 
449
 In Russia this is widely referred to as “unintentional” (cf. Sergei Mar kedonov, political scientist, in Caucasian Knot 
2010). This viewpoint is increasingly undermined by research that includes documentation from archives that hitherto 
have been difficult to get access to: for instance research results presented by the American historian Walter Richmond 
at conferences in May 2012 in Anaklia, Georgia and in June 2012 in Brussels , Belgium; the results are presented in the 
book The Circassian Genocide (2013). 
450
 Somet imes also referred to as the Circassian Issue or the Circassian Problem. Such designations have often been 
used in relation to indigenous peoples or peripheral geographies in a manner similar Edwards Said’s defin ition of the 
term Orientalis m. Assigning indigenous groups as a “problem” or a “question” according to Linda T. Smith is one of 
the degrading practices of colonialis m (Smith 1999, 90). The Circassian Question was largely interpreted as part of the 
so-called Eastern Question in the nineteenth century—the competition between Britain and Russia over influence in the 
Middle East and beyond, that has also been referred to as the Victorian Cold War or the Great Game.  
451
 According to Sufian Zhemukhov (2009) the Circassian Question was “practically dormant” until Russia won the 
Olympic bid in 2007. 
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case of promoting the understanding of the exile as an act of genocide) and as a means of 
communication, coordination and cooperation between Circassian organisations. The arrival of the 
social media of Web 2.0, together with the increased outreach of the Internet, has resulted in new 
forms of youth activism and in a large number of discussions on sites such as Facebook and 
YouTube on the meaning of Circassian identity.  
 
The increased level of mobilisation among Circassian diaspora youth has come as a surprise to 
some observers, not only because this is the first generation that no longer speaks the Circassian 
language, but partly also because some of the cultural traditions, that had survived and unfolded in 
rural communities through more than a century in exile, had been lost during the relocation to large 
urban entities (Hansen 2013, 97). A number of Circassian youth activists have shown that 
reproduced representations of Circassian history and identity are still central to most of their actions 
and priorities, while at the same time they challenge the operational modus of older organisations. 
Many Circassian and Caucasian youth activists are inspired by international civil society trends to 
integrate social media and the Internet in their activities. 
 
Circassian Counter-Memorialisation 
 
Since 2005, a renewed Circassian memorialisation process has become a key element of Circassian 
civil society mobilisation and has increasingly taken the form of a counter-memorialisation 
targeting official Russian historiography, which today prescribes an understanding of Circassian 
inclusion into Imperial Russia as voluntary. This is not only opposed by most Circassians but is also 
generally rejected by most international research—including a number of Russian scholars—on the 
issue.  
 
The French historian, Pierre Nora, has contributed to the discussion on the role of minorities or 
ethnic groups in relation to the “memory turn”—by referring to this type of memorialisation 
processes as an “emancipator trend” and as part of a “democratisation of history”. Nora suggests 
two main reasons behind this outbreak of memory. The first reason is the “acceleration of history” 
as reflected in, for example, media, books, museums, tourism and historical re-enactments. Nora 
describes the second reason as follows:  
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A second reason for this outbreak of memory is of a social nature and is linked to what might 
be called, by analogy with “acceleration”, the “democratisation” of history. This takes the 
form of a marked emancipator trend among peoples, ethnic groups and even certain classes 
of individuals in the world today; in short, the emergence, over a very short period of time, of 
all those forms of memory bound up with minority groups for whom rehabilitating their past 
is part and parcel of reaffirming their identity (Nora 2002, 5).  
This leads Nora to define “minority memories” as part of three types of “decolonisation”: 
international, domestic and ideological. The latter is the most relevant with regard to the Circassian 
context as it addresses the context of a totalitarian past where “liberated peoples” had “long-term 
memories confiscated, destroyed or manipulated” (Nora 2002, 5). 452 Nevertheless, “international 
decolonisation” is also relevant in the Circassian context: International decolonisation, which has 
allowed societies previously stagnating in the ethnological inertia of colonial oppression access to 
historical consciousness and the rehabilitation (or fabrication) of memories (Nora 2002, 5). This 
links to the pre-Soviet era of the Russian Empire as addressed by the documentation and research 
efforts prioritised by many Circassian organisations and their partners. A revised “domes tic 
decolonisation” is in many ways what Circassian actors are asking for. On the one hand, these types 
of decolonisation frame the Circassian memorialisation efforts as part of a redefinition of minority 
memories in a democratisation and emancipation perspective. On the other hand, they also illustrate 
that this struggle for “decolonisation” continues in the case of the Circassian revival. 
 
According to Michael Rothberg, there is a widespread understanding of collective memory as a 
zero-sum game that promotes the understanding of memory as competitive: “Fundamental to the 
conception of competitive memory is a notion of the public sphere as a pre-given, limited space in 
which already-established groups engage in a life-and-death struggle” (Rothberg 2009, 5). If not 
literally a life-and-death struggle, this understanding of competitive memory corresponds in many 
ways to the wider Russian as well as to the North Caucasian contexts more specifically. There is a 
significant reluctance on the federal level to accept the ongoing redefinition of Circassian memory 
and identity, as illustrated by celebrations, held in 2007, of the 450-year anniversary of the 
“voluntary” union between Russia and the Circassians (see below). 453 Ten years earlier, similar 
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 This refers to, for instance, the former Communist countries and some of the totalitarian reg imes in Latin America in 
the second half of the 20
th
 century. 
453
 “The challenges of the Sochi Olympics and Russia’s Circassian problem” (North Caucasus  Analysis 2007); 
“Circassian outrage at anniversary plans.” (IWPR 2006). 
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celebrations were cancelled after being rejected as false by a commission of historians from 
different parts of Russia.454 In a similar vein, Circassian actors complain that their history as an 
indigenous people of the area is disregarded in the extensive Sochi Olympic presentation 
material.455 This reluctance of the federal centre could illustrate the increasing authoritarian 
tendencies, including attempts to control civil society and ethnic minorities (Orttung 2012, 2). 456 
 
In recent years, Circassian actors have shown that additional public spheres or counter-publics can 
be developed and, if successful, manage to extend into the wider federal public sphere of Russia 
(Fraser 1990 and 2007). This has largely been possible due to the interest generated by the 2014 
Winter Olympics as a forthcoming mega sports event that, by definition, is transnational. The new 
forms of activism, including transnational cooperation and the use of new communication 
technologies, could prove to be a new challenge for the Russian system of “managed democracy”. 
A significant element of Russian governance during the Putin era has been containing, for example, 
civil society, ethnic revival and political opposition into controllable and manageable pockets, 
characterised by a reduced visibility in relation to the larger public sphere of Russia. The December 
2011 Russian elections showed that civil society protesting, as well as using new social media and 
the Internet more generally, could set a wider national agenda on democratisation. 457 Still, President 
Putin won a resounding victory in the March 2012 election; subsequently, the space for action of 
civil society actors has, on several accounts, been reduced. 458 The new visibility generated by the 
Circassian mobilisation contains elements similar to those used in the protests against election fraud 
which penetrated the otherwise tightly government-controlled public sphere of Russia in the winter 
2011-2012. 
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 “Outrage at “fake” Circassian anniversary.” (IWPR 2007); “Russia: imperial anniversary challenged in North 
Caucasus” (Radio Free Europe 2007).  
455
 The Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics was also criticised by local indigenous people on several accounts, although 
the degree of indigenous inclusion was considerably higher than in the case of the Sochi Olympics.  
456
 According to the annual Freedom House report on Russia 2012,  Russia is classified as a “Consolidated Authoritarian 
Regime” (Orttung 2012).  
457
 Sometimes referred to as the Russian Spring. The difficu lties of civil society protesting in Russia were further 
illustrated by the court case and conviction of the members of  the Pussy Riot group during the summer of 2012, that 
generated significant international media coverage. A new anti-Sochi Olympics initiative was launched during this 
period, including a campaign with a drawing of the Olympic rings in handcuffs with the t ext “Pussia Sochi 2014” 
(“Boycott Russian Olympics 2014” on Facebook.com, upstart on August 17, 2012).  
458
 A 2012 law in Russia demands civil society organisations that receive funding from donors abroad to formally 
register this as support from “foreign agents”. This is for instance used to imprison activists from organisations, that 
receive funds from international donor to different projects, for taking part in demonstrations that are labelled as, for 
instance, “mass riots” (Voice of America 2012).  
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From the perspective of many Circassian actors, the Sochi Olympics are perceived either as a 
deliberate omission or as an act of enforced forgetting. 459 Notions of “hidden history” or 
“suppressed history” play an important role in the contemporary processes of redefining 
“Circassianness” (Cohen 1997, 235).460 The Circassian historical (as well as contemporary) 
presence in the region being ignored in the extensive Olympic material motivates and generates 
increased mobilisation among the Circassians. One such example is when Greek colonies on the 
Black Sea coast two thousand years ago are mentioned, while the Circassians as an indigenous 
people of the area are disregarded.461 With the spreading of the Internet the process of counter-
acting to enforced forgetting has accelerated, resulting in an increased involvement of additional 
Circassian activists.  
 
Developed by Pierre Nora, “sites of memory” is another term that has gained prominence as one 
aspect of the memory turn, especially since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union (Nora 1997, 1). A “site of memory” can be a concrete geographical place, a symbolic link to 
a place that once existed, or a historical event.462 In any case, the spatial dimension of 
memorialisation is often at the centre of discussions, although it usually constitutes a more complex 
phenomenon than just a spatial representation.463 Sochi as a renewed site of memory within the 
Circassian memorialisation process has increasingly become part of the rituals and performances 
carried out by Circassians in relation to the annual May 21 events. The rituals and performances on 
the Internet have become a year-round phenomenon that peak on May 21. The Circassian diaspora’s 
use of a redefined site of memory in a distant historical homeland has similarities with various post-
colonial memorialisation processes. The role of activists and civil society organisations in the 
Circassian memorialisation process demonstrates the relevance of the terms “vernacular memory” 
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 “Putin IOC speech - lies about the Sochi Olympics - Hiding the truth of Circassian genocide” (YouTube.com 2011). 
Somet imes also referred to as cultural genocide or ethnocide (massviolence.org/Ethnocide).  
460
 Sefer Berzeg for instance refers to the Circassian village of “Socha” that was bombarded and destroyed by the 
Russian navy in 1830 and then replaced with the fortress Navaginski in 1838, that later become the city of Sochi 
(named in 1896, formal town status in 1917) (Berzeg Undated). Both are named after the Sochi river that is generally  
regarded as of Circassian/Caucasian origin though opposing versions can be found. 
461
 “Full version of Putin speech (2014 W inter Olympics)”. Youtube.com (2007). For a  Circassian YouTube-response, 
see note 18. 
462
 Nora’s term focuses especially both on geographical locations including, for instance, monuments, celebrations or 
rituals linked to certain sites, archives, etc. and on issues such as celebrations, historical persons or symbols such as 
flags or languages. 
463
 Other concepts such as cultural heritage, historical consciousness and identity building are related to the term “sites 
of memory”. 
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and “official memory” as protests against official Russian history writing are at the centre of 
Circassian efforts (Bodnar 1992, 15).464  
 
Transnational long-distance belonging to a historical homeland constitutes one of the key 
characteristics of diaspora groups (e.g., Safran 1991, 83). 465 This element of long-distance 
belonging has evolved into a transnational community-building process that includes a strongly 
increased level of cross-border exchange—whether of social, cultural, economic or political 
character (Van Hear 1998, 6). The intense interest in discussing their historical homeland on the 
Internet illustrates an increasing diversity in the memorialisation and renegotiation of homeland 
perceptions among diaspora Circassians, most of whom have never visited the Caucasus. In 1998, 
the anthropologist Seteney Shami (1998, 642) characterised this changed relationship to the 
homeland as a shift from a mythological homeland towards a concrete territory, but I will argue 
both that this is a process that continues today and that this affected, at most, only a small 
percentage of Circassians in 1998. The Circassian diaspora’s actions on the Internet have become so 
widespread that they can be labelled as a virtual re-territorialisation, indicating a re-establishment of 
connections and a sense of belonging, that challenge the state where this historical homeland is 
located today (Hansen 2009). Certain actors within Russian media and politics perceive this as a 
challenge, and they have responded by calling the Circassian diaspora’s actions “external” or 
“foreign” interference. Still, the Circassian diaspora actors’ combining of “Sochi” and “May 21 
(1864)” is a “double long-distance counter-memorialisation” that brings together representations 
both of time and of space in a strong symbolic illustration: “Sochi 1864-2014”. 
 
It is not surprising that mega events such as the Sochi Winter Games generate counter-actions 
(which can be labelled “counter-branding”) from organisations focussing on, for instance, 
environmental protection or indigenous peoples’ rights. 466 Such protests are often regarded as 
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 The three Circassian republics in many ways constitute an in-between category in this respect. On the one hand the 
republican leaders take part in official celebrat ions of 450 years of voluntary union and publicly flag slogans of the 
United Russia party saying “together forever”, while at the same time balancing the wordings in s tatements in relation 
to the annual May 21 commemorative events. These official Russian versions are simultaneously countered by research 
and publications from local republican research institutes. 
465
 For instance, Benedict Anderson, Schiller and Fouron (2001, 4) have written on the role of long-distance nationalism 
but this is only one of several aspects of the revival of the long-distance relationship among the Circassian diaspora. 
This is also illustrated by the five different categories or strands of the Circassian movement identified by Sufian 
Zhemukhov (2012, 511), of which “nationalism” is but one.  
466
 One element of the Circassian counter-branding is constituted by reference to the name “Krasnaya Polyana”—the 
location in the mountains where the downhill skiing events will take p lace and the planned location of Russian winter 
sport tourism after the Olympic Games (Mountain Cluster). This name can be translated as “Red Meadow”, or as one 
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hostile or against the interests of the nation in countries such as the Russian Federation, where the 
process of democratic transition towards diversity, pluralism and a non-restricted civil society has, 
arguably, receded. Resistance and protests have become part and parcel of all mega-sport events, 
and the Olympic Games are regularly met with various counter-actions (Jarvie 2012, 428). Another 
type of resistance directly and wholly oriented towards the Olympics is the Counter Olympics 
Network (CON), which was organised as a network of organisations in which individuals with 
diverse interests cooperated to protest against a number of issues relating to the 2012 London 
Olympics.467 
 
The aforementioned official celebrations of 450 years of voluntary union between Circassians and 
Russia in 2007 constitute a key example of the role of contested or competing memory in the 
Circassian mobilisation.468 Many Circassian activists refer to the 450-year celebrations as part of 
their motivation to become actively involved in the Circassian revival—often in combination with 
the Sochi Olympics.469 On October 4, 2007, the first transnationally coordinated demonstration took 
place in Istanbul and New York, where protesters stressed the connection between ignoring the 
Circassians in the Sochi Olympics project and promoting the understanding of a violent, forced 
exodus as voluntary unity. A huge triumphal arch, modelled after the one in Paris, was erected in 
Nalchik, in the North Caucasus, for the celebrations of the 450-year anniversary.470 Further, a large 
federal budget for concerts, cultural festivals and publications in all the Circassian republics was 
allocated from Moscow connected to the anniversary celebrations. 471  
 
These large-scale celebrations were carried out despite the cancellation of similar celebrations ten 
years earlier, when a commission of Russian historians of different ethnicity concluded it would be 
more appropriate to refer to these historical events as violent wars and forced evictions rather than 
                                                                                                                                                                  
person has suggested, “Blood-Red Clearing” (in comments to http://nosochi2014.com/press -release/index.php, 27-7-
2012).  
467
 During the 2012 London Olympics, ICON (the International Counter Olympics Network) was launched with the 
intention of continuing the joint efforts as a transnational network-based cooperation (CounterOlympicsNetwork 2012).  
468
 In an article on NoSochi2014.com, a Circassian writer from Turkey, Sefer Berzeg, refers to the 450-year anniversary 
celebrations as the “production of a factitious history thesis” (Berzeg Undated). 
469
 Sochi has been subject to similar historical reassessments. For instance in relat ion to the official 150 -year 
anniversary of Sochi in the late 1980s: “The Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of History announced that 1838 
was not the founding year of Sochi but the date of its conquest by Russian troops (the Circassians recaptured it after the 
Crimean War but lost it again in 1864)”, as the leaders of a Shapsug organisation in the region pointed out in 2008 
(Zhemukhov 2009). Th is is still ignored in many tourist  guide-books and other tourist guide narratives. 
470
 The arch is located in a roundabout on the main road north towards central Russia. Fifty years earlier, the so -called 
Maria-statue at the central square in Nalchik was erected to celebrate the 400-year anniversary. 
471
 $ 7 million according to Fatima Tlisova (2007).  
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as “voluntary unity”. The official Russian version was also countered by the erection of a 
monument in remembrance of the Circassian victims in the war between 1763 and 1864 in a central 
park of Nalchik. The statue is formed like a tree, and it’s called the “Tree of Life” in reference to an 
old Circassian legend—it has become a focal point for the annual Circassian May 21 events. 472 
Many monuments in the Caucasus in general are a noteworthy factor in the Circassian revival that 
illustrates the role of competing and contested memorialisation in the region. An examp le of this is 
the many monuments in the North Caucasus of Russian generals that took part in the colonisation 
the region in the nineteenth century. In Lazerevskoe (in the greater Sochi area), Circassian activists 
have on several occasions attacked the statue of Admiral Lazarev, who they regard as responsible 
for assaults and killings of Circassians including civilians. 473 
 
Circassian memorialisations have also involved a context of competing monuments along the Black 
Sea coast with the Sochi Rivera at the centre, in many ways a classic post-Soviet memorialisation 
dispute.474 One act of potential and/or partly official recognition of Circassian history in the area is 
the decision to construct a monument depicting three persons including a Circassian and a Cossack 
shaking hands (plus also an Armenian) by the Sochi Airport in Adler. This type of monument, 
many of which can still be found in the Caucasus, was used by the Soviet leaders to illustrate the 
friendship of peoples united by Soviet communism. Representatives of the main Circassian 
association on the Black Sea coast reject the suggested monument at Sochi Airport as representing a 
historical lie: a bloody war was fought between the Circassians and the Cossacks, who were part of 
the advancing Imperial Russian Army that rewarded them with the land formerly belonging to the 
Circassians.475 To many Circassians, this was another example of the official Russian history 
manipulating the narrative of the Circassians. Whether this monument actually will be erected is 
still not clear.  
 
Shortly after the Soviet Union fell in 1991, a monument commemorating the expulsion of the 
Circassians and the Abkhazians was established in Krasnaya Polyana, where alpine skiing events 
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 The competing memorialisation has become visib le in the urban space of Nalchik. 
473
 To many Circassians the very name of the city of Lazerevskoe is seen as an insult, that constantly remind them about 
the tragedies of the nineteenth century (as does also the name of Sochi).  
474
 The greater Sochi area—sometimes referred to as the Sochi Riv iera or the Russian Riviera—is a 142 kilometre long 
urban settlement that in the tourism promotion often is referred to as Europe’s largest coastal town or urbanised area 
(second in the world only to San Francisco). It  is this coastline that most of the tourism act ivities in Sochi are orientated  
towards, supplemented with especially Krasnaya Polyana and Abkhazia. 
475
 Informat ion retrieved in the Caucasus by the author in 2009.  
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will occur during the Winter Olympics. However, after a few years, the Sochi authorities ordered it 
removed and subsequently the monument was relocated to the Black Sea coast in Abkhazia, where 
it presently stands. Another monument commemorating the eviction of the Circassians was 
presented to the public in Anaklia, Georgia (close to Abkhazia on the Black Sea coast) on May 21, 
2012.476 This is yet another example of the increased transnationalisation of the competing 
memorialisations surrounding the Circassian Question, especially along the Black Sea coast. 
Moreover, it marks a “second step” following the Georgian Parliament’s official recognition of the 
Circassian genocide in 2011.  
 
A new initiative in the tourism sector in Sochi, including significant elements of renewed Circassian 
memorialisation, resulted in the Circassian village Bolshoi Kichmai, outside Sochi, becoming the 
“hit of the season” in 2011. This one-day bus-trip is advertised all over Sochi as either “33 
waterfalls” or “evening show” on posters showing Circassian dancers. 477 The waterfalls have been a 
tourist attraction in the Sochi area for many years but now include an evening show of Circassia n 
dances performed by professional dancers from the Adygeya Republic, which is located on the 
other side of Caucasian mountain range. The name Circassian (or Caucasian) is not mentioned on 
the posters, which show Circassian dancers dressed in traditional Caucasian costumes.478 These 
relatively new tourist initiatives are referred to by some of the initiators in the village as “ethno-
tourism’, and they have become very successful in just a few years: often more than one thousand 
tourists visit the village every day. This development has revitalised Bolshoi Kichmai, generated 
many new jobs and managed to stop its depopulation. As part of this process, the village now has 
five museums with many exhibited items signalling “authenticity” by linking to historical 
Circassian village life.479 Authenticity and local belonging are also signalled by the presentations of 
the tamada, the Circassian man who functions as a storyteller by linking together the different dance 
                                                 
476
 The Georg ian involvement has been labelled by some as an attempt at divid ing the usual solidarity be tween 
Circassians and Abkhazians (Jaimoukha 2001, 82). They generally regard each other as brothering peoples, and 
intermarriages often take place within the diaspora in  Turkey, where Circassian and Abkhazian v illages have often been 
located in the same areas and where Circassians and Abkhazians were part  of the same cu ltural associations.  
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 In Russian. By 2011 the language used in the tourist sector in Sochi is predominantly Russian.  
478
 The Kuban Cossacks have, in the former centuries, taken inspiration from the male dress of the Caucasian 
Mountaineers named after the Circassians: The Cherkesska. The casual tourist of the Sochi Riv iera is often unable to 
notice the difference. As a Circassian from Sochi ironically noted in 2009, “The most Circassian part o f the Sochi 
Olympics will be the costume on the ‘Cossacks’ greeting new arrivals at the Sochi Airport ”. (p.c.) 
479
 Approximately ten Circassian villages are located in this area which, before 1864, was part of the Shapsugia 
province in Circassia. A Shapsug National district also existed from 1924 to 1945 (Natho 2009, 414). Since all villages 
were burnt during the war and colonisation, and all remaining Circassians were forced t o move to the northern plains, 
the present-day Circassian villages in the area were established by Shapsugs, who managed to return to the area an 
establish new villages from the 1870s.  
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numbers of the shows. The tamada generally avoid mentioning “1864” and the nineteenth century 
war—perhaps because most of the spectators are ethnic Russians—but he still presents Circassian 
history and traditions in the region with dignity, which is a general aim among the organisers of the 
tourism initiatives in the village. The local belonging is further emphasised by incorporating 
Circassian legends, most of which are linked to the region. 480 Furthermore, there has been an 
increase in the number of published books and booklets on Circassian issues in Sochi; many of 
these are published on the other side of the Caucasus mountain range in the Republic of Adygeya, 
but also distributed in Sochi. This story of successful “ethno-tourism” in a Circassian village is an 
example of how Circassian spaces have become enlarged these years-not only on the Internet.481 
Several other villages and towns are considering similar tourism projects, some of which are 
regarded as problematic due to the lack of proximity to Sochi. The tourism sector in Sochi remains 
predominantly oriented towards a post-Soviet market, but one of the goals of the Sochi Olympics is 
to attract European tourists, among others, in the immediate future (Kreiten 2011, 350). All things 
considered, tourism-related trends would increase knowledge of Circassian history in the region.  
 
For the Circassian diaspora, local Circassian names of rivers, valleys and mountains, as well as old 
Circassian legends of the land, are examples of a hidden or forgotten history that has almost 
disappeared.482 Most local Circassians on the Black Sea coast still possess this knowledge, and 
tourist-guides in the region sometimes refer to the origin of these names and often convey stories of 
the local legends (though often only elements hereof). The level of included information—and 
correct information—on Circassian history and contemporary presence in tourist guide books and 
brochures still varies significantly, although it appears to be increasing alongside tourism in 
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 The Russian Geographical Society (RGS)—that, in the nineteenth century, was a part of the Russian imperial 
apparatus of colonisation—is today an NGO that provides knowledge that otherwise might have been suppressed or 
ignored. The Sochi branch takes part in training of tourist guides, and it has published books showing a mo re inclusive 
approach to the indigenous peoples’ history in the area than is the case of the Olympic project. This includes, for 
instance, the books The History of the Ubykhs by B.I. Vorishilov (2008) and Caucasian Names, Titles and Legends by 
A.V. Tverdy i (2008). The knowledge on Circassian history transmitted by tourist guides varies significantly. Many 
tourist guides still have limited knowledge on local history. Still, they often refer—as part of the stream of informat ion 
passed on to tourists during excursions—to names of rivers, valleys and mountains as being of Circassian origin.  
481
 The successful introduction of Circassian “ethno-tourism” appears to be spreading, with proposals to develop new 
Circassian villages for tourism in the Anapa-region (two hundred kilometres north of Sochi) and in the above-
mentioned Anaklia in Georgia, where the houses are planned to form the stars and arrows in the Circassian flag.  
482
 The names in the wider Sochi area are not only Circassian but sometimes also of Abaza or Abkhaz origin, especially 
in the southern parts. A number of legends (Narts) are shared between Circassians and Abaza/Abkhazians. Different 
publications on the Nart legends and/or about their origin are published, for instance, in Maikop in the Republic of 
Adygeya on the other side of the Caucasian mountain range but are increasingly distributed along the Sochi Riviera. 
(“Nartskie skazan iya dlya detei” (Nart tales for children), Elot.ru, 2008). The Nart legends generally play an important 
part of the Circassian revival on the Internet, though many are still in the early stages of understanding how these link to  
the historical homeland. 
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general.483 Circassian names are mentioned on many souvenirs—beach bags, t-shirts, caps and 
magnets—that can be seen all over the Sochi area in the tourist season. Still, these souvenir 
products mainly represent local exotica to many tourists as few know the names are of Circassian 
origin.484 Another example of the continued use of Circassian names is the 2012 decision of naming 
the Olympic Stadium in Sochi after Fisht Mountain, which is both a Circassian name and one of the 
most important mountains in the mythology and history of the western parts of historical 
Circassia.485 One the one hand, this decision could place one of the requests of Circassian 
organisations into the spotlight, namely, the request to base the opening and closing ceremonies on 
local indigenous legends and symbols (as in the cases of Sydney in 2000 and Vancouver in 2010). 
On the other hand, this seems unlikely as, according to the preferred Russian version of the Greek 
legend, Fisht is the mountain where Prometheus was chained. In most Circassian versions of the 
Prometheus-legends, the much higher Mount Elbrus (located more than hundred kilometres south-
east of Fisht) are mostly referred to, while many of the Greek versions simply just refer to “a 
Caucasus mountain”.  
 
The Sochi Olympics in the Circassian Revival 
 
The reproduction of Sochi as a key location in Circassian memory and identity has become 
widespread among Circassians worldwide partly due to the increasingly successful 
institutionalisation of May 21 (1864) as a common day of remembrance. Recently, this has been 
further enhanced through linking and sharing slogans and photos on the Internet. These 
commemorative acts, as well as the wider Circassian memorialisation in general, include 
establishing Sochi both as the location of the last Circassian Parliament from 1861 to 1864 
(therefore regularly referred to as the former Circassian capital) and as one of the last locations from 
where Circassians left the Caucasus in 1864 (Jaimoukha 2001, 69).486 
                                                 
483
 Almost exclusively in Russian language. 
484
 Including the names of Ubykh origin. In the districts of Krasnaya Polyana and Adler many of the topographic names 
are of Abaza o r Abkhaz origin.  
485
 Mount Fisht lies along the border to the Republic of Adygeya, north of Sochi, in an area where the so-called 
Circassian Trail, which links the Black Sea coast with Adygeya, is located. This trail can be expected to play an 
increasing role as tourism continues to grow in the Sochi region. Mount Fisht  has earlier been the scene of clashing or 
competing popular memory when a large orthodox cross was erected on the northern side of the mountain and 
subsequently was removed by what is assumed to be Circassian activists (Vatchagaev 2009).  
486
 Zhemukhov (2009) refers to Sochi as “the last capital of independent Circassia (1861 -1864)”. 
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In combination with a number of new publications, newspaper articles and other forms of media 
representations, the institutionalisation of May 21 as a joint annual transnational day of 
commemoration among Circassians illustrates how the Circassian memorialisation has developed 
since the fall of the Soviet Union, including elements of “countering” or “competing” as seen in 
other post-totalitarian or post-colonial contexts. With the establishment of new organisations and 
web-based initiatives since the mid-2000s, this process has accelerated significantly, supported by 
an ever-increasing use of social media. A key characteristic of this development is the new role of 
contemporary Russia as a central target of actions and events. This accelerated process has included 
a new focus on Sochi as a link both to the Circassian genocide and to the 2014 Olympics, which 
many Circassians regard as a disrespectful travesty of the 150-year anniversary of their forced 
exodus from the Caucasus (Berzeg, undated). Internet-based actions today function as an extension 
of offline memorialisation practises, which, in many ways, have also resulted in extending the May 
21 commemorative actions into potential everyday practise. The Internet can function as a 
“democratic” space where a plethora of websites and social media are used in the joint process of 
memorialisation and mobilisation. In other words, the contemporary commemorative acts among 
Circassians represent an extension both in terms of space and time. 
 
Appeals for genocide recognition and the spreading of this understanding among Circassians 
internally were at the centre of the renewed Circassian mobilisation since 2005; following the 2007 
decision to hold the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, these two issues have combined to further 
strengthen and accelerate the Circassian revival. Since 2007 an increased lobbying process, which 
included a focus on both issues, led to the Georgian parliament, in 2011, formally recognising the 
Circassian genocide.  
 
Most of the Imperial Russian archives are located in Russia and have often been difficult for 
Circassian and international researchers to gain full access to. However, parts of the imperial 
archives are located in Tbilisi, a city that during the nineteenth century functioned (under the name 
Tiflis) as the administrative centre of Imperial Russia in the Caucasus. The cooperation between 
Circassian organisations and Georgia on the issue of genocide recognition resulted in a research 
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grant being awarded to a Circassian researcher to investigate the imperial archives. 487 Key docu-
ments from the nineteenth century were copied, and selected findings were presented at exhibitions 
and on the Internet.488 The renewed attention on Sochi due to the Winter Olympics has resulted in 
an increased documenting of Sochi- related events as part of the general search for documents 
supporting the genocide claims. This include records of ships sailing with Circassian refugees from 
the Sochi area; the records detail how the exodus was organised, including how ships—many of 
which sank on route to their destinations—were overcrowded with “natives” (JFNC undated, 3; 
UNPO 2006).489 Assessments, prepared by different Russian army officers stationed along the 
Black Sea coast, of the total number of “natives deported” during 1863 and 1864 are also found in 
imperial records. According to these sources, the final number of exiled Circassians is 470,703 
(JFNC Undated, 1). Imperial Russian reports further render the existence of mass-graves in the 
Sochi area probable as they, for instance, include expressions of concerns from the army staff over 
the possibility of diseases spreading into potentially threatening epidemics due to the many bodies 
that were not always properly buried (Berzeg 2010, 11).490 Circassian organisations working for 
genocide recognition claim the existence of mass graves from the time of their final expulsion; their 
claim is reflected in one of their key slogans: “No Sochi Olympics on the graves of our 
ancestors”.491 
 
Another example of Circassian complaints can be found in an open letter of protest from a number 
of diaspora organisations to the Republic of Adygeya’s Parliament against their attempts to suggest 
the inclusion of Circassian culture and traditions in the official programme of the Sochi Olympics. 
The efforts of the Parliament of Adygeya resulted in the Russian Olympic Committee formally 
                                                 
487
 Research by Ali Berzeg, who formerly represented the Circassian Congress in Maikop , Russia, but now represents 
the Circassian Cultural Institute (CCI) in New Jersey, USA, during two months in Tbilisi in 2009-2010 resulted in 1500 
pages from 300 documents that were scanned in order to be available for future research. The conclusions of his 
research were presented at the conference in Tbilisi in March 2010 that functioned as a stepping-stone that led, a year 
later, to the formal Georg ian recognition of the Circassian genocide (Berzeg 2010).  
488
 The website “The Circassian Genocide” (www.circassian -genocide.info). Similar research and publication efforts 
took place in relation to Ottoman archives in Turkey. One of the first results of this access to imperial Russian archives 
is the book The Circassian Genocide (2013) by the American historian Walter Richmond. Key conclusions were 
presented at conferences in Anaklia , Georgia (May 2012) and in Brussels  (June 2012). 
489
 As most ships listed in the army reports were Russian. This, according to Ali Berzeg, counters the myth that mos t 
ships came from Turkey and that the staff of Turkish ships deliberately threw Circassians into the Black Sea (Berzeg  
2010, 10). This myth is still circu lating among tourist guides in the Sochi area. According to Ali Berzeg many Russian 
historians have contributed to the creation of this myth. In general this is an example of one of the key areas of 
Circassian research—countering circulat ing myths and narratives with informat ion from archives. 
490
 “Mass graves” is a term that—as part of the agenda on “genocide recognition”—often plays a significant role in the 
post-2005 renewed Circassian mobilisation. 
491
 This research also included assessments of the total number of “deported natives”. 
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answering that Circassian culture will be included, together with other peoples of the Russian 
Federation, in the cultural programme of the Olympics (known as the Cultural Olympiad). 
According to the protesting Circassian organisations, this would be equal to “dancing on the graves 
of our ancestors” (Caucasus Forum 2010). During 2012, Circassian music and dance ensembles 
became more visible as part of the Cultural Olympiad.492 To most Circassian activists, Circassian 
inclusion in the Cultural Olympiad represents yet a new way of “hiding” Circassians among a high 
number of cultural acts and events from all over Russia instead of recognising them as a local 
indigenous people. Something similar could also be said regarding the visual identity of the Sochi 
Olympics—the “Look of the Games”—in which folkloristic patterns from all over Russia are 
combined into a patchwork design.493 Despite Kuban Cossacks being represented together alongside 
many examples from central regions of Russia, no Circassian patterns are included on the designs.  
 
As a response to the Sochi Olympics, Circassian activists in Turkey established the website 
OlympicGenocide.org that later became the NoSochi2014.com website. The latter website was 
established through transnational cooperation between Circassian organisations from different 
countries, most of which belong to the post-2005 generation of Circassian organisations. Recently, 
this initiative has been further broadened to also include a number of older organisations, 
demonstrating an increased consensus on the agenda of genocide recognition. Many of the slogans, 
which are frequently used at Circassian/Caucasian demonstrations and events, referred to in the 
beginning of this chapter, were developed as part of the NoSochi2014 cooperation, which includes 
posters designed as part of a joint approach to the visual performance at the events.494 These posters 
are frequently used and circulated among Circassian activists and on websites. 495 
 
                                                 
492
 Gateway to the Future, Sochi 2014 Newsletter, Issue 15, September 2012. 
http://www.sochi2014.com/en/media/bullet ins . 
493
 Gateway to the Future, Sochi 2014 Newsletter, Issue 10, March-May 2011. 
http://www.sochi2014.com/en/media/bullet ins . According to issue 15 “Traditional patterns and designs from the North 
Caucasus, including from the Adyghe-Circassians, along with other ethnic decorative designs, formed the basis for the 
Sochi 2014 Look of the Games” (p. 28). If this is true, it marks a shift since Issue 10, when local indigenous peoples’ 
patterns and designs were fu lly ignored. It is here further noted that the Adygehe-Circassian ensemble “acquainted over 
a thousand spectators with cultural traditions from the Sochi reg ion”. This could mark a decision of the Olympic 
authorities to be more accommodating towards the Circassians in the last phase leading up to the games.  
494
 A Circassian/Caucasian activist from Turkey has been harassed due to his involvement in the NoSochi-campaign 
(Caucasus Forum 2012; Amnesty International in Turkey (Acileylem.org 2012). The NoSochi campaigners us ed the 
occasion of the London Olympics to protest against this. 
495
 The anti-Sochi slogans have, for instance, been presented and circulated on Facebook, YouTube and other Web 2.0 
sites. 
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As part of the NoSochi campaign, a competition for an anti-Sochi Olympics mascot was launched 
in October 2011 under the slogan “to reveal the true identity of the Sochi Olympics”. The 
background for the initiative was further elaborated: “A logo, mascot or graphic design which 
captures the bloody history of Sochi and the cruelty carried out against Circassians to be sent to the 
Sochi Olympic Committee and used in the No Sochi 2014 campaign”.496 The aim of the 
competition was “to provide visual material to the international campaign we implemented and also 
support it in order to bring historical facts to the attention of world public opinion”. 497 A jury 
selected the best suggestions, and they were launched for public voting on the NoSochi2014.com 
website. The wining image was a snow-leopard holding a snowboard, and it was copied from the 
official Sochi 2014 mascots; however, the image was modified with the snow-leopard having 
bloody paws and with the snowboard transformed into a coffin painted as the Circassian flag. 498 In 
other words, the winner of the popular vote for the anti-Sochi Olympics mascot was a direct 
counter-version of one of the official mascots of the Sochi Olympics.499 
 
                                                 
496
 The second round of this campaign was launched with a text  that pointed to some of the historical persons involved 
on the side of the Russian army in the war in the nineteenth century (noSochi2014.com/campaign).  
497
 The website noSochi2014.com was attacked by unidentified persons that placed a high number of vo tes on a specific 
item, but the organisers were able to part ly identify and delete these votes (Information retrieved from conversations 
with Circassian/Caucasian activists in Istanbul in May 2012). 
498
 See, for instance, talisman.Sochi2014.com. It is actually a Caucasian leopard that is light-brown but has often been 
presented as a snow-leopard, also at official events (for instance, at the sponsors, Bosco, which is also responsible for 
the design of the visual identity of the Sochi games, s ee bosco.ru; bosco.co.uk, Gateway to the Future, Issue 13, W inter 
2012, p. 24). http://www.sochi2014.com/ en/media/bulletins . 
499
 The expert jury chose to award the first prize to one of the other designs. The winners were p resented at a ceremony 
April 22, 2012 in Istanbul where all the suggested designs were exhib ited. 
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May 21 Demonstration in the centre of Istanbul in 2011. The largest annual Circassian manifestation worldwide that 
year-by-year has managed to attract increasing support. The increased use of English on posters illustrates the 
increasing transnationalisation of the Circassian question. The design of posters and formulation of slogans are 
coordinated through the NoSochi-cooperation. The demostration is arranged by the Caucasian Forum in Istanbul. (Foto: 
Lars Funch Hansen). 
 
Hacktivism is a new aspect of the Circassian revival, occurring during 2012 under names such as 
Adiga Hackers, Circassian-Cyber-Army and Anonymous Kavkaz.500 These connected groups or 
initiatives have announced attacks on Russia during 2012, 2013 and 2014, and many references to 
Sochi and the Sochi Olympics can be found on their Facebook sites and YouTube videos.501 They 
have not only announced cyber-attacks but also potential cyber-defence actions, which include 
announcements that some websites—noSochi2014.com, narttv.tv, radioadiga.com, adiga.ca, 
adiga.com, circassianworld.com, circassian-genocide.info—will be “protected”.502 A video from the 
Circassian Cyber Army concludes with the following statement: “We Are Coming Back to Sotchi”; 
                                                 
500
 Adiga Hackers on its YouTube channel (to April 2013) had 106 v ideos, 49,792 views and 130 subscribers. The 
Facebook-site of Adiga Hackers uses the URL “facebook.com/Anonymous.Kavkaz”. According to the site 
“facebook.com/ CircassianCyberArmy”, the organisation refers to itself as “CCA of Anonymous Kavkaz”.  
501
 According to a video placed on YouTube (12-8-2012), “The Announcement of Circassian Cyber Army at 
10/8/1012”, the Circassian Cyber Army is a new group init iated after being called upon by Anonymous Kavkaz and 
after working silently for many years.  
502
 This type of activity is referred to as “cyber-defence” as opposed to the type of “cyber-attack” earlier announced by 
the same organisations and to cyber-init iatives against, for instance, the Russian Government (cyberwarzone.com 11-4-
2012). 
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further, the video announced “Adiga Hackers Attacks” on the Russian government in 2013. 503 
Judging by the use of slogans, posters and visual images, these initiatives are intended as part of the 
post-2005 renewed Circassian activism, in which most of the protests and other actions target 
Russian authorities. Following an announcement on YouTube in March 2012, Adiga Hackers 
attacked two Russian websites that support the 2014 Olympics in Sochi: megafon.ru (a large 
telephone company) and Sochi2014.com.504  
 
In April 2012, Anonymous Kavkaz, declared its willingness to defend the NoSochi.com website, 
and it once more circulated an often used poster: “SOCHI—Land of Circassian Genocide” with the 
Olympic rings on fire and a “May 21, 1864” logo at the bottom. 505 A video placed on Adiga 
Hackers” YouTube channel on in November 2012 begins with the image of the well-known 
Occupy/Guy Fawkes-mask and the speaker announcing, on behalf of Anonymous Kavkaz, “Occupy 
Russian Embassies Worldwide on May 21st 2013”.506 The video concludes with the statement, “Join 
the Revolution. Save the Sochi Land”. The headline on the Adiga Hackers/Anonymous Kavkaz 
Facebook-site pronounce: “Operation PayBack for Sochi at 21 May” (1,075 “likes” per 8-12-2012). 
 
Circassian activists visited and demonstrated both at the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver and 
again in London in 2012. Even though activists from the Circassian Cultural Institute in New Jersey 
played a key role in both cases, in London, they were part of a wider NoSochi- initiative: the 
demonstrations were larger and the participants came not just from USA. In both cases, viral videos 
were quickly uploaded to document their actions, and these videos were further circulated among 
Circassian and Caucasian websites in a number of countries.507 These actions have contributed to 
increase the visibility of Circassian protests against the Sochi Olympics.  
 
Several other civil society organisations have protested against the Sochi Olympics on issues such 
as environmental protection and corruption.508 They complain, for instance, that the Olympic 
                                                 
503
 The slogans used in the viral videos include the well-known “No Sochi Olympics on the Land of Genocide” and 
“SOCHI - Land of the Circassian Genocide”. 
504
 14-3-2012 (793 views by 20-8-2012). 
505
 Youtube.com: “Anonymous Kavkaz declares for their defence of NoSochi2014.com” (7 -4-2012: 132 views by 20-8-
2012). 
506
 Youtube.com: ”Anonymous Message to the Russian Government Operation #OpPayBackForSotchi”. 
507
 Circassian dance and musical ensembles from the Caucasus took part in presentations of the Russian Olympic 
Committee in London and in Sochi during the London Games as part of the “Cultural Olympiad”.  
508
 E.g. Environmental Watch in the North Caucasus (http://ewnc.info); the Sochi branch of the Russian Geographical 
Society (http://geo.opensochi.org). 
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organisers often use “double-speak”, pretending that the Games will be the “most green Games 
ever” while the opposite is more likely, and that civil society are put under increased pressure. 
However, authorities disagree: Dmitrii Kozak, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and responsible for 
the Sochi Olympics, has stated, “The impetus which the Olympic Games has given to the Volunteer 
Movement in our country will be even more important than the Olympics itself for forming civil 
society and for Russia’s social and political development”. 509  
 
As illustrated above, the Olympic project has elevated Sochi into a key locality in the different 
understandings of the historical homeland of the Circassians. “Sochi”, “1864” and “genocide 
recognition” constitute three issues that can be seen as linked in a triangle of constantly ongoing 
Circassian mobilisation, where information or promotion on one issue almost certainly both 
produces and reproduces the other two. In a process that began before the fall of the Soviet Union, 
the year “1864” has gradually become institutionalised as a so-called “defining moment” in 
contemporary Circassian identity (Huttenbach 1995, 673).  
 
  
Conclusion 
 
The 2014 Sochi Olympics has played a facilitating role in elevating the Circassian Question into a 
transnational issue. Recently, the issue has managed to reach Russian mainstream media, 
particularly on the Internet, where access is relatively easy compared to the traditional media of TV, 
radio and newspapers that, to a much greater degree, are controlled by the Russian government in 
different ways. This increased visibility of Circassian issues is illustrated by the reactions of 
politicians and various expert observers in the Russian media; especially since 2011, they have 
begun to react to media stories on the Circassians that were generally ignored earlier.  
 
In the accelerated memorialisation of the Circassians and their organisa tions, Sochi has become a 
long-distance site of memory among Circassians worldwide. This is particularly true for the 
diaspora, for which Sochi as a contemporary Caucasian location has become a key symbol of the 
                                                 
509
 Dmitrii Kozak (http://www.sochi2014.com/en/media/quotation/, January 15, 2012). An environmental act ivist 
referred to the Sochi Olympic Games as a Potemkin v illage. 
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lost homeland. In this process, Sochi has been produced and reproduced as a symbol of the tragedy 
of war and forced expulsion in the nineteenth century that is now widely referred to as the 
Circassian genocide. According to Seteney Shami, the historical homeland of the Circassians 
shifted its status from a “mythological homeland” into a “territory” already back in the late 1990s. 
Compared to the contemporary situation, Shami’s conclusion represents a much smaller group of 
civil society actors and intellectuals. I have argued that this shift has emerged gradually and that 
Sochi as a geographical location has only recently achieved the type of dominance or vernacular 
breakthrough ascribed by Shami. 
 
The many references on the Internet, for instance, in blogs, discussion forums and social media, to 
the historical as well as to the contemporary homeland in the Caucasus can be considered a form of 
virtual re-territorialisation. These representations of the historical homeland (increasingly with 
Sochi at the centre) on the Internet share a number of similarities both with various decolonisation 
processes from different parts of the world during the twentieth century—and with post-colonial 
debates and efforts in relation to other post- imperial contexts. As Linda T. Smith has noted, the 
term post-colonial indicates that the world has become decolonised, while in reality many 
indigenous peoples are still fighting against a colonial heritage that they often experience as 
marginalising or discriminating (Smith 1999, 98). Counter-memorialisation is often one of the key 
features in processes of decolonisation and in post-colonial endeavours. The gradual shift from a 
more general and inward-oriented memorialisation (focussing on the importance of culture and 
memory) towards a process that can be defined as counter-memorialisation (more directly targeting 
of the contemporary Russian authorities) is one of the key results of the renewed post-2005 
Circassian mobilisation process. This is further revealed by the increased use of the term genocide. 
By engaging in this form of competing memorialisation (which has also been labelled “memory 
wars”), Circassian actors are part of a wider Caucasian as well as post-Soviet trend. Judging both by 
the Russian authorities’ lack of will to engage in open and inclusive research that includes full 
access to historical archives of the Russian Empire, and by the many examples of manipulated 
representations of the history of the region, this type of memory war can be expected to continue for 
many years to come.  
 
The Sochi Olympics and the related issue of genocide recognition have come to play a key role in 
creating a new level of unity and transnational awareness among Circassians worldwide. The 
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decision to hold the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi has resulted in an increased mobilisation 
among Circassians—both on an organisational level and on an individual level, as can be seen by 
the escalation in different forms of Internet activity. Students and youth activists are significant 
actors in driving the renewed Circassian mobilisation process as it has been unfold ing since 2005.  
 
There is no doubt that the selection of Sochi as a host of the 2014 Winter Olympics has played a 
key role—perhaps the key role—in creating a new unity among Circassians on the understanding of 
the forced exile as an act of genocide. In many respects, the decision in 2007 to hold the Winter 
Olympics in Sochi was precisely what the activists of the renewed Circassian mobilisation needed 
in order to drive this process forward. However, many Circassians consider this a sad irony, as it 
symbolises not only the loss of the historical homeland but also a lack of respect for Circassian 
history in the region. Circassian representatives have brought attention to the Olympic project 
ignoring or even concealing the need for archaeological excavations as all Circassian villages that 
were burned during the war in the nineteenth century are mostly covered by forests today.  
 
Some Circassians have voiced fears that certain sections of the Circassian movement will be 
regarded as being too radical or too one-dimensional; for instance, there are concerns that focussing 
too squarely on the issue of genocide recognition, which can be expected to be a controversial issue 
in Russia for many years to come, will be counter-productive for the movement. The possibility of 
being considered too radical is also one of the potential traps of the recent hacktivism. Nevertheless, 
both issues of genocide recognition and anti-Sochi Olympics are examples of initiatives that 
demonstrate the progression of Circassian mobilisation as many Circassians now regard the recent 
examples of “minor recognition” (for instance in relation to potential inclusion into the Cultural 
Olympiad) as too little, too late. The priority of the Cultural Olympiad to focus on national 
inclusion of all the peoples of Russia can be said to entail an exclusion of the local peoples, 
traditions and history. 
 
The arrival of the 2014 Sochi Olympics has finalised a triangle of constantly increasing Circassian 
mobilisation, where the two other fixed points are constituted by “May 21 (1864)” and “genocide 
recognition”, respectively. These three issues have been able to mutually reinforce each other, and 
they produce a constantly increasing memorialisation and mobilisation that continuously create and 
recreate the Circassian revival. As a transnational mega event, the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics has 
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significantly contributed to the acceleration and spread the Circassian process of memorialisation 
and mobilisation both within Russia and in other national contexts of Circassian residence. 
Considering the manner in which the Sochi Olympics is used by Russian authorities to brand Russia 
internally and externally, this form of counter-branding is not surprising. The Circassian processes 
of (counter-) memorialisation establish Sochi as a symbol of the minimal or warped representation 
of Circassian memory often found in contemporary Russia.  
 
Through the concurrence with the 150-year anniversary of the eviction of the Circassians from the 
Caucasus, the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics has created a link to the year 1864. Since the fall of the 
Soviet Union, 1864 has increasingly been institutionalised among the Circassians (and other 
Caucasians) through the assignment of May 21 as the annual day of Circassian commemoration. 
May 21, 1864 has become the defining moment in the contemporary understanding of Circassian 
history and identity, and in 2014 it will be commemorated as such by all Circassians around the 
world—including in Russia. 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Acileylem.org 2012. “Çerkez asıllı Türkiyeli aktiviste koruma sağlandı.” http://acileylem.org/haber-
detay.php?q=3. 
 
Anderson, Benedict. 1992. “Long-distance nationalism. World capitalism and the rise of identity 
politics.” The Wertheim Lecture 1992. Centre for Asian Studies Amsterdam. 
 
Berzeg, Ali. 2010. “Additional archival disclosures.” Isthmus No. 1, 2010. 
 
Berzeg, Sefer. Undated. “1864-2014 Circassian Genocide Olympics.” noSochi2014.com.  
http://nosochi2014.com/articles/1864-2014-circassian-genocide-olympics.php 
 
Bodnar, John E. 1992. Remaking America. Public memory, commemoration, and patriotism in the 
twentieth century. Princeton and Chichester: Princeton University Press.  
 
“Boycott Russian Olympics 2014”. Facebook. Start date August 17, 2012. 
www.facebook.com/BoycottOlympics2014. 
 
254 
 
Caucasian Knot. 2010. “Parliament of Georgia asked to recognize Circassians’ genocide in Russian 
Empire”, Caucasian Knot, March 22, 2010. www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/12871/. 
 
Caucasus Forum. 2010. “Open letter to Circassian members of the State Council - Khasa of the 
Adygeya Republic.” Caucasus Forum, November 13, 2010. www.caucasusforum.org/open-
letter-to-circassian -members-of-the-state-council-khasa-of-the-adygeya-republic/. 
 
—. 2012. “Caucasus Activist Feels Heat in Turkey.” July 22, 2012. 
http://www.caucasusforum.org/Caucasus-activist-feels-heat- in-turkey/. 
 
Cohen, Robin. 1997. Global Diasporas. An Introduction. London: Routledge. 
 
CounterOlympicsNetwork 2012. “Launch of the International Counter Olympics Network.” July 
26, 2012. http://counterolympicsnetwork. wordpress.com/2012/07/24/launch-of- icon/.  
 
“Ethnocide”. Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence. http://massviolence .org/Ethnocide.  
 
Fraser, Nancy. 1990. “Rethinking the Public Sphere. A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy.” In Social Text. Vol. 25 (26): 56-80. 
 
—. 2007. “Transnationalising the Public Sphere.” Theory, Culture & Society. Vol. 24 (4): 7-30. 
 
Goble, Paul. “Non-Russians Winning ‘Memory Wars’ while Russia Still Losing Theirs, Bordyugov 
Says.” Window on Eurasia. June 7, 2011. 
 
Hansen, Lars Funch. 2009. “iCircassia”, conference paper, ASN Congress, University of Columbia 
NYC, April 2009. 
 
—. 2012. “Renewed Circassian mobilization in the North Caucasus 20-years after the fall of the 
Soviet Union.” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe. Vol. 11, No. 2: 103-135. 
 
—. 2013. “Frontier-Zones of Diaspora-making: Circassian Organizations in Turkey.” A 
Comparative Ethnography of Alternative Spaces. Jens Dahl and Esther Fihl (eds.). New York 
and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Huttenbach, Henry R. 1995. “Some Defining Moments: Crossing the Rubicon.” Nationalities 
Papers, Vol. 23, No. 4. 
 
IWPR 2006. “Circassian outrage at anniversary plans”. Institute of War and Peace Reporting: 
Caucasus Reporting Service, No. 358. September 26, 2006. http://iwpr.net/report-
news/circassian-outrage-anniversary-plans. 
 
IWPR. 2007. “Outrage at “fake” Circassian anniversary”. Institute of War and Peace Reporting. 
Caucasus Reporting Service, No. 413. Oct. 5, 2007. http://iwpr.net/report-news/outrage-fake-
circassian-anniversary. 
 
Jaimoukha, Amjad. 2001. The Circassians. A Handbook. New York: Palgrave Macmillian.  
 
255 
 
Jarvie, Grant (with James Thornton). 2012. Sport, Culture and Society: An Introduction. London 
and New York: Routledge.  
 
JFNC Undated. “Documented Evidence.” The Circassian Genocide. www.circassian-
genocide.info/Documents/English.pdf  
 
Kreiten, Irma. 2011. “Between exoticism, geopolitics and ignorance: the search for a post-colonial 
Circassian history.” In Sürgün/Circassian Exile. 21 Mayis 1864. Ankara: Kafdav.  
 
Kurilla, Ivan I. 2009. “Memory Wars in the Post-Soviet Space.” Ponars Eurasia Policy Memo. No. 
63, September 2009. 
 
“Nartskie skazaniya dlya detei”. Elot.ru. June 23, 2008. http://www. 
elot.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=730&Itemid=5 
 
Natho, Kadir I. 2009. Circassian history. Wayne, New Jersey: Xlibris Corporation. 
 
Nora, Pierre. 1996-98. Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French past, 3 vols. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
 
—. 2002. “Reasons for the current upsurge in memory.” Eurozine.com : 19-4-2002.  
 
North Caucasus Analysis. 2007. Fatima Tlisova: “The challenges of the Sochi Olympics and 
Russia’s Circassian problem”. North Caucsus Analysis, Vol. 8, Issue 33. August 16, 2007. 
Jamestown.org/single/ ?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5D=4382.  
 
Orttung, Robert W. 2012. “Nations in Transit 2012: Russia.” Freedom House 
(freedomhouse.org/report/nation-transit/2012/russia). 
 
Radio Free Europe. 2007. “Russia: imperial anniversary challenged in North Caucasus.” Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty. September 27, 2007. www.rferl.org/content/article/1078805.html.  
 
Richmond, Walter. 2013. The Circassian Genocide. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 
 
Rothberg, Michael. 2009. Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of 
Decolonisation. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
 
Safran, William. 1991. “Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and return.” Diaspora, 
Vol. 1, No. 1. Spring 1991. 
 
Schiller, Nina Glick and Georges Eugene Fouron. 2001. Georges Woke Up Laughing: Long-
Distance Nationalism and the Search for Home. Durman/London: Duke University Press.  
 
Shami, Seteney. 1998. “Circassian Encounters: The Self as Other and the Production of the 
Homeland in the North Caucasus.” Development and Change 29: 617-46. 
 
Smith, Linda T. 1999. Decolonising Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples. London and 
New York: Zed Books Ltd. Dunedin: University of Otago Press.  
256 
 
 
“The Genocide Continues”. Isthmus No. 3, 2010. Circassian Cultural Institute, New Jersey.  
 
Tlisova, Fatima. 2007. “Demonstratsiya v N yo-Iorke: ‘Sochi - zemlya genotsida!’ ‘Net Olimpiade 
na krovi!’.” Caucasus Times, October 6, 2007. 
http://www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=13420.  
 
Tverdyi, A. V. 2008. Kavkaz v imenakh, nazvaniyakh, legendakh. Krasnodar: Platonov. 
 
UNPO 2006. “Circassia: Adygs Ask European Parliament to Recognize Genocide.” Unrepresented 
Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), October 16, 2006. http://unpo.org/article/5634.  
 
Van Hear, Nicholas. 1998. New Disaporas. London: UCL Press. 
 
Vatchagaev, Mairbek. 2009. “Adygeya: the New North Caucasus Hot Spot?” Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, Volum 6, Issue 182. October 5, 2009. 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35579&cHash=6
1ba6b28d3. 
 
Voice of America. 2012. “Russian Conservatives see ‘Foreign Agents’ and ‘Treason’ Behind Social 
Change”. VoA, December 11, 2012. Blogs.voanews.com/Russia-watch/2012/12/11/russian-
conservatives-see-foreign-agents-andtreason-behind-social-change. 
 
Vorishilov, B. I. 2008. Istoriya Ubykhov. Maikop: Poligraf-Yug. 
 
Youtube.com. 2007. “Full version of Putin speech (2014 Winter Olympics).” Published July 4, 
2007. http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=_aNo3DxWaW4. 
 
—. 2011. “Putin IOC Speech - Lies About The Sochi Olympics - Hiding Truth Of Circassian 
Genocide.” Uploaded April 6, 2011. http:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=vycBeSsdvIM. 
 
Zhemukhov, Sufian. 2009. “The Circassian Dimension of the 2014 Sochi Olympics.” Ponars Policy 
Memo, No. 65, September 2009. Georgetown University. 
 
—. 2012. “The Birth of Circassian Nationalism.” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 40, No. 4, July 2012: 
503-524.  
 
Zhurzhenko, Tatiana. 2012. “Heroes into victims. The Second World War in post-Soviet memory 
politics.” Eurozine.com, October 31, 2012.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
257 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
 
 
A. Acknowledgements ......................................................................... 258 
B. Facts and maps: Circassians and Circassia ..................................... 259 
C. Visual representations of the Circassian Revival ........................... 262 
D. Circassian/Caucasian Organisations in Turkey 2008-2009 ............ 281 
E. Summary ......................................................................................... 290 
F. Resumé ............................................................................................ 291 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
258 
 
 
                                      Acknowledgements 
 
The writing of the papers and chapters of this thesis would not have been possible without all the 
assistance I have received from a great number of people, including not least all the many 
discussions along the way. First and foremost, I owe much gratitude to a large number of Circassian 
and other Caucasian activists around the world, representatives of organisations and associations, 
writers, researchers, volunteers at private archives etc. This thes is is based on all your inputs. 
Special thanks to Helen Krag for many years of interesting and enriching cooperation - and thanks a 
lot for all your inputs and support in the process of writing this thesis and many of the preceding 
papers. Thanks to Henrik Rønsbo for reading and commenting on the first draft of the thesis. 
Thanks to all my colleagues in the Alternative Spaces research programme at the Department of 
Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies for interesting discussions, professional input and good 
company along the way: Esther Fihl, Jens Dahl, Helen Krag, Margit Warburg, Lars Højer, Brian 
Arly Jacobsen, Lars O. Trans, Dorthe Høvids Possing, Andreas Bandak, Ditte Maria Søgård, Laura 
Maria Schütze, Birgitte Schepelern Johansen, Carsten T. Callesen, Anna D. E. S. Køster, Mette 
Rønsager, Stine Simonsen Puri and Margit Anne Petersen. Thanks to Stine and Margit for good 
office partnership. Thanks especially to Esther Fihl and Jens Dahl for comments, suggestions and 
support in the writing process. Thanks also to all the colleagues of the former seventh floor at 
Leifgade including Kirsten Thisted, Thomas Brudholm and others from Minority Studies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
259 
 
 
Facts and maps on Circassians and Circassia 
 
 
Circassians in the North Caucasus region of Russia: 800,000 people (though some have moved to 
other parts of Russia).   
 
Diaspora Circassians: Between two and six million, probably several millions in Turkey alone – 
statistics are lacking and many have assimilated. Other countries include Syria and Jordan with 
more than 100,000 each, Israel, Germany, USA etc. (see second map below). 
 
In Russia, Circassians constitute ‘titular nationalities’ in three federal republics: Adygea (Adygs 
25%), Kabardino-Balkaria (Kabardians 55%) and Karachai-Cherkessia (Cherkes 11%). 
Aproximately 10,000 Shapsugs live Krasnodar Krai along the Black Sea coast north of Sochi. 
Kabardians and Shapsug are old Circassian tribes, while Adyg and Cherkes are new contructions 
from the Soviet period (both denote ‘Circassians’ (in Russian and C ircassian language, 
respectively). See the first map below (Circassian areas marked with a grid pattern).  
 
Flag (see appendix on visual representations): Green with three yellow arrows and with 12 yellow 
stars representing the 12 tribes or provinces of the Circassians in the 19th century. Designed in the 
1830s by the Scotsman David Urquhart as part of the resistance against Imperial Russian 
colonization (Jaimoukha 2001, 71).  
 
Religion: Muslims (Sunni). Introduced by the Crimean Tatars and the Ottoman Empire , primarily 
during the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries and further consolidated as the war with Russia 
progressed. 
 
Language: Circassian is an indigenous Caucasian language. Circassian is one of the three divisions 
of the North-Western group of Caucasian languages (the other two are Abkhazian and Ubykh) and 
is divided into two groups: a Western and an Eastern.  
 
The different geographical (and other forms of) Circassian spaces are illustrated below. In relation 
to the Circassian spaces it should be noted that the ongoing Circassian revival (CR2 - or the second 
post-Soviet revival) is characterised by the increasing number of links between Circassian 
individuals as well as organisations, where the Internet play a considerable role.  
260 
 
 
Next Page: Circassian Spaces  
The marked spots on the world map represent the dispersion and key locations of Circassians and 
Circassian organisations. Circassians often state that they live in ‘50 places around the world’ and 
most of these are shown in the map, but, additional locations in Turkey alone would extend this 
figure to more than 50. Other forms of Circassian spaces that are dealt with in this thesis include: 
 Historical sites (where Circassians earlier resided): Poland, Kosovo, Bulgaria, Egypt, and in 
the Caucasian homeland for instance Kbaada (todays Krasnaya Polyana).  
 Sites of historical memory (archives, museum, archaeological collections etc.): In Russia: 
Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Krasnodar. In Georgia: Tbilisi, Anaklia. Inbetween: Abkhazia. 
 Sites of protest, campaigns etc.: New York, Brussels, Istanbul, Anaklia etc.  
 Virtual spaces (on the Internet): ‘iCircassia’ (see chapter 6).  
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Visual Representations of the Circassian Revival 
 
The role of visual representations of Circassia and Circassians in the Circassian revival has 
increased with the continued development of the Internet. But visual representations already in the 
mid-nineteenth century Circassian mobilisation against the advancing Russian Empire gained a role 
in illustrated journals and geography textbooks around the world, as can been seen below. Today 
remediation of images from the nineteenth century is a significant feature of the ongoing Circassian 
revival. Historical maps locating Circassia and/or the Circassians in the northwest Caucasus 
constitute another significant part of the visual remediations, from not just the 19th century but 
covering a period back to the 15th century. The map on the frontpage is one example that is 
discussed in chapter 5 (page 147). An extended version of the visual representations of the 
Circassian revival can be found on CircassianSpaces.net.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
263 
 
May 21 Events 
 
 
The centre of Istanbul, May 2010. Demonstration arranged by the youth organisation Caucasus 
Forum that has become the largest annual Circassian/Caucasian manifestation attracting thousands.  
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Istanbul May 2010. May 21 commemorative event at Besiktas by the Bosporus Strait, at the first 
place where Circassians arrived in Istanbul in 1864. With poems, music and 19 th century images.  
Ending with throwing a wreath and flowers in the water after sunset. Arranged by Kaffed.  
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  Black Sea coast, Anaklia, Georgia. May 
2012. May 21 Commemoration ceremony with flowers that later, following a prayer, are thrown 
into the Black Sea. Afterwards the new ‘Monument of Grief’ in the centre of Anaklia was officially 
opened (below). 
 
 
266 
 
 
Hamburg, Germany 2011. Homemade figure 
used at a demonstration in front of the 
Russian consulate. Below: Activist asked by 
police to move to the other side of the street.  
 
 
Anaklia, Georgia. 2012. Opening of 
exhibition of documents from imperial 
Russian archives in Tbilisi. Documenting the 
planning and execution of the forced 
displacement of the Circassians 1863-64. 
 
 
May 21 2009 Istanbul. Rosette given to 
participants of the commemorative event at 
the harbour. Includes references to flag, dress 
and ‘1864’. 
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Cover of a book (Kavdav) of the presentations at a conference on the Circassian Exile held in 
Istanbul in 2011 (147th anniversary) in relation to the May 21 events. The map is one of the 
iconographic images of the Circassian Revival with the arrows illustrating the first round in the 
1860s (blue) and the second in the 1870s (red).  
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Cartographic representations of Circassia 
 
 
One of the two most popular cartographic representations of historical Circassia (a version mostly 
referred to as from the 15th – 16th centuries, though not stated in this case), with the name 
’Cherkesia’ and elements from the Circassian flag. Fridge-magnet (Maikop, October 2013). 
 
 
A popular map of the Circassian revival, where the names of a large number of villages from the 
17th and 18th centuries have been reconstructed. This version is from Adyge Hasa in Maikop (2009).  
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Excerpts from maps from 16th to 19th centuries that mention and localise Circassia in the North 
Caucasus - outside the Russian Empire. These maps figure regularly within the Circassian revival. 
These four maps are used in Russian Historical Museum in Moscow to illustrate the expansion of 
the Russian Empire (visited in 2009).  
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Details from four historical maps from 
roughly the same period as above. As seen on 
the wall in the offices of Circassian Cultural 
Centre in Wayne, New Jersey (April 2009). 
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Circassian subregions or subtribes in the mid-19th century before 1864. Map prepared by 
University of Georgia in 2012 and presented at the May 21 event in Anaklia, Georgia the same 
year. The map resulted in discussions on the Internet on how to define the historical borders 
between Circassians/Ubykh and Abkhazians/Abaza.  
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Other Visual Representations or Icons of the Circassian Revival 
 
The Circassian Flag: Senzhaq Sharik (green with yellow). First designed by the British publicist 
and politician David Urquhart in the 1830 during his stay in Circassia. Since 1991 the official flag 
of the Republic of Adygea. Reproduced in many forms as part of the ongoing Circassian revival.  
 
 
Vanilla-scented Circassian cardboard flag (car 
air fresherner, Maikop 2011). 
 
 
Logo for the 20 year anniversary of the 
Republic of Adygea, 2011. Based on the 
republican coat of arms from 1992.  
 
Circassian Flag with stars in a circle with 
name ‘Cherkessia’ and names of 12 
Circassian sub-tribes (T-shirt, Maikop 2009). 
 
Logo of the Istanbul Caucasian Cultural 
Association (2012).
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Dancing and Costumes 
 
Dance lessons are a key activity of most Circassian cultural associations in the diaspora. Since the 
fall of the Soviet Union, dance instructors from the Caucasus have often visited the diaspora 
associations. The costumes represent a link to the historical Circassian homeland as seen in many 
19th century representations. 
 
 
A mirror on the wall in the Khase in 
Damascus, Syria (2010) 
As relief picture on the wall in the Khase in 
Damascus, Syria (2010) 
 
Mosaic on the Circassian cultural house in 
Marj al Sultan, Syria 
 
Young Circassian/Caucasian wearing a 
Cherkeska dancing at the opening of a 
exhibition at the Caucasian Cultural 
Association in Üsküdar, Istanbul. May, 2011.  
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The Pegasus rhyton (drinking-vessel for ceremonies). Perhaps the most popular image of an 
archaeological finding in the Circassian revival. Left: a replica on display at the Maikop branch of 
the State Museum of Oriental Art, Moscow (where the original is located). From 5th century BC, 
probably of Greek origin, excavated in Adygea in 1982. At the reopening of the branch in 2011, the 
Pegasus rhyton was placed as the centre piece after which the rest of the exhibitions were ordered. 
Right: The Pegasus rhyton remade in cheese for the day of Circassian cheese, Maikop, October 5th, 
2011.   
 
Below: From the inner cover of a book on Sultan Khan-Girei, a Circassian author from the 
nineteenth century, with his protrait and the covers of post-Soviet republications of his works, 
biographies on him etc. - placed on a version of the most popular map of the Circassian revival: 
’Map of Circassia 1830’.   
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Drawing by G. Gagarin of a Circassian from 
1840s on the cover of the book ‘History of 
Circassia’ by C. Kh. Khotko (St. Petersburg 
2002).  
 
Russian Army medal from 1864: ‘For Service 
in the Caucasus’ and ‘1864’. Also used in the 
campaign poster to the right.  
 
‘Cherkesia’ written on a reproduction of a G. 
Gagarin drawing from 1840s. Fridge-magnet, 
Maikop 2009. 
 
 
‘This is n-o-t an Olympic Medal’. 
NoSochi2014 campaign.  
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 ‘Circassian Lady’ (19th century). Circassian women 
have for centuries been famous for their beauty, not least through the Ottoman harems and slave 
markets.   
 
In May 1864, the American P. T. Barnum ordered two C ircassian beuties from the Istanbul slave 
markets for his Museum-exhibitions. From the mid-1860s Barnum regularly presented Circassian 
beuties, for instance as ‘Star of the East’. But these women were not Circassians.  
 
 
Below: ‘Circassian, shooting at full gallop’, 1832-34. A drawing by the famous Russian author 
Mikhail Lermontov, who was deported from St. Petersburg to the Caucasus as a punishment. Since 
then he has regularly been referred to as ‘the poet of the Caucasus’. He died in a duel in the spa-
town Pyatigorsk on former Circassian lands in 1841.
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General Zass has, together with a number of other Russian officers of the 19th century, become a 
regular feature of the Circassian revival as an example of the atrocities committed during the violent 
war. The image of the Circassian skulls on the fence has repeatedly been remediated and circulated 
on the Internet. From a poster circulated on the Internet (undated). See also chapter 8 above. 
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The Crimean War (1853-1856) resulted in a renewed international interest in Circassia and the 
Circassians, as illustrated by the following examles from Illustrated London News  
 
 
 
Fort Golovin at fire. Illustrated London News, April 29, 1854. Drawing by officer on board a 
British war ship. Today the location of the small town Golovinka, north of Sochi.  
 
Next page: ’The Circassians’ (two extracts from the text, ILN 3rd June 1854) 
”We present, in two engravings of Circassian life, an idea of the bearing and aspect, in their homes 
and out of doors, of a race, perhaps, as interesting and remarkable as any that ever existed. In the 
first place, they are one of the most ancient nations in the world; their history is so prolonged, that, 
with eth exception of China, of Egypt, and of Persia, the history of every other country which is at 
present independent, is a record of yesterday in comparison; but, if in this particular they have but 
one or two revivals on earth, there is a much more striking peculiarity in which they defy all parallel 
– and that is, that at no epoch have they ever yet lived in subjection to a foreign dominion.” (then 
follows a paragraph on Circassians as wellknown several millenias ago...)  
 
“We need not remind our readers in what concerns Russia, although the odds are so enourmously 
against a handufl of mountaineers, and in favours of the discipline, the numbers, and the resources 
of an immense military empire, that, despite the pertinacity of the efforts expended, the Caucasian 
tribes are still at a great distance from being reduced to the condition of the Poles. They are still 
liven under their own chiefs, with their own customs and with their own laws. It is not, therefore, 
merely because this race trace back so far their national history that they interest us; but because 
they are the only peoples on the face of the globe who can trace back so far an independent national 
history.” 
279 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
280 
 
 From British Newspaper 14th June 1854 
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Circassian Organisations in Turkey 2008-2009510 
 
 
Due to the sheer size, Turkey has a special position among the Circassian diaspora around 
the world. Due to its role as successor state to the Ottoman Empire, several millions of 
Circassians today resides in Turkey. Consequently Turkish language play an important role 
among the Circassian diaspora today as many has over the years moved from Turkey to 
various European countries, where they have established Circassian and/or Caucasian 
organisations.511 
 
The history of Caucasian exile in first Ottoman and then in Kemalist Turkey has not just 
resulted in a confusing use of the word ‘Circasssian’ as equivalent to ‘Caucasian’, but also 
to a widespread solidarity among the Caucasians in Turkey - especially among the mountain 
peoples mostly from the North Caucasus. This has lead to both most old and new 
organisations being named ‘Caucasian’ and not ‘Circassian’ - also those only or mostly 
dealing with Circassian issues. Most of the organisations outside Turkey use the term 
‘Circassian’. 
 
Based on how they presented themselves to me, the Circassian organisations can be placed 
along a line from cultural-to-political, where ‘cultural’ refer to a pure focus on traditional 
music and dance while ‘political’ at the other end refer to an orientation towards policy and 
advocacy efforts and ultimately promoting a Circassian agenda. 512 On the one side there is 
generally a significant level of mutual distrust between the two categories, which includes 
the potential relation to Russia with various accusations. 513 On the other hand a quite a 
significant number of people can be found as active in organisations belonging to both 
groups, as there is a culture of supporting each other, for instance caused by clan or family 
ties. Or because many of the older organisations are traditionally seen as associations, to 
which potentially all Circassians in the community belongs. 
 
 
DIASPORA ORGANISATIONS IN TURKEY514 
 
                                                 
510
 Draft paper from 2009, based on interviews and observations from 2008 and 2009.  
511
 At most places where a certain number of Circassians reside there is usually established an association, often 
referred as a Khase (Council). The parliament of the Republic of Adygea is called a Khase. The first post -Soviet 
Circassian organisations were called Adyge Khase. In the diaspora perhaps only ten or twenty percent are members of 
the Khase but it is still largely regarded as  representing the interests of all Circassians in the area.  
512
 The latter are sometimes referred to as nationalistic but this is a simplificat ion as these organisations generally 
consists of members of different North Caucasian and Abkhazian peoples in Turkey. 
513
 Including accusations of being a KGB-spy or a KGB-puppet etc. 
514
 Circassians in general still have a positive image in Turkey and a relatively h igh status, for instance, among civil 
servants and in the military. This is also reflected among the polit ical part ies, where five out of the six largest political 
parties in Turkey have a Circassian as a secretary (a sort of vice chairman in charge of organisational affairs). The 
Circassians have a reputation of being skilled at organising and networking.  
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As a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union, and especially the subsequent violent 
conflicts in Chechnya and Abkhasia, a process of redefinition of identity started among the 
diaspora Caucasians.515 This took place mainly on a personal level, but was later also 
reflected in the establishment of new organisations, especially among the Abkhasians. The 
wars in Abkhasia and Chechnya also resulted in a new and more visible role for the 
Circassian/Caucasian organisations, many of which took part in provision of humanitarian 
assistance, support for refugees and other form of support to the parts of the homeland 
affected by conflict and war.  
 
This process has been characterised by the change in re-designation of themselves as an 
ethnic group from being an exiled group into being a diaspora, which is a gradual process 
that is still ongoing - especially on the individual level. This change is reflected both in the 
establishing of the new organisations of the 2000 ’s and in the (very varying) reprioritisation 
among the older organisation. These new developments have been enhanced by the general 
changes in the civil society sector in Turkey in this decade due to the gradual rapprochement 
to EU standards on issues such as human rights, minority rights, freedom of speech and civil 
society organisation in general.516 These are all features that characterises Turkey as a 
country in transition, which will be discussed in the following.  
 
The Circassian organisations in Turkey generally present themselves as being either 
‘cultural’ or ‘political’, but instead of accepting this as two separate camps, I prefer to assess 
this as a ‘line’ where the strictly cultural efforts of folklore and dancing is at one end while 
the most political, often nationalistic, are at the other end. 517 This opens up for the placement 
of those in-between type of organisations engaged in a little of both and is also useful when 
it comes to assessing the actual type of activities the organisations. (This line also indicates a 
chronology, which - though not applicable for all organisations - still is generally 
relevant.)518 
 
 
Mostly cultural: Kafder/Kaffed (key type: association)  
                                                 
515
 A rough estimate of the ethnic dispersion within the Circassian/Caucasian organisations: 75-80 % Circassians, 10-20 
% Abkhazians and the rest: other (North) Caucasians or of mixed Caucasian descent.  
516
 Adherence to these principles has also helped to reduce the pressure from Russia towards the Caucasian 
organisations in Turkey, whom the Russian authorities - especially in the 1990s and in the early 2000s - regularly 
accused of supporting terrorism in the Caucasus. Russia - unsuccessfully - suggested Turkey to close specific 
organisations and has managed to persuade the Turkish authorities to impose some financial restrictions on the 
organisations. 
517
 To distinguish between categories of ’cultural’ versus ’political’ is not ideal but are maintained here for an alytical 
purposes.  The so-called politically o riented organisations, for instance, priorit ise lobbying activities. 
518
 Another and closely related divid ing line among the diaspora organisation is the relationship with  and attitude 
towards Russia. Kaffed and some of the Kafder’s appear to have the most contacts with Russia, including the authorities 
in the three Circassian republics in the North Caucasus . This is often perceived by the more polit ically oriented 
organisations as a sign of cooperation with Russ ian intelligence services or even as ‘selling your soul to the devil’.  
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Both cultural and political: Caucasus Foundation/Shamil Foundation/BKD (type: 
foundation)   
Mostly political: Caucasian Forum/Caucasian House/(CircassianWorld) (key type: modern 
NGO) 
 
 
 
Mostly Cultural: (Kafder/Kaffed) 
 
Kafder, which is an abbreviation for the Caucasian Cultural Association, is the most 
widespread Circassian organisation in Turkey with more than one hundred branches. They 
can be found in all Circassians settlements and has several branches in the big cities like 
Istanbul and Ankara. Upstarted shortly after the democratic changes in Turkey in 1950. 
Originally only with cultural activities focussing on dance, music and other form of folklore. 
Today still mainly culturally oriented, though significant changes has occurred through the 
last two decade. The new priorities includes language training, collecting and distributing 
historical documents, arranging and implementation of annual events such as May 21st 
(which includes conferences, publications, exhibitions etc.).  
 
The activities and ambitions of the local branches of Kafder can be very different. There are 
examples of specific individuals having developed their own projects, which can be of quite 
different nature than the classical Kafder- focus on cultural activities. One example is the 
chairperson from local Kafder of Düzce, east of Istanbul and Izmir, who wish to set 
repatriation on the agenda in a much more concrete manner than Kafders (and Kaffed and 
ICA - see below) in general, who she accuse of just talking and not acting. As a result she 
has travelled back and forth between Turkey and the Caucasus, found partners and investors 
and taken part in the development of a new building programme for repatriates in the 
republic of Adygea. Consisting of concrete buildings with a co- location that include joint 
initiatives to support the local integration in Russia, which for many repatriates have been a 
serious obstacle - and has kept many from going beyond considering repatriation.  
 
All Kafder organisations are united in an umbrella organisation called Kaffed, short for 
Federation of Caucasian Associations. Kaffed is in charge of the overall arrangement of the 
annual May 21 commemoration events, with the local Kafder’s in charge of the practical 
planning and execution, which includes many volunteers - many of whom are students. In 
2008 the most extensive May 21 event took place in Istanbul over a period of seven days, 
including one day to visit Kefken, the rocky caves where Circassians arrived at by the 
Bosporus strait outside Istanbul in 1864.519 
 
                                                 
519
 In 2008 a new leadership of Kaffed was elected with several new members, which some of the newer and more 
politically o riented organisational representatives feared would increase the control over the local Kafder’s and even 
other Circassian/Caucasian organisations .  
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Excurse: The International Circassian Association (ICA) is the official world-wide 
Circassian organisation with headquarter in Nalchik in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria 
in the North Caucasus. By most of the new or politically oriented organisations ICA is 
regarded as controlled by the Russian intelligence services and established in order to 
control and contain the diaspora. As stated by one NGO-representative from Turkey: ”ICA 
has many important issues on its agenda, but does nothing”. Still, ICA can play a role in 
certain key issues, such as protesting against the recent transfer of territory from Kabardian 
parts to Balkarian in KBR. The biannual meetings also gather an impressive number of 
representatives from Russia and from the diaspora, as witnessed for instance in October 
2009 in Maikop. The number of delegates reflects the number of Circassians in the world, 
which results in most participants from Turkey. Still, the agenda is controlled by the 
government controlled organisations in the three Russian republics in cooperation with the 
Kaffed leadership, which is also in line with their Russian counterparts. Suggestions from 
the new organisations are generally excluded from the official agenda and representatives 
sometimes barred from entering the meeting.520    
 
 
Both cultural and political: (Caucasus Foundation/Shamil Foundation/BKD (key type: 
foundation)) 
 
The Shamil Foundation began operating in 1978 and the Caucasus Foundation in 1995. A 
foundation was an acceptable format for the Turkish authorities, which was not the case 
with NGO’s that mostly were regarded as potentially anti-Turkish or anti-government. 
Among the main priorities the establishment of libraries and collecting of book and other 
relevant material for an archive, arranging conferences and publishing, scholarships and 
dormitories for students. Recently this has been supplemented with new agencies, support to 
achieve research, digitalisation of documents including online accessibility etc. Being a 
foundation has clearly been an advantage, as these are by far the biggest Circassian 
organisations in terms of square meters of offices and libraries as well as in number of 
employees. The board have been dominated by older dignitaries521 and appears to on the one 
side have been rather cautious, while on the other hand engaging in efforts to cooperate with 
the homeland.522 The foundations appear to be gradually changing into modern NGO’s and 
increasingly engage youth as activists, web editors etc.  
 
                                                 
520
 This happened to, for instance, the representatives of the relatively new organisations called Circassian Congress in 
the North Caucasus.  
521
 Who are highly respected and often have done crucial efforts in consolidating and developing the foundations. 
522
 Some board members of the foundation in the 1990s actively cooperated with the Confederation of Mountain 
Peoples of the Caucasus - especially in connection with the conflict in Abkhazia , where they were involved in peace 
negotiations. The cooperation with the Confederation was planned to be increased but instead the opposite happened. 
This was especially due to the war in Chechnya and to new difficu lties of obtaining visas to travel to the North 
Caucasus. (Although the idea of the Confederation is generally accepted as dead in th e North Caucasus - at least for the 
time being - it  is still an ideal for many Caucasians in Turkey. ) 
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The United Caucasian Association (BKD) was established in 1951 by persons from the 
exiled governments of the two short- lived North Caucasian republics of the period between 
1917 and 1921, when Soviet power was finally consolidated in the region. 523 Dissemination 
and discussion of ideas from this period resulted in a revitalisation of BKD after 1991, as 
many Caucasians in Turkey still argue that a joint multi-ethnic North Caucasian republic 
should be established in the future. These sentiments were further enhanced by the war in 
Abkhasia and the subsequent contacts with the Confederation of Mountain Peoples. ”We 
used to regard the Caucasus at the land of our dreams and before the new changes of 1991 
had sunken in war broke out and ruined the new prospects. But now we are ready.”524 Both 
of the above mentioned foundations were started by former members of BKD.  
 
BKD defines themselves as both a cultural and a political organisation and argue that these 
two are connected and strengthen each other. Cultural activities still seem to be the main 
activities and the target groups are mainly youth. BKD also prioritise to teach the youth 
about the history and culture of the (North) Caucasus and arrange annual exchange of 
students and youth dance groups. In order for youth from the diaspora and from the 
homeland to meet, exchange views and get a better understanding of each other. And 
perhaps lay the ground for further cooperation - and even potential repatriation - in the 
future. 
 
The main challenge for BKD is to reorganise the association into a modern NGO, for which 
there is a general lack of funds. Lack of time and expertise is also an issue as the association 
is still run on a voluntary basis.  
 
 
Mostly political (and new): (Caucasian Forum/Caucasian House/(CircassianWorld))  
 
The Caucasian House Social and Strategic Research Centre (CH) was established in 
Istanbul in 2007 motivated by the fact that the more than hundred Caucasian/Circassian 
organisations had difficulties cooperating and still mainly focussed on cultural activities. 
The goal is to establish a think-tank type of organisation. The aim is to activate intellectuals 
and others in both Turkey and the Caucasus to promote the consciousness of the common 
destiny for present and future generation. Also motivated by the treat of total assimilation in 
the next generation in Turkey. 
 
CH regard their organisation as representing a new direction with the Caucasian/Circassian 
civil society organisations in Turkey, as the others mainly belong to two ‘umbrellas’: most 
of the older organisations or associations are loyal to Russia and controlled by the Moscow 
                                                 
523
 Also partly inspired by the succeeding Autonomous Soviet Mountain Republic from 1921 to 1924.  
524
 BKD interview, May 2008. 
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endorsed local Caucasian authorities525, while the rest mainly are engaged with the Turkish 
authorities.526   
 
The Caucasian Forum (CF) is a youth organisation established in Istanbul in 2005, without 
membership or a central leadership and with all activities organised in self-managed 
working groups.527 First gathered around support to Chechen refugees, but soon discovered 
a common Caucasian identity and solidarity among the youth - and a wish to enhance and 
support these sentiments among the disapora, where many seemed unaware of history and 
culture. The first years was used on publication, information and establishment of extra-
curricular lectures in Caucasian issues at educational institutions in Istanbul and Ankara. 
This location has made it possible to include relevant specialist in the courses. This work has 
in more than one way functioned as a learning experience for the CF activists and still 
continues to be a priority. Other priorities include the ‘OlympicGenocide’ website and the 
related protests against the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, which is supported by several 
other Circassian/Caucasian organisations in Turkey. Future plans on this issue include 
multi-media productions for the internet and activities on different internet and media 
platforms.  
 
CF plan to use their website - and the internet in general - in a more integrated way in the 
future - partly because this can be done by youth activists almost without funds. The plan is 
to use Turkish, English and Russian languages on the website. It is the aim of the CF to 
cooperate as much as possible with the other Circassian/Caucasian organisations and 
activists from CF can be found in several projects in other organisations. Within the next 
couple of years CF plan to increase the cooperation with diaspora organisations in other 
countries, including the Middle East. Likewise it is the aim of CF to develop cooperation 
with international organisations, though initial attempt has proven to be unsuccessful. ... CF 
arrange public demonstrations - a relatively new thing in Turkey - often in cooperation with 
other Caucasian organisations, who clearly see the benefit of including CF, who can easily 
assemble youth based on the use of mobile phones and internet and promote the issues 
through IT- instruments. 
 
CircassianWorld.com was established by primarily one Circassian activist in Ankara in 
2005 with the main goal of providing information and analysis to Circassians as well as to 
non-Circassians under the motto: “Information is valuable as long as it is shared”. From 
2009 Abkhasian issues was moved to a new separate website called AbkhazWorld.com. The 
choice of English as prioritised language has resulted in a significant profile internationally, 
while the many Turkish (or Russian) language sites still are preferred by most Circassians. 
                                                 
525
 Many of the leaders in the associations are still former military or policemen or civil servants.  
526
 This is partly because it still is perceived as potentially risk-full to promote ethnic identity in  Turkey though this is 
gradually changing. 
527
 Approximately 75 active part icipants (2008). 
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The term ‘Circassian World’, which indicates the scattering of the Circassians all over the 
world, has gained widespread acceptance as popular joint designation for all Circassians.  
 
 
SUMMARY OF RECENT TRENDS  
 
There is a significant accord on the motivation of the Circassian organisations: it is 
important to preserve our culture and identity as it is threatened by assimilation in all 
countries of their scattered communities. In Turkey many are further motivated by a time 
factor: the present seventh generation in exile is the first generation to lose the Circassian 
language. This is identified an urge to act immediately - according to these assessments is 
can be too late already in ten years. The apparent unity in current motivation reflects a 
contradiction typical to modern diaspora conditions, where new urban and globalised living 
conditions on the one side results in the establishment of new organisations setting new 
agendas, while simultaneously losing the language, which used to be regarded as one of the 
very few key fundamental pillars of their ethnic identity.528   
  
When listing the concrete activities and priorities of the above mentioned organisations a 
more diverse dispersion of activities become apparent, than reflected in the statements on 
belonging to either the cultural or the political camp. The eighteen types of activities can be 
regrouped into the ten types, several of which are connected or overlap, thought not always:  
 
1. Dance, music, costume sowing - folkloristic features 
2. Language training - courses, preparing teaching material including web based 
3. Enlightenment teaching (in history, culture etc.) 
4. Student support, scholarships, dormitories, job and carrier support 
5. Linking Circassians/Caucasians, including through the internet 
6. Repatriation support, promotion - incl. housing projects 
7. Cooperation with homeland: Student exchange, tourism promotion (private sector 
overlap) 
8. Transnational cooperation: May 21 events, Sochi OL 2014 protests, Recognition of 
genocide 
9. Humanitarian aid, legal assistance (to refugees, to Caucasus) 
10. Documentation/research/archives/libraries/publications/information/media-news 
provision (conferences/seminars), museum 
                                                 
528
 There is a clear split in the assessment of the language issue: Some organisations and individuals have language 
training as their most important issue, which is manifested in arranging training courses, promoting the use of the 
Cyrillic alphabet version (which is an obstacle for many diaspora Circassians), publishing books and magazines and 
establishing websites in Circassian language, training their own families etc. Others state that the language is important, 
but it is equally important to focus on other areas of the cultural survival of the Circassians, as the loss of language 
could be happening anyway (a global condition or trend). Some of these opt to learn Russian language, as this is 
important in the homeland. 
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This variation of priorities includes all the organisations - for a number of different reasons. 
In general the picture is much more blurred and varied than the self-understanding of the 
organisations presented above. Among the politically oriented or those belonging in the 
middle category their analysis differ from an acceptance of Circassian dance and music 
being so popular and the only issue that seriously attract a high number of participants and 
to acknowledging that many of them are new, poor and small - and realising the large need 
for engaging and enlightenment among the Circassians themselves, they have to take a 
number of small steps before they can act as politically as their ambition tells them. This is 
reflected in the above list, where the main target group are the Circassians themselves, 
especially those in their own communities and including attempt to reach out to those not 
yet active members of the organisations. The other main target group could be called the 
‘world community’, as there is a huge wish among many Circassian intellectuals and 
organisations to document and argue for a re-entry of Circassia and the Circassians in the 
history books of the world.529 They find it especially important to challenge the official 
Russian history writing, which is a difficult task for small and geographically scattered 
organisations and intellectuals, though the use of the Internet has shown some potential for 
this type of action in the future.530 
 
Stuart Hall has analysed the relationship between ‘cultural identity’ and ‘diaspora’ among 
different cultural groups under post-colonial circumstances that have many similarities with 
the ongoing Circassian re- identification into a ‘diaspora’ instead just constituting an exiled 
group. This includes a so-called ‘victim diaspora’.531 This has come as an extension of the 
re-ethnification that has taken place among the Circassians since the early 1990’s, both in 
post-Soviet Caucasus and among the diaspora. The term ‘diaspora’ is still new to many 
Circassians. Stuart Hall has defined two ‘positions’ in the understanding of cultural identity 
among diaspora groups. The first can be labelled ‘cultural revival’, which incorporates many 
of the above mentioned activities of the Circassian diaspora organisations. This process is 
typical for transitionnal contexts, which both Russia and Turkey, arguably, could be said to 
belong to. The transition from being an exiled group primarily with mythological connection 
to the homeland into a self-designation as a diaspora, is reflecting a general politicisation of 
all the Circassian organisations (and little by little the whole Circassian community). Even 
those defining themselves as strictly cultural now take an active role in researching for and 
presenting historical documentation and in arranging the annual May 21 event, which has 
                                                 
529
 The perception of having a ’hidden history’ is as motivation to many activists . 
530
 Several Circassian/Caucasian organisations are new and several are established by young activists inspired by 
international trends for NGO-activ ities. At the same time, several have funding problems and have had to reprioritise 
their activit ies. Fundraising is one of the major challenges in the transitional civil society sector, where the 
Circassian/Caucasian organisations have traditionally been used to finding sponsors within own members or among 
Circassian/Caucasian business men. 
531
 According to Robin Cohen (1997, 235), the term ’victim diaspora’ contain a strong potential for social mobilisation  - 
as is the case regarding the above mentioned rediscovery of ’hidden histories’. Many representations of diaspora groups 
have a character of ’imaginary reunification’,  which can also be observed among the Circassians. 
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grown into being a significant success story as marked by all Circassians around the world. 
This represents a collective politicisation - from exile to diaspora communities.  
 
Regarding motivation and target groups, there appeared to be more unity than anticipated or 
stated by the organisations, the big difference is found in relation to goals and strategies. 
Many new organisations state their ambition to act political - including support to the 
homeland Circassians and to repatriation, in order to protect and preserve their culture and 
identity. They accuse the older and more culturally oriented organisations for doing what 
they always have does, which has shown just to lead to further assimilation, with a little 
folklore on the top as decoration (until even that eventually will disappear). On the other 
hand several of the new organisations hesitate to state their long term goals, as they fear - at 
least for the time being - that it can serve to widen the gap between the diaspora and the 
homeland Circassians and generate hostility in Russia in general. These are difficult 
discussions, which potentially can almost paralyse an organisation into a non-active state. 
Still, this is exactly what has driven many members of older or more culturally oriented 
organisations into establishment of new organisations. Such dilemmas are central to 
understanding the context in which the Circassian diaspora organisations find themselves.  
 
In spite of the differences, the mutual suspicion and even hostile emotions expressed, there 
is a considerable amount of cooperation and overlap of active personnel between the 
organisations of all three categories. Actual cooperation is taking place and even functions 
as a positive cross-fertilisation and vitalisation of the organisations. Youth play a large role 
is this process, with a generally (sometimes surprisingly) very cooperative approach towards 
the older organisations - probably also affected by the Circassian traditions of respect for 
older generations. (And by the need for their social media and general ITC-skills.) 
 
It is clear that a growing number of Circassians have become active with the arrival of the 
new organisations. Also the extend of interest and involvement of youth is a success, which 
is an encouragement for the organisations, but also a challenge as the youth are 
internationally oriented, which brings new challenges to both the form and the content of the 
activities. Still, many Circassian activists voice frustrations about the big number of inactive 
Circassians, who appear to accept with their cultural loss as part of an overall assimilation to 
a globalised urban lifestyle. 
 
It is apparent that Circassian civil society has undergone significant changes through the last 
five or six years and that an entirely new level of politicisation has been established. And a 
new diversity of activities has been initiated. Still, this is just the beginning of a long process 
that can develop into very different scenarios. Which most organisations seem to be aware 
of, in spite of being new, small and relatively vulnerable.  
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Summary 
 
This thesis is an investigation into key aspects of an ongoing revival of the Circassians, who live 
geographically dispersed as minorities and diaspora groups in many countries of the world. Their 
original historical homeland was in the Caucasus and their dispersal was the result of a lost war 
against the expanding Russian Empire in the nineteenth century. The war ended in 1864.  
 
The contemporary Circassian revival, as it has unfolded since 2005, is the second post-Soviet 
Circassian revival, but now with a much stronger element of transnational civil society cooperation 
that includes a significant use of the Internet. As such the ongoing Circassian revival represents an 
example of a late-modern (Eurasian) trajectory as affected by key elements of contemporary 
globalisation such as Internet-based mobilisation, cross-border civil society networking, minority 
rights and mobilisation etc. It fosters new possibilities for civil society mobilisation - particularly in 
the two dominant Eurasian states of Russia and Turkey - where the rights of minorities are often 
still a field of conflict. This is for instance reflected in Circassian claims for revision of official 
history-writing, which are in line with similar developments among other minority groups.  
 
I apply the term ‘frontier-zones (of globalisation)’ developed by Saskia Sassen to analyse and 
discuss how the Circassian civil society mobilisation has created new transnational public spheres 
that have resulted in a more successful lobbying on behalf of Circassian issues than before. The 
main focus and the target of many of the new post-2005 Circassian diaspora organisations and their 
activities have been the Russian authorities in an attempt to attain recognition of their forced exile 
in the nineteenth century as an act of genocide. Assessing different aspects of the transnational 
Circassian revival, I conclude that the search for ‘recognition’ in a broader understanding can be 
assigned as the key aim of the efforts of many of the Circassian actors. The use of the term frontier-
zones also points at new ways of becoming geopolitical actors in the Caucasus context during the 
era of globalisation. 
 
I have chosen to employ the term ‘digital capitalism’ as an extension of Benedict Anderson’s term 
print capitalism and Arjun Appadurai’s electronic capitalism, in order to ana lyse and discuss how 
the new conditions for minority mobilisation have changed and have increased the outcome of this 
mobilisation, where the use of the Internet plays an important role. One of these results could be 
regarded as a form of virtual re-territorialisation of the Circassian homeland that was lost in the 
nineteenth century. This at the same time represents a new form of community building and identity 
building. Prominent features of Web 2.0 such as Facebook and YouTube with their interactive 
elements function as important tools in these processes.  
 
I argue that the three issues of a) the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, b) the pursuance of genocide 
recognition, and c) the annual May 21 commemorations of the 1864 exile, together can be seen as 
constituting a triangle of Circassian revival, where mobilisation on one issue immediately activates 
the other two issues.    
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Dansk Resumé 
 
Denne afhandling udgør en undersøgelse af centrale aspekter af den igangværende fornyede revival 
blandt tjerkessere, som lever som geografisk spredte minoriteter og diasporagrupper i en række 
lande verden over. Deres oprindelige historiske hjemland var i Kaukasus, og deres fordrivelse var 
resultatet af en tabt krig mod det ekspanderende russiske imperium i det nittende århundrede, som 
sluttede i 1864. Den nuværende tjerkessiske mobilisering, som tog sin begyndelse i 2005, er den 
anden post-sovjetiske tjerkessiske revival. Den er præget af et betydelig stærkere tværnationalt 
samarbejde mellem civilsamfunds-organisationer og en signifikant brug af internettet. Som sådan er 
den igangværende tjerkessiske revival et eksempel på en senmoderne (euro-asiatisk) 
udviklingsretning - under påvirkning af centrale træk af globaliseringen som f.eks. Internet-baseret 
mobilisering, grænseoverskridende civilsamfunds-netværk, mindretals-rettigheder og -mobilisering 
etc. De nye muligheder for civilsamfunds-mobilisering - især i de to dominerende Euro-asiatiske 
stater Rusland og Tyrkiet - hvor minoritetsrettigheder stadig ofte udgør et politisk konfliktfelt. Dette 
kommer bl.a. til udtryk i de tjerkessiske krav om revision af officiel Russisk historieskrivning, som 
er et emne, der også er rejst af andre minoritetsgrupper.  
 
Jeg anvender begrebet ’frontier-zones (of globalisation)’, som er udviklet af Saskia Sassen, til at 
analysere og diskutere, hvordan den tjerkessiske civilsamfunds-mobilisering har skabt nye 
transnationale ’public spheres’, hvilket har resulteret i, at tjerkessiske spørgsmål er kommet højere 
op på ’dagsordenen’ end tidligere. I et forsøg på at opnå anerkendelse af deres tvungne eksil i 1800-
tallet som et folkedrab er de russiske myndigheder blevet den primære målgruppe for mange af 
aktiviteterne blandt de tjerkessiske organisationer, især de nyere etableret efter 2005. Jeg 
konkluderer efter at have undersøgt og iagttaget den tjerkessiske revival på flere niveauer, at 
opnåelse af anerkendelse - som del af et folk med en distinkt historie - kan betegnes som et 
overordnet mål for stort set alle aktiviteter. Betegnelsen ’frontier-zones’ kan også bruges til at 
diskutere nye måder at blive geopolitiske aktører på, bl.a. for civilsamfunds-organisationer. 
 
Jeg har valgt, at anvende betegnelsen ’digital capitalism’ som en forlængelse af Benedict Andersons 
’print capitalism’ og Arjun Appadurais ’electronic capitalism’. Dette er med henblik på at analysere 
og diskutere, hvordan de nye betingelser for organisering blandt minoritetsgrupper har resulteret i 
øget mobilisering, hvor anvendelse af internettet spiller en vigtig rolle, og hvor ’medieret erindring’ 
ligeledes spiller en signifikant rolle. Et af disse resultater er en form for virtuel ’re-territorialisering’ 
af det tjerkessiske hjemland, der forsvandt med den endelige russiske kolonisering. Dette 
repræsenterer samtidig en ny måde at etablere fællesskaber og identitet på. Fremtrædende 
eksempler fra Web 2.0 som Facebook og YouTube, bl.a. pga. deres interaktive funktioner, fungerer 
som vigtige redskaber i disse processer.  
 
Jeg argumenterer for, at de tre emner, a) 2014 Vinter-OL i Sochi, b) kravet of anerkendelse det 
tjerkessiske folkedrab samt c) de årlige minde-arrangementer for eksilet i 1864 i forbindelse med 
21. maj, tilsammen kan ses som en ’triangel af tjerkessisk revival’, ifølge hvilken mobilisering på ét 
af områderne, nærmest automatisk skaber mobilisering i forhold til de to øvrige.  
